Just Missiles are not Enough
by Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee in IDR 6/1/13
It
was a red letter day for the DRDO when the Agni V ICBM was successfully
test fired on 19 Apr 2012. Indeed, it was a landmark event for the
country as far as its military security is concerned. The nation rightly
was rapturous at this achievement and the Defence Ministry and the DRDO
had reason to be proud. A statement made by some Chinese analysts,
stating that the actual range of the missile was 8000 km and not just
5000 km as announced by the DRDO, added coyness to the happiness all
around. “How modest of us?” many wondered.
However, statements made by some
‘experts’ that the missile would act as a deterrent to aggression is perhaps misplaced.
Great
strides made in missile technology and development has been one of the
rare success stories of defence research, development and production in
India. One has to feel proud of this achievement of the DRDO. But
how should the students of defence strategy view this capability in the
overall context of India’s defence preparedness and her ability to
impose credible military deterrence over those adversaries who might
attempt to secure their political objectives through military means?
The answer lies in examining as to what paradigm shift has this missile made in India’s favour.
Political
direction to this effect must be given and progress monitored to ensure
bureaucratic red tape is removed and the modernisation process is
expedited.
Will
the Agni V – and its earlier versions – subdue China’s outlandish
territorial claims, or giving up the Shaksgam Valley which she received
from her ‘all weather friend’, or stop her from making in-roads into
Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, or from propping up Pakistan to keep India
down? Will a fear of this missile deter her should she decide to seal
her claims by military aggression? The answer is in the negative. In fact, nothing short of a balanced and modernised conventional military force would achieve that aim. To that end, it is essential that the drive to modernise the Indian armed forces within affordable budgetary
provisions, must not be allowed to flounder. Political
direction to this effect must be given and progress monitored to ensure
bureaucratic red tape is removed and the modernisation process is
expedited.
Will
the missile at the least strengthen India’s ability to resist a
military offensive, say by threatening to, or by actually destroying
value targets, civilian or military, deep inside the Chinese mainland,
while our armed forces are locked in intense, but perhaps unequal,
combat? Will five, ten or twenty attacks with such missiles break the
Chinese people’s will to fight? The answer is again in the
negative; while most analysts are aware of this, only the soldiers, sea-warriors and air-warriors acknowledge it.
A
regime that condones mass killing and destruction of entire societies
to build ‘great’ dams or to ‘revolutionise culture’ just to keep the
‘great helmsman’ and his ‘party’ in absolute power, is unlikely to be
too concerned about the possible damage that Indian missiles can
inflict. In any event, Chinese capability in this field far exceeds
India’s.
Though
Indian missile capability can act as a deterrent against Chinese
missiles, it is no substitute for conventional capability required to
defend our land borders. While China is unlikely as of now to use force
to press her claims along the McMahon Line and in parts of Ladakh, the
deterrent required by India has to be based on conventional capability.
This
would require capability in the cyber domain, network centric warfare
capability, air dominance over the Tibetan Plateau, improved artillery
support, enhanced infantry capability and an improved logistic
infrastructure. All of these are planned for as per the Army’s
modernisation plan. It must now be ensured that slippages in the
process do not occur. It would be a mistake to simply rely on missiles
for our defence.
For the missiles to make their mark, therefore, India has to have a strong conventional military capability.
While
the successful launch of the missile is a credible achievement, it
cannot be a substitute for lack of capability in the conventional
domain. The focus thus must not shift from the modernisation process in
the vague hope that missiles can be appropriate instruments of
deterrence.
Military
security of a nation is a multi-tiered structure, with each tier
complementing the others to construct a strategic whole. Missiles of
nuclear and conventional payloads and of varying ranges are at the top
of that multi-tiered structure which must be supported by stronger
structures from beneath– one cannot have a wonderful top
floor when lower floors are tottering. For the missiles to make their
mark, therefore, India has to have a strong conventional military
capability.
The
successful development of the missile is certainly a feather in the cap
of the DRDO. However, this success needs to be replicated in other
projects too if India’s military is to become a force to be reckoned
with.
While
the nation rightly celebrates the successes achieved in missile
development, serious students of national security, civilian or military
must certainly pause before doing so. They must continue to work for a
comprehensive security architecture and workable deterrence that allows
India to prosper in peace.
Warm Regards
sanjeev nayyar
sanjeev nayyar
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