KARGIL WAR – AN OVERVIEW - by Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar (PVSM AVSM)
KARGIL WAR – AN OVERVIEW
The True ScenarioIt
is correct to an extent, that the Army had in a certain measure failed
to read the events correctly. The absence of the Chief of Army Staff
(COAS) on a foreign visit in the initial period also added to the
perception that the Army and
Government were taking matters lightly. I can state unequivocally that
this was not so. As the VCOAS during this period, I was well aware that
it was the overall geo-political environment and lack of intelligence
that took everyone by surprise - rather than any lack of effort or
planning. We in the Army HQ, once the initial assessment of the
situation was made, were totally involved day and night in planning the
operations to evict the infiltrators.
by Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar (PVSM AVSM)
VCOAS during the Kargil War
The
Kargil ingress by Pakistan occurred in the first week of May 1999,
shortly after the February 1999 Lahore-Agreement between Prime Ministers
Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif. This happened at a time when the tensions
between the two neighbours were believed to have de-escalated and mutual
relations were on the upswing. Imagine the surprise and sense
of dismay in India, when the intrusions were detected during the second
week of May 1999. The overall political environment, the nuclear
capability demonstrated in 1998 and the improved military situation in
Jammu & Kashmir did not justify
the development. There is no doubt that the nation was taken by total
surprise and the Army and civilian intelligence agencies did not
anticipate it.
Much
has been written on the Kargil War by experts on both sides– its
political and strategic objectives, the conduct of military operations,
the nuclear angle, the excessive number of casualties, and the
diplomatic and media efforts. However the difficulties in handling the
conflict, the ground realities
and the higher direction of war, have not been sufficiently examined.
Without going into the specific ground
operations, which have already been covered in a number of books
published on the subject, I believe it is necessary to explain the
actual situation as it was in the area of Kargil at that time, and the
larger context of the regional environment. Having been closely
associated in the entire operational planning of the Kargil conflict, as
the then Vice-Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS) of the Army, I believe it is
also useful to share my knowledge and perception of the follow-up
measures undertaken during and after the Kargil War, and our response to
restore the situation.
Most
of the public coverage during that
time focused on the government’s alleged complacency, the
criticism of the Lahore venture in hindsight, and a limited
understanding of the Kargil intrusion purely as a huge intelligence
failure. I believe that the widespread acceptance of such a one-sided
perception led to not just national embarrassment, but also contributed
to the continuance of avoidable conflict and to our ultimate loss of 527
killed and 1363 soldiers wounded in the battle.
The
criticism that the
Army was slow to react was also unreasonable, and very far from the
truth. There were even absurd allegations made in some quarters that the
Army had kept the Ministry in the dark. The fact that such allegations
came forth - despite the regular personal interactions with the MoD at
the senior level and despite the Army reporting the situation on a daily
basis, as is the practice, and also declaring in-the-situation reports
that some of its soldiers were wounded in the patrol clash in the sector
- was not just surprising to us but also very disheartening. It must be
understood that the Army has to depend on the other Intelligence
Agencies for information other than tactical information, and it does
not have any resources or authority to deploy the other Intelligence
Agencies. In the initial days of the
incursions, in the absence of any information from any of the agencies
who have the responsibility and the duty to provide such intelligence,
the Army itself had no clear picture of the situation. It therefore
assessed such information as it did obtain through its own observation,
as a case of routine infiltration. It was not, either at that time or
later, appreciated by most of our nation that the Armed Forces,
particularly the Army was responding as best as they could in a
situation that was not a planned military operation but a reactive
response to the ingress in the unoccupied gaps of our territory.
As
soon as we became aware of the nature of the
infiltration, we at Army HQ, along with HQ Northern Command, were
simultaneously engaged in doing the best possible to obtain detailed
information about the enemy, and in speedily building up additional
resources from other sectors. This was notwithstanding the handicaps
that the Army faced due to the surprise-factor achieved by the enemy,
and the fact that logistics in the mountains are complex and take
considerable time and effort. The issues were many, ranging from a total
lack of intelligence about the enemy, to the slow progress in launching
operations due to poor infrastructure and the difficult terrain,
problems in mobilization of forces, and the disinformation due to the
Pakistani war propaganda.
The
reasons that the Army could not itself detect the specific extent of
the infiltration initially, was primarily due to the extremely
inhospitable terrain along the LoC (at an average height of 12000 feet)
and the extreme weather conditions. The enemy had planned its move well,
and made good use of adverse weather conditions and the winter months
for the intrusion. The area is large with very wide gaps in the
Mashko-Dras and the Batalik–Kargil sectors, many of which have been
traditionally un-held. The effective patrolling of such a terrain was,
and is, difficult. Patrolling was therefore, selectively carried-out and
limited during the sub-zero temperatures in winter. Since the gaps were
large, there was inadequate ground observation or contact. The monthly
Army Aviation helicopter sorties flew only when the weather was clear
and followed predictable routes,
operating more as communication
flights, and did not locate any unusual activities.
The
air-photographs of the ingress could be obtained only by 14 May 1999
through the Aviation Research Centre (ARC) as the IAF aircraft earmarked
for such missions had developed some technical problems. The satellite
imagery provided did not have the requisite resolution to pick up any
details of enemy positions. The Army thus lacked support of technical
intelligence, such as satellite-imagery, night–vision devices or even
air photographs taken periodically to detect any deployment or
additional infrastructure development. Some would question the
Army’s wisdom in keeping such large gaps as blind spots
without any means for their surveillance and creating any military
capability for any intervention or reactive response in this area in all
the years since 1948.
I
will only say that the Armed Forces of India perform the best that they
can with the means that they have at hand; there are certain decisions
that the civilian leadership takes on behalf of, and sometimes despite
the advice of the Armed Forces. That the Armed Forces continue to
discharge their duties within these constraints should be seen as even
greater proof of their ability and restraint rather than otherwise. The
Kargil conflict,
notwithstanding the initial surprise, demonstrated the
traditional Indian national resolve to hold onto and fight for what is
rightfully ours, whatever the cost. This was also demonstrated in the
earlier Indo-Pak wars. It seems to me that as a nation we still do not
sufficiently appreciate the conditions under which the Armed Forces
operate, or the fact that they are human beings operating for the most
part under extremely adverse conditions, or that we should be aiding
their efforts through timely and prompt access to such technology as can
help them in such adverse conditions.
I
have a fairly intimate understanding of the terrain and deployments,
and first-hand
knowledge of the challenges that deployment in such a
terrain entails. I spent a number of years in this sector, at different
stages of my long service in the Indian Army. My very first posting
after being commissioned as a young officer was with my battalion (2/4
GR) in the Kargil sector, and then as a sub-unit commander in an
adjoining sector in Ladakh. From my experience in dealing with the
manifold issues in surveying and defending the LoC in J &K as a
Brigade Commander in 1984-5, and later as the Chief of Staff of the HQ
15 Corps in 1991-93, I was more than aware of the larger constraints of
the defence of this region. I had also been in the area during the
actual conflict in May 1999 and discussed the situation on the ground
with the concerned formation commanders, Major Generals V. S. Budhwar
and Mohinder Puri.
The Impact of Political Decisions
The
Indian political leadership has of course always displayed total
confidence in its Armed Forces and institutions. Even when the
international opinion was not favourable during the initial stages of
the Kargil War, it gave directions to the Armed Forces to evict the
intruders without enlarging the conflict elsewhere. This policy of
restraint to keep the conflict localized may have been
appreciated by international powers, but has been a major disadvantage
in the actual conduct of operations. India has adopted a similar policy
of restraint even in the earlier wars, and during the recent Mumbai
attacks. In fact, the restriction of not crossing the LoC has no
military logic, when the adversary has already violated the borders.
What
is also little appreciated is that we had no troops to react with in
the area of intrusion, or any reserves with the local Brigade, the
reason being that all its Units were already deployed on other
parts of the LoC. The only troops available in J&K were already
committed in the
ongoing Counter Insurgency (CI) operations down
below in the Valley, across the Zojila pass. The pass is snowbound and
closed from October to May for any movement. All the available troops in
J&K had to be dis-engaged, moved over a distance of 150 kilometers,
and had to undergo a minimum acclimatization period of seven days,
before being launched for the operations in the high-altitude sector.
The Artillery units had to move from the plains sector along with
ammunition. The logistics support needed, had to be built-up.
It
must be conceded that the Army also failed to read the few isolated
indicators that did come. There were unconfirmed
reports from some sources of fresh-road construction across the
LoC on the Gultari–Shakma axis, opposite the Kargil Sector. This
information was interpreted as routine improvement works. There were
reports of induction of long-range artillery guns, apart from the
ongoing medium artillery shelling of the Kargil-Dras road. The artillery
fire was seen by us as reactive retaliatory fire to our interdiction of
the road in the Neelam valley which we had undertaken to disrupt the
winter stocking convoys in the POK.
However,
these reports came in piecemeal, as isolated events, and at different
times. As the VCOAS, I would have been apprised by the DGMI, of any
unusual
activity and of any important developments or reports, if
these had been noticed. Infiltration in J&K has been occurring for a
long time. After the initial ingress was detected, the ground
commanders read the infiltration as routine, having seen it regularly
for the past decade. The Army formations thus, at first considered this
too as a case of the periodic infiltration regularly encountered over
the past ten years and hence not a matter that could not be handled in
the normal course. The IB and the RAW inputs also failed to project the
likely Pakistan designs or ingress, notwithstanding some reports of
improvement of tracks and defence-works.
One
of
the other reasons for the lack of an independent analysis in
the Army and its dependence on a conditioned response may perhaps have
been due to its total focus and long-term engagement on the insurgency
in the Kashmir Valley. The Kargil sector on the other hand was
considered comparatively a low threat area due to the majority of
friendly Shia Muslims, who did not support the separatists. The
extremely difficult terrain and friendly population were considered as a
sufficient safeguard and the entire focus remained in the Valley and on
the Siachin-Glacier. In fact even the reserve formations had been
de-inducted earlier on for employment in the Valley. This lack of
deployment, the fact that the Indian Army was stretched thin on internal
CI responsibilities, and the large gaps traditionally un-held by us,
were well exploited by the adversary to infiltrate forces in small
groups throughout the winter to achieve total surprise. As a nation, we
had also under-estimated Pakistan’s obsession with and its deep
resentment against the success of the Indian Armed Forces in previous
Wars. General Musharraf publicly accepted in his book In the Line of Fire that the Kargil operations were planned to take revenge for the 1971 War and the 1984 Indian action in the Siachin Glacier.
The Strategy Adopted
After
the initial apparently slow response, the nation forcefully went about
exposing Pakistan’s complicity in the Kargil ingress,
and the involvement of its regular troops in the garb of
irregulars. The correctness of the Indian stand was thereafter
understood, nearly one month after the ingress. Armed forces were
instructed to make all the necessary preparations for various
contingencies but were to restrict operations within the Kargil sector.
The IAF was directed to mount operations without crossing the Indian
airspace. In fact, even the general mobilization for war was not ordered
and severe tactical restrictions were placed on the Armed Forces by not
crossing the border or developing operations elsewhere due to strategic
considerations. The operations were not enlarged to the other sectors
and limited to the area of ingress as per the Government’s directions,
notwithstanding the severe tactical disadvantages and tremendous costs
in men and material.
It
is with sadness and regret that I recollect the energy and time spent
by the political leadership in debates for and against enlarging the
conflict, the discussion on defense purchase scandals and scams in the
procurement of military equipment, and the questions asked on the
Government’s inability to combat insurgency in J&K and on Pakistan’s
ability to internationalize the Kashmir issue - all at a time when so
many of our soldiers were battling not just the enemy and adverse
conditions but also a lack of adequate equipment, stores and battle
gear. The emphasis on the part of the media and our political leaders
should have been on ensuring that the urgent and desperate needs of our
soldiers in conditions of War were met, by speeding up bureaucratic
hurdles. Unfortunately this was not the
case.
To
make up the shortages, procurement of defence equipment was on paper
put on fast track, but the fact that defence equipment takes time to
procure was not realized by the successive governments. There were
large-scale shortages of weapons and equipment with the units, as also
in the artillery ammunition, night fighting capabilities and
communications systems. Our procurement system failed to make up the
shortages despite concluding 129 procurement contracts for stores worth
Rupees 2175 crore, on emergent basis. It needs to be understood that
defence equipment is not available off the-counter,
from a grocery store or a market. It needs time for assembly, testing
and training by troops.
Defense preparedness has to be done over a period of time as a regular
process and has to be given adequate funding. The Indian defence budget
at 2.5% is not only low but remains under-utilized due to procedural
delays. The Mumbai attacks have again highlighted the institutional and
intelligence weaknesses that continue to exist in our system.
Long Term Implications
Such recurrent reluctance in important matters of national
security bring into question our political resolve and our lack of
decisive capability. The Kargil Committee
Report, after the operations were concluded became an issue of
‘mud-slinging’ and politics, rather than correcting the inadequacies in
the planning and direction of war. Although
a number of recommendations were implemented, a few key important ones,
such as the creation of the CDS, integration of the Armed Forces HQ
with the MoD and greater delegation of the defence budget to the users
have still been held back, more than a decade after Kargil. Even
today, the modernization programme continues to suffer due to lack of
political resolve and institutional weaknesses. The funds earmarked
remain unutilized due to lack of decision making and are surrendered,
thus adversely affecting our military capability. We still do not have
an institution to render single point advice and military assessment to
the Government.
Military
strategy cannot be planned in a political vacuum. A clear directive
regarding political intentions and objectives must be given by the
national leadership. In our system the Service HQs formulate their
individual operational plans; these are factored for joint-ness by the
Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), discussed with the Raksha-Mantri (RM)
and thereafter presented to the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for
approval. We
do not have a Chief of Defence Staff [CDS] to render full-time military
advice to the National Security Agency or to the CCS. The COSC is an
ex-officio
Committee, which operates when required in addition to their other
primary tasks and cannot devote exclusive attention to the higher
defence management, or to coordinate
and monitor military operations on a regular basis. The three Service
Chiefs meet in the COSC as equal partners and attempt consensus for
agreement, which many times may not happen. The
chairmanship goes to one of the Chiefs on protocol seniority, without
any authority to decide on contentious issues or override dissent.
In
the Kargil Conflict, as we know, the initial assessment was not
correctly made due to lack of intelligence inputs since we did not – and
still do not - have an integrated
intelligence agency. We lost valuable time since a reasonable tactical
picture emerged only after the Air photographs/ radio intercepts of the
sector were made available to
the Army. These were obtained by 14 May, whereas the patrol–clashes had
occurred on the 5th May. The ingress had reportedly
commenced in small groups, as early as January 1999, as revealed from
the captured diary of a Pakistani officer after the war. There was no
information of the enemy or the ground situation, to any of the
intelligence agencies – military or civil. It is to the credit of the
field formations, who were inducted hurriedly from all over the country,
that once the gravity of the situation was discerned, they threw
themselves in preparations to evict the enemy, with great effort and
courage against great odds. Had there been timely information through
technical sources or an independent intelligence coordination agency
with an objective analysis at the highest level by the NSA/ CDS, we
would not have had to react with such little preparation time, and we
would not have had to lose so many fine Indian
soldiers.
At
the time of the Kargil War, the COSC did meet, and handled most of the
issues with understanding and total cooperation and maturity but it
functioned more as a briefing and information sharing meeting. The
requests of the Army for employment of attack helicopters for quick
retaliation on the enemy infiltrators in the initial detection were not
agreed to by the IAF due to differing perceptions on their employment
and the threat of shoulder-fired missiles of the intruders. The basic
fact that we need quick reaction capability and information advantage
over our adversary to
respond appropriately was indeed realized - but was not exercised due
to
considerations of safety of the helicopters. Had we obtained the latest
satellite-imagery, deployed unattended electronic sensors and
night-vision devices in the area, we would have been forewarned and
perhaps avoided the pain of loss of many gallant lives at Kargil.
The eviction of the intruders often entailed mounting frontal attacks through narrow ridges dominated by the enemy. In
such a landscape, the neutralization of the enemy defence-works by our
artillery achieved limited results due to the nature of the ground in
the mountains. The employment of the IAF
aircrafts with laser-guided munitions for ground–attacks, and the
Bofors medium-caliber
artillery contributed significantly in weakening the enemy’s resolve,
and assisted the valiant attacks of the ground forces on these
formidable heights.
Although mountainous terrain does not lend to effective neutralization,
nonetheless, as regularly reported in the media, there were a number of
gallant attacks by our infantry units led by highly motivated young
officers while evicting the enemy from their dominating position. There
were many acts of heroism against great odds by the infantry units which
are not being described here. The importance of physical fitness and
the need for younger profile of the commanding officers in the infantry
was felt for combat in battle. As always all the Indian Army units
deployed for battle irrespective of their Arm or Service delivered their
might fully and displayed acts of highest gallantry while re-taking or
supporting the attacks on these formidable
heights.
The Larger Picture
The
Kargil war was significant for the impact and influence of
international opinion to both sides. Kargil news–stories and war-footage
were often telecast live on Indian TV and many web-sites provided in
depth analysis of the conflict. It was important to project the
correctness of the Indian point of view, due to Pakistani attempts of
denying involvement of
its forces and linking the ingress to the Kashmiri freedom-fighters and
even disputing the very alignment of the LoC. This was successfully
done by
releasing the original maps, officially delineated at the
Shimla-Agreement, the details of the signal-intercepts implicating
Pakistani senior commanders, exposing the captured Pakistani soldiers
and the weaponry used by the so-called irregulars. This was achieved by
the dynamic diplomatic efforts of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA)
and by our efforts to highlight Indian restraint of limiting the
conflict to the international community so effectively that even China,
the all-weather ally of Pakistan, did not support or intervene in this
conflict. Regular briefings of foreign diplomats in India jointly by the
spoke-persons of the Army, IAF and MEA as also of the Media, which
acted as a force-multiplier, contributed in clearly communicating the
Indian stand.
Finally,
the Indian position was accepted by major international powers, the G-8
nations, the European Union and the ASEAN, but the success came at a
great cost and after initial frustrations of lack of credible evidence,
the slow progress of ground operations, substantiated only later by the
capture of enemy held heights and the Pakistani soldiers. Two months
into the conflict, the Indian troops had slowly retaken most of the
ridges, but it was the American pressure on Pakistan which hastened the
pull-out from the remaining locations. At the end of the war Pakistan,
looked isolated and the Indian stand stood vindicated. The media both
the electronic and the print-media played a very positive role to shape
the international opinion in our favour.
Since
both countries were nuclear armed, many in the international community
were concerned that if the conflict intensified, it could lead to a
nuclear war. Pakistan reportedly threatened on May 31 that any
escalation of conflict could lead to use of all arsenal at her disposal.
Pakistan also accused India of using Chemical Warfare against the
Kashmiri fighters. The nuclear factor was considered in-depth by the
COSC and the CCS. The USA, it is understood, persuaded Pakistan to
desist from deploying nuclear weapons and assured them that India had
not deployed any nuclear weapons although, both sides, reportedly took
some preparatory steps. The American diplomacy played an important
role in the nuclear restraint by the two sides. India successfully
campaigned against Pakistani nuclear brinkmanship and showcased a cache
of gas masks to indicate Pakistan’s preparations of a NBC war. This was
a major restraining factor in not enlarging the area of engagement
beyond Kargil. Notwithstanding such public posturing, the lack of a
nuclear war fighting capability was obvious on both sides. The nuclear
doctrine of India itself perhaps needs a relook.
Follow-up Measures
The
Kargil War has a number of lessons both for the
military and for various civil institutions. In the immediate aftermath
of the war, the government took a number of steps to rectify the
shortcomings in the defence preparedness, following widespread media
reportage about military procurement irregularities and criticism of
intelligence agencies like RAW, which failed to predict the intrusions
or the identity of the infiltrators. The Central Bureau of
Investigations (CBI) and the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) have now
closed the cases of procurement irregularities due to lack of credible
evidence, but the nation has lost valuable time and resources to
modernize the Armed Forces. On the diplomatic front, it is interesting
that relations with the USA, Russia, South Africa, Israel and France,
which discreetly aided India with defence procurements, improved.
The
recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee Report were on the whole
addressed in a professional manner to enhance defence capability. Our
political leadership then, did show considerable maturity and wisdom in
carrying out institutional reforms. The needs of the Armed Forces were
re-examined with particular requirement of improving their pay and
allowance, looking after the battle casualties, medical and housing
facilities. Some of the steps initiated to enhance defence capability
are indicated below:-
(1) The
MoD
and the other players involved have commenced work on evolving a
nuclear strategy and on integrated command and control structure. The
Defence Forces have streamlined their mobilization & deployment
plans. Some of the areas/sectors which were thinly held have been
reinforced by raising additional forces and formations. The road network
and logistics structure in the border region is being enhanced.
(2) An
integrated joint staff under a new HQ has been established for greater
joint-ness; however it does not enjoy any independent authority in the
absence of CDS. A separate Defence Intelligence Agency for the three
services and a
joint procurement planning wing has been created
under the integrated defence staff (IDS).
(3) A
Defence Acquisition Cell and a separate defence procurement board have
been created to streamline defence modernization and fast-track
induction of weapon systems. However on the ground there are delays due
to indecisions and fixed mind sets.
(4) Strategic
forces command and amphibious forces Headquarters have been created
and placed under the HQ IDS. Border
surveillance and the communications systems are being upgraded. The
counter-terrorism mechanism and the Intelligence Services are being
re-vitalized to improve our response to security threats.
However,
a few anomalies still continue in the pay and allowance and the pension
entitlements of the defence forces. These, needless to say, must be
settled speedily. And while, on the one hand, defence procurement
procedures have been streamlined and financial powers of services
enhanced, the actual defence procurements and
modernization programmes have got stuck in corrupt practices and
political controversies. Thus, though the Kargil conflict has made the
nation aware of many shortcomings and given an impetus to security
preparedness, our institutional weaknesses and political indecisions
have not allowed the Armed-Forces the desired levels of modernization.
The political leaders have not been able to overcome the institutional
delays and implement much needed reforms.
This paper is primarily based on my personal recollections of the Kargil War as the VCOAS, and supplemented by information from A Soldier's diary: Kargil, the Inside Story, byHarinder Baweja, 2000, Books Today; and Kargil War - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kargil_War accessed on 6 May
2009
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