Costs of lowering our guard byAbhijit Iyer-Mitra
There
is lack of vision and financial management on the part of the Defence
Ministry and the Armed Forces. As a result, the country ends up
squandering most of its defence budget on wasteful peacockery and
so-called big-ticket reforms
There
are several way of looking at the recently announced five per cent cut
in the defence
allocation for this budgetary year amounting to some Rs10,000 crore.
The negatives are obvious — most of the cuts will be to the capital
account. This means most acquisitions will be the most hard hit.
Indications are that the Rafale deal for the Air Force, the light
helicopter deal for the Army and the raising of the mountain strike
corps, will be severely affected. Besides this cut, the additional
Rs40,000 crore reportedly being sought for modernisation will also in
all probability not be had. Consequently the three services have
reportedly been asked to prioritise their acquisitions.
As the saying goes, history repeats itself usually as a tragedy. Historically
the militarily relevant period here, when defence was starved of funds,
dates back to the China war of 1962 for much the same reasons. Then, as
now, reckless spending on
ill-conceived socialist projects saw to it that defence never really
got what it wanted in terms of finances. Historians give Jawaharlal
Nehru a clean chit for this, claiming quite rightly that then Union
Minister for Finance Morarji Desai did not give what then Union Minister
for Defence Krishna Menon asked for. All this conveniently ignores the
fact that the precarious economic situation was precisely one of
Nehru’s making. Then, as now, tainted Ministers — and Krishna Menon was
seriously tainted due to his involvement in the purchase of defective
Army jeeps — survived merely because of their loyalty to the dynasty,
despite their proven incompetence.
This, however, is one side of the story.
The
other side is the lack of proper vision or financial
management on the part of the Defence Ministry and Armed Forces
themselves, which means that India squanders most of its defence budget
on wasteful peacockery and big-ticket items.
A
lot of this has to do with the complete lack of a strategic vision.
Notably, self-defeating obstinacy usually masquerading under the guise
of ‘strategic autonomy’ would be the main culprit. In the narrowest
sense, strategic autonomy would mean the ability to hit Pakistan with US
weapons free from US reproach or the threat of sanctions.
In
the broadest sense, this could mean that India should be able to mount
an independent invasion of Lichtenstein hidden high in the Alps. The
problem of course
is that a generalist bureaucracy guiding a generalist Minister simply
cannot narrow down the scope of strategic autonomy to something tangible
and workable.
What
this means is that the Armed Forces are required to spread their
resources very thin over a broad spectrum of threats. What this results
in is that India chooses by its own volition to be a jack of all trades
and master of none.
The jack-of-all-trades state comes about largely because of inter-Service rivalry — jockeying for scarce resources.
Given that we
trumpet civilian supremacy in this country, it falls to the civilian
bureaucrats and their civilian Minister to then prioritise acquisition.
The problem here is that defence — specifically the nature of modern
warfare and the complexity of the acquisition process — is a heavily
technical subject requiring knowledge of the industry, technology and
its processes and of war. One just needs to look at the service
directory to see that none of the ‘civvies’ in the Ministry have any
such experience. Prioritisation, therefore, falls prey to a substandard
debate based on half-baked facts and half-baked knowledge.
The
second issue, however, lies with Armed Forces themselves and their own
idiosyncrasies. Even within their own ranks they seem completely unable
to define their
roles. The lack of political direction is obvious, but the lack of
vision and leadership within the Armed Forces needs to be acknowledged.
Start,
for example, with the Jaguar and the MiG-27 procurements, each
totalling about 120 plus airframes. The only real difference was that
the former was made by an Anglo-French combine and the latter by the
Russians. Both performed the exact same role, and yet the Air Force in
its infinite wisdom chose to waste its money duplicating capacity. The
Air Force gained two separate logistics chains, two separate engines,
two separate sets of weapons, two separate sets of communication
equipment, two separate training protocols and two separate sets of
tactics. None of this has translated into local expertise of any sort,
as evidenced by the fact that we were
unable to master the production of either. Local assembly was passed
off as local production.
If
history repeats itself as a tragedy, it is also equally prone to
repeating itself as a farce. A case in point is the acquisition of the
Rafale. Whatever the Rafale does, the Sukhoi also does — and much better
usually. It fights at the same altitude, has a much bigger radar, and
flies anywhere between three and six times the distance the Rafale can. A
host of Israeli systems, including jamming and reconnaissance pods,
active electronically scanned array radars et al, means that Western
quality can be combined with a cheap Russian platform with relative
ease, given the enormous onboard power of the Sukhoi and its onboard
space. Yet, for some strange reason, the Sukhoi is yet to be
indigenised. This
process was to be completed by the time at least half the airframes
were acquired of a planned total of 230. Yet, in 2011, the Government
had to sign a deal to procure an additional 42 airframe kits from Russia
for local assembly.
Now,
despite this, the Air Force chooses 126 Rafales — a plane that is
inferior to the Sukhoi in every sense of the word. The Air Force has a
lot of explaining to do. But the babus too have some explaining of their
own to do, given that this inferior Western platform costs twice as
much as its Eastern analogue. In reality, the Rafale was severely
underpriced to win the contract.
When
Dassault does submit the final bid, expect
the price to rise anywhere between 200 per cent and 400 per cent. Given
that the service directory lists French as the spoken language of
several Defence Ministry babus, it is curious that none of them bothered
reading French Senate reports indicating a per unit price upwards of
200 million euros a pop and rising — nowhere close to the 80 million
euros quoted.
So,
the Government bears serious blame for financial mismanagement and the
bureaucracy for incompetence. But our sense of gratitude for those who
defend us must not prevent us from calling the Armed Forces out when
they go so far astray.
No comments:
Post a Comment