America and NATO leave Afghanistan to regional tussle
Sajjad Ashraf; Apr 17, 2013
As
the US and their allied forces begin withdrawing from Afghanistan, a
process that will be completed by the end of next year, India and
Pakistan continue to jostle to fill the vacuum they will leave behind. Kabul is “the new battleground for the India-Pakistan rivalry” says Ahmed
Rashid, the best selling author and analyst.
The
importance of Afghanistan for both New Delhi and Islamabad stems from
its location. Any country dominating Afghanistan potentially dominates
the natural resources of Central and South Asia. Afghanistan has long
been the victim of political games. But these games are only going to
become more cut-throat in the months and years ahead.
The
2,700 kilometre Pakistan- Afghanistan border is rugged, and nearly
impossible to control. It straddles the Durand Line, which successive
Afghan governments have refused to recognise, and which plays into
Pakistan’s psyche: afraid of domination by India, and preoccupied with
Afghan policy of avoiding encirclement by India.
For
much of Pakistan’s first three decades of independence, Afghan
territory was used to fan demand for a Pashtun homeland. And India
covertly supported this demand. This separatist irritant weakened only after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, but it remains a potent card in the
hands of future trouble makers.
This
experience compels Pakistan to continue to try to shape the make-up of
the Kabul government. The Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, meanwhile,
says Pakistan would like Afghanistan to “cut all ties to India, send
army officers to Pakistan for training, and sign a strategic agreement”
of cooperation.
For
its part, India has historically supported successive Afghan
governments, except the one under the Taliban. The Indian-Afghan
alliance has thus heightened Pakistan’s paranoia that India wants to use
Afghanistan to destabilise Pakistan.
Pakistani
intelligentsia and decision makers believe that in its aversion to
Pakistan, India follows Kautilya, the ancient
Indian military philosopher, who argued that “immediate neighbours are
considered as enemies, but any state on the other side of a neighbouring
state is regarded as an ally”. Pakistan therefore believes India
attempts to deny Pakistan a healthy relationship with Afghanistan,
thereby hoping to contain Pakistan both militarily and economically.
Pakistan
watches warily when relations between India and Afghanistan deepen.
India’s aid disbursements of over $2 billion (Dh7.34 billion) during the
past decade puts India among the top four aid donors to Afghanistan.
That is a number that Pakistan cannot match.
Projecting
India’s soft power serves India’s strategic goals and encourages
governments in Kabul to remain at odds with Pakistan, or so the thinking
goes.
Pakistan
is deeply suspicious of India’s consulates and embassy in Afghanistan;
some Pakistani intelligence officials see these as covert centres of
subversion against their nation.
But
there are more concrete links between Kabul and New Delhi. For
instance, over 200 Afghan military officers attend Indian military
institutions under a strategic partnership agreement. Pakistan’s attempt
to engage the Afghan military in a similar fashion has yet to succeed.
In fact, Pakistan’s deal to get 11 Afghan military men to take part in a
simulated military exercise at a staff college in Quetta collapsed at
the last minute in late March.
Concerns
of double-dealing are decades old.
After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, India accused Pakistan of
pushing the Mujahideen towards Indian-held Kashmir. Minimising
Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan remains one of India’s goals in
Afghanistan. “[T]here is a history of Afghan soil being used for terror
attacks on India,” the Indian external affairs ministry spokesperson
says. “We can’t have that again.”
India
is desperate to reopen land access to Afghanistan for trade reasons.
Presently Pakistan allows road access for Afghan exports to India, but
denies it for India’s exports to Afghanistan. Politically there are
reasons for this. Economically, however, Pakistan may be hurting itself
unnecessarily by denying itself huge transit fees and regional economic
engagement.
But
unless Pakistan is
secure in its relations with India and Indian intentions in
Afghanistan, it will continue to believe that its interests are best
served through securing a friendly government in Kabul – at India’s
expense. Unless and until that changes, India is likely to seek to keep
the Pakistan-Afghan border boiling.
Of
course, these self-serving policies do little to help the country in
which the India-Pakistan struggle is playing out. What all sides must
recognise – India, Pakistan and Afghanistan – is that three-way
cooperation is a prerequisite for economic development across the entire
region.
Sajjad
Ashraf, a former member of the Pakistan Foreign Service, is an adjunct
professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National
University of Singapore
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