The engine of China's naval rise has flown under the radar - until now.
Eight key themes, listed sequentially below, characterize China’s rise as a
world-class military shipbuilder. For reference, the companies building the
warships are China State Shipbuilding Corporation (“CSSC”) and China
Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (“CSIC”).
1. China’s warship buildout thus far supports modernization and
replacement, not rapid expansion
Over the past six years, China’s overall fleet of frontline combatants has
expanded, but slowly, growing from 172 ships in 2005 to an estimated 221 vessels
in 2012. However, the fleet has improved substantially in qualitative terms as
newer ships and subs replace older ones. For instance, as Type 052 C/D
Luyang-series destroyers, Type 054A Jiangkai II-series
frigates, and Type 041 Yuan diesel-electric submarines have come into
the fleet, they are allowing the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to
steadily retire obsolete platforms like Luda destroyers and Ming
submarines.
2. Chinese military shipbuilders are catching up to Russian and
U.S. Yards
China’s large state-backed military shipbuilders are approaching their
Russian and U.S. peers in terms of the number of warships built. China’s large
submarine and surface warship buildout will, in a decade, likely have it become
second only to the U.S. in terms of total warships produced since 1990. More
importantly, the ramp-up of China’s construction of large warships in recent
years will mean the PLA Navy will likely be taking delivery of larger numbers of
modern surface combatants and submarines annually than the U.S. Navy.
Measured in terms of warships commissioned since 1990, China is now number
three globally and is rapidly gaining on Russia, the number two country. Most of
Russia’s post-1990 military ship deliveries simply reflected yards “finishing
up” Soviet-era projects.
Chinese yards, in contrast, have come on strong over the past decade, with
a big push in submarine construction that began in 2002-03 and a strong pipeline
of surface warship deliveries that continues to gain steam to this very day.
Chinese military shipyards—in particular the Changxing Island and Hudong
Zhonghua yards near Shanghai—are humming with activity, and over the next 2-3 years, China is likely to commission enough
large warships to put it second only to the U.S. in terms of large warships
built and delivered since 1990.
3. China’s military shipbuilders are using modular mass production
techniques
CSSC’s Jiangnan Shipyard is using modular construction methods to build
Type 052-series destroyers. Modular construction involves building the ship in
“blocks.” This maximizes a shipyard’s productive potential and also provides
greater latitude for modifying designs and customizing ships. Modular
construction also gives yards the flexibility to either build centers of
expertise within the yard or outsource the production of certain components and
then import them to the yard for final assembly.
CSSC’s Hudong Zhonghua shipyard also appears to be using modular
construction techniques for the Type 071 LPD. The yard has now constructed four
of the vessels, two of which are in service and two of which are in the
trial/outfitting stage. They have also been able to fabricate the Type 071 hulls
faster, with a time gap of nearly four years between the first and second
vessels, but only 10 months between vessels two and three, and four months
between vessels three and four.
4. China’s military shipyards appear to be sharing design and
production information across company lines
Historically, CSIC built all Chinese submarines, but the current production
run of Type 041 Yuan-class advanced diesel electric subs has seen at
least two boats being built in CSSC’s Jiangnan yard. This suggests submarine
construction expertise is growing outside of CSIC. However, there are no
indications thus far that CSSC is doing submarine design work, which could mean
that Beijing is making the companies and their design institutes share submarine
design and construction information. Likewise, the new Type 056 corvette is
being built in both CSSC and CSIC shipyards, suggesting that a standardized
design and production approach is being shared by both companies.
5. China’s military shipbuilders will be able to indigenously build
aircraft carriers
China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning,
which entered service on September 25th of this year, started as an empty
hull and gave CSIC valuable experience in effectively creating an
aircraft carrier from the keel up. China has a total of seven shipyards with
sufficiently large berths to assemble a carrier hull (three hundred meters or
more), and the yards are basically equally dispersed between CSSC and CSIC.
These yards are located in Dalian (CSIC), Qingdao (CSIC), Huludao (CSIC),
Shanghai (CSSC), and Guangzhou (CSSC).
CSIC Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry complex near Huludao (where China
builds its nuclear submarines) is a top candidate due to its large, covered
building sheds where carrier parts could be fabricated in modular fashion and
out of the view of satellite surveillance. The company says it has the “largest
indoor seven-step” ship construction facilities in China. This facility,
together with CSSC’s large new Changxing Island yard, and CSIC’s Dalian
yard—which fitted out the carrier Liaoning that just entered PLAN
service—are the three leading candidates to build China’s indigenous
carriers.
6. China will retain a military shipbuilding cost
advantage
We project that for at least the next five years, Chinese shipbuilders will
have a substantial labor cost advantage over their counterparts in South Korea,
Japan, and the U.S. CSSC’s Jiangnan shipyard can likely deliver a Type 052C
destroyer for 24% less than it costs Korea’s Hyundai heavy Industries to produce
a KDX-III destroyer. Likewise, according to disclosures in the July 2011 issue
of Shipborne Weapons, Wuchang shipyard can produce a late model diesel
electric sub such as the Type 041 for roughly 47% less than it would cost South
Korea’s DSME to make a Type 209 submarine. The lower labor cost in China likely
serves as a core driver. This may help explain the larger Chinese cost advantage
in building submarines, since advanced submarines can require substantially
larger number of man-hours to build than surface ships do.
7. China’s neighbors feel increasingly compelled to augment their
naval forces in response to Chinese warship production
South Korea has decided to expand its procurement of advanced
diesel-electric submarines to include nine KSS-III 3,000-ton submarines by 2020
and nine 1,800-ton subs by 2018. This acquisition will basically double the size
of the country’s current sub force and substantially enhance its capabilities,
since the biggest boats in the fleet are currently 1,800-ton vessels. South
Korea has also elected to double its Aegis destroyer purchases over the
next decade.
Similarly, Vietnam’s maritime friction with China and fear of the PLAN’s
growing power is making Hanoi into one of the Russian defense industry’s star
customers. Vietnam has ordered six
Kilo-class diesel submarines from Russia and is likely to take
delivery of its first Kilo by the end of 2012. Hanoi is also adding advanced
Russian anti-ship missiles and stealthy Gepard-class missile armed
patrol boats to its naval force.
8. China now has the potential to become a significant exporter of
diesel submarines and smaller surface warships
China’s shipbuilders are becoming increasingly competitive in terms of the
ratio of cost to combat power they can deliver. For instance, the July 2011
issue of Shipborne Weapons reports that China will supply 6 potentially
Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP)-equipped submarines to Pakistan for as little
as 1/3 the unit price at which European shipyards would be able to supply
comparable boats.
With the advent of the Type 041 Yuan-class diesel sub and Type 056
corvette, China now has two platforms for which it is already capable of series
production and for which the unit costs are likely to drop significantly in
coming years. The export version of Russia’s Steregushiy-class
corvette, called Tigr, currently stands at around U.S. $150 million per
vessel. As China’s Type 056 production run continues to expand, it
would not be a surprise to eventually see the PLAN’s unit cost end up in the
U.S. $110-120 million per vessel cost range, which would make the Type 056 a
serious export competitor to the Tigr and other smaller Russian
warships.
Conclusion
China’s naval shipbuilding industry has advanced to the point that it can
series produce modern diesel submarines, landing platform docks (LPDs),
destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and fast attack craft, albeit with some
imported components for a number of key systems. The ongoing series production
of Type 041 SSKs, Type 071 LPDs, Type 052 destroyers, and Type 056 corvettes
strongly suggests that China’s military shipbuilders have rapidly assimilated
commercial innovations such as modular construction.
Chinese naval shipbuilding faces several challenges moving forward. Most
notably, six major questions remain:
1. Does Beijing have the political will to continue devoting substantial
and growing resources to naval modernization?
2. Can China achieve requisite technical advances in weapons systems,
propulsion, and military electronics?
3. Can China master the technologies needed to build nuclear submarines
capable of surviving in a conflict with U.S. and Russian boats?
4. Can it build an aircraft carrier with catapults that would allow it to
maximize the strike and air combat capabilities of the J-15 fighter it is
likely to carry?
5. Will the Chinese leadership be willing to invest political and financial
capital in establishing intensive and realistic training for the PLAN and
provide diplomatic support for establishment of sustained access to facilities
in key areas such as the Indian Ocean region?
6. Will continued weakness in the global ship market prompt Beijing to
capitalize on the availability of shipyard space to further increase the pace of
military shipbuilding?
China’s military shipbuilders are showing that they can meet Beijing’s
current call for warships and could produce more if given the mandate and the
resources. The U.S. strategic rebalancing
toward the Asia-Pacific will need more than rhetoric if it is to
remain credible in the face of China’s potential to rapidly produce modern
warships.
The Pentagon should consider adjusting the U.S. Navy’s ship acquisition
programs in response. As Chinese warships become better, the numbers ratio
between the PLAN and U.S. Navy combatants will become increasingly important.
Given that shipbuilding is an industry where lead times can be many years, now
is the time for Washington to begin responding to China’s warship production
improvements and prepare strategically for further naval advances that Beijing
is likely to unveil over the next 2-3 years.
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