The great American betrayal
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-great-american-betrayal/article4494705.ece
However
else it is dressed up, the reality is that the world is about to
witness a U.S. retreat from Afghanistan, one that can have disastrous
consequences for the region
It
is well known that of all military operations, retreat is the most
difficult and complicated. A victorious march that takes a wrong turn
can end in a stalemate, but a retreat gone wrong will most likely turn
into a disaster. These are the grim forebodings that come to mind when
we think of the forthcoming withdrawal of the American-led military
forces from Afghanistan.
Whistling in the dark
The
Obama Administration is putting it out as though the withdrawal is a
great achievement, since it will pull it out of the quagmire that it has
been stuck in ever since George Bush declared a “global war on terror.”
But the reality is shoddier — we are witnessing yet another western
retreat from Afghanistan, one that can have baleful consequences for
others. No matter what the Americans say or do officially, they are,
essentially, whistling in the dark.
The
departure of the Americans and their allies — even though reports
suggest that a small force will remain — is
a fraught moment for the Afghans, the United States and neighbouring
countries. Last month, representatives of India, Russia and China met in
Moscow. According to an official in the know, the discussion was
businesslike and devoid of the double-speak that often marks the
occasion. The subject was Afghanistan. Faced with the withdrawal of the
American-led alliance from the country, the three regional powers are
scrambling to see how they can stabilise the situation. Each of them has
interests there, and none of these really clash.
But
all three have an interest in ensuring that Afghanistan is stable and
secure, witnesses economic growth and reconstruction, and is integrated
into the regional economy. India and China are interested in ensuring
that a war-ravaged Afghanistan does not once again become a place
where militants are able to establish training camps freely. Both have
important investments — India’s $ 2 billion are spread in development
projects to promote Afghan stability, while China’s $ 3 billion could
aid in its prosperity. As for Russia, it is the primary security
provider to the Central Asian states and has an interest in preventing
the return of a situation of civil war.
It
is important that the post-U.S. situation does not degenerate into an
India-Pakistan battlefield. The responsibility here lies heavier with
New Delhi, since Pakistan can be trusted to follow its baser instincts.
Indeed,
New Delhi’s strategy
must be to prevent Islamabad from trying to turn the Afghan clock back
to the pre-American days. In this, it can fruitfully use the dialogue
processes it has established with Russia and China and, separately, the
U.S. Interestingly, in the recent India-China-Russia talks, the Chinese
pointedly avoided projecting Islamabad’s case and spoke for their own
interests, just as the other interlocutors did.
But
for things to work, there is need for both Washington and Islamabad to
confront the hard realities. As for the U.S., writing in Foreign Policy,
Vali Nasr wrote “America has not won this war on the battlefield, nor
has the country ended it at the negotiating table. America is just
washing its hands of this war.”
According
to Mr. Nasr, who worked in Richard Holbrooke’s AfPak team in the U.S.
State Department, President Obama’s attitude to the American commitment
in Afghanistan has been dictated by domestic politics — when it was
popular back home he backed it, and when it became unpopular, he pushed
for terminating the U.S. commitment. The
American withdrawal, Mr. Nasr argues, is without any concern for the
fate of Afghanistan itself, or for the possible chaos that may follow in
the region.
As
for Pakistan, the belief among some key players, notably in the Army,
that there can once again be “Fateh” (Victory) in Kabul is delusional.
Nothing in the ground situation suggests
that the writ of the Taliban will run across Afghanistan again, at
least not the Taliban that Pakistan so effectively aided and controlled
in the 1990s.
Indeed,
the most unstable part of the country will be the eastern region
bordering Pakistan, whose own border with Afghanistan is the site of an
insurgency led by the Tehreek-e-Taliban, Pakistan (TTP). If anything,
the TTP could be the principal beneficiary of the withdrawal, since it
will find it easier to get sanctuary and arms from the Taliban.
As
of now, in the international process, we have the western countries
trying to work out a negotiated settlement that will bring elements of
the Taliban into
the governance of the country, based on the constitution of the Loya
Jirga of 2003. This Doha process has been a slow-moving affair with the
Taliban delegation in the Qatari capital twiddling its thumbs most of
the time.
One
problem is no one is really clear as to whether they are dealing with
the genuine representatives of Mullah Omar. The bigger problem is that
both Islamabad and the Taliban are merely hedging in their responses to
the West and they are waiting to see how precipitous the American
retreat is, and what happens in the run-up to the Afghan elections of
2014.
Even
today, the Taliban’s supreme leader, Mullah Omar, and several of its
top leaders live in
Pakistan. Though Islamabad says it is supporting the Doha process,
there are doubts as to whether or not Pakistan can actually “deliver”
the Taliban to the U.S. and its allies.
But
there can be few doubts about Islamabad’s ability to play the spoiler.
This is what countries like the U.S., India, Russia and China need to
prevent through coordinated diplomacy. And talking of elections, we have
to see just how the election in Pakistan expected in a few months will
play out.
Since
2002, a set of new facts has been created on the ground. Foremost among
these have been the presence of an elected Afghan government and, now, a
substantial Afghan National Security
Force. This will continue to get the support of the international
community and the ANSF will also have the ability to control the key
parts of the country, as long as it gets external support.
On
the other hand, the Taliban has suffered considerable attrition and the
relations between Pakistan and the Taliban have been conditioned by the
emergence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban, Pakistan (TTP) as well as the
unhappy experience of the Taliban at the hands of the ISI.
There
is one important, and indeed overriding, consideration in the manner in
which we deal with Afghanistan.
Both the U.S. and India need to recognise that they have far greater
security interests in Pakistan than in benighted Afghanistan. The
“victor” of Kabul will inherit a war-torn and ravaged country without
the basics of schools, hospitals and transportation systems.
But
should the Afghan situation catalyse the rise of Islamists in Pakistan,
India will be in for trouble. It does not need to be repeated that
Pakistan is a country with some industrial capacity, nuclear weapons and
a powerful military. Its capacity for mischief would go up by orders of
magnitude, were the Islamists gathered by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed in the
Difa-e-Pakistan Council to become even more central to the country’s
politics.
AfPak to PakAf
For
this reason, it is important to reverse the appellation AfPak to PakAf,
at least mentally. We need to ensure that a “solution” in Afghanistan
has a collateral beneficial effect in Pakistan. Or, at least, it should
not affect Pakistan negatively. This is not, of course, a call for
pandering to Islamabad’s Afghan fantasies.
The
presence of U.S.-led forces has played a stabilising role in
Afghanistan. But now they are going and leaving fear in their wake. The
Afghans are petrified at the prospect of a renewed civil war and the
return of the Taliban,
the
Pakistanis, or at least the sensible ones, are scared of the threat
from the TTP. India, Russia and China are worried about the possible
spill-over effects of a civil war in the country. As for the U.S., its
fear is that its retreat could, through some missteps, become a rout.
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