Waiting for the long haul may irreversibly compromise Indian Security Interests
It
is amazing that while a potentially strategic vulnerability is being
created with each passing day on the DBO front in Ladakh and possibly
elsewhere as well the Foreign Minister of India in his wisdom chooses to
call it a minor blip, an acne that will soon disappear.
Disappear it will not and by the time the Foreign
Minister returns from Beijing an element of irreversibility
and potential future untenability of positions in Siachen could
conceivably have been created. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say
that every hour that a well-thought out military response by top
commanders on the ground is delayed the situation becomes more and more
difficult.
In
the process the government through its vacillation is leaving everybody
confused. Leaving senior military commanders tasked with the defence of
Ladakh or for that matter any other sector bereft of initiative is an
invitation to disaster; minute-to-minute micro-management from the top
not being the answer.
That
the present incursion does not fall into the category of routine
Chinese incursions is clear to all military commanders and defence
analysts. It is a given that Chinese incursions have been increasing,
sometime on a daily basis, in direct proportion to the government’s
response of playing them down or denying that they have taken place.
Lack
of condemnation and allowing even minimal freedom of action to military
commanders only emboldens the other side who have taken the full
measure of the government and its functioning. It is nobody’s contention
that an asymetrically enfeebled army should not exercise extreme
caution; the army
commanders being more than aware of their vulnerability due to gaps in
infrastructure and the delay in critical military acquisitions that
should have been in place by now or even the lack of a riposte
capability that should have been in place ages ago.
More importantly, what the government
and its strategic planners do not appreciate is the impression that is
being made on the rest of the world by its flip-flop policies in the
face of continued Chinese aggravations.
They
have seen that India has already ceded control on its periphery on the
subcontinent in several countries of SAARC. A few years
earlier under pressure from the US and the West it had jeopardised its
most advantageous relationship with Iran by unnecessarily and
unprovokedly voting against it in Vienna. Other decisions that indicated
to the world that the government may not be in control of its foreign
policy followed.
Having
ceded strategic space to China on its West, what exactly is the
government’s response to the latest provocation by China indicating to
its strategic partners in East Asia; with whom strategic defence
agreements should have been taken to much greater heights by now.
A
policy of keeping all options open simply means that when the
crunch comes no option is available to be exercised. Specifically,
Japan, Vietnam and several other potential strategic partners to India’s
east are watching and waiting; wondering whether it has the resolve to
protect its own interest in the first instance, before calculating
its ability to come to their assistance should the need arise.
From
day one instead of dithering and hamstringing military commanders on
the ground the incursion in DBO to a depth of 19 kms demanded an
immediate and robust response. It is akin to fire fighting. A
blaze can be put out by the effort of a single man or few people in the
first few minutes; after more than 10 to 15 minutes it would
require far greater fire fighting resources to get it under control; and
after
about thirty minutes or so it can often become completely
uncontrollable.
The
government cannot be pardoned for disallowing the immediate fire
fighting actions to remove the Chinese incursion. Instead of leaving it
to the military commanders to deal with the situation it took it upon
itself to show its diplomatic consummate-ness.
It
will send its foreign minister who has actually pushed off in the
reverse direction for the time being to Beijing after another 10 or 12
days, thereby allowing the ingressors time to consolidate their
incursion and dig in deeper. Meanwhile asking
the army to take up positions opposite them in its own territory and do nothing to evict them while it would be possible to do so with minimal force.
To
the armed forces, to the people of India, and to the world the foreign
minister of India is not going to the Chinese capital to demand a
pull-back. He is seen to be going to Beijing as a supplicant. As in the
days of yore the imperial power may graciously oblige its vassal.
The
country will not know as to what concessions the minister would have
been authorised to
concede that would further undermine India’s capability in the future.
Flowing from it, it could be well on the cards that during the Chinese
Prime Minister’s visit some public pronouncements that the country can
live with would be made. Nobody would be deceived that once again India
would have been humiliated.
India
still has a range of options to make China see reason without losing
face. It hardly matters that India loses face, the country having been
inured to it, used to it and reconciled to it by now. If these options
are not exercised early enough – timing always being of the essence - India’s
humiliation would have been compounded and its
military position further degraded. What is worse the status quo might
conceivably turn out to be freezing of positions as obtaining on the
date of the agreement; meaning thereby the new LAC on the DBO sector
would be 19 kms within Indian Territory.
Major General Vinod Saighal (Retd) is the author of Revitalising Indian Democracy, Restructuring Pakistan and Third Millenium Equipoise. This article first appeared in The Statesman of Apr 28.
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