Meet the New PLAAF
By Rebecca Grant
China
has learned a lot from USAF.
China’s air force—the People’s
Liberation Army Air Force—has emerged in recent years as an upstart competitor
in the realm of airpower. "All indicators point to the continued
improvement of the PLAAF over the next decade, to the point where
China is expected to have one of the world’s
foremost air forces by 2020," said the US Air Force’s National Air and
Space Intelligence
Center (NASIC) in an
authoritative 2010 report.
The PLAAF put itself in the headlines around the world by rolling out the
J-20 with its first public flight in January 2011. The stealthy aircraft’s
first flight was one dramatic example of a steady process of modernization
based on outright purchases from
Russia,
licensed production agreements, and
China’s own aircraft development by
leading prime manufacturers Shenyang Aircraft Corp. and Chengdu Aircraft
Industry Group.
Fighters aren’t the only new capabilities. China has added
advanced missiles, upgraded its venerable H-6 bombers, and pressed ahead with
airborne early warning. China’s
air force operates numerous advanced air defenses. In the last few years,
progress in doctrine and training has picked up speed. Last but not least, China has an
aircraft carrier undergoing sea trials.
Today the new PLAAF is reorganized, modernized, and in the hunt for control
of the air.
Geopolitical Response
China’s airpower
ambitions come from its own direct experience and from observing the success of
the
US
and its allies in crafting airpower into an asymmetric advantage. One major
catalyst for change was the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, when
China threatened
Taiwan, through short-range
ballistic missile tests and military exercises, and US Navy aircraft carriers
made transits of the strait in a show of force.
Amy Chang of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission wrote in a
recent report that the crisis "catalyzed investment in the long-term
modernization and professionalization of
China’s armed forces. If there had
been uncertainty before as to what the United States might do in a Taiwan
scenario, this seemed to be a clear statement that US forces would
intervene—and that the PLA lacked effective capabilities to deter or defeat
them."
A June 2012 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report on
Asia stated, "In particular, China realized after the Taiwan
confrontations that it possessed a limited set of military options (short of
nuclear weapons) and that US power projection in the form of aircraft carriers
and long-range precision strike (e.g., B-2 bombers) to deter Chinese aggression
were insurmountable for the PLA."
China entered the second decade of the 21st century on track to wield a much
wider range of conventional force options and with improved airpower
capabilities out in front. No longer is the PLAAF "an overly large,
technologically inferior force," stated NASIC. Divestment and investment
have reshaped
China’s
two-tier air forces. The PLAAF is moving into position to capitalize on
geographic strengths and raise the stakes very high for an opponent should a
crisis arise. It is worth recapping how all this came to be.
China’s Fighter Modernization
By far the most significant development for the PLAAF has been the shift
from a large force of outdated, 1960s-vintage fighters to a smaller, more
capable force. Today’s PLAAF features several fighters brought into service in
the 2000s. Some were purchased from
Russia,
while others were built under license by
China’s two major combat aircraft
manufacturers, Shenyang Aircraft Corp. and Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group.
Together they total nearly 400 aircraft whose aerodynamic characteristics and
armament may be close to par with US fighters, excepting the F-22.
The PLAAF describes its force structure as a two-tier system. "The
PLAAF has established a major weapons and equipment system with third
generation aircraft and surface-to-air missiles as the mainstay, and modified
second generation aircraft and surface-to-air missiles as the supplement,"
as China described it in a 2008 national defense document.
The Pentagon’s 2012 China military report tallies 1,570 fighters, 550
bombers, 300 transport aircraft, plus another 1,450 older aircraft in the PLAAF
inventory. However, the report does not offer a thorough order of battle.
A more detailed way to look at the PLAAF is by its own metric of
"mainstay" and "supplement" forces. The mainstay forces
correspond to fourth generation fighters in
US terminology. The supplement
forces owe much to advances and derivatives of the MiG-21. The table shows
estimates from two sources for fighter and attack aircraft plus the H-6
strategic bomber.
The number range suggests China
probably has more than 400 fighters in the fourth generation class by US terminology.
Analyst Richard Fisher Jr. expects this number to grow. "Given what can be
discerned about production rates, by 2020 it is conceivable that the percentage
of ‘modern’ combat aircraft could exceed 50 percent or be closer to 1,000 in
number," Fisher concluded in a late 2011 calculation published by the International
Assessment and Strategy
Center.
Just as important are improvements in air-to-air missile technology.
China once
relied on imitations of the AIM-7 family but now has sophisticated short- and
medium-range air-to-air missiles in its inventory. The principal types are the
R-27/AA-10 semi-active radar/infrared missile; the infrared guided R-73/AA-11
with a range of 18.6 miles; and the active radar homing R-77/AA-12 with a range
estimated at 31 to 50 miles. Three of the four main types of fourth generation
fighters—the J-10, J-11, and Su-30—carry the long-range advanced air-to-air
missile R-77/AA-12 and the indigenous variant PL-12. So does the J-8, bringing
the number of potential missile platforms to 776.
Stealth Competition
Two major Chinese aerospace firms are flying stealthy fighter demonstration
aircraft. Of course, both are subsidiaries of AVIC, China’s Aviation Industry
Corp. Together, the J-20 and J-31 could represent a design competition similar
to the contest between the Lockheed Martin team X-35 and the Boeing X-32 back
in 2001. At the least, the new fighters indicate a healthy combat aircraft
design base absorbing lessons from multiple international sources and putting
them in experimental designs.
The Chengdu J-20 was first to fly. In a 2009 China Central Television
interview, Gen. He Weirong, deputy head of China’s air force, said stealth
fighters were about to undergo test flights and would be deployed in eight or
10 years. The J-20 "Mighty Dragon" made its first public flight in
January 2011 during a visit by US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates to
China.
The J-20’s front aspect in particular shows many external stealth design
curves and features similar to the F-22. From side and rear aspects, the
resemblance fades, due to the block fuselage, canards, protruding engines, and
thin vertical stabilizers. For now, it is equipped with Russian-built AL-31F
engines. The size of the J-20 suggests it could carry internal fuel plus a
large bomb bay suited to known Chinese missile inventories including cruise
missiles and extended range air-to-air and anti-ship missiles.
RAND analyst David A. Shlapak estimated it might be capable
of supercruise, i.e., reaching Mach speed without afterburner.
Second to fly, on Oct. 31, 2012, was the Shenyang J-31 (named by analysts
after its tail number), first seen in roll out photos before it took flight.
The J-31 appeared to be a more compact and advanced design. From flattering
angles it could almost be the fourth variant of the F-35.
"The J-31 is almost certainly designed with the
intention to have the potential of operating on aircraft carriers, judging from
its enhanced double-wheel nose landing gear" and vertical stabilizers,
aviation analyst Bai Wei told The Times of India.
The flight of the
Shenyang demonstration
aircraft leaves little doubt
China’s
two top fighter houses are striving for stealth. In
US terms the presence of two X
aircraft types would signify a demonstration and validation flyoff competition
and put a potential full-scale program less than five years from production.
China’s bombers are not new or stealthy but their armament
cannot be dismissed. With Russia,
China
is one of the few air forces to operate a bomber fleet. China’s H-6 bomber is an old design derived from
the Soviet Union’s Tu-16 Badger bomber. The
total build was around 150 H-6 bombers shared among the PLAAF and PLA Navy. Up
to five were converted to air refueling tankers in the mid-1990s.
By itself, the 1950s-era technology is not impressive.
The real story lies in the cruise missiles carried by the
H-6. An H-6G bomber first tested an extended-range, air-launched
anti-ship missile more than a decade ago in 2001. At least one variant, the
H-6K, reportedly can deliver six DH-10 cruise missiles or carry six to eight
long-range air-to-air missiles primed for hunting airborne early warning
aircraft such as the E-3 AWACS and E-2C/D Hawkeye.
The DH-10 cruise missile shows Chinese military air
attack development in microcosm. The ground-launched missile was first deployed
in small numbers in 2008. By 2009, the number of deployed DH-10s was pegged at
up to 350 missiles. Current assessments suggest China has between 200 and 500 DH-10
missiles with a 930-mile range. What portion of the inventory consists
of air-launched cruise missiles is not known.
Still, this growing capability gives China the
ability to create havoc in the air over the Pacific. Estimates suggest the H-6M
carries four anti-ship missiles, while the H-6K carries six cruise missiles. China has the
option of combining its most advanced H-6 bomber variants with air-launched
DH-10 cruise missiles, theoretically increasing the missile’s reach to more
than 2,000 miles.
Guam
and all other locations of US Pacific Command facilities would fall in range of
the H-6 bomber given those specifications.
China made its first move
for an AWACS-like aircraft more than a decade ago by attempting to buy
Israel’s
Phalcon airborne early warning system. The deal was nixed in 2000 but only
after the US House Appropriations Committee threatened to cut
US aid to
Israel.
China has since developed the KJ2000 radar system, mounted now
on Il-76 aircraft. Reports indicate China is attempting to modify a
Boeing 737-800 to host the radar package. Estimates suggest China has four
operational airborne early warning aircraft.
The PLAAF is also tasked with ground-based air defense. The PLAAF took
delivery of its first SA-2s in 1958 and has since built a formidable arsenal of
legacy SAMs, advanced Russian systems, and their own indigenously modified
HQ-9s. Like fighter aircraft, the PLAAF surface-to-air missile fleet has a
highly modernized elite force of about 192 launchers on top of a bedrock of
approximately 490 legacy launchers.
Of particular concern are the 192 SA-20, SA-10, and HQ-9 type launchers. The
SA-10 range is about 50 miles, but the SA-20 variants have ranges between 93
and 124 miles.
Training for the SAM units "focuses heavily on night mobility,"
according to NASIC. A typical exercise begins with rapid departure, positioning
to a preselected launch site, and camouflage and concealment.
The Chinese-developed HHQ-9 is a
sea-launched missile that has been demonstrated in launch from Chinese Navy
destroyers. Its range is estimated between 47 and 93 miles. With the HHQ-9, China could
project lethal air defenses at sea as far as its fleet can maneuver.
Carrier Aviation Prospects
Next to its stealth aircraft, the most dramatic expansion of
China’s
airpower comes in the form of its new aircraft carrier.
China purchased the
ex-Soviet Union’s
Varyag in 1998 and ultimately towed it from the
Black Sea for extensive refurbishment.
The 65,000 ton displacement Varyag was the second
hull of the Kuznetsov class. The carrier put to sea in August 2011.
Liaoning was formally christened on
Sept. 25, 2012, at a ceremony attended by
China’s President, Hu Jintao.
Senior Col. Zhang Zheng was named as
Liaoning’s
first commanding officer. Zhang, age 43, previously commanded a frigate and a
guided missile destroyer. He studied English and military doctrine at the Joint
Services Command and Staff college in
Britain from 2001 to 2003.
People’s Daily Online in October 2012 reported that Li Jie, a
professor at the
Marine
Military Academy,
said the aircraft carrier and their fleets in particular enable the naval force
to go farther and conduct maritime surveillance with more efficiency.
As with the stealth programs, there have been major debates about the
Chinese carrier. "The most controversial issue of the post-Cold War era
has been whether or not
China
is planning to procure aircraft carriers," wrote Norman Polmar in December
2008.
Liaoning
differs from the US Navy’s Nimitz-class carriers in several ways. Launch
operations take place from the primary deck where a 12-degree ski jump lofts
fixed wing aircraft into the air. Arresting wires recover aircraft.
Liaoning’s
hull was originally designed for substantial self-defense, with automatic deck
guns comparable to the Phalanx, vertical launch tubes for long-range air
defense, and ship-to-ship missiles.
Full flight operations have not yet been observed. However, a Shenyang J-15
fighter completed a touch-and-go landing drill on
Liaoning on Oct. 12,
2012, and in late November a pair of J-15s made successful arrested landings
before launching again from the carrier.
The J-15
is a Chinese-built derivative of the Su-33 designed for carrier operations. China acquired one Su-33 (an upgrade of the
Su-27) from Ukraine
in 2001. Analysts Phillip C. Saunders and Joshua K. Wiseman from the
National Defense
University expect the J-15 to enter
full rate production between 2015 and 2017, which "will give
China a capable
fourth generation fighter that can be operated from aboard aircraft
carriers." The carrier class was originally designed to deploy with some
30 fixed wing fighters and an additional complement of helicopters. That deck
mix will add both prestige and local control of the air.
Net Assessment
NASIC summed up the improvements so far: The PLAAF "is
emerging as a well-equipped and increasingly well-trained force, still
possessing some identifiable shortcomings and weaknesses."
Significant holes remain in the PLAAF
modernization. Foremost among these is its small air refueling fleet. China has
perhaps eight Il-78 tankers and may have converted up to a dozen H-6 bombers to
refueling status.
Lack of combat experience is also a factor. The USAF pilot force, for
example, has long boasted at least a fraction of airmen with combat experience
from
Vietnam,
Operation Desert Storm, etc. Combat experience plus large force exercises
season aircrews. The last Chinese pilots to gain combat experience also flew
during
Vietnam.
So far,
China’s pilots have
given no sign that they are gaining skills the way
US forces do in Red Flag and other
training events. However, they have begun some international exercises as with
the deployment to
Turkey
in 2010.
What’s much harder to assess is the tactical
savvy of China’s
air force leaders from unit to headquarters level. One interesting fact: The
preponderance of top officers are fighter pilots, a characteristic that reflects
the sheer number of fighter cockpits in the PLAAF since its inception.
Given the forces it’s acquiring,
China can now combine top equipment
and information-focused doctrine into tough tactical problem sets for other
forces in the Asia-Pacific region.
Geography may still be China’s biggest asset because it
allows for concentration of forces. China has its entire coastal and inland
territory to use as a launching point for fighters, bombers, and support and
reconnaissance aircraft. In hypothetical air combat, China will be fighting near home
base. The US and its allies, on the other hand, would be reaching to project
force—a task that can only be accomplished with backing from tankers, ISR, and
air battle control aircraft, all of them far more vulnerable than the fighters
and bombers themselves.
US technology may still be 15 years ahead of China’s. But
that gives little reassurance, especially given the trickle of US stealth
aircraft production.
Carlisle put it simply. "We’ve had an advantage in stealth
for a number of years. That kind of time [gap] will not occur again."
Rebecca Grant
is president of IRIS Independent Research. Her most recent article for
Air Force Magazine was "Linebacker II" in the December 2012 issue.
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