Arab Spring or Islamic Spring?
August 26, 2013 -- Is the Arab Spring still an
appropriate moniker for describing the series of uprisings that started with
the overthrow of Tunisian president Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and then spread
eastward to engulf Libya, Egypt, Syria and Yemen? Or given how the region has
evolved over the past couple of years, would a more accurate label be the
Islamic Spring?
Prior to the overthrow
of Egypt's president Mohamed Morsi, whose roots were in the Muslim Brotherhood,
the trend line looked pretty clear. Islamic-flavored governments had sprouted
in Tunisia and Egypt, and there had been an alarming rise of extremist Islamic
groups in the civil conflicts in Syria and Iraq. But the recent violent purges
of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt should cause a reassessment of whether the
emergence of Islamic leadership in the region is an intermediate stage of a
process that will ultimately return to a more secular brand of politics, or
whether this will be a permanent legacy of the Arab Spring. This question isn't
trivial, as the political fortunes of Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, and the
interests of the United States, hang in the balance. A window onto the question
of whether it will be political Islam or secular nationalism that will emerge
strengthened from the current regional instability is provided by examining the
complex relationship between secular and religious identities in the Middle
East. In the political psyche of countries with strong national identities,
like Egypt, Islamic identity and national identity are two sides of the same
coin. While wrapped in very different symbols and ideologies, secular and
religious identities both are receptacles for, and get stirred by, nationalist
goals and grievances. The identity which achieves primacy in the political
consciousness of a particular individual or group is likely to be the one
perceived as the most instrumental in solving political (and social) problems,
not necessarily the one with the deepest ideological or historical roots.
Let’s look at the historical relationship between
secular and religious identities in the Middle East in this light, starting
with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1920s, and culminating
with the Iranian revolution in 1979. In both of these countries, Islamic
identity gained political currency, not as a repudiation of nationalism, but as
a more effective vehicle for delivering on nationalism's promises.
In Egypt in the 1920s and 1930s it was the inability
of secular nationalist leaders to deliver the country from the vice-grip of
British colonialist control that stirred the Islamic political identity of
Egyptian youth, and transformed the Muslim Brotherhood from a fringe to a more
mainstream movement. Inspired by the anticolonialist rhetoric of Islamic
leaders, both secular and religious-minded youth abandoned the nationalist Wafd
party to join the Muslim Brotherhood. And in Iran in 1979, individuals who were
ardent secular nationalists donned Islamic garb and supported the Islamic
Revolution and its leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. For them, Islam became a
more potent outlet for nationalist ambitions than the Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi,
who had lost political legitimacy. This tilt towards political Islam by
Iranians normally predisposed to be secular tells us that the revolution wasn't
a repudiation of secular nationalism, but rather an alternative vehicle for
expressing it.
So what does this
retrospective view mean for the future of Egypt’s national identity? It means
that Islamic politics is likely to continue to be a viable part of the
political mix because of, not in spite of, Egypt’s strong national identity.
For the followers of the Muslim Brotherhood, the popularity of the organization
doesn’t merely stem from its ability to tap into religious fervor, but also
from its deftness in tapping into Egypt's national narrative and its political
aspirations. Despite the terrorist labels Egypt’s current military leaders
apply to followers of the Brotherhood, one shouldn’t forget that Islamic
identity isn’t a negation of nationalism, but rather a different embodiment of
it. For this reason, the Egyptian military, unable to completely quash the
Brotherhood, would be wise to eventually create a pathway back into the
political system for the Islamic organization.
The political dynamics in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, countries with weak
national identities, however, are completely different. In these countries,
Islamic and national identities aren’t two sides of the same coin, but rather
polar opposites of one another. In the absence of strong national identities
and communities, Islamic groups fill the political vacuum. But in contrast to
Egypt, where national and Islamic identities are mutually reinforcing, Islamic
identities in these weak states don’t strengthen the national fabric; they tear
at it.
Some have suggested that one way
out of the current conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon is the devolution of
existing states into more viable Shi'ite, Sunni, and Christian enclaves. But
the emergence of rump states built on sectarian religious identities is
unlikely, as the current conflicts along sectarian lines are symptomatic of
crumbling states and illegitimate political structures, not evidence of a
crystallization of new and durable political communities. Sectarian religious
identities may represent a pathway into conflict, but they don't necessarily
provide a roadmap out. Predictions about
the formation of states built on sectarian religious identities also ignore the
tug of ethnic and nationalist identities that may form a solider foundation for
political community. A tilt towards these types of secular identities could be
reinforced by the geopolitics of the region.
If Syria, Lebanon and Iraq do
start to splinter on sectarian lines, the threat of possible exploitation by
Iran and Turkey could be a stimulant for some kind of revived Arab nationalism.
As we saw with Egypt and Iran, identity shifts can occur in response to the
need to generate power. The rise of non-Arab Iran and Turkey as regional
powers, juxtaposed with the weakening of states like Syria, Iraq and Lebanon,
might just be that imperative. The specter of this could be the jolt required
to push sectarian identities once again beneath the surface in favor of a more
powerful, unifying nationalist identity.
So the outlook for political Islam in the region is likely to be mixed.
Paradoxically, in Egypt where the Muslim Brotherhood is being brutally
suppressed, the prospects for an eventual role for Islamists are reasonably
strong. The only question is whether that will be played from the underground
opposition or as part of a new government. The Egyptian military will hopefully
pull back from the brink before it is too late, keeping in mind that the
challenges from the Brotherhood revolve around issues of legitimate governance
and leadership, not Egypt’s national identity. This is in stark contrast to
Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, where current battles are being fought for national
identity.
Washington lacks the leverage
to stem any of these conflicts. But if its goals are stabilization of Egypt and
prevention of further advances by Islamic elements in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon,
then it must take care not to unwittingly sully the credentials of
secular-nationalist elites in these countries. For this reason, despite the
political pressure in Washington for more muscular responses to the situations
in Syria and Egypt, at this point the Obama administration is correct in its
decision to tread lightly.
Ross Harrison is on the faculty of the
Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He is the author of Strategic Thinking in 3D: A Guide for National Security, Foreign Policy
and Business Professionals (Potomac Books: 2013).
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