Exercise caution in dealing with Pakistan
Normalisation of relationship with Pakistan must also yield tangible benefits to India
http://pragati.nationalinterest.in/2012/12/exercise-caution-in-dealing-with-pakistan/
Over
the last few months, there has been substantial momentum in engagement
between India and Pakistan. Visa regimes have been liberalised and a
Joint Business Council has been established, involving business leaders
of both the countries. The newly inaugurated check post at Attari
provides another avenue for trade between the two countries and
Pakistan’s president Asif Ali Zardari even hosted a Diwali dinner for
the visiting chief minister of Bihar, Nitish Kumar.
Given
these developments, one could be persuaded to thinking that Pakistan’s
antagonism towards India has decreased, thus behooving India to be more
accommodating of Pakistan. There are suggestions that India can further
gain Pakistan’s
confidence through an official visit by prime minister, Manmohan Singh,
or by being more conciliatory on border or territorial issues.
Supporters of such narratives argue that India and Pakistan can
gradually build on each other’s trust through trade. Indeed, some in
India already see Pakistan’s acquiescence to discussing trade,
independent of its stated “core issue” of Kashmir, as a sign of a
changing mindset in Pakistan.
However,
before a case can be made for benevolence towards Pakistan, a closer
examination of Pakistan’s positions on relations with India is
necessary. Reconciling the divergent positions that India and Pakistan
hold on issues requires accommodation; and accommodation cannot be the
sole responsibility of India. In fact, there is a very good case to be
made for India to expect Pakistan (as the weaker
power, and one that operates with considerable strategic disadvantages)
to be more accommodating and conciliatory.
It is here that we must put the government of Pakistan’s words and deeds on improving ties with India into proper context. Some writers suggest that Pakistan agreeing to grant India MFN status will be a sign of a more amiable Pakistan.
But this is a false proposition for two reasons: first, by granting
India MFN status, Pakistan will only be fulfilling (belatedly, by about
two decades) its commitments as a WTO member, and second, it is almost
exclusively Pakistan, not India, that will benefit from the removal of
excessive trade barriers. This, then, is not accommodation, but the
rational actions of a government attempting to salvage its failing
economy.
This
is not to say that India must not normalise relations with its
neighbours. Clearly, it is important to do so, and to the extent that
trade can be an engine in this normalisation process, efforts that
bolster bilateral trade must be encouraged. But these efforts must also
yield tangible benefits to India. In terms of
trade, India’s primary interest in Pakistan is its proximity to
Afghanistan and Central Asia. India has pledged more than $2 billion to
reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan; however, as it does not share a
land border with Afghanistan, most of India’s goods enter the Afghan
market by sea – either through the Iranian port of Chahbahar or Karachi,
in a limited manner. The option to trade with Afghanistan via land
through Pakistan is vital to India’s ability to fulfill trade
commitments in an economically feasible manner.
However, Pakistani suspicions on Indian intentions have delayed a
workable solution that could benefit not only India and Afghanistan, but
also Pakistan.
Similarly,
Pakistan’s location and proximity to energy-rich Central Asia could
potentially be of benefit to India. However, energy supplies routed
through Pakistan could be targets of attacks, either with or without the
sponsorship of the Pakistani state. Pakistan, while interested in joint
energy pipeline projects with India, has been unable to assuage these
fears. Indeed, if persistent attacks against NATO trucks in
Balochistan are any indicator, India’s misgivings are not without
justification.
Further,
if
Pakistan’s accommodation on issues of trade is minimal, it is largely
unyielding on issues related to border disputes with India. Articles
in the mainstream media and papers presented at Track-II moots put
forth solutions for resolving the Siachen dispute which involve Indian
withdrawal from Siachen/Saltoro Ridge or creating a “peace zone” for
joint weather studies. But given Pakistan’s historical proclivity
for adventurism in Kashmir and the growing Chinese presence in
Gilgit-Baltistan, such suggestions can hardly be entertained.
On
terrorism, Pakistan’s position vis-a-vis India remains unmoved. That
there haven’t been any recent large-scale attacks is not evidence of a
lack of intent. Training camps continue to exist across the border. The
26/11-court case in Pakistan
has dragged on since 2008, with four different judges having been
assigned to the case and then surreptitiously removed. While
Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi and six others are in custody, LeT’s emir, Hafiz
Saeed, continues to operate freely in Pakistan, organising rallies
against the U.S. and India, and delivering keynote speeches at the
Lahore High Court. There are suggestions now in Pakistan’s media that
the 26/11 judicial proceedings could be negatively impacted with the
execution of Ajmal Kasab in India. Clearly, these are not signs of a
country desirous of pursuing peace with any level of assiduity.
Finally,
India need not take hasty decisions today that could negatively impact
our national security in the future. India must evaluate evolving
scenarios of a post US Afghanistan in 2014.
Pakistan believes it can ensure that the reconciliation process in
Afghanistan ends in its favour. But Pakistan’s vision for Afghanistan
sees Indian involvement in that country as inimical to its interests.
The downgraded American presence in the region after 2014 may result in
decreased financial largesse to Pakistan, increased reliance on drone
attacks and inevitable sanctions.
How
Pakistan intends to respond to these challenges remains to be seen.
Historically, Pakistan has tried to retain American interests by
injudiciously acting on Washington’s fears; these included expanding its
nuclear weapons program, proliferation, terrorism and war with India.
Alternatively, Pakistan could seek to offset decreased financial
assistance through a greater reliance on China and through genuine
attempts at reconciliation with
India. If Pakistan chooses the latter, India should not be found
wanting in reciprocating. If chooses is the former, we must not find
ourselves regretting compromises made to our national security in
moments of overzealousness.
Photo: Anne
Rohan Joshi is a Fellow at the Takshashila Institution
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