Putting our children in line of fire -The Nation - Review of Kargil War by a Paki; Lt Gen Shahid Aziz, commanded Pak 4 (Lahore) Corps
By: Shahid Aziz | January 06, 2013
Kargil,
like every other meaningless war that we have fought, brings home
lessons we continue to refuse to learn. Instead, we proudly call it our
history written in the blood of our children. Indeed, our children
penning down our misdeeds with their blood! Medals for some, few songs, a
cross road renamed, and of course annual remembrance day and a memorial
for those who sacrificed their tomorrow for our today; thus preparing
more war fodder for our continuing misadventures. Since nothing went
wrong, so there is nothing to learn.
We shall do it again. We decide. You die. We sing.
Cut
off from the reality of pain and affliction that would be brought upon
the nation, the decision maker takes the course most suited to his
whimsical ambitions. Possible hurdles are sidetracked, on the basis of
‘need to know’, or merely bulldozed. Never has there been an
institutional decision for the bloodshed. And at the end of each fiasco,
original objectives are redefined to cry, “Hurrah! We have won”.
Our
leaders seek personal glory, and desire honour in the eyes of other
nations. Sadly, that has become our definition of national honour; but
how can we be respected when we have little self respect? So concerned
have we become about how they perceive us that we openly deride our
religion and all the social values that we once stood
for.
The
whole truth about Kargil is yet to be known. We await the stories of
forgotten starved soldiers hiding behind cold desolate rocks, with empty
guns still held in their hands. What stood them there could only be a
love higher than that of life. Some refused to withdraw even when
ordered, and stayed to fight the proverbial last man last round. Such
precious blood spilled without cause!
Whatever
little I know, took a while to emerge, since General Musharraf had put a
tight lid on Kargil. Three years later, a study commenced by GHQ to
identify issues of concern at the lowest levels of command, was
forcefully stopped by him. “What is your intent?” he asked. His cover-up
was revealed many years later, on publication of his book.
An unsound military plan based on
invalid assumptions, launched with little preparations and in total
disregard to the regional and international environment, was bound to
fail. That may well have been the reason for its secrecy. It was a total
disaster. The question then arises why was it undertaken? Were there
motives other than those proclaimed, or was it only a blunder, as I had
assumed for many years?
It
certainly wasn’t a defensive manoeuvre. There were no indications of an
Indian attack. We didn’t pre-empt anything; nothing was on the cards. I
was then heading the Analysis Wing of Inter Services Intelligence and it
was my job to know. Our clearly expressed intent was to cut the supply line to Siachen and force the Indians to pull out.
This
was not a small result we sought and cannot be classified
as a tactical manoeuvre, where no one other than the local commander
needed to be aware. General Musharraf himself writes, “800 sq kms of
area was captured.... and it created strategic effects”. To
say that occupying empty spaces along the Line of Control was not a
violation of any agreement and came under the purview of the local
commander is astounding. This area was with the Indians as a result of
Simla Agreement, and there had been no major violation of the Line of
Control since 1971.
The
entire planning and execution was done in a cavalier manner, in total
disregard of military convention. In justification, to say that our
assessment was not wrong, but there was, “unreasonably escalated Indian
response” is a sorry excuse for not being able to assess Indian
reaction. Assumptions were made that they would not be able to dislodge
us and the
world would sit back idly.
There
were no mujahideen, only taped wireless messages, which fooled no one.
Our soldiers were made to occupy barren ridges, with hand held weapons
and ammunition. There was no way to dig in, so they were told to make
parapets with lose stones and sit behind them, with no overhead
protection.
The boys were
comforted by their commander’s assessment that no serious response
would come. But it did — wave after wave, supported by massive air
bursting artillery and repeated air attacks. The enemy still couldn’t
manage to capture the peaks, and instead filled in the valleys. Cut off
and forsaken, our posts started collapsing one after the other, though
the general publicly denied it.
The
gung-ho mannerism, when there were no pressures, was cowed when lines
started shrinking and
the international setting became frightening. There was no will to stay
the course. Media was hushed to silence, so that pulling out does not
become a political issue. We will sing when our songs don’t tie us down.
The
operation, in any case, didn’t have the capacity to choke Siachen. When
this truth surfaced, the initial aim was quickly modified. Now the book
reads, “I would like to state emphatically that whatever movement has
taken place so far in the direction of finding a solution to Kashmir is
due considerably to the Kargil conflict.” Glory be to the victors.
We
continue to indulge in bloody enterprises, under the hoax of
safeguarding national interest. How many more medals will we put on
coffins? How many more songs are we to sing? And how many more martyrs
will our silences hide? If there
is purpose to war then yes, we shall all go to the battle front, but a
war where truth has to be hidden, makes one wonder whose interest is it
serving?
It must be Allah’s country, for who else is holding it afloat?!
The writer is a retired lieutenant general and former corps commander of Lahore. Email: azizshahid10@gmail.com Blog: gen-shahidaziz.blogspot.com
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