Pakistan’s Dangerous Quest for Tactical Nukes
Pakistan’s quest to acquire tactical
nuclear weapons (TNWs) has added a dangerous dimension to the already
precarious strategic equation in South Asia. The security discourse in the
subcontinent revolves around the perennial apprehension of a conventional or
sub-conventional conflict triggering a chain reaction, eventually paving the
way for a potential nuclear crisis haunting peace and stability in the region.
The Pakistan army’s directorate of
Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), announced the successful testing of the
60-km nuclear-capable short-range missile Hatf IX (Nasr) on 11 February 2013
and declared, “…Nasr, can carry nuclear warheads of appropriate yield, with
high accuracy… and has been specially designed to defeat all known
anti-tactical missile defence systems.”
The test, an implicit signal to the region
about Pakistan’s commitment to developing “full spectrum deterrence including
the use of TNWs”, was witnessed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Committee, General Khalid Shameem Wynne, Director General Strategic Plans
Division, Lieutenant General Khalid Ahmed Kidwai (Retd), and Commander Army
Strategic Forces Command, Lieutenant General Tariq Nadeem Gilani.
While Pakistan believes that the Nasr “adds
deterrence value to Pakistan’s strategic weapons development programme at
shorter ranges,” it has, in fact, further lowered its nuclear threshold through
the likely use of TNWs. Pakistan has not formally declared a nuclear doctrine,
but it is well known that nuclear weapons are its first line of defence.
Its
presumed “first-use” policy is aimed at negating India’s conventional military
superiority by projecting a low nuclear threshold. The use of TNWs in the
India-Pakistan case will alter the strategic scenario completely as Pakistan
would threaten India with the use of TNWs in the event of New Delhi responding
against Islamabad with a conventional strike in reaction to a 26/11-style
terrorist attack. According to the Pakistan army, TNWs are designed to counter
India’s Cold Start doctrine. Under this new policy, Indian troop formations
could well face an onslaught of Pakistani TNWs.
Tactical nuclear weapons, often referred to
as “battlefield”, “sub-strategic”, or “non-strategic” nuclear weapons, usually
have a plutonium core and are typically distinct from strategic nuclear
weapons. Therefore, they warrant a separate consideration in the realm of
nuclear security. The yield of such weapons is generally lower than that of
strategic nuclear weapons and may range from the relatively low 0.1 kiloton to
a few kilotons.
As Pakistan is already building its fourth nuclear reactor at
Khushab—a plutonium producing unit, the clamour in the Pakistan armed forces
for manufacturing tactical nuclear weapons has gone up.
Pakistan has been advocating the concept of
a Strategic Restraint Regime based upon the principle of nuclear restraint and
conventional force reductions and has termed it as a strategic
confidence-building measure. Often citing what it terms as “India’s
conventional military threat”, Pakistan forgets that given its offensive
strategic posture and continuing involvement in terror strikes in India, it is
New Delhi which is confronted with the problem of developing a strategy to
counter Pakistan’s “first-strike” and proxy war in light of its declared
“no-first-use” policy.
India has always viewed nuclear weapons as
a political instrument whose sole purpose is to deter the use and threat of use
of nuclear weapons against itself. India’s nuclear doctrine clearly outlines
the strategy of credible minimum deterrence and also establishes that India
will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike. However, India shall
respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.
To achieve this end,
India’s nuclear doctrine calls for a sufficient, survivable and operationally
prepared nuclear force; a robust command and control system; effective
intelligence and early warning capabilities; comprehensive planning and
training for operations in line with strategy; and requisite primary and
alternate chains of command to employ nuclear weapons.
If Pakistan intends to develop these
lower-yield nuclear warheads that can be fired from short-range tactical
missiles, a future limited war scenario with India with grave repercussions
remains a possibility.
Pakistan should cooperate with India by taking requisite
steps to stabilise nuclear deterrence and minimise existential nuclear dangers.
It should not indulge in further destabilising nuclear deterrence in the name
of “balancing the asymmetry with India in conventional capabilities.” India,
yet again, has acted as a responsible player by not going down the TNW route
fully acknowledging the perils involved. Pakistan needs to introspect. Even one
nuclear strike-- tactical or otherwise --whether in India or against Indian
forces, shall unquestionably invite massive punitive retaliation that will
finish Pakistan as a nation state.
The history of nuclear deterrence tells us
that TNWs lower the nuclear threshold and that makes them inherently
destabilising. Their command and control is complex as it involves delegation
of the authority to launch to commanders in the field if they are to avoid
being confronted with the “use them, or lose them” challenge. Pakistan has
opted to go down a dangerous path. It must stop its quest for TNWs as weapons
of war.
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