THE
“TWO INCOMPATIBLES” AND PLA SELF-ASSESSMENTS OF MILITARY CAPABILITY
Publication: China Brief Volume: 13 Issue: 10
May 9, 2013
Recently, a Beijing-based defense attaché from a NATO
country was reported saying, “Our assessment is they [the People’s Liberation
Army] are nowhere near as effective as they think they are” (Foreign Policy,
May/June 2013). Though the foreign officer did not provide further details,
contrary to this attaché’s assertion, a large body of evidence in the official
domestic Chinese military and Communist Party media suggests People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) officers—ranging from the senior leadership to
operational and tactical commanders as well as staff officers—do not judge the
Chinese military to be anywhere near as effective as many foreigners do.
When speaking to foreigners, senior PLA leaders often say
something like what Minister of Defense Liang Guanglie told U.S. Defense
Secretary Robert Gates in January 2011, “The gap between us and that of
advanced countries is at least two to three decades” [1]. The senior leadership
understands the PLA has made progress in many areas over the last 15 years,
especially in some important, well-publicized capabilities, but internally they
emphasize the need to educate and train PLA personnel to execute a new doctrine
that they have never tested in combat.
Acknowledging the force’s shortfalls and focusing how to
overcome these deficiencies reflect a professional approach to the task of
military modernization. It also is the basis for the multi-decade timeline extending
out to 2049 that the PLA has set for itself to complete the modernization
process. At its most basic level, the recognition of shortcomings is consistent
with Sun Tzu’s guidance to “Know the enemy and know yourself.”
The PLA Constantly Evaluates Its Capabilities and
Shortfalls
Critical analysis of problems in PLA personnel quality,
organization, training and logistics can be found in the writings and quotes
from operational commanders and staff officers responsible for unit readiness
published in Chinese military newspapers and journals. They are almost always
in Chinese, directed at the PLA itself or Communist Party members. These
evaluations are often buried in longer articles and usually follow the pattern
of recognizing improvements that have been made, identifying shortcomings and
recommending actions to overcome these problems.
Many articles contain
descriptions of units learning basic lessons that all militaries confront in
training. Many articles, however, describe systemic problems that apply to more
than just the individual unit involved and are published as lessons for others
in the PLA. This type of analysis is not a new practice and can be traced back
through decades of military reporting.
Significant problem areas are identified for all the
services. The following sections provide a few examples across three categories
from Chinese reports published since 2010. Often reports are couched in terms
of “some units,” so it is difficult to assess exactly how widespread the
problems are. The difficulties, however, must be common enough throughout the
force to merit such public attention.
Personnel Quality
The goal of improving the quality of officers,
noncommissioned officers, and conscripts has been at the top of the PLA agenda
for many years, going back to Jiang Zemin’s guidance in the 1990s: “Though
we’re unable to develop all high-technology weapons and equipment within a
short period of time, we must train qualified personnel first, for we would
rather let our qualified personnel wait for equipment than the other way round”
(“Chinese Military Logistics: The GAD System Part II,” China Brief, October 14,
2004). Despite this emphasis, the PLA leadership still sees major shortcomings
in the performance of many commanders, staff officers and troops in all
services. A few examples of this type of evaluation include the
following:
- Then-President
Hu Jintao said “The military is facing prominent difficulties in
recruiting soldiers, retaining professionals…Therefore, we must find the
solution to these problems by adjusting and reforming related policies and
institutions” (Outlook, March 28, 2011);
- A
PLA Daily staff commentator article stated “We must be aware that the
overall level of talented personnel in our army is not compatible with the
requirements of fulfilling the historic mission in the new century, and
the quality of information technology personnel is not compatible with the
requirements for the development of combat effectiveness” (China Military
Online, April 19, 2011) [2];
- Another
PLA Daily article focused on the Navy noted “It must be understood that
the incompatibility between the requirements to build naval personnel and
to build an informatized navy and win informatized maritime wars remains a
relatively obvious contradiction” (China Military Online, May 11,
2011);
- Writing
about the state of the PLA’s joint operations capabilities, Major General
Chen Pinghua, political commissar of the 14th Group Army, said, “currently
there is still a gap between the Party committee’s [unit commander,
political commissar, and their deputies] tactical command capability and
the requirements to win an informatized warfare in some troop units”
(China Military Online, December 22, 2011 in Chinese and December 23 in
English).
Old-Style Thinking
Closely related to the quality of personnel is the need for
more innovation in thought and action. Much of the problem traces back to a
reluctance to change old practices. Some units must be encouraged to “change
their thinking” to actually use the new weapons and equipment issued them. Even
recently there have been reports of soldiers who are afraid of using new
equipment for fear of breaking or losing it, or because they have not been
properly trained in its operation and maintenance (this situation is often
referred to as “Lord Ye’s love of dragons,” Yègōng hàolóng).
- A
PLA Daily staff commentator article observed: “Some units have long been
mired in the conventional mentality…These units handle issues arbitrarily
and in accordance with their personal preferences, and they replace laws
and regulations with governance, power, order and personal feelings…a
small number of units still exhibit the phenomena of disobeying laws,
orders and regulations” (China Military Online, June 7 and 8, 2010);
- A
year later another staff commentator article repeated, “The problem at
present is that the phenomenon of failing to obey regulations and/or
failing to enforce laws or rules rigidly still exists in some units in one
form or another. Some people pay more attention to the rules of men than
to the rule of law” (China Military Online, March 21, 2011);
- Nanjing
Military Region commander and political commissar Cai Yingting and Zheng
Weiping told party leaders, “At present, due to the long peaceful
environment, a small number of military personnel relax readiness in their
thinking and mentality…
- Our forces are short of experience in fighting
actual operations under informatized conditions, and there still exists a
gap between their military capability and the requirement of winning in
war” (Qiushi, March 1).
Training
Currently, the PLA is experimenting with its training system
to implement a new doctrine that incorporates the new and old equipment in the
force. Commanders and staff officers recognize problems in both the content and
form of training. They seek to conduct realistic training so that their units
will “train as you fight and fight as you train” (China Military Online, May 4,
2012).
Some personnel, however, take “shortcuts,” like using unauthorized
civilian radios or cell phones, which undermine realism and could jeopardize
actual operations. Units are trying to find the best way to standardize,
monitor and evaluate training and eliminate the problem of “fakery” in order to
get good results.
- Major
General Xu Jingnian, commander of the 20th Group Army (a corps-level
organization) said “The basic campaign corps face many problems carrying
out joint training under current conditions” (China Military Online,
January 21, 2010);
- Major
General Chen Zhaohai, director of the General Staff Department Military
Training and Arms Department (now the Military Training Department)
assessed: “Currently, the PLA’s military training under informatized
conditions is still at the initial phase” (Xinhua, January 29,
2010);
- A
PLA Daily staff commentator summarized, “…military training in our army is
still generally mechanized. Traditional ideas and habitual practices have
not been drastically changed…The level of training support is not
sufficient for training under informatized conditions” (China Military
Online, March 31, 2011);
- Major
General Zhou Xiaozhou, commander of the 14th Group Army, stated “Some units
do not pay attention to training quality and efficiency, waste valuable
resources, which affect the scientific upgrading of unit combat
effectiveness” (China Military Online, July 24, 2011);
- After
acknowledging progress in military modernization, Lieutenant General Li
Shaojun, deputy commander of the Beijing Military Region, reported to the
National People’s Congress, “there is a gap between the overall combat
effectiveness of the PLA and the requirements of fulfilling new historical
missions” (China Military Online, March 13, 2012);
- Rear
Admiral Qiu Yanpeng, deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet, said, “No
matter whether it is in comparison to the navies of other world powers or
looking at the needs of the construction and development of the Chinese Navy,
there is considerable room for improvement in terms of the strength and
results of our distant sea training” (Xinhua, December 11, 2012).
The “Two Incompatibles”
Most of the examples above come from senior Army personnel
in positions of operational authority and responsibility. Similar assessments
are found in the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery newspapers. In addition
to the areas mentioned above, organizational shortcomings have been a common
theme over the past 15 years as the PLA has become smaller, but more
technologically advanced.
Operational and tactical headquarters have discovered
they are not structured adequately to command and control joint and combined
arms operations and have undergone significant structural and equipment changes.
Likewise, the PLA leadership understands the requirement for its logistics
system to keep pace with the changes in its combat systems. The problem of
logistics support is complicated by the existence of multiple types of similar
equipment in the force. For example, the Army has at least five types of main
battle tanks (each with variants) and 12 types of helicopters in its inventory.
Each different type of equipment brings with it different maintenance and
supply requirements, increasing the complexity of the logistics effort.
The challenges the PLA faces in its modernization program
have been clear to the senior leadership for many years. While they simplify
their assessment for foreigners by speaking of a 20 to 30 year gap in
capabilities, for their own internal consumption they speak of the “main
contradiction” (zhuyao maodun) or the “two incompatibles” (liangge buxiang
shiying). This evaluation of PLA (and People’s Armed Police) capabilities has
been attributed to Hu Jintao and was first published on January 1, 2006 in a
PLA Daily editorial. Though it has been translated in many ways, the statement
usually follows these lines:
“The main contradiction in our army building is that the
level of our modernization is incompatible with the demands of winning a local
war under informatized conditions, and our military capabilities are
incompatible with the demands of carrying out the army's historic missions in
the new century and new stage.”
Nearly all senior PLA leaders have repeated the “two
incompatibles” assessment in speeches or writing. It continues into the Xi
Jinping era, found as recently as April 4 and 16, 2013 inPLA Daily. Like other
assessments, it is usually buried deep in a Chinese-language article after
acknowledging progress in some area has been made. Its purpose is to motivate
the troops to continue the difficult task of military modernization. It also
may be used within the government bureaucracy to justify continued increases to
the defense budget. An accompanying explanation often bears these points
out:
“After the CCP's 16th Party Congress, China's defense power
has been substantially increased. Military Transformation with Chinese
Characteristics has attained significant achievement, with revolutions in
military affairs, modernization and regularization all working together in
concept to strengthen the military on all fronts.
At the same time,
preparations for military conflict continue apace, with clear advancements in
the ability of our nation's military to carry out the New Historical Missions.
But we must see, although the ‘two incompatibles’ are an important
contradiction affecting our military's construction, there remains a major
disparity between not only our military's level of modernization and the needs
of our national security, but with between ourselves and cutting edge military
forces around the world. Speeding up the modernization of National Defense and
the military and redoubling efforts to resolve the major contradiction while
increasing our across-the-board ability to carry out missions and implementing
the party's directive to strengthen the military has decisive significance”
(PLA Daily, April 16).
In short, for the senior Chinese leadership, the “Two
Incompatibles” are the measure of PLA modernization and a framework for
evaluating China’s military capabilities. They understand that although the PLA
has made great progress and looks much different from 15 years ago, there
remains much work to be done to achieve across-the-board advanced military
status. This self-awareness on the part of the PLA leadership suggests that
many senior military officials may not be as “hawkish” as they are frequently
portrayed. It is possible that their understanding of the many shortcomings in
the PLA may embolden them to urge caution in the use of force when advising the
senior Communist Party leadership in private. When ordered by the party,
however, they will seek to accomplish the missions using all the forces and
capabilities at their disposal. Moreover, the professionalism signaled in these
self-assessments suggests the PLA may employ these capabilities in ways we do
not expect. Discipline and necessity can be the parents of invention.
Some readers may be skeptical and assume this evaluation is
part of a grand strategic deception plan (Sun Tzu said, “All warfare is based
on deception”), but nearly all instances of the “Two Incompatibles” and most
functional assessments are found in newspapers and journals directed at a Chinese
audience. They have not been included in any of the externally-oriented defense
white papers. More importantly, such evaluations reveal the practical problems
a military will encounter as it moves from the book-learning phase to live
training in the field. It is more likely that the “two incompatibles”
assessment is related toSun Tzu’s instruction to “Know the enemy and know
yourself.” Successful execution of a deception plan or operations order is
unlikely without accurate knowledge of both the enemy and your own
capabilities…and weaknesses.
Notes:
Staff commentator articles in the PLA Daily, published by
the General Political Department, “speak for the paper as an institution.” See,
Paul H.B. Godwin and Alice L. Miller, China’s Forbearance Has Limits: Chinese
Threat and Retaliation Signaling and Its Implications for a Sino-American
Military Confrontation, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Center for
the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6,
April 2013, p. 32.
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