Book Review:
Hybrid Warfare and Transnational Threats:
Perspectives for an Era of Persistent Conflict
Coedited by Paul Brister, William H. Natter III, and Robert R. Tomes
Council for Emerging National Security Affairs, 2011
Hybrid Warfare and Transnational Threats:
Perspectives for an Era of Persistent Conflict
Coedited by Paul Brister, William H. Natter III, and Robert R. Tomes
Council for Emerging National Security Affairs, 2011
There are over 20 armed conflicts under way around the world
today—and none of them are straightforward conventional clashes. To be sure,
there are recognizable battle lines in some places, such as Somalia, where
al-Shabaab fighters contend against central government and intervening foreign
forces. But much of the violence there is irregular as well, with hit-and-run
raiding, piracy, and acts of outright terrorism forming part of the mix. Such a roiling brew—conventional fighting,
guerrilla tactics, terror, and strategic crime—is the prototypical kind of
“hybrid war” addressed in this remarkable volume.
The editors and contributors all write with a clear sense of concern,
perhaps because of the perceived need to challenge the still widely held view
that
warfare has not fundamentally changed—a perspective that is given its due in the
book. For all the fairness in their approach, though, the weight of the evidence
and argument presented leave the reader in no doubt about the overarching belief
that, as Congressman Adam Smith puts it in his thoughtful foreword, “better
solutions” are needed. Given the travails of American arms over the past
decade—and not forgetting the debacle in Somalia nearly 20 years ago—one can
only nod in agreement with the call for improvement and lean forward in
anticipation of fresh ideas.
Hybrid Warfare and Transnational Threats is replete with new
insights into the nature of conflict in our time. The rise of networks and other
non state actors receives full coverage as a high-priority issue area. As
Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey Friedman assert in their chapter on the lessons of
the Israeli-Hezbollah war of 2006—a quintessential conflict between a nation and
network—the “future of non-state military
actors is a central issue for U.S. strategy and defense planning.”
Other contributors are just as sensitive to this theme, including Frank Hoffman—one of the “founding fathers” of the hybrid warfare concept. He mines other conflicts for insights and finds some rich veins of ore, as in the Russo-Chechen war of the mid-1990s. Hoffman notes that the “Chechens’ fusion of conventional capabilities, irregular tactics, information operations, and
Other contributors are just as sensitive to this theme, including Frank Hoffman—one of the “founding fathers” of the hybrid warfare concept. He mines other conflicts for insights and finds some rich veins of ore, as in the Russo-Chechen war of the mid-1990s. Hoffman notes that the “Chechens’ fusion of conventional capabilities, irregular tactics, information operations, and
deliberate terrorism makes this case an excellent prototype [of hybrid warfare]
against a modern power.”
The mention of information operations in the Chechen
case is just a hint of the comprehensive analysis of this subject that comes later in the
book. For example, there are useful observations about the skillful Russian use
of cyber attacks, in close coordination with conventional and irregular military
operations, in the 2008 war with Georgia. In her chapter on cyber warfare, Chris
Demchak goes further, making the case that cyberspace-based attacks can create
“historically unprecedented advantages.” The virtual domain aside, there is
also, in several chapters, close examination of the various “softer” forms of
influence operations being used in
most of the world’s conflicts most of the time—by all
sides.
For all the attention given to
analyzing the nature and extent of the hybrid warfare phenomenon, there is also
a significant effort to think through the responses the U.S. military ought to
make as it traverses the new landscape of conflict. In her chapter, Jackie
Sittel keys, among other things, on the “transformation of the services into
an agile force,” a
concept that has made its way into the new strategy that President Barack Obama
rolled out in the Pentagon in January. James Hasik next homes in on the problems
posed by our “absurdly long development cycles” and outlines a new approach
based on “rapid learning and responsive
development.” Daniel Magruder offers a compelling argument for pursuing
military organizational redesign along networked lines—with special operations forces serving as
exemplars. On this networking theme, Steven Miska rounds out the book’s
prescriptive agenda by
making the forceful case for including in the mix many key nodes from the
nonmilitary departments of government.
There is also considerable examination of American military
performance in Iraq and Afghanistan—and, to some extent, British operations in
the latter case. Perhaps the most wide-ranging and thought-provoking
contribution in this section comes from the eminent military historian Martin
van Creveld. His chapter has a kind of haunting quality, placing these wars in a
larger, six-decade-long context, and using them to pose the question of whether
the leading states really can master the challenges posed by insurgents and
terrorists. The answer, as he sees it, is still “blowing in the wind.” For
Guermantes Lailari, this “wind” is at the backs of the world’s jihadists,
helping to propel them along in the ways of hybrid warfare.
It is against the backdrop of the wide range of topics covered in Hybrid Warfare and Transnational
Threats—with its far-ranging survey of odd, irregular, and mixed
conflicts—that the outlines of the future world are now being sketched. The
editors and contributors have convinced me that developing an understanding of
hybrid warfare and mastering the challenges it poses are the most important
strategic concerns of our time.
But before understanding and mastery comes acceptance of
the phenomenon itself. My own experience suggests that acceptance comes slowly.
It took nearly 20 years from the time David Ronfeldt and I introduced our
concept of cyberwar for the Pentagon to formally declare cyberspace a
“warfighting domain” in July 2011. It took
15 years from the time we first asserted that “it takes a network to fight a
network” for these words to become widely repeated throughout the
military and national security apparatus. In both cases, it seems that these
long delays had costly but not grave consequences.
The same is not true of hybrid
warfare. Every day the validity of the concept is denied, and understanding and
mastery are delayed, is another day that sees the spread of conflict, suffering,
and the deaths of countless innocents. So let me wish the editors and
contributors to this volume Godspeed—and the same to those who I hope will
become a large legion of their readers.
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