2012
The Rafael Deal-Detail lies in hidden costs
Author: Abhijit
Iyer-Mitra
Rafale may have won the contest
for the supply of Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft to India, but there's a
strong possibility that we will end up paying far, far more than the bid amount.
It appears that Rafale had quoted an unrealistically low amount to win the
contract
After
Rafale won India’s Multi-Role Fighter aircraft contest in February this year and
the deadline given to its manufactures Dassault to submit the final documents
expired last week, one would think that having no international orders since its
first flight 21 years back, Dassault would have bent over backwards and produced
the required documentation in time. But nothing was submitted. Behind this
simple lapse lies a very complex story — one that should make every Indian
taxpayer pay much more attention to how the Defence Ministry spends its
money.
The Rafale story has just one ending: India
will not receive even half the technology that was promised by Dassault in the
company’s “100 per cent” claim, and the cost of the plane is likely to escalate
by well over 100 per cent, by conservative estimates.
The Defence Ministry’s think-tank, the
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, was the first to defend the missed
deadline — variously claiming mischief, pointing to interested parties, and then
going on to assert that no matter what the delays or cost, Rafale’s induction
was a national priority. It gave a whole host of bogus reasons and cyclic logic
that only a Government servant could think up. Ultimately this is the same line
used to defend the disastrous NREGA scheme where ‘need’ trumps demonstrated
failure.
There is a very sound logic to the delay. Having underpriced the
Rafale in the initial bidding, France has no option but to look for ways of cost
escalation in order to make a profit. This is exactly what happened with the
Scorpene submarines and the Russian Gorshkov carrier, which were offered at
ludicrously low prices, precisely to pre-empt the competition, and since then
have seen anywhere between 200 and 2000 per cent escalation. One would reckon
that with a 2000 per cent budgetary overshoot at the Defence Ministry, some
babu’s heads would roll or at the very least some lessons would have been
learnt? Evidently not. At some point, some one really needs to have a long hard
look at whether the IAS officers— like all products of standards tests, truly
are as monumentally incompetent as their actions reveal or if, in fact, this is
graft masquerading around as ineptitude and shielded by a lack of
accountability.
While
the IDSA was busy defending the deal, a little known French publication was
spilling the beans, pretty much predicting the course of the entire Rafale
procurement. L’usine nouvelle reported that Dassault was now convinced that
India did not have the technological expertise to indigenise the Rafale’s
production and well over 50 per cent of the production would remain in France —
including the all-important Active Electronically Scanned Array radar.
Evidently in the five years that the Medium
Multi-Role Combat Airraft competition dragged on, France did not see this
deficiency — promising us a full 100 per cent technology transfer. Even at that
time the high foreign content of the Rafale was deliberately concealed,
especially the seven per cent of it which comes under the US International
Traffic in Arms Regulations controls, which means India, will not even be
allowed to open the boxes in which those components are housed. Now, within six
months of winning the contract based on such promises they have already
determined that India cannot cope with such advanced 21-year-old
technology.
Hindustan
Aeronautics Limited and Defence Research and Development Organisation are
typical socialist enterprises — not required to perform, they merely provide
useless employment for the uselessly educated. Since there are no guidelines or
timeframes for research translating into tangible products, they are yet to
produce a single operational weapons system. Their research and development
being done without competent market research, much of their attention is
diverted to answering questions no one asked.
The deciding factor that won the Rafale the
competition was its lower cost. Even a cursory glance at the Rafale’s costing
for the French Senate done in 2009 indicated a unit price 2.25 times of what the
French quoted us, not factoring in inflation. Now given that all this knowledge
was public, when quality control is highly suspect, when your grocer sells you
‘premium basmati’ at 1/3rd the market price, it takes a real specimen to not
step back and ask, “Why”? Even after costing the country a full 2000 per cent in
hidden costs over the Gorshkov, evidently South Block mandarins do not involve
themselves in such trivial details so long as they get their D1 flats, Gymkhana
memberships and chauffeur-driven cars. Honestly living that life you could be
excused for thinking public money grows on trees.
What
can one expect from here? Four things:
First,
Dassault’s final submission will take much longer to materialise —
possibly another year or so.
Second,
a stream of news reports that we’ve already heard a thousand times before will
come out telling us how unprepared our institutions are to receive this
technology.
Third,
when that document from Dassault does indeed materialise, expect a minimum
170 per cent jump in costs attributed to “time delay”, “unforeseen problems”
and “supply chain variables”. Let’s not forget that, when this competition
started out in 2007 the deal was meant to cost us $10.6 billion. Now the figure
has already doubled to $20 billion, while any intelligent person who bothered
studying the publicly available costs would have fixed the price at $27 billion
as far back as 2009.
Finally,
India will not achieve self-sufficiency in combat aviation any time this century
— after all, if standardised tests produce bureaucrats this daft, HAL and
DRDO’s similarly standardised test scientists can hardly be expected to be much
better?
At some point, one needs to introspect very deeply. This is a
complex societal matrix of woe combining a broken education system, a complete
lack of governance, a total lack of accountability, institutional collapse, a
worrying lack of innovation, introspection and self-correction all leading up to
near total intellectual ossification. And you think simplistic solutions like
the Lokpal would work?
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