Weapon that has more than symbolic value:Shyam Saran
The Hindu
While India needs to make its nuclear deterrent more robust, it is misleading to spread the notion that it is dysfunctional or non-existent
Since India became a declared nuclear weapon state in May 1998, there
has been a concerted campaign, particularly by non-proliferation lobbies
in western countries, echoed by analysts in China and Pakistan, to
spread the notion that India’s strategic programme has been driven by
considerations of prestige and propaganda, rather than by any real
security threats. Lately such assessments have also begun to emerge from
some Indian commentators, who argue that “India’s dominant objective
was political and technological prestige, while for every other nuclear
weapon state it was deterrence.”
Security environment
These assessments conveniently ignore the steadily worsening regional
and global security environment India has confronted right since its
birth as an independent nation. With the advent of the atomic age, India
became conscious of the fact that possession of nuclear weapons by a
country or a group of countries created an asymmetrical international
order which would limit India’s strategic space and independence.
India’s preference was and remains a world from which nuclear weapons
have been eliminated. It is the only state with nuclear weapons to
profess that its security would be enhanced, not diminished, in a world
free of nuclear weapons. However, India has also been categorical in
rejecting the division of the world in perpetuity into nuclear-haves and
have-nots.
After the end of the Cold War, a determined attempt was made to
legitimise precisely such a division, firstly by making the
discriminatory Non-Proliferation Treaty permanent through an amendment
adopted in 1995. Then a similar discriminatory Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty in 1996 was foisted without any link to the goal of nuclear
disarmament, a link that India had consistently insisted upon.
These
moves would have permanently foreclosed India’s option to acquire a
fully tested nuclear weapon arsenal, while those already in possession
of nuclear weapons would enjoy an asymmetrical advantage in perpetuity.
This would have severely undermined India’s security, making it
vulnerable to nuclear threat and blackmail.
China's and Pakistan's Nuclear Tests and Collusion
If we add to this the regional dimension as it unfolded over the years,
India’s compelling security dilemma becomes even more apparent. In 1964,
China exploded its first nuclear bomb and this came only two years
after the 1962 border war, in which India suffered a humiliating defeat.
One can well imagine the sense of vulnerability this would have created
in the country.
A serious quest for a nuclear capability may be traced
to this period, culminating in the 1974 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion.
Thereafter, the clandestine acquisition of nuclear weapons and missile
delivery capabilities by Pakistan, fully supported and assisted by
China, created a heightened security threat to India. That China
actually supplied a fully tested nuclear weapon design to Pakistan in
1983 and may have even tested a Pakistani weapon at its test site in Lop
Nor in 1990, confronted India with a hostile Sino-Pakistan nuclear
nexus, which continues to operate even today.
(There are recent
indications that China may be revising its no-first use policy.)
India's May 1998 Tests
It is
this evolving regional and global security landscape which precipitated
India’s decision to carry out a series of tests in May 1998 and declare
its status as a nuclear weapon state. It was the quest for security in a
hostile and threatening environment that drove the country’s strategic
programme, neither prestige nor propaganda.
A more recent argument is that since the May 1998 tests, India has not
taken credible steps to operationalise its nuclear deterrent. And this
demonstrates, it is claimed, that India looks upon its nuclear weapons
as a political instrument, a source of prestige, rather than as a
deterrent.
STEPS TAKEN BY INDIA TO MAKE ITS DETERRENT POTENT
In fact, since January 2003, when India adopted its nuclear doctrine
formally at a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security, it has taken
a series of graduated steps to put in place a triad of land-based,
air-delivered and submarine-based nuclear forces to conform to its
declared doctrine of no-first use and retaliation only.
The Nuclear Triad
Currently,
at least two legs of the Triad are fully operational. These include a
modest arsenal, nuclear-capable aircraft and missiles, both in fixed
underground silos and those mounted on
mobile rail and road-based platforms
LAND BASED MISSILES
Land-based
missiles include both Agni-II (1500 km) as well as
Agni-III (2500 km). The range and accuracy of further versions for
example, Agni V (5000 km) which was tested successfully only recently,
will improve with the further acquisition of technological capability
and experience.
The third leg of the triad is admittedly a work in progress. We need a
minimum of three Arihant class nuclear submarines so that at least one
will always be at sea. The submarine-based Sagarika missiles have been
developed and tested but are still relatively short in range. It is
expected that a modest sea-based deterrent will be in place by 2015 or
2016.
THE NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY
The National Command Authority (NCA) is in charge of India’s nuclear
deterrent. At its apex is the Political Council which is headed by the
Prime Minister and includes all the ministerial members of the Cabinet
Committee on Security such as the Ministers of Defence, Home and
External Affairs.
THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
At the next level is the Executive Council which is
headed by the National Security Advisor and includes the Chiefs of the
three armed forces, the Commander-in-Chief of India’s Strategic Forces
Command, a three star officer, among others.
ALTERNATE NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY
There is an alternate NCA
which would take up the functions of the nuclear command in case of any
contingency that renders the established hierarchy dysfunctional. The
NCA has access to radiation hardened and fully secured communication
systems, and redundancies have been put in place as back-up facilities.
STRATEGIC PROGRAM STAFF
In order to support the NCA, a Strategy Programme Staff has been created
in the National Security Council Secretariat to carry out general staff
work for the NCA. This unit is charged with looking at the reliability
and quality of our weapons and delivery systems, collate intelligence on
other nuclear weapon states, particularly those in the category of
potential adversaries, and work on a perspective plan for India's
nuclear deterrent in accordance with a 10-year cycle.
The Strategy
Programme Staff has representatives from the three services, from our
Science and Technology establishment and other experts from related
domains, including External Affairs.
STRATEGIC ARMAMENT SAFETY AUTHORITY
A Strategic Armament Safety
Authority has been set up to review and update storage and transfer
procedures for all categories of nuclear armaments. It will be
responsible for all matters relating to the safety and security of our
nuclear and delivery assets at all locations.
The NCA works on a two-person rule for access to armaments and delivery systems.
REGULAR DRILLS
Regular drills are conducted to examine possible escalatory scenarios,
surprise attack scenarios and the efficiency of our response systems
under the no first use limitation. Thanks to such repeated and regular
drills, the level of confidence in our nuclear deterrent has been
strengthened. Specialised units have also been trained and deployed for
operation in a nuclearised environment.
This is clearly not the record of a state which regards its nuclear
arsenal as having only symbolic value. While further steps may be
required to make our deterrent more robust, it is misleading to spread
the notion that it is dysfunctional or worse, that it is non-existent.
Recently, there have been claims by Pakistan that it has developed
theatre nuclear weapons which could be used to meet a conventional armed
thrust across the border by Indian forces.
By seeking to lower the
threshold of nuclear weapons use, Pakistan’s motivation is to dissuade
India from contemplating conventional punitive retaliation against
sub-conventional but highly destructive and disruptive cross-border
terrorist strikes such as the horrific 26/11 attack in Mumbai.
Massive retaliation
India’s nuclear doctrine declares that while India will not be the first
to use nuclear weapons, if it is attacked with such weapons, it would
engage in nuclear retaliation which will be massive and designed to
inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary. The label on a nuclear
weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical, is irrelevant
from the perspective of its doctrine.
The security of both India and
Pakistan would be enhanced if Pakistan abandoned cross-border terrorism
as an instrument of state policy and instead joined India in the pursuit
of nuclear and conventional confidence building measures which are
already on our bilateral agenda. An agreement on non-first use of
nuclear weapons would be a significant follow-up to the existing
bilateral commitment to maintain a voluntary moratorium on nuclear
testing.
India and Pakistan should take the lead in promoting multilateral
negotiations to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. That is a
better future for which to aspire.
(Shyam Saran is a former Foreign Secretary. He is currently Chairman,
National Security Advisory Board, Chairman, Research and Information
System for Developing Countries, and Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy
Research. This article reflects his personal views)
COMMENT:- India needs to change its Nuclear Doctrine from "NO FIRST USE" as China the only other Nuclear country in the world following this is also de-facto
Changing it.
There is a big lacuna in NO FIRST USE Nuclear Doctrine. In case say Pakistan fires a tactical nuke in
Bikaner-Jaisalmer Sector in case our forces penetrate 40-50 miles and threaten the Railway line from Lahore to Sukkur, which causes unacceptable casualties to our offensive formations, WILL INDIA CARRY OUT A MASSIVE NUCLEAR ATTACK ON PAKISTAN CITIES, MILITARY TARGETS ETC!!
The answer is a big NO!! Our political leadership and their bureaucrat advisers will panic as Pakistan would
announce that they have nuked only Indian troops who
have attacked Pakistan and are threatening their life line to Sind and
Karachi and if India retaliates on civilian and other targets they will also attack our civilian targets.
In addition, there would be frantic calls from President of USA, Russia,
Germany,
UK to name a few to EXERCISE RESTRAINT and NOT ESCALATE THE SITUATION!! Indian leadership, especially UPA2 will certainly buckle.
Now, looking towards China, if China
attacks and makes inroads due to local superiority, only a Tactical
Nuclear strike will be able to halt them in their track.It would therefore be more realistic if India qualifies
its NO FIRST USE Doctrine, as China is doing, to add some scenarios in
which India would have no choice but use tactical Nuclear Weapons, particularly against a Chinese
offensive.
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