A case for a new regional doctrine-Arvind Virmani
Various developments in our region challenge us to think about a
regional doctrine to replace the abandoned “Indira doctrine” and “Gujral
doctrine.” We can take a cue from the strengths and weakness of these
doctrines and apply them to the changing strategic environment.
What should the geographical reach of such a regional doctrine be? That
depends on the degree to which developments in the country/region can
either benefit or harm us. There is general agreement that developments
in South Asia (Afghanistan to Myanmar, Nepal to Sri Lanka) have this
potential. Whether the Maldives in the Arabian Sea has this potential is
less clear. What about other more distant island nations in the Indian
Ocean? This depends partly on the amount of resources we are able to
commit to the overall task and our strategic reach and also on the
presence of larger, stronger potentially hostile external powers
operating in the Indian Ocean (a circumscribed version of the “Indira
doctrine”). By these criteria, the Maldives could be included within the
region of operation of the doctrine, while other islands may be added
over time as capabilities and potential threats grow.
Our own culture, secular traditions and democratic principles must form
the bedrock of any external doctrine. The basic thrust of the doctrine
must be to actively support friendly, peaceful, secular, democratic
forces in the region. This would include civil society organisations,
political forces and parties that believe in a peaceful democratic
future for their own country and for peaceful, friendly and cooperative
relations with neighbouring countries (including India). One operational
consequence would be for Indian elites, the media, and public to
clearly and openly back genuinely pro-peace, political parties in these
countries.
On the other hand government per se should not “unabashedly back
pro-India political parties” in these countries, as this could be
counterproductive in promoting friendly, peace-loving forces in these
countries. If and when such friendly parties are in power, the Indian
government should however, provide asymmetric inter-governmental
benefits to assure them and their supporters of the benefits of their
positive approach (a selective version of the Gujral doctrine).
Confronting extremism
The second aspect of this doctrine must be a hard-headed strategy for
opposing dictatorial and militaristic forces that have no compunctions
about using violence against their own citizens, or supporting
terrorists or engaging in hostile actions against neighbours such as
India. This requires us to undermine fundamentalist/extremist elements
and organisations, whether religious or ideological, which have a
philosophy, ideology or history of violence. We have to rid ourselves of
our extreme squeamishness in confronting those without moral or social
compunctions about harbouring, sheltering, training and financing
militant groups which use violence against innocent civilians (in any
country in the region). We must be prepared to use every feasible means
to thwart such forces. We must also undermine their supporters —
political parties which provide open or tacit support, countries or
organisations outside the region that provide funds and safe heavens.
Again, it is essential that the Indian elite, media and public adopt a
clear and open stand against extremist forces, organisations, elements
in supposedly moderate political parties and organs of the government
(e.g. an army). They must have an equally clear stand against genocide
and terrorist killing of innocent civilians. Though the government’s
stand should be equally unabashed with respect to hostile non-government
organisations, its public posture towards extremist forces within the
government (of these countries) would have to be more nuanced. It is
more important for the government to act quietly and forcefully against
such institutions than to talk a lot about it. There is one important
exception.
The government should take a more active role in international forums in
exposing genocide and ethnic cleansing by an anti-India governing party
or organ of government, perhaps through an announced policy. For
instance, India should have supported international efforts to expose
the genocide in East Pakistan/Bangladesh and to punish the guilty,
including elements of General Tikka Khan’s army (à la Justice
Hamood-Ur-Rahman Commission) and its agents and collaborators in the
Jamat-e-islami (Razakars).
Role for civil society
The main modality for supporting positive forces and opposing negative
ones in the region should be civil society organisations funded or
supported by the government. These would need to have a clear programme
for study and analysis of neighbouring countries to identify the
positive and negative forces, the socio-political dynamics and the
organisations that need to be supported or ostracised. Based on this
analysis they would have to work out country strategies to support the
positive forces and oppose and undermine the negative forces in each
country. They may need to hire development experts, former diplomats and
intelligence experts with knowledge and expertise in these countries to
formulate and implement these strategies. This knowledge and expertise
would also be invaluable in government decision making in emergencies.
Though this doctrine will help in the medium to long term, in the short
run, national interest should play a dominant role in deciding how to
deal with an army-led Pakistan (Musharraf after his coup), a
military-led Myanmar (with its sole friend, China), or democratic
countries veering towards oligarchy. We must ignore the self-interested
advice of western human rights activists who have never been able to
stop their own countries from coddling dictators who have made things
difficult for neighbouring countries.
(The writer is president, Chintan (Empowerment through Knowledge),
former chief economic adviser, Finance Ministry, and former ED and
ambassador to the IMF.)
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Monday, March 25, 2013
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