Why Armies Do Not Trust Air Forces
by James Dunnigan
April 15, 2013
The Indian Defense
Ministry turned down an army protest of the air force refusal to give
up control of its AH-64 Apache helicopter gunships. An earlier decision
gave the army control of helicopters, but the air force insisted that
the
AH-64s were different and were crucial for certain air combat missions
(attacking air defense
radars and other helicopters). The army generals were furious and
demanded that the government set the air force straight. The army was
particularly anxious to get the 22 Indian AH-64s as soon as possible, as
these are generally recognized as the best gunships currently in service anywhere and are very rarely used for attacks on anti-aircraft defenses
or other helicopters. The army generals probably won’t let this
decision alone because losing control of the AH-64s puts soldiers in
combat at greater risk.
Last
October the Indian Army thought it
had won a major victory over the Air Force, when the government
agreed to transfer most attack helicopters from the air force to the
army. That was supposed to mean the army gets control of
over 270 armed helicopters (22 AH-64s, 179 light combat models, and 76
armed Indian made transports). The air force would continue to operate a
dozen or so elderly Mi-25 and Mi-35 helicopter gunships, until they
retire by the end of the decade. These are export versions of the
Russian Mi-24. The air force was not happy about this and spent a lot of
time and effort to change minds at the Defense
Ministry about who would control the AH-64s. Inside the air force there
is unhappiness about this army effort to create its own “air force” and
determination to halt this sort of thing.
The
army has long complained that air force control of the armed
helicopters, which were designed to support army operations, are
sometimes difficult to get in a timely manner. Another aspect
of this deal is
a new agreement by the air force to
station some transport helicopters at army bases in Kashmir, so that
there will not be a delay when transport is needed for an emergency.
This
sort of problem between the army and air force is not unique to India
and is actually quite common. It all started back in the 1920s, a decade
after aircraft became a major military asset. For example, at the start
of World War I (1914-18), the British Royal Navy had more aircraft than
the Royal Flying Corps (which belonged to the army). But at the end of
World War I, it was decided to put all aircraft under the control of the
new Royal Air Force (the former Royal Flying Corps). The navy was not
happy with this and just before World War II broke out, the admirals got
back control of their aircraft, at least the ones that operated from
ships (especially aircraft carriers).
The
British army expanded its Army Air Corps during World War II, to gain
control over artillery spotter aircraft, gliders (for parachute
divisions), and a few other transports for supporting commando
operations. After World War II the Army Air Corps mainly controlled the
growing fleet of transport and attack helicopters. The Indian Air Force
has always refused to allow the Indian Army to do the same thing after
modern India was created in 1947.
Air
forces tend to keep at it. British Royal Air Force generals still
demand control of everything that flies, believing that this is more
efficient. The army and navy, not to mention the experience of many
other nations, say otherwise. At the very least the army needs to
control its helicopters and some small transports. In Russia the army
always controlled ground attack aircraft, as well as some fighters. In
the United States the Marine Corps controlled its own fighters, light
bombers, and helicopters. It made a difference, especially to the
marines on the ground, that the marine aircraft were being flown by
marines.
Another
problem with a unified air force is that it becomes, quite naturally,
air force centric. This is understandable and the air force proceeds to
develop strategies, and tactics, that emphasize
looking at military matters from an air force viewpoint. Before World
War II this led to the doctrine of strategic bombardment. This was
supposed to be a decisive weapon but it wasn't. When nuclear weapons
came along the air
force believed
that it finally had a way to make strategic
bombardment decisive. But it didn't, as ballistic missiles (another
form of artillery) became the key delivery system for nukes. Nuclear
weapons were so destructive that they became more of a threat than a
weapon that you could use (and they have not been used again, since the
first two atomic bombs were dropped on Japan in 1945). The fact of the
matter is that wars are still ultimately won by the ground forces. As
the army likes to point out, the ultimate air superiority weapon is your
infantry occupying the enemy air bases. Everyone else (the navy and air
force) is there to support the infantry in actually winning the war.http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/Why-Armies-Do-Not-Trust-Air-Forces-4-15-2013.asp
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