(Afghanistan) The American REACTION (Afghanistan) by N A Shaikh in DAWN
IN
the days that have passed since American Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel
visited Kabul and received a
less than cordial welcome from President Hamid Karzai, there has been
no visible improvement in relations between the Karzai administration
and the International Security Assistance Force.
The
fact that two Americans and some others were killed in a
“green-on-blue” attack the day after Karzai made his speech criticising
America and the Taliban was probably a coincidence. But the speech
itself blaming the two for colluding to create security conditions to
justify a continued American presence, was deemed provocative.
US
and Nato commander Gen Joseph Dunford issued an advisory to his
commanders in the field asking them to be extra alert after what he
termed an inflammatory speech that could trigger insider attacks by
Afghan forces against Westerners.
He
even went on to say that “he [Karzai] may issue orders that put our
forces at risk”. It is difficult to think of anything else that could
better describe how precarious the Afghan-American relationship has
become.
After
a call from US Secretary of State John Kerry, Karzai did acknowledge
the importance of working with America and maintained: “My recent
comments were meant to help reform, not destroy the relationship.” He
did not, however, retract his charges of Taliban-American collusion or
change his adamant stand on the transfer of Bagram’s Parwan prison
unconditionally to Afghan authorities.
In
subsequent conversations with Dunford, Karzai’s office claimed it had
been agreed that the transfer would be completed within a week but the
American statement on the
subject went no further than stating that the next week would be used
to work out the issues.
It
does not seem likely that the Americans will agree to the transfer
unless they are given assurances that the three dozen or so prisoners
the Americans regard as “enduring security threats” will not be released
by the Afghan judicial system.
And
therein lies the rub. If one understands Karzai it would appear that
beyond the
publicly stated position of asserting Afghan sovereignty Karzai does
want to release these mostly Pakhtun prisoners because of the influence
they enjoy in the Pakhtun-dominated areas of south and east Afghanistan.
Perhaps
he believes that these prisoners will on release become the vehicle for
dialogue with the Taliban leadership that Karzai says he desperately
wants as a means of advancing reconciliation. More likely he hopes that
they will galvanise support in the Pakhtun belt for the candidate he
puts forward for next year’s presidential election.
In
the meanwhile, Karzai’s speech has provoked reactions both within
Afghanistan and in the West. In Washington a senator, Lindsey Graham,
involved in Afghan policy has been quoted as being ready to “pull the
plug” on assistance to Afghanistan. The New York Times in an editorial
has called Karzai’s behaviour “appalling” and opined that “it will make
it harder for Mr Obama to argue compellingly to keep a smaller
counterterrorism and training force in Afghanistan into 2015 and
beyond”.
In
Kabul, a group of representatives from 14 political parties —
most of them opposition groups but several with members in government —
held a news conference to denounce the president’s stance.
On
the other hand, there have been demonstrations in Maidan Wardak and
Kabul calling for the immediate implementation of the Karzai order to
remove all American forces from Wardak.
The
Afghan Ulema Council, all government appointees, have made a similar
demand in a statement which called the
Americans “infidels” and threatened that if they [the Americans] did
not “honour their commitments then this [their presence in Afghanistan]
will be considered as an occupation, and they may expect to see a
reaction to their action”.
The
Americans currently are adamant that this contretemps will not affect
their military plans but the truth is that if there is an increase in
“green-on-blue” attacks it is not only a residual presence but also an
orderly American withdrawal that will become a nightmare. British
commentators are grimly recalling the fate of British troops in the
First and Second Afghan wars. The accepted axiom that “retreat is often
the most dangerous part of a
deployment especially when the military falls below the critical mass
required to protect itself” will certainly apply if by April 2014,
34,000 troops are withdrawn. This would leave half the number to carry
out their own withdrawal and that of the $48 billion worth of equipment
currently in Afghanistan, which would require the movement of 95,000
containers and 35,000 vehicles.
America
will do what it can to avoid such a situation. One way is to pursue
reconciliation with or without Karzai. The Afghan president’s opponents
have now made public their efforts, undoubtedly with American support,
to seek recon-ciliation with the “armed” opposition.
An
Associated Press story by Kathy Gannon, easily the Western
correspondent with the best connections with Afghan politicians and
knowledgeable Pakistanis, recently said that the 20-party Council of
Cooperation of Political Parties which counts among its numbers some
heavyweight Afghan politicians, many part of Karzai’s administration, is
reaching out to both the Taliban and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. And that two
senior Taliban officials have indicated the group is willing to pursue
talks.
The
problem is that, to my mind, these parties all have different agendas
and while they could come together to frame a “charter of democracy” in
September 2012 laying down reasonable conditions for Afghan elections,
they will have very different views on how negotiations with the Taliban
should be conducted and what the outcome of these negotiations should
be. It is difficult to imagine that they can sink their differences and
reach a solution.
The
outlook is bleak for Afghanistan and therefore for Pakistan. Can we do
something about it? And if not can we make whatever effort we can to
insulate ourselves from the turbulence that is to begin in
Afghanistan?
The writer is a former foreign secretary.
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