ON AGNI V- 2ND TEST: WHAT LATE B. RAMAN WROTE IN APRIL 2012
Southasiaanalysis : Paper No.
5563
Dated 19-Sept-2013
We republish herewith
what late B. Raman wrote on Agni V soon after its first test on April 19, 2012.
What he wrote then still holds good. He called Agni V rightly a “Chinese
centric missile”, though the authorities even now are shy of calling it so. We
are also adding two more tributes on Raman written by our colleagues that could
not be published earlier.
Director.
Paper no 5014
21-April-2012
OUR CHINA-CENTRIC
MILITARY CAPABILITY
By B. Raman
We don’t need Agni-V,
the intermediate range ballistic missile that we successfully tested on April
19, 2012, to give ourselves a deterrent capability against Pakistan. We
need it only for a deterrent capability against China.
2. Agni-V is a
Chinese-centric missile. The Chinese rightly know it and would be evaluating
any changes required in their defence strategy vis-à-vis India in the light of India
having at its disposal a missile capable of hitting targets in mainland China, including Beijing. The operational missiles that we
have at our disposal now are in a position to successfully target
Chinese-occupied Tibet and
Western China such as Sichuan, which are not
yet economically as developed as Eastern China.
Once Agni V becomes operational, India
should be in a position to target those parts of Eastern
China on which its economic prosperity depends.
3. China’s plans to protect itself against a
possible Indian missile strike have to cover the whole of China, instead of only Western
China as it is till now. Our intelligence agencies have to be on
the look-out for indications of Chinese thinking on this subject.
4. While we are now in a
strategically better position to protect ourselves against China by discouraging Chinese temptations to
intimidate us with its missile capability, this does not mean that
our capability to protect ourselves tactically against China will
improve with the induction of Agni V into our arsenal.
5. Our ability to protect ourselves tactically will depend on
our conventional capability to deter a surprise Chinese strike across the
Himalayas to occupy areas---particularly in Arunachal Pradesh which it describes
as southern Tibet---
that it claims as its territory.
6. During the last 10
years, the entire Chinese military planning vis-à-vis India has been
focussed on giving itself such a surprise strike capability. Its improvement of
its road and rail networks in Western China, particularly in Tibet, its attempts for road-rail connectivity
with Nepal, Myanmar and Bangladesh,
its improvement of its air bases in Chinese-occupied Tibet
and live firing air exercises in Tibet are part of its plans to
strengthen its surprise strike capability.
7. Our Army did badly in
the 1962 Sino-Indian war not because it was a bad fighting force, but because
our policy-makers had not given it the required capability to neutralise a
Chinese surprise strike. If you do not give the Army the required capability,
you cannot blame it for doing badly.
8.Have we now learnt the right lessons from history and given the Army
the capability to blunt a surprise Chinese
strike and throw them back after inflicting a prohibitive cost on them? Unless we
confront the Chinese with the prospects of a prohibitive cost and outcome if
they indulge in a surprise strike as they did in 1962, the temptation on their
part to launch a surprise strike, if they lose patience with the border talks,
will remain.
9. While we are steadily
closing the gaps in our strategic military capabilities with China, the gaps
in our tactical capabilities remain and need to be identified and redressed. In
our euphoria over the successful Agni V test, we should not lose sight of the
continuing gaps in tactical capabilities and the need to close them.
10. The tactical situation that we face today is less
favourable than what the Chinese face. In 1962, China
had no military relationship worth the name with Pakistan. Today, China has a multi-dimensional military
relationship with Pakistan,
much of it focussed around the Gilgit-Baltistan axis. In 1962, China had no
military-related presence in our periphery. Today, it has in Myanmar, Bangladesh
and Sri Lanka. In 1962, we didn’t have to worry about the Chinese Air
Force and Navy. Today, we have to.
11. In 1962, the war
plans of the Chinese Air Force were largely focussed on Taiwan.
Today, there are indications of a partial shifting of the thinking of their Air
Force towards India. In 1962, they had no Navy worth the
name. Today, they have a Navy increasingly capable of operations in the Indian Ocean.
12. It is my assessment that if the Chinese mount a surprise
tactical strike across the Himalayas now, it
will be a joint Army-Air force operation. It will be a lightning strike
designed to satisfy their territorial objectives in the shortest possible time
without running the risk of a prolonged war. The role of their Navy will be insignificant for some
years to come.
13. We have to have a multi-pronged
strategy designed to enable us to pre-empt a tactical Chinese strike with the
co-operation of our Tibetan friends and to blunt their strike and throw them
back if pre-emption fails. Such a strategy would call for better
intelligence collection, better road-rail-air connectivity to the border areas, more well-equipped bases near
the border from where our Army and Air Force can operate and a better logistics
trail well-tested during peace time.
1`4. We have already taken steps towards
giving shape to such a multi-pronged strategy in the Himalayan area, but the
progress in implementation has been slow. Our policy-makers should pay urgent
attention to this. Our strategic and tactical thinking continues to be largely
Pakistan-centric.
15. Whatever Chinese-centric
thinking there has been is largely in the context of our power projection with
US blessing. We must remember : If there is another
limited border war with China
imposed on us by Beijing, the US will have no role in helping us.
We have to fight and win the war alone. Are we in a position to do so?
( The writer is
Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi,
and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate
of the Chennai Centre For China
Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter
: @SORBONNE75 )
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