URGENT IMPERATIVE: Army Aviation
Posted
on 01 February 2013 by admin
The aviation component of the Indian Army came into existence in
1986, after a
great
deal of procrastination and considerable opposition from the Indian Air Force
(IAF). It continues to be a force that is unable to provide comprehensive
aviation support to the army, as its current capabilities are severely limited.
The biggest reason for this is the opposition bordering on
paranoia from the IAF.
Army aviation is a force multiplier, on account of its ability
to quickly engage, disengage and regroup in the battle zone. Integral aviation
assets enable field commanders to exploit fleeting opportunities. This is also
true for sub-conventional operations.
Emerging challenges require major restructuring and redefining
of the roles and the manner of functioning of this extremely important arm.
This needs to be formalised in the context of the likely threats to the nation,
keeping in view the changing nature of war and conflicts, and the impact of
technology.
The Historical Context
Indian Army pilots had been flying both fixed wing aircraft and
helicopters for air observation post duties since 1942. These were Air Force
units manned and maintained by Air Force personnel except for pilots who were
artillery officers.
The need to have its own aviation arm was apparent soon after
the 1947-48 War in J & K, but in the 1950’s it was only flagged in-house
within the army. Even though the IAF was not employed during the 1962 war with
China, the need for an air arm for the army was acutely felt. Soon after the
1962 War, the proposal for an aviation corps for the army was mooted in 1963.
However, it was only in 1986, after 23 years, that it saw the light of the day,
after considerable opposition and great reluctance from the IAF. At that time,
only light helicopters, already being flown by army pilots, were transferred to
the army, while attack and utility helicopters remained with the IAF.
Thereafter, the growth of army aviation has been slow and tardy.
Current
Status
In the 27 years of its existence, army aviation is still stuck
in a changeless groove. As presently structured, it has a number of limitations
in aerial platforms, manpower and organisational structures. It continues to be
a force that is unable to provide comprehensive aviation support to the army,
as its capabilities are severely limited.
The army wants its aviation component to grow but it has not
displayed adequate vigour in pushing for a decision on account of a
self-imposed policy of ‘staying of its hands’, being the senior and the bigger
service! This false sense of not ruffling the feathers of smaller services even
when it costs an arm and a leg has served the army badly, not only in ensuring
the legitimate growth of army aviation but also in other important spheres!
The IAF is the biggest stumbling block in the growth of army
aviation. Its obduracy and opposition are a meaningless and repetitious litany
of excuses. The last player the MoD, is unconcerned and is blasé about the
army’s requirements! A great pity indeed!
Presently, army aviation flies predominantly light helicopters.
It has only about a dozen squadrons and less than 50 Reconnaissance and
Observation (R&O) flights, equipped with about 200 Chetak and Cheetah
helicopters of 1960 and 1970 vintages, as well as a few utility flights,
equipped with the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH). The few armed light
helicopters (Ranjit and Lancer) are now defunct, though plans exist to arm some
ALH (Dhruv) with weapons. The irony is that the attack helicopters currently
held have been paid from the army budget, but continue to be with the IAF,
despite strong objections from the army. Army aviation does not have its own
pilot’s cadre and the existing 460 officer pilots are all seconded from other
arms/corps.
The Army Aviation Corps (AAC) needs to perform a variety of
roles to be called a complete force, but the present structure of the AAC
inhibits it from performing them. The roles it must perform are attack; combat
fire support; electronic and visual surveillance; as well as aerial
photography; tactical lift; logistical functions; communications; casualty
evacuation; provision of airborne command posts; electronic warfare; and
monitoring of the nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) environment. However,
its present structure and aviation platforms inhibit it from performing all
roles.
Unless army aviation starts growing rapidly, the army will not
be able to exercise many operational options in future conflicts. The loser
will be the nation, but the army will get the blame!
Stance of the IAF
The IAF still thinks that the growth of army aviation is a
wasteful process, as the IAF is capable of providing all types of support to
the ground forces. It also argues that all air components must be centrally
controlled for optimum functioning, cost-effectiveness and best results. At one
time they floated the absurd argument that any object that flies must be under
the IAF, till it was pointed out that all projectiles of the army delivered
from the lowly rifle to guns, rockets and missiles fly through the air! IAF
also argues about the difficulties of air space management, forgetting that
this is not a problem peculiar to only our air space; militaries of most
important countries have found answers, which are efficient and fool-proof.
In actuality, these are mere excuses and the main reason for
their inordinately rigid position is the misconception that the growth of army
aviation will reduce the size of the IAF! Institutionally, this is anathema to
them, as their aim has always been to grow bigger and bigger. It is of course a
baseless fear; there is plenty of room for both to grow in their respective
spheres.
The IAF had used the same approach earlier to stymie the
establishment and later growth of naval aviation, but the navy stuck to its
guns, like limpet mines on the hull of ships and did not accept any dilution in
their visualisation of the size and shape of the naval air arm. The result is
that it has a full-fledged air component, which has contributed immensely to
the all round development of the Indian Navy.
While one can sympathise with the aspirations of the IAF to grow
to a large and formidable force, it must not usurp the genuine operational
requirements of army aviation. Diminishing the fighting potential of ground
forces, on account of the grandiose turf considerations of the IAF is not only
incorrect but is self-serving.
The army’s treatment of the IAF with kid gloves for maintaining
inter-service harmony and not pushing hard enough was with the hope that better
sense will prevail. In hind sight, although altruistic, it has been a wrong
policy.
Aviation
Corps of Selected Armies
All professional armies of the world have their own fully
equipped aviation arm, because even the best air forces have severe limitations
in carrying out many tasks which are intimately concerned with the land battle.
While their organisations may differ, they all have a combination of
reconnaissance; attack; utility; and medium lift helicopters, as well as a
small proportion of fixed wing aircraft for meeting functional requirements of
aerial command posts; communications; electronic warfare; casualty evacuation;
and some logistics functions. They are thus immediately available to the land
forces commanders for operational tasks of great importance that influence the
outcome of battles.
Space does not permit a listing of the structures and
organisations of the army aviation components of selected countries in detail.
However, the following table not only lists the army aviation platforms of
selected countries, but also juxtaposes them with the strength of their
militaries and their holding of major equipment in terms of tanks, other
armoured fighting vehicles (AFV’s) and aircraft: (Table 1)
STRENGTH
TANKS AFV’S AIRCRAFT
AVIATION
INDIA 1,325,000 3,215 1,810 632 250 (-)
CHINA
2,285,000 7,550 (+) 5,150 (+)
2,554 522
PAKISTAN
619,000 2,640 (+) I,266 376 550
USA 1,477,896 9,573 26,653 4,269 5,263
RUSSIA
I,200,000 23,000 (+) 27,190 (+)
2,080 1,700
UK 2,24,500 420 4,347 1,300 350
FRANCE 3,62,485 406 8,468 1,330 424
GERMANY
1,48,496 408 1,794 780 568
It would be clear from the table that our army aviation is
minuscule when compared to the size of our army and the long and geographically
dispersed and varied borders we have to guard.
Rationale
for Growth of Army Aviation
The question usually asked by persons who do not understand the
intricacies of the land battle is why does the army, or for that matter the
navy, need their own aviation arms, especially when we have a first class IAF.
The answers are actually quite simple. First, there are certain operational and
logistics tasks which are best performed by integral resources of the army or the
navy, because of the intimate nature of support and the need for immediate
application of aviation assets. It is not possible for air forces to carry out
such tasks, however efficient they may be.
Secondly, it is only army pilots who can correctly read the
ground and the actions taking place in real time on the ground by rival armies.
Even the best air force pilots cannot do so, despite considerable practice.
Consequently, the army aviation pilots must man the aerial platforms, which are
going to support the operations taking place on the battlefield. Conflicts in
various parts of the world have further reinforced this, as it is only integral
aviation resources which would provide the field force commander real time
battlefield flexibility and consequent enhancement in combat power.
The roles and tasks of army aviation in the coming decades need
to be derived by looking at the battlefield milieu of the future. Proxy war,
including terrorism by non-state actors are major challenges, which would
increase in lethality and vigour. These are in addition to the ever present
danger of fighting a conventional war, in the backdrop of a nuclear threat.
Army aviation gives additional tactical capabilities to the
field commanders, as their areas of influence increases. It does so by a
combination of reconnaissance, mobility and firepower, which enable commanders
to exploit fleeting opportunities. Army aviation expands the ground commander’s
battle space well beyond the effective range of ground manoeuvre forces at successive
echelons of command and enables them to achieve the effects of mass without
massing weapons systems.
Army aviation’s greatest contribution to battlefield success is
the ability it gives the commander to apply decisive combat power at critical
times, virtually anywhere on the battlefield. This may be direct fire from
aviation maneouvre units or the insertion of major infantry forces or artillery
fires, delivered into combat. This versatility is the very essence of army
aviation.
Army aviation plays an important role in counter-insurgency
operations too. Tasks include detection by sensors, raids by armed helicopters,
quick positioning of infantry to seal escape routes, aerial assault where
feasible, and movement of reinforcements speedily by utility and medium-lift
helicopters.
Suggested Areas of Growth
Reconnaissance, attack, utility, and medium lift helicopters;
medical evacuation platforms; and air traffic control units are all required to
support the army. The Special Forces (SF) need dedicated aviation assets for
the successful conduct of operations. Army aviation must also provide aerial
platforms for command, control and communications, as well as for electronic
warfare. In addition, intuitive and versatile leaders, staff officers and
well-trained soldiers are also essential for future operations.
In the Indian Army, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s) are
presently grouped with the artillery. This needs to be changed. UAV’s are best
grouped with aviation units, especially as UAV’s and manned attack helicopters
have successfully conducted hunter-killer joint operations in the US and other
armies. It is a logical and a cost-effective option, which is likely to give
better pay-offs.
The operational diversities of the Indian Army, coupled with the
variety of terrain; extensive deployment in mountainous and high altitude
areas; need for over the crest line observation for reconnaissance by field
commanders; direction of artillery fire; casualty evacuation from inaccessible
areas; and speedy move of commanders to the forward posts which are difficult
to access; make the need for a dedicated aviation unit for every infantry and
mountain division and in some cases to independent brigade group levels too a
necessity.
In plains and deserts, the integration of the third dimension
with mechanised forces by way of attack and scout helicopters is essential. All
armoured divisions need a dedicated attack helicopter squadron, in addition to
a reconnaissance and observation squadron.
The following recommendations are made to enhance the combat
potential of Army
Aviation:
• AAC must have a mix of small fixed wing aircraft and a full
complement helicopter fleet comprising attack, utility and light helicopters.
• Fixed wing aircraft are needed by AAC for communications
duties, as airborne command posts, for reconnaissance and surveillance, for
casualty evacuation and similar other tasks.
• The helicopter fleet should consist of attack helicopters;
armed helicopters (gun ships); heavy, medium and light lift utility
helicopters; observation helicopters; and helicopters for communications,
electronic warfare and as aerial command posts.
• One or more composite squadrons specially dedicated for
functioning with the Special Forces are essential.
• Headquarters Commands and Corps need to have aviation brigades
and divisions should have aviation squadrons. Armoured divisions need to have
attack helicopter squadrons in addition.
• UAV’s need to be integrated with the AAC for optimum results.
• All logistics functions need to be integrated within the AAC
and the present system of control of logistics manpower by different corps
needs to be dispensed with.
• Besides hardware, manpower upgrade, to include a
separate aviation cadre, increased intake of aviators; recruitment and training
of technical as well as non-technical manpower; revision of war and peace
establishments; and introduction of new trades are needed.
• Other changes include modernisation of aviation bases,
raising of aviation brigades and logistics units; restructuring of training
establishments; enhancement of air field support services; dedicated
communication systems; and the upgrade of the Army Aviation Directorate, which
is now manned by an additional director general level officer.
Conclusion
The strength of army aviation is in its ability to deploy
quickly, conduct reconnaissance and surveillance, manoeuvre rapidly, and apply
tremendous combat power for the land forces commander.
Army aviation’s mobility and firepower make it a dominant force,
as it gives the commander a force that can rapidly build devastating firepower
at any point on the battlefield. Army aviation’s strength is its versatility to
deploy quickly, see the battlefield, manoeuvre rapidly, and focus maximum
combat power at decisive points.
Army aviation needs to develop organisations that enhance capabilities
to support the concepts of operations of field commanders. The force structure
should be tailored to meet evolving operational requirements. In addition,
aviation organisations should include appropriate maintenance and logistical
support elements required to sustain the force. Aviation leadership development
should be expanded to prepare aviation leaders for the diverse challenges that
this versatile force requires.
The writer, Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi is a former Vice Chief of Army
Staff (VCOAS).
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