India Needs a Neocon Foreign Policy
It's time New Delhi shed its historical reticence about promoting democracy in its neighborhood.
By SADANAND DHUME
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324556304578116512489010812.html
It isn't often that two of the world's most instantly recognizable leaders
visit India in the same week. On Monday, Afghan President Hamid Karzai wrapped
up a four-day visit that focused on trade and investment, as well as deepening a
"strategic partnership" the two countries embarked upon last year. The next day,
Burmese Nobel laureate and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi arrived in India
for a week-long trip that includes a high-profile speech and a visit to her alma
mater in New Delhi.
On the surface, little more than coincidence ties the two visits together.
New Delhi plays host to scores of dignitaries each year, and it just happens
that the two most prominent ones this month hail from the neighborhood. But
Burma and Afghanistan also point toward the possibility of an intriguing new
direction for Indian foreign policy. Bracketed between a rising China and the
threat of resurgent radical Islam, the world's largest democracy may want to
rethink an old allergy to democracy-promotion.
In the long term, only the region's democrats, flawed as they may be, offer
India the hope of fostering the stability in its neighborhood it needs in order
to focus on economic development. With this in mind, it's about time New Delhi
fashioned a regional policy built explicitly around the idea that more democracy
is better for India and the region than the alternatives—Chinese-style
authoritarian capitalism or radical Islam.
This doesn't mean choosing countries' governments for them, or even
refusing to deal with authoritarian regimes when forced to by circumstances. But
it does involve shedding India's historical reticence about "interfering" in
other countries' internal affairs.
In Burma, this means rebuilding a frayed relationship with Ms. Suu Kyi
despite uncertainty over whether the generals who run the country are ready to
loosen their grip on power. Ditto for Afghanistan, where even an uninspiring and
incompetent elected government offers more hope than the medieval madness of the
Taliban.
In Pakistan, where admittedly India wields little direct influence, only
the deepening of democracy carries the prospect of Islamabad's civilians
ultimately prevailing upon the army to abandon its support for jihadist groups
such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Taliban and the Haqqani Network. In Bangladesh, New
Delhi should ideally prefer the relatively secular Awami League to the
Islamist-friendly Bangladesh Nationalist Party, but either is better than
military rule. In Sri Lanka, the biggest challenge India faces is ensuring equal
treatment of the beleaguered Tamil minority, and helping safeguard democratic
institutions that are under siege from the ruling Rajapaksa regime.
As for Nepal to the north, traditionalists may long for the days of the
monarchy when the country was at least governed, if not governed well. Yet by
now it's obvious that the most New Delhi can do in Kathmandu is encourage the
country's squabbling politicians to figure out how to work together without
returning to the violence of its Maoist rebellion.
Supporters of India's traditional worldview will balk at such boldness. As
a postcolonial nation, India has been careful to express no view of the kind of
government other nations choose. In Burma, for instance, India decided to play
ball with the generals when it became clear, in the 1990s, that Ms. Suu Kyi's
prospects were dim.
Ultimately, preferring such realpolitik over idealism, as the choice is
made out to be, is a false dichotomy. Despite its best efforts in Burma and
Afghanistan, in the long term India can't hope to compete with China by building
roads and power plants. Its strength is its vibrant society and entrepreneurial
private sector, not its decrepit government. This means leaving infrastructure
to the Chinese and focusing instead on the principles of free speech, minority
rights and independent institutions such as the judiciary and election
commission.
We could call this Indian neoconservatism. New Delhi should emphasize
giving young Sri Lankan journalists exposure to India's press or involve India's
private companies in a conversation with Burmese entrepreneurs, or give Afghan
movies a Bollywood boost.
To be sure, an Indian neoconservatism will evolve slowly. In practice, New
Delhi, like any other power, won't give up the right to work with authoritarian
regimes when other interests, such as access to natural resources, are involved.
Only the most starry-eyed optimist would suggest that strengthening democracy
will make the region's many problems—from poverty to corruption to religious
extremism—disappear overnight, or earn the goodwill of those irredeemably
hostile to it.
Nonetheless, there's no need
to be shy any longer about India's great achievement in protecting its core
democratic principles. A democratic neighborhood tilts the playing field toward
India and away from the authoritarian ideas that challenge it. It's time to
bring democracy-promotion in from the proverbial cold.
Mr. Dhume is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and
a columnist for WSJ.com. Follow him on Twitter @dhume01
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