Why Revise US-ROK Missile Guidelines?
November 29, 2012
http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/why-revise-us-rok-missile-guidelines/
When South Korea and the United States amended their missile
guidelines last month after years of tough negotiations, China and other
countries expressed some concerns about the revisions, the first change
in the guidelines in more than a decade. Shedding some light on the
reasons for the decision might help assuage them.
Under a 2001 accord with Washington, Seoul agreed not to deploy
ballistic missiles having a range of more than 300 km or a payload of
more than 500 kg. Under the new guidelines, South Korea can now possess
ballistic missiles with a range up to 800 kilometers with a higher
maximum payload of 500 kilograms. The payloads can be even heavier for
missiles with shorter ranges. The agreement also permits the ROK to
operate drone aircraft having a range of 300 km with payloads up to
2,500 kilograms as well as shorter-range UAVs with no restrictions on
their payloads.
South Korean officials offered several reasons for the revised
guidelines. The most common was the need “to cope with the North’s
nuclear weapons and missile threats” by bolstering the ROK deterrent
and, in a war, rapidly neutralizing North Korea’s nuclear and
conventional strike capabilities.
It is true that the ROK already has long-range cruise missiles like
the Hyunmoo-3, but, like manned aircraft, these fly more slowly and at a
lower altitude than ballistic missiles, making them easier to shoot
down. The ROK’s ballistic missiles can be more effective at destroying
the DPRK’s mobile or underground missiles that are about to be launched.
The ROK needs the larger and heavier reconnaissance and combat UAVs for
the same reason—to remain aloft above North Korea in a battle and use
its own missiles against any fleeting North Korean targets as well as
guide longer-range ROK missiles towards them.
The U.S. and ROK forces in South Korea are deploying GPS-guided
artillery shells, Patriot PAC-3 air defense missiles, and ATACMS
surface-to-surface missiles, but these systems cannot be used to strike
deep inside North Korea and, being located near the intra-Korean border,
are themselves vulnerable to DPRK attacks. With their new ranges, the
South Korean ballistic missiles under developments could hit even
targets in North Korea’s Hamgyong Province while being stationed in much
safer places in southern South Korea, such as on Jeju Island. Their
reduced vulnerability increases crisis stability since the ROK command
would feel less of an urgent need to use them before losing them to a
DPRK attack.
International status and domestic political considerations also may
have influenced ROK decision-making. Although the ROK possesses superior
conventional forces to the DPRK, until now the ROK had nothing to match
North Korea’s long-range missiles, which by its calculations can hit
all of South Korean territory as well as parts of Japan. China, Russia,
and many other countries also have ballistic missiles with a range of
at least 800km and are developing long-range cruise missiles and armed
drones. The ROK has explicitly declined to follow the paths of North
Korea, China, Russia, and the United States and develop its own nuclear
weapons.
South Korea’s ruling conservative party also wanted the agreement to
trumpet its nationalist credentials in standing up to the United States.
Many South Koreans want the ROK to acquire nuclear weapons or at least
found the guidelines grating since they denied the ROK capabilities that
North Korea and other countries enjoyed. President Lee personally
appealed to President Obama on several occasions to relax the
restrictions. All three of the major ROK presidential candidates
endorsed the revised guidelines, which were a popular move.
U.S. officials claim to support the revised guidelines as “a prudent,
proportional and specific response” to the DPRK’s threats and
provocations. The increased ROK capabilities are in line with the
administration’s Asian Pivot of bolstering local capabilities and with
the planned transition to South Korean leadership of the joint U.S.-ROK
wartime operation control (OPCON) arrangements in a few years.
Conversely, openly resisting the revisions would have risked reviving
latent anti-Americanism in South Korea and making the ROK-U.S. alliance
seem more of a hindrance than a help to South Korea’s security. Even
so, media leaks made evident that the negotiations over the revisions
were contentious.
While reluctantly accepting some South Korean demands, U.S.
negotiators did insist on provisions that limited the potential threat
to China or other countries. South Korea originally wanted a 1,000 km
range allowance but U.S. negotiators stuck firmly to the 800km limit,
which keeps the ballistic missiles from reaching Beijing or Tokyo if
fully loaded to 500km. The U.S. negotiators also resisted ROK demands
for a solid fuel-powered space vehicle since the rocket could provide
the basis for an intercontinental ballistic missile. The Obama
administration continues to oppose allowing the ROK to possess sensitive
technologies that could be used to manufacture fissile materials.
U.S. and ROK negotiators continue to discuss how to apply the
guidelines as well as other steps to bolster their defenses in the face
of North Korea’s missile buildup, nuclear weapons tests, and other
provocations.
Of course, China could do its part to limiting the negative regional
repercussions of the ROK move by more strongly discouraging North Korea
from further testing its nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.
Richard Weitz is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for
Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute. His current
research includes regional security developments relating to Europe,
Eurasia, and East Asia as well as U.S. foreign, defense, homeland
security, and WMD nonproliferation policies.
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