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Policy Brief: Dealing with a Rising China:By J. Stapleton Roy

Washington and Beijing both consider good bilateral relations to be vital, but their growing strategic rivalry has the potential to evolve into mutual antagonism. Top leaders on both sides see building a new type of U.S.-China relationship as necessary to avoid a drift toward confrontation. Yet the competition of capabilities now under way between the Chinese and U.S. military forces in the Pacific does not conform to the strategic goal, articulated by both sides, of striking a stable and mutually acceptable balance between cooperation and competition. Active measures are needed by leaders in both capitals to resolve this discrepancy between policy and action. 

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DEALING WITH A RISING  CHINA

The Policy conTexT:

SuSTainable  u.S.  engagemenT

wiTh eaST aSia

The  United States  and  China  are both in the

process of selecting the leaders who will guide

their respective countries for the next few

years. These leaders will face a host of daunting

domestic and foreign issues that will demand their

attention. None is more important than the task

of finding ways to block the current drift of  U.S.-

China  relations toward strategic rivalry. If both

countries do not properly address this drift, it will

become more difficult, perhaps dangerously so, to

preserve the climate of peace and prosperity that

has fostered  China ’s rise and made  East Asia  such a

dramatic success story.

The  U.S.  strategy of rebalancing in  East Asia ,

as reflected in increased  U.S.  attention to the

region, particularly  Southeast Asia , is part of a

coherent  U.S.  policy approach. The policy does

not seek to contain  China  but hopes to restore

the region’s confidence that the  United States ,

despite its budget difficulties, is committed to

maintaining a robust regional presence. With the

conspicuous exception of  China , this approach has

been broadly welcomed in  East Asia , although not

without underlying concerns.

China ’s more assertive behavior following the

2008 financial crisis increased neighboring

countries’ desire for the  United States  to continue

to play a balancing role. However, these same

countries worry that the  United States  may go

too far in provoking  China  by trumpeting  U.S.

determination to pivot back into  East Asia  and to

reassert a leadership role. In addition,  America ’s

closest friends and allies in the region share the

concern that the United States, distracted by its

Policybrief

J. Stapleton Roy

SummaRy

Washington  and  Beijing  both consider good bilateral relations to be vital, but their

growing strategic rivalry has the potential to evolve into mutual antagonism. Top

leaders on both sides see building a new type of U.S.-China relationship as necessary to avoid a drift toward confrontation. Yet the competition of capabilities now

under way between the Chinese and  U.S.  military forces in the Pacific does not 

conform to the strategic goal, articulated by both sides, of striking a stable and 

mutually acceptable balance between cooperation and competition. Active 

measures are needed by leaders in both capitals to resolve this discrepancy 

between policy and action.

November 20122

Tackling Global Issues Through Independent Research, Open Dialogue and Actionable Ideas

domestic difficulties, will lack the staying power to

remain fully engaged in  East Asia .

This ambivalence underscores the fact that the

credibility of  U.S.  policy in  East Asia  rests to a

significant degree on the perception in Asian

capitals of how effectively  Washington  is managing

its relations with  Beijing . East Asians want the

United States  sufficiently engaged to deter  China

from using its growing military capabilities in

inappropriate ways. At the same time, they do not

want the  United States  to rely excessively on the

military component of its regional presence, which

could have an undesired polarizing effect. Above all,

these countries fear that unconstrained U.S.-China

competition could make  China  a more dangerous

neighbor and increase pressures on them to choose

between  China  and the  United States , a choice they

do not want to make.

These considerations underline the importance of

using measured rhetoric in defining  U.S.  regional

policy. In contrast to the Cold War era, countries

in East Asia are seeking a sustainable  U.S.  political,

economic, and military presence in the region. They

do not want a robust affirmation of  U.S.  leadership,

which would highlight regional rivalry between

China  and the  United States .  Washington  also should

show respect for the concept of centrality of the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

and not appear to challenge the leading role played

by the ASEAN countries in creating a new regional

architecture over the past decade and a half.

The Policy challenge:

creaTing a new TyPe of

bilaTeral greaT Power

relaTionShiP wiTh china

The  U.S.  rebalancing strategy does not address

the principal challenge in managing  U.S.  relations

with a rapidly rising  China : how to deal with the

destructive dynamic created when a rising power

contests the positions of an established power.

The governments of both  China  and the United

States are aware of the lessons from history on this

question and are determined not to let history

repeat itself.

On a number of public occasions in 2012, Secretary

of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has spoken of the

need to find a new answer to the ancient question

of what happens when an established power and a

rising power meet. As she put it, “The United States

is attempting to work with a rising power to foster

its rise as an active contributor to global security,

stability, and prosperity while also sustaining and

securing American leadership in a changing world.”

She added that “We are trying to do this without

entering into unhealthy competition, rivalry,

or conflict.” In her view,  China  and the United

States “are, together, building a model in which

we strike a stable and mutually acceptable balance

between cooperation and competition.” This new

circumstance, in her words, requires “adjustments in

our thinking and in our actions on both sides of the

Pacific.”

1

The  United States  is not the only country that is

talking in this fashion.  China ’s top foreign policy

official, State Councilor Dai Bingguo, has spoken

in very similar terms. He has emphasized the

imperative of building a new type of China-U.S.

relationship so that the two countries can break

what he called the “iron-clad law” of history that

dooms established powers and rising powers to “go

to war, hot or cold alike.” He has also acknowledged

that this new type of relationship should balance

competition and cooperation. In his words, it “is

impossible for  China  and the  United States  not to 3

Dealing with a rising china

have any competition. But such competition should

be healthy and galvanizing to each other. It should

be understood in the context of cooperation.”

Both countries, in short, have defined a common

goal of creating a new type of relationship that

strikes a balance between cooperation and

competition. If they fail in this endeavor, they

will be hard put to steer clear of the dangerous

precedents of the past.

The STraTegic Problem

This need to strike a balance between cooperation

and competition is the heart of the strategic

problem. Both  Washington  and  Beijing  consider

good bilateral relations to be vital. But their

growing strategic rivalry has the potential to evolve

into mutual antagonism. A stronger  China  will

undoubtedly see itself as again becoming the central

player in  East Asia . The  United States , for its part, has

long been a Pacific power with formal alliances and

strategic ties throughout the region. As successive

U.S.  presidents have made clear—including, most

recently, President Barack Obama during his

November 2011 visit to the region—the United

States intends to remain actively engaged in  East Asia .

The question for the leaders of both countries is

whether they can find a solution to this conundrum

that lies at the heart of the bilateral ties between

Washington  and  Beijing . This solution will be

the key to building the new type of U.S.-China

relationship that top leaders on both sides see as

necessary to avoid a drift toward confrontation.

Where do we stand in this process? The answer

is that both  China  and the  United States  have

a discrepancy between their respective defense

responses and declared strategic goal of preventing

a drift toward confrontation in the U.S.-China

relationship. This condition undermines the

coherence of the overall strategy.

The Chinese approach is based on developing what

the Chinese call counterintervention capabilities, which

are aimed at sharply increasing the risks for  U.S.

forces operating in a hostile environment in areas

adjacent to Chinese territory. The  U.S.  term for this

emerging People’s Liberation Army capability is

anti-access/area denial.

The U.S. Defense Department is responding

with a concept jointly developed by the U.S. Air

Force and Navy called Air Sea Battle. Because

the concept is based on attacking capabilities on

the  China  mainland, it is essentially a formula

that could quickly escalate to all-out war. Even if

conflict on this scale is unlikely and preventable,

this action-reaction process holds the potential

for what one writer has called a “military

capabilities competition” of unlimited duration.

Such a competition not only has serious budgetary

implications but also is certain to increase mutual

mistrust between  Washington  and  Beijing . In other

words, Chinese and  U.S.  actions and their declared

strategic goals do not yet conform with each other.

A complicating factor is that despite the

commitment of leaders in  Washington  and  Beijing

to the goal of developing a positive, cooperative,

and comprehensive bilateral relationship, public

opinion in both countries is divided on the question

of whether the other is a friend or a potential

adversary. Meanwhile, both countries’ military

establishments are busy preparing for worst-case

scenarios.

Failure to address this problem forthrightly will

make it more difficult to manage. Clearly, active Tackling Global Issues Through Independent Research, Open Dialogue and Actionable Ideas

measures are needed by leaders in  Washington  and

Beijing  to address the trust deficit between the

two countries that contributes to the drift toward

confrontation. Giving high priority to this strategic

challenge will make other bilateral problems easier

to manage. This challenge will be the critical test of

leaders in both countries.

endnoTeS

1 The quotations are from  Clinton ’s remarks at the

U.S. Institute of Peace China Conference, held in

Washington ,  D.C. , on March 7, 2012. For a full text

of her remarks, see http://www.state.gov/secretary/

rm/2012/03/185402.htm.

Key recommendaTionS:

Four policy actions are advisable:

•           Give priority to sustaining a robust and

comprehensive  U.S.  regional presence in

which the vital military component is not

the dominant feature.

•           Lay policy stress on sustainable

engagement in the region rather than on

reasserting  U.S.  leadership, which Asians

fear will sharpen U.S.-China rivalry and

detract from ASEAN centrality in developing

regional institutions.

•           Address forthrightly with  China ’s leaders

the measures both sides must take,

especially in the military sphere, to reverse

the destructive dynamic created when a

rising power challenges the positions of an

established power.

•           Exercise leadership in fostering  U.S.  public

opinion that supports the declared policy

goal of developing a positive, cooperative,

and comprehensive bilateral relationship

with  China .

The  Wilson   Center

@TheWilsonCenter

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www.wilsoncenter.org

Woodrow   Wilson   International   Center  for Scholars

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Washington ,  DC   20004-3027

J. Stapleton Roy is director of the Kissinger

Institute on  China  and the  United States .  

He can be reached at 

Stapleton.Roy@wilsoncenter.org.