THERMOPYLAE REDUX IN HIGH HIMALAYA
Maj Gen Raj Mehta, AVSM, VSM (Retd)
The
immortal, last stand of Maj Shaitan Singh, PVC (Posthumous), and Charlie
Company, 13 KUMAON, at Rezang La during
the Sino-Indian War, 1962.
"How can a Man
die better than facing fearful odds,
For the ashes of his Fathers and the temples of his Gods?"
-
Quoted from the poem ‘ Horatius’, by Thomas B. Macaulay, 1842.
It was sometime in the summer of 1986. Having just attended the Staff College course, I was pleasantly surprised when ordered to report to the Kumaon Regimental Centre (KRC), Ranikhet, for correction of the Army’s Part D Promotion Examination papers. I spent a week there, in that pine scented Centre in the Kumaon hills, helping correct the papers. I also spent some time during each day of my stay, visiting the KRC War Museum; one of the finest the Army had available.
There were fascinating exhibits to see but none more moving than those of
Maj Shaitan Singh, PVC (Posthumous), that held me riveted.…His blood stained
uniform shirt, his bullet pierced FSMO (back-pack) and aluminum mess tin, were indisputable proof of the manner in which this bravest-of-bravehearts
met his death, and, with him, almost all of his Charlie Company…I have traveled
widely but do not recall any other bravery exhibits that so compel you to
salute the spirit of a men who led himself and his men into the noblest of
deaths; on an icy Himalayan battlefield, equipped with little more than cold
courage, sheer grit and passion for Naam,
Namak and Nishan. 21 years
later, I visited the war memorial at Chushul, in Ladakh; the strategic area
that he had died defending. I recalled too, another war wounded Chushul hero,
the dignified, quietly humorous Maj Gen PL Kher, VrC, 1/8 GR, who, at Staff College,
had once narrated his memories of 18 November 1962 in the Chushul battle. This
article is, for I, one of the most moving of war stories that I have ever
narrated. Read on…
The Macro
Picture
The thoughtless conception and unprofessional conduct
of the rhetoric driven, militarily unviable and catastrophic ‘Forward Policy’ on
the Sino-Indian border, prior to conduct of the Sino-Indian War of 1962 (20
Oct-21 Nov 1962) led to savage Indian reverses at all the posts occupied by the
Indian Army to lend substance to this policy. This notwithstanding, the often
superb display of courage by the officers and soldiers at the tactical, unit
and sub unit levels commands our soldierly respect. Their posts were over-run
only after their ammunition was expended and bayonets and khukri’s used as a
last resort.
On the Western Sector front, the reduction of the
forward policy posts from their hasty deployments on the Indian claim line;
right from the area of the Karakoram Pass-DBO southwards to general area
Chushul, was completed by the PLA by 22 Oct 62.
Chushul in 1962 was an important strategic target
for the Chinese. It is a small Ladakhi village in a narrow (40 kms long and 6-7
kms wide), sandy valley at 14230 feet; flanked by the towering ridges of
the Ladakh Range (19000 feet) on its west and the Pangong Range (22000 feet);
an extension of the Karakoram Range on its east side. Chushul is located
less than 15 kms from the Chinese claim line and its great importance lay not
only in its all weather landing strip that was critical to the defense of
Ladakh, but also its strategic location on the just completed road linking
Chushul to Leh. Extended eastwards, this road linked through the critical “Spanggur
Gap” in the Pangong
Ranges to the Chinese hamlet
of Rudok, a key PLA forward zone launching base. The importance of Chushul is
better understood if one sees it as roughly equidistant between Leh, the
capital city of Ladakh about 130 kms to the
northwest across the Ladakh
Range and Rudok, the key
Chinese launching base about a 100 km to the southeast of Chushul. Immediately to the north of Chushul lay the
160 km long Pangong Tso (Lake) and eastwards
across the Spanggur Gap, lay the far smaller lake, named after it.
The strategic Spanggur gap which Chushul controlled
had dominating heights on either side. On the north lay Gurung Hill at 4808 metres. On the South lay Maggar Hill at 5182 metres and adjacent to it and southeast from
Chushul, lay Rezang La at 5005 metres or about 16300 feet; a key pass to
which the Chinese had built a motorable track which linked with the
Spanggur-Rudok Road. The capture of the pass by China would lay the newly
constructed Indian road to Chushul which ran southwards from Chushul to Tsaka La and thence to Leh open to
Chinese interception/road block; thus cutting off the Chushul defences from their
supplies and sustenance which were Leh based. Readers familiar with the area
will note that in 1962, the northern
road from Leh, via Karu-Chang La and along the southern banks of the
picturesque Pangong Tso (depicted in the Amir Khan film Three Idiots) did NOT exist.
Any Indian military appreciation could divine that, to capture the Chushal
complex, the Chinese first needed to capture Gurung Hill, Maggar hill and, most
importantly, Rezang La, which provided the flanking and therefore the most
dangerous approach to cut off the sole Indian communication life-line to Leh
around Tsaka La.
They did.
The Build up to the Battles of Chushul
HQ 15 Corps had approved of Gen Budh Singh, GOC
of the just raised 3 Infantry Division at Leh recommending Chushul as the Vital
Ground (VG) foreseeing that if the Chinese intended to take Leh, then the Spanggur
Gap between the mountains in which Chushul lies, would be their obvious route. 114
Infantry Brigade, till September 1962 a two battalion Brigade tasked to defend
the whole of Ladakh, thus suddenly found itself tasked to defend Chushul with
four battalions under Brig (later Army Chief) TN ‘Tappy’ Raina, MVC, a Kumaon Regiment
officer. He was ordered to defend this VG to the last man, last bullet. He flew
into Chushul on 28 October 1962. His area of responsibility was from Lukung in
the north to Tsaka La in the south; a formidable 80 km stretch in high
altitude.
Raina assessed that the Chinese had three attack
options for Chushul; from the north (Lukung/Thakung area); from across the
Pangong Tso; and, lastly, integrated infantry/armour attacks launched from
Rudok, which provided road access up to the Spanggur Gap, along with the option
of cutting off the Indian road communications near Tsaka La. This he considered
most likely. He realised that defending Chushul could be done by holding the
western heights of the valley (the air strip would be compromised) or occupying
the eastern heights (Gurung Hill, Maggar Hill and Rezang La). He chose the
latter option. His final deployment was to hold the northern approach (Lukung)
with 1 J&K Militia; the southern (Tsaka La) approach with 5 JAT, Gurung
Hill with 1/8 Gurkha Rifles supported by two troops of AMX-13 tanks of 20
Lancers which had been airlifted by AN-12B aircraft to Chushul on 26 October
and the Maggar Hill-Rezang La complex with 13 Kumaon, with one of its companies
at the site of the current Rezang La memorial in the valley. Chushul proper was
protected by the half squadron of light tanks, the RCL guns of the Brigade; a
battery of 13 Field Regt and a troop of 32 Heavy Mortar Regt, as also a lot of
camouflaged dummies made of abandoned dozers and other unserviceable vehicles.
The Brigade HQ was on the high ground overlooking the airstrip, protected by
the Battalion HQ of 1/8 GR and a section of Mahar Regt MMG’s.
The stage was thus set for war. The Chinese,
realising that rushing the Spanggur Gap would prove prohibitive, chose to try
and pretend that rushing was indeed their best option, while preparing silently
for the more pragmatic option of clearing the heights surrounding it.
Clausewitz would have approved…
The Battle of Rezang La
As stated above, till September 1962, the defence
of all of Ladakh was vested with the 114 Brigade and consisted of just two
infantry battalions; 1/8 Gurkha Rifles and
5 Jat. Initially, only the Gurkhas were deployed in Chushul. 13 Kumaon,
which was at Baramula, in the Kashmir
Valley, with its CO, Lt
Col HS Dhingra in hospital, was rushed in; beginning its deployment on 24
October, with the CO leading. He simply walked out of the MH as the unit was
going to war. Charlie Company, led by
Maj Shaitan Singh, was allotted to defend Rezang La by the experienced CO,
putting his best company commander at his most critical and furthest deployment,
a full 10 km from his Battalion HQ.
IC-7990 Shaitan Singh Bhati was born on December 1, 1924 at Jodhpur. His father was Lt Col Hem Singh
Bhati. He was commissioned in 13 Kumaon on 1 August 1949. He is
recalled as a thoughtful, serious soldier wedded to his profession. The defensive
positions dug out in the permafrost soil and rock by his 7, 8 and 9 Platoons were
‘crested’ for Indian artillery, meaning, thereby, that these troops could not
access artillery fire support when
needed as the guns were behind the Maggar Hill complex in the Spanggur Gap – a
major disadvantage. The company was stretched to straddle the two kilometer
wide pass; besides being compelled by terrain considerations to spread themselves
in depth, with wide gaps between the platoons and without shell proof overhead
cover for their bunkers.
13 Kumaon, an old Paltan with a glorious military record was the Kumaon Regiment's
only all-Ahir battalion; its hardy men of farming stock; coming from the Gurgaon/Mewat/Mahendergarh/Rewari
Ahirwal belt of Haryana. The men had bolt action .303 rifles equipped with five
round magazines and 600 rounds@soldier, six LMGs and some grenades and 1000
mortar bombs. The company had no anti-personnel mines. The Chinese, by
comparison, had 7.62mm self loading rifles; MMG’s and LMG’s; 120mm/81mm/60mm
mortars; 132mm rockets; and 75mm/ 57mm recoilless guns to bust bunkers.
Topographically also, the Chinese attacks on the Indian positions in the
Chushul area, came from the ridge line of the Pangong Ranges, which dominated
the lower Indian positions.
Before we proceed to the Rezang La battle, understanding
what was happening at Spanggur Gap will place Shaitan’s last stand in context. The
Chushul battle commenced at 0435 hours on 18 November 1962. The eerie silence
was shattered by the Chinese pounding the gap and many of its dummy positions
with murderous artillery barrages. The Indians retaliated. At 0545 hours,
Gurung Hill, held by 1/8 GR was attacked. Capt (later Maj Gen) PL Kher, VrC,
repulsed the attack, with severe losses to the Chinese; ably assisted by his
Artillery OP, 2/Lt SD Goswami, 13 Field Regt. A second attack was also repulsed.
In the Spanggur Gap, the half squadron tanks had also got into action against
the Chinese human waves. Kher had by now got wounded, but held on; with his troops
using their Khukri’s to regain a lost
position. Goswami, with most of his OP Party dead, continued to bring effective
fire on the Chinese till he was grievously wounded. His final orders before
losing consciousness asked for his own fire to be directed on to Gurkha
positions crowded by PLA soldiers; called ‘Defensive Fire Save Our Souls
(DF-SOS). Located late that night, barely alive, his legs had to be amputated.
He was awarded the MVC. By about 0900 hours, on 18 November, Gurung Hill had
fallen. Maggar Hill was kept under fire but not attacked. Instead, Rezang La
was.
With his Battalion HQ 10 kms away and with little
interconnectivity with the adjoining Maggar Hill Kumaoni Company, Shaitan and
his men knew that, for them, it would be “last man, last round” ab initio and
accepted their situation cheerfully. 7 Platoon led by Jemadar Surja was deployed north of the pass, 9 Platoon, led by Jemadar Ram Chandra was 1 km south of 7
platoon’s position along with the Company HQ and 8 platoon was deployed a
further 1.5 km south along with the
section of 3 in mortars.
It started snowing on the night of 17 November. At
0200 the Chinese were seen approaching. A skirmish followed. Meanwhile, a Chinese
patrol had cut the telephone lines to the Battalion HQ. At 0435, all platoons
reported heavy shelling. Shaitan ordered them to watch their flanks. At 0505
hours both Hari Ram and Surja saw attacks forming up against them. By 0515 the
attacks had been beaten back. The Chinese now changed tack, shifting to
tactical assault and bringing forward an
MMG. Jemadar Surja watching the attack forming up ordered Naik Ram Singh to take an LMG and move forward towards some rocks
along with Gulab Singh. This attack
was also beaten back. However, the Chinese MMG fire took its toll. Surja now
had only 11 men left. It became imperative to take out the MMG. Gulab Singh
volunteered and, along with Ram Singh he worked his way forward and both
charged the MMG from 50 metres. Both fell dead, just feet away. Out of respect,
the Chinese later covered them with blankets, leaving a “Brave Indian Soldiers” note behind; a gesture of rare battlefield
chivalry.
Meanwhile 7 Platoon was also targeted by intense
mortar and MMG fire, picking up heavy casualties. The attack was, however,
beaten back. It had become clear that the Chinese planned to capture the 7 and
8 Platoon defended localities before taking on the centrally located 9 Platoon
and CHQ. At 0655 hrs the sun rose. The Chinese barrage recommenced. The first
two of the renewed attacks were defeated, followed by two more which were also
beaten back. But now the Kumaonis were down to a few men. Vicious hand-to-hand
fighting with bayonets, and in one case, stones, ensued, in which all the men
were killed; found months later with multiple bullet and bayonet wounds. At
0800 hours the Chinese signaled their success over the platoons.
Shaitan was everywhere. Unmindful
of his own safety, he went from post to post raising the morale of his men and
continued to fight; ordering quick readjustments and taking spot decisions. He gauged
the grim situation and decided that the best position for him to make his last
stand would be the No 7 Platoon location. En route, a Chinese MMG from a hidden
location suddenly came to life, causing debilitating casualties. Shaitan
was hit in the arm and pulled by Phul Singh to cover. Phul Singh along
with Jai Narian tried to thereafter take him along to relative safety. Shot
again, this time in the abdomen, Maj Shaitan Singh sensed danger to their lives
and ordered the two to leave him and go
fight. They placed him behind a boulder,
where he was located, months later. By 1000 hours, it was all over. Of the 118 men at Rezang La, 109 men were
martyred, 5 were captured and only 4 returned alive; amongst them the two soldiers who were last with
Shaitan.
With the fall of Rezang La, Maggar Hill was next but
this attack was never launched. The Chinese had obviously had enough. Witnesses have testified that the PLA used blue uniformed
porters to load their dead into trucks. Opposite Rezang La, 25 such trucks were
loaded, placing the Chinese dead at a conservative 500 against the immortal
loss of the “Rezang La” company. This was witnessed by Brig R Jatar, who was
commanding the Bravo and Delta Companies of 13 Kumaon on Maggar Hill. He had
also sent a patrol of four men to find out the situation in Charlie Company but
only two had returned alive. Peking radio, in a
rare confession, admitted to having suffered its worst casualties at Rezang La.
Overall, they lost 1000 men in the Chushul battles combined.
What is
noteworthy is that, Chushul, the 15 Corps and 3 Infantry Division Vital Ground
had not fallen. 114 Infantry Brigade had held up the honour of the country.
Brig (later Army Chief) TN ‘Tappy’ Raina, the Commander, was correctly awarded
the MVC; yet another Kumaoni honour.
The War
Diary of 13 Kumaon noted movingly for that day: “We are now without Charlie company” – a poignant testimonial at par with that written
for the dead at Thermopylae, Greece in 480 BCE, when most of the defenders; especially
the 300 Spartans and their leader, King Leonidas, had died, defending the pass
against the Persian invaders:
Wayfarer, tell the world
Here we lie
Obedient to our orders
Here we lie
Obedient to our orders
The Rezang La War Memorial at Chushul, raised in
memory of those who died in this battle stands out for recall of another moving
testament to classic heroism rarely found on the battlefields of the world
across the time continuum:
"How can a Man
die better than facing fearful odds,
For the ashes of his Fathers and the temples
of his Gods?"
- Quoted from the poem ‘
Horatius’, by Thomas B. Macaulay, 1842.
The Aftermath
In January 1963, a shepherd chanced on Rezang La. It was
as if the last moment of battle had turned into a frozen tableau. Using International
Red Cross facilitation, Brig Raina led a
team which recorded the scene for posterity with cine/still cameras. Proud India learnt what
had actually happened on that Sunday morning. The company commander and his Jawans
were found in the trenches still holding their weapons; each with multiple
bullet and shrapnel/bayonet wounds. The 2-inch mortar man died with a bomb in
his hands; the medical orderly with a syringe in his hands…993 of the 1000
mortar bombs had been fired, with the balance seven ready to be fired. Every man had died a hero.
Major Shaitan Singh was conferred the PVC. Eight JCO’s/Jawans
the VrC. 13 Kumaon received the battle honour 'Rezang La' and its Charlie
Company is today proudly called Rezang
La Company.
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