Covert Action Against Pak Terrorists
Much as I sympathise with the views expressed in the article and the proposed covert action against Pak-based terrorists, one needs to recognise some of the reasons why the GoI is hesitant.
Underlying all the reservations and hesitancy of the GoI is a fear that Pakistan will quickly escalate to nuclear threats if the punishment meted out by Indian proxies is truly effective. On the issue of nuclear diplomacy, Pakistan has already won hands down because the Indian political establishment lacked the expertise to engage in the game of nuclear brinkmanship and deterrence, which Pakistan played to the hilt, unlike any nuclear-weapons state in history! India's nuclear weapons acquisition and deployment were in the hands of scientists and bureacrats who were preoccupied with achieving technical capacity rather than diplomatic and strategic goals that ought to arise from it. India also suffered from the additional disadvantage of dated delivery systems for nuclear warheads while Pakistan was gifted these by China. This is now being rapildy remedied but the submarine brone, third leg of the triad is yet to become operational.
India needs to issue threats that Pakistan will find hard to ignore because third parties will force their absorption by its leadership. I have repeatedly suggested that India engage in a public discussion, without the involvement of the GoI, but with contributions from senior retired military and diplomatic personnel, along the lines that if India suffers a nuclear strike all bets are off and it will retailate against the country which financed them (Saudi Arabia) and the country (China) to which they ultimately belong, since they have merely outsourced the nuclear assets to Pakistan.
The GoI might also fear that Pakistan has many more resources inside India than vice versa and retaliation will mean India having to absorb serious costs. The advantage for India in the prevalent situation is that Pakistan has fewer vital targets and India has many, which means the former will be hard pressed to inflict enough damage to demoralise the Indian public. But one must bear this hard reality in mind and prepare accordingly, with adequate precautions, before embarking on undeclared war. The use of Afghan proxies for the task of assasinating LeT, other leaders and their families is an option that should be considered. In the main, once this policy is adopted there must be no mercy or let up until the enemy surrenders. These people are beyond redemption after their unpunished war crimes in East Pakistan during 1970-71 and the torture and muder of Indian service personnel like Captain Saurabh Kalia.
Much as I sympathise with the views expressed in the article and the proposed covert action against Pak-based terrorists, one needs to recognise some of the reasons why the GoI is hesitant.
Underlying all the reservations and hesitancy of the GoI is a fear that Pakistan will quickly escalate to nuclear threats if the punishment meted out by Indian proxies is truly effective. On the issue of nuclear diplomacy, Pakistan has already won hands down because the Indian political establishment lacked the expertise to engage in the game of nuclear brinkmanship and deterrence, which Pakistan played to the hilt, unlike any nuclear-weapons state in history! India's nuclear weapons acquisition and deployment were in the hands of scientists and bureacrats who were preoccupied with achieving technical capacity rather than diplomatic and strategic goals that ought to arise from it. India also suffered from the additional disadvantage of dated delivery systems for nuclear warheads while Pakistan was gifted these by China. This is now being rapildy remedied but the submarine brone, third leg of the triad is yet to become operational.
India needs to issue threats that Pakistan will find hard to ignore because third parties will force their absorption by its leadership. I have repeatedly suggested that India engage in a public discussion, without the involvement of the GoI, but with contributions from senior retired military and diplomatic personnel, along the lines that if India suffers a nuclear strike all bets are off and it will retailate against the country which financed them (Saudi Arabia) and the country (China) to which they ultimately belong, since they have merely outsourced the nuclear assets to Pakistan.
The GoI might also fear that Pakistan has many more resources inside India than vice versa and retaliation will mean India having to absorb serious costs. The advantage for India in the prevalent situation is that Pakistan has fewer vital targets and India has many, which means the former will be hard pressed to inflict enough damage to demoralise the Indian public. But one must bear this hard reality in mind and prepare accordingly, with adequate precautions, before embarking on undeclared war. The use of Afghan proxies for the task of assasinating LeT, other leaders and their families is an option that should be considered. In the main, once this policy is adopted there must be no mercy or let up until the enemy surrenders. These people are beyond redemption after their unpunished war crimes in East Pakistan during 1970-71 and the torture and muder of Indian service personnel like Captain Saurabh Kalia.
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