| Balkanization of Afghanistan beckons By Derek Henry Flood http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/SOU-02-200213.html In his February 12 State of the Union address, President Barack Obama outlined the beginning of the end of American participation in Afghanistan's now decades long civil war. The US would endure a phased troop withdrawal meant to halve the presence of American soldiers within a year's time, reducing the present force of approximately 66,000 by 34,000. The remainder are then theoretically going to make a rather hasty retreat between October 2014 and the start of 2015 with a possible residual force of several thousand soldiers staying on in a training and support capacity. The precise number of troops, if there are to be any at all, will depend on the outcome of negotiations between Washington and Kabul. Obama did not provide any spoiler alerts in his annual speech most likely because timetables and logistics with America's Afghan counterparts simply have yet to be hammered out. The message, however, was very clear: whether Afghanistan is ready or not, America's oversized military boot print in that country is already dissipating. On February 10, a transfer of command took place in Kabul for the American-led NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops waging a years-long fraught counterinsurgency campaign. Marine General Joseph Dunford took over from his predecessor General John Allen. Allen, still nominated for the top NATO post of Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), played a tangential part in a petty sex scandal that felled the career of now former CIA Director David Petraeus last fall. Though the Obama administration has yet to formally withdraw Allen's SACEUR nomination publicly, though Allen himself has opted out from the nomination process to avoid undue speculation regarding his role, however minimal, in the scandal that brought down his comrade Petraeus. An ever quixotic President Karzai refused to dignify the locked down handover ceremony with his presence despite a recent pledge to continue efforts to wind down the war by negotiating a vaguely outlined peace accord with the Afghan Taliban. The Presidential Palace dispatched the Afghan defense minister and national security chief in lieu of his eminence. During General Dunford's first full day on duty, the United States military began experimentally shipping a small quantity of voluminous metal containers stocked with war materiel through the contentious border gate at Torkham, signaling that the United States was beginning its drawdown under the stewardship of a man who Washington somewhat optimistically states will be its last major theater commander in Kabul. The equipment will eventually make the long trek to Karachi's port facilities on the Arabian Sea from where it can be shipped onward to return to American military supply depots. Though Afghanistan borders a total of six countries, in the eyes of the major Western players in the Afghan war, Pakistan is the sole meaningful border state. Sharing the 2,640-kilometer-long Durand Line (the de facto border), with its deep ties to the Taliban, Pakistan is deemed the state whose cooperation and influence is indispensable to ease the much-desired exit of virtually all NATO troops by the end of 2014. Without access to the Pakistani trucking network's perilous land routes leading down to Karachi, NATO is forced to rely on the much more costly, incredibly laborious Northern Distribution Network (NDN) in order to send the equipment as far away as cold-water ports on the Baltic Sea. After the deaths of 24 Pakistani soldiers in a coalition strike in November 2011, Islamabad enacted a seven month long blockade of NATO gear transiting Pakistani territory. This tragic incident gave NATO logisticians planning their withdrawal pause for thought with their temporary total reliance on the NDN in the face of Pakistani anger. Pakistani drivers may face death at the hands of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and NATO vehicles may be destroyed in the process, but the Pakistani transit corridor is simply considered far more efficient by the West. The withdrawal of the Americans en masse from Afghanistan coincides with the end of President Hamid Kazai's wobbly reign over the country since he was installed as interim ruler in December 2001 and then elected twice in a series of terribly flawed electoral processes in 2004 and 2009. Karzai has vowed to step down as Afghanistan's sole post-Taliban head of state but thus far he has no clear successor. The next presidential ballot is slated for April 2014 but prominent Afghan leaders are already maneuvering. Afghanistan appears to be at the edge of a cliff. Washington and its ISAF partners have been focused on the readiness of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and limiting the notorious corruption plaguing the Afghan National Police (ANP). The question that must be asked at this time though is whether the men in these organizations can and will remain loyal to a centralized state in Kabul if it appears Afghanistan is reverting to its pre-9/11 self. The wishful metrics of progress for Afghan security forces may be of little utility if powerful regional leaders begin openly reasserting themselves should the Taliban come back into measurable power in Nimruz, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Nangarhar provinces. If Taliban fighters then begin moving into vulnerable provinces like Herat, encircling the heavily Shi'ite Hazarajat region and applying military pressure in contested areas of northern Afghanistan's southern tier, as they did in the 1990s, Afghanistan will either Balkanize itself into distinct warlord-led enclaves or enter into civil war without the advantage of Western air support.  Mohammed Sardar Saeedi, a northern regional leader of the ethnic-Hazara, Shia faction Hezb-i-Wahdat photographed at his home in Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan on April 4, 2008. Sardar is a key deputy of Hezb-i-Wahdat chief Mohammed Mohaqiq who fought bitterly against the Sunni Taliban assaults on northern Afghanistan in 1997 and 1998. Sardar told Asia Times Online that he led his men against the Taliban again in 2001 after 9/11. Hezb-i-Wahdat leaders like Saeedi have developed strong links with Iran over the years and detest the anti-Shi'ite sectarianism of the Taliban. Credit: Derek Henry Flood It was stipulated in the Bonn Agreement of December 2001 that Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) initiatives would do away with the warlord armies while bringing former combatants into interim security forces which would later become the ANA and ANP. Whether Afghanistan will see a total unraveling of DDR efforts after 2014 will depend on whether the overly centralized government in Kabul can maintain a degree of control over the regions enmeshed with a high degree of warlord culture. When United States forces began attacking Taliban and al-Qaeda positions in October 2001, the Americans - and later NATO - were essentially entering in an alliance with the losing side in a civil war. With a mix of overwhelming air power, suitcases full of cash handed over to anti-Taliban commanders popularly referred to as "warlords" in the press, and American Special Forces assisting ethnic-Tajik and Uzbek militias, the US reversed years of Taliban hard won military gains over the course of that fateful autumn.  Abdul Qadir Dostum, younger brother of the ethnic-Uzbek militia commander Abdul Rashid Dostum, pictured in the salon of his brother's lavish villa in Kabul's Shirpur district on August 16, 2009 after Abdul Rashid returned from a brief exile in Ankara, Turkey. Abdul Qadir was reportedly seriously injured when a Taliban suicide bomber attempted to assassinate Abdul Rashid in January 2005. It is highly unlike the powerful Dostum brothers would quietly accept some form of coalition government that folded in their Taliban foes. Credit: Derek Henry Flood Despite the George W Bush administration's stated desire to put an end to the "cruise missile diplomacy" emblematic of the Clinton era, there were very few American "boots on the ground" during the volatile weeks that the Taliban regime crumbled and melted away. The first Americans in Afghanistan were intelligence officers liaising with local Afghan strongmen hostile to the Taliban followed by small numbers of elite Special Forces detachments. Central Intelligence Agency officers were helping to reinvigorate the stagnant fiefdoms of anti-Taliban military leaders while small detachments of the US Army's 5th Special Forces Group Operational Detachment Alpha units (ODA) operating out of Uzbekistan's Karshi-Khanabad airbase were quietly inserted by the dozen under the cover of darkness to assist northern Afghan power brokers eager to reclaim territory lost to the Taliban in previous retreats or defeats. Groupings such as ODA 595 and 525 famously fought alongside General Abdul Rashid Dostum's Junbesh-i-Milli fighters and the mostly ethnic-Tajik forces under the command of Mohammed Atta Noor from Jamiat-i-Islami to eject the Taliban from Mazar-i-Sharif and other key northern cities facing Central Asia's soft underbelly. The wrinkle in this strategy was that Langley and the Pentagon were partnering with men who were not only enemies of the Taliban but loathed by Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment. This initial pairing of American Special Forces with Dostum, Atta, Mohaqiq, and others was deeply problematic from the start not only because of the less than stellar human rights record attributed to indigenous commanders documented by groups like Human Rights Watch dating back to the internecine fighting of the 1990s but because these men were sworn enemies of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate in headquartered in Islamabad's Aabpara area. Northern warlords - each with their own unique set of interests backed by constellation of patrons - relied on ties with states like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Iran, India, Turkey, and Russia for diplomatic succor (semi-hermetic Turkmenistan officially maintains a policy of "neutrality" in the region), refuge, and backing. This put the individual leaders of the former United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, known as the United Front for short, in a differing political and economic realm than the bulk of their Pashtun countrymen in the south and east in Pakistan's historic zone of influence. The heavily personality driven parties of the country's north, northeast, west and center, with their often bellicose view of the Taliban, may greatly complicate both Pakistan's and the United States' schemes for a bloodless transition to a post-NATO, post-Karzai Afghanistan. This contentious history put the legacy leaders of the United Front - long referred to in press accounts somewhat inarticulately as the "Northern Alliance" - in direct confrontation with Islamabad's interests on the Afghan battlefield. From late 2001 until now, the United States has tried to strike an impossible balance between the quarrelsome ethnic interest groups inside Afghanistan and its inherently frustrating alliance with the Pakistani security state and Islamabad's often wildly divergent localized regional strategic objectives. It was ascribed to the point of cliche that regularly cited the need for a friendly regime in Afghanistan in order to provide the Pakistani state with "strategic depth" in its geopolitical struggle with India that centered on ownership of Kashmir dating back to the partition of the British Raj in 1947. Pakistan's ambassador to the US, Sherry Rehman, insisted in mid-summer 2012 that Islamabad was already moving away from its failed strategic depth policy vis-a-vis Afghanistan. Rehman's comments were immediately backed up by the US Ambassador to Pakistan Richard Olson, who cited Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar's apparent willingness to abandon Pakistan's strategic depth doctrine. Pakistani daily Dawn reported last March FM Khar stating that Pakistan was firmly abandoning its legacy Afghanistan policy which she referred to as "historical baggage" that represented a "hangover " from an earlier era that was no longer relevant. While Pakistan's Taliban policy in Afghanistan caused Delhi to fret, outright frightened the authoritarian regimes in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan who feared for the creeping radicalization of their fragile societies, as well as nearly bringing Tehran to the brink of war with Islamabad's proxies after the execution of Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998, Islamabad's fostering of the Afghan Taliban did the most damage within Pakistan. For the Taliban are not merely an autochthonous Afghan movement, but one raised and shaped by activist Pakistani military officials influential during Benazir Bhutto's second prime ministership in the 1990s. Rather than the Taliban becoming the jurists of an efficient client state, its pathetic governing period in Afghanistan led to increased destabilization deeply affecting Pakistan for years to come. The sponsoring of Mullah Omar's regime ultimately resulted in drawing in the 100,000 ISAF troops currently present on Afghan soil - an anathema to many Afghans - and the Talibanization of vulnerable sectors of Pakistani society. The rise of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2007 has had severe consequences for Pakistan's entrenched political order. From the assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto in late 2007 to the tacit though denied complicity of ever increasing, deadly drone warfare in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the physical destruction of the old militant nexus in Afghanistan has only metastasized militancy at the juncture of South and Central Asia over the long term. Along with the troubles created by the TTP in the FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province more broadly, Pakistanis - the Hazara minority in Balochistan in particular - are suffering increasingly under the savagery of virulently anti-Shi'ite groups like Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan and Jaish-i-Muhammed, now known collectively as the "Punjabi Taliban". On January 14, the state-run Qatar News Agency disseminated a statement from the Qatari Foreign Ministry that it was officially sanctioning the opening of some kind of liaison office for the Afghan Taliban at the behest of the White House and Kabul. The Peninsula, a Qatari English-language daily, categorizes the Taliban vaguely as a "movement" rather than the Pentagon and NATO preferred term of an "insurgency". Labeling the Taliban as a movement implies the grouping had concrete, terrestrial political goals unlike the al-Qaeda men it once harbored from 1996-2001. The United States is eager to finally evolve from a poorly framed policy goal made by George W Bush on the evening of September 11, 2001 that told a global audience: "We will make no distinction between those who committed these acts and those who harbor them." Thus well before American jets dropped their first ordinance on Afghan soil on October 7, 2001, the Bush administration conflated the Taliban which sought international recognition as Afghanistan's legitimate rulers with the transnational al-Qaeda whose aim was to sow terror among apostate government both near and far. In fact the mostly provincial Afghan Taliban's initial aims were quite narrow. Under the leadership of a village preacher from rural Uruzgan Province called Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Taliban was largely focused on consolidating its rule inside Afghanistan by defeating its domestic opponents in central and northern Afghanistan. While in the process of imposing its parochial worldview among ordinary Afghans regardless of their sectarian or ethnic identities, Omar's group played host to an array of Sunni movements from across the Muslim world. From the amorphous al-Qaeda to those with far less grandiose goals that involved the creation of separatist Muslim-majority homelands such as the Caucasian rebels from the "Chechen Republic of Ichkeria" or the forlorn Uighur militants from China's Xinjiang Province who desired to political secession from the Russian Federation and China respectively. Though the Taliban harbored al-Qaeda during this period as it did many other radical Sunni movements, the two groups did not in fact share a common Islamist ideology. The Taliban are a historically Deobandi movement under Islam's Hanafi school of jurisprudence whose ideations originate in the Daurl Uloom madrassa in what is today the state of Uttar Pradesh, India. The Arabs that dominated the political Islam espoused by al-Qaeda were Salafi-jihadi adherents of the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence. The Deobandi Hanafism of the Taliban with its ingrained Central and South Asian Islamic socio-cultural currents was traditionally at odds with the even more literalist Hanbalism of the Saudi and Egyptian Salafis who have always been at the upper echelon of al-Qaeda's thought cycles. None of this is to say the two outfits certainly did not make common cause, particularly when facing external challengers such northern Afghan war-fighting groups or the foreign intervention forces suddenly present following 9/11. Though the two very different outfits at times maintained a sometimes mutually beneficial relationship, the working alliance between Mullah Omar's tin pot emirate and the stateless al-Qaeda leadership it hosted was laden with serious ideological and strategic disagreements. Beyond this, there were schisms within al-Qaeda itself regarding the Taliban's merits in relation its deeply flawed implementation of Islamic law in Afghanistan. Bin Laden was considered by many to in fact be a fairly minor, though notable for his pedigree, player in the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s. But with the attacks he ordered on the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on August 7, 1998, his presence and notoriety had begun to overshadow Mullah Omar outside Afghanistan. Bin Laden's fame heightened rapidly in neighboring Pakistan in particular when President Bill Clinton clumsily responded to the atrocities in East Africa with a barrage of Tomahawk missiles two weeks later on militant training camps in Khost Province in southeastern Afghanistan. Bin Laden's relaxed defiance of the American military juggernaut gave him the air of a folk hero among supporters in Peshawar or sympathetic enlisted men in the Pakistani army but it greatly chafed the Taliban's shura council who were not appreciative of the kind of explosive attention al-Qaeda's activities outside Afghanistan were bringing to their desperately impoverished, agrarian nation. The sort of comparatively abstract millenarian terrorism abroad espoused by bin Laden did not sync with the Taliban's attempts at nascent state re-formation in Kabul. The Taliban were keenly interested in creating an Islamic state that had its rightful place among the internationally recognized community of nation-states. To this end, the Taliban sought recognition as Afghanistan's rightful leaders at the UN headquarters in New York. Al-Qaeda was not interested in issues of statehood. Bin Laden's modus vivendi with the Taliban of the 1990s occurred partly to Afghanistan's pre-existing isolation after it was utterly abandoned by outside powers following the collapse of the Soviet Union. While only their patrons in Islamabad, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh provided them with such diplomatic credentials, the Taliban desired political acceptance by the wider world. They continued to prosecute their war against the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras of the north until they had pushed them back into a slice of Takhar Province and Badakhshan Province bordering Tajikistan. The rump government of the late president Burhanuddin Rabbani - which still held Afghanistan's seat at the UN - maintained an internally exiled government in the Badakhshani capital of Faizabad. Mullah Omar had the very earthly goal of destroying or coopting what remained of these ethnic war-fighting groups in order to wrest control of every square kilometer of Afghanistan from Rabbani's faction once and for all. The Taliban created facts on the ground as they battled fighters allied to Rabbani led by Ahmad Shah Massoud and other northern commanders harder and further into a remote corner of Afghanistan with little strategic relevance. Now several of the state actors that seek to steer Afghanistan toward a quasi-peaceful post-NATO-era settlement suddenly view the Taliban as a legitimate negotiating partner. David Cameron recently hosted Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari, at Chequers, the British prime minister's sprawling country estate northwest of London. The transparent episode appeared borne out of desperate pragmatism from the NATO side of the aisle. In response to the talk of talks, Zabiullah Mujahid, the lugubrious Taliban spokesman, dismissed the premise as a political farce. Mujahid told the Associated Press: "There is no change in the policy of the Islamic Emirate of not talking to the Karzai government…the Karzai regime is powerless and installed by others. Real parties to the conflict are those who have committed aggression." Karzai and Zardari pledged to conclude a peace deal between Kabul and the Taliban within an astonishingly brief six-month period. Considering the existing mutual distrust between Islamabad and Kabul, the factionalization of the Taliban over the last decade, and the fact that since first proposed in January 2012, the Taliban's Doha office has yet to really materialize. President Karzai's High Peace Council has borne little or no tangible fruit thus far. The brazen assassination by the Taliban of the former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani in his role of head of Karzai's appointed council in September 2011 eroded the idea of the so-called "moderate Taliban" in the eyes of skeptics. Amrullah Saleh, the former head of the National Directorate of Security and outspoken Karzai critic, told the BBC's Hardtalk that the notion of Taliban members who had genuinely moderated their views or reformed their ideology was "an invention."  The inauspicious former office of Abdul Hakim Mujahid, Mullah Omar's envoy to the UN until 2001, photographed on July 5, 2002 in Queens, New York's Flushing neighborhood. Though his efforts were formally halted by the US State Department in February 2001 which said it was enforcing UN sanctions related to the Taliban's refusal to expel Osama bin Laden, when Asia Times Online attempted to visit the office shortly before 9/11, a sign on the door still read "Taleban Islamic Movement of Afghanistan" in Pashto, Dari, and English. Mujahid is presently the deputy chairman of the Afghan High Peace Council appointed by President Karzai as interlocutors with the Taliban and warns of the prospect of renewed civil war should the West entirely abandon Afghanistan after 2014. Credit: Derek Henry Flood All considered, these factors add up to the notion of a peace deal by summer of this year as an unrealistic, herculean task. The High Peace Council is now led by Salahuddin Rabbani, the slain former president's son. For its part, Qatar is meant to serve as a neutral space where the concerned parties can come to at least an ad hoc agreement. In many parts of the world, however, tiny Qatar's intentions are met with outright suspicion. Qatari officials operated alongside Libyan rebels during the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, have been active in arming insurgent groups in Syria's bloody revolution turned civil war, and have been the subject of unsubstantiated reports of assisting Salafi-jihadis following the short-lived Islamist takeover of northern Mali. Though no robed Qatari official appeared alongside the pro-peace troika of Karzai, Zardari and Cameron, the small Emirate is no stranger to hosting rogue Islamists of varying stripes. In the 1990s, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was out of the reach of American authorities while he quietly worked as an engineer at Qatar's Ministry of Electricity and Water. On the small, lightly populated peninsula jutting forth from Saudi Arabia into the Persian Gulf, it is highly unlikely that Mohammed or other known al-Qaeda operatives were existing without both the knowledge and cooperation of government authorities such as Qatar's, then Minister of Islamic Affairs, Sheik Abdullah bin Khalid al-Thani on whose farm Mohammed was thought to have lived before fleeing to Pakistan in advance of a US dragnet. Al-Thani, currently interior minister would not likely object to the Taliban operating openly in the emirate. So while Kabul, Islamabad, London, Washington and apparently Doha are myopically pushing for a settlement with the Afghan Taliban, the various other non-state groups are barely mentioned if at all as if the Taliban were the sole perpetrator of anti-state violence, presently or potentially.  "…Make no distinction…" An American B52 Stratofortress strategic bomber makes the lengthy run from the obscure British Indian Ocean Territory of Diego Garcia toward the frontline between the ethnic Tajik and Uzbek fighters of Jamiat-i-Islami/Shura-i-Nazar and Taliban trenches amidst the hills beyond the town of Dasht-i-Qala on the cloudless morning of November 2, 2001. The B52 pilots indeed made no distinctions between Taliban front line positions and those held by al-Qaeda and other assorted non-Afghan nationals. Credit: Derek Henry Flood Outlier Pashtun warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, believed to be sheltering in Pakistan, still commands a potent insurgent movement called Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan that is not under the Taliban umbrella and which is opposed to the Afghan central government. Unlike the Taliban, HIG maintains a legal, tangible political office in Kabul and views itself as a hardline Islamist political party undergirded with strains of Pashtun nationalism. The Haqqani Network, a familial cross-border hybrid criminal-insurgent group allied to the Taliban but autonomous in nature, has barley been mentioned in big-think public pronouncements about the possibility of creating a lasting peace in Afghanistan. And then there are the previously mentioned war-fighting organizations whose allegiances lay primarily along ethnic and sectarian lines. Groups such as Jamiat-i-Islami, Junbesh-i-Milli, and Hezb-i-Wahdat can easily be reactivated in the event of a major Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan. The leaders of these groups have stores of weapons, cash, and bitter memories from a time when there were no Westerners present in their beleaguered Afghanistan. It is not difficult then for them to posit darker future scenarios where identity-based warfare will return in the event of a full-scale collapse of the central government in Kabul which has an unhealthy dependency on wealthy donor nations dating back to the Bonn Agreement. Though independent minded Afghans of all stripes have no desire for any form renewed Pakistani hegemony over Afghanistan, it is the recalcitrant northern-based leaders who fought so bitterly in the late 1990s, that feel their factions have the most to lose.  Dr Abdullah Abdullah photographed in the garden of his home on November 4, 2009 as he announced his exit from that year's bitterly contested presidential election with Hamid Karzai. In 2012, on the prospect of talking to the Taliban in Qatar, rather than Kabul or Kandahar, Abdullah told Iran's Fars New Agency: "We want negotiations with Taliban under the supervision of the United Nations and on Afghan soil." Credit: Derek Henry Flood When the Taliban swiftly rose to power from Kandahar to Kabul from 1994-1996, ruling Afghanistan's Pashtun belt hugging the Pakistan border was insufficient. Mullah Omar's commanders envisioned themselves as the whole of the country's rightful, righteous rulers. The minority ethnic factions originating in the anti-Soviet jihad may not want to but are prepared to retreat into their pre-Karzai era selves if push comes to shove.  Following the fall of Taloqan on November 11, ethnic-Tajik militiamen of Jamiat-i-Islami/Shura-i-Nazar mass on the frontline near the town of Khanabad during the siege of Kunduz City on November 15, 2001. If the leaders northern Afghan war-fighting groups genuinely believe the Taliban will try and retake the country after the exit of ISAF troops, it is not hard to imagine will quickly reconstitute autonomous militias like these. Credit: Derek Henry Flood In this context, having Pakistan and Qatar broker a settlement which reintegrates the Taliban into Kabul's spare ministry buildings or in the future formally cedes it territory in Pashtun-majority provinces in the south and east to the exclusion of all the other surrounding players in Eurasia may result in a future Afghanistan that resembles elements of the country's unfortunate past. Derek Henry Flood is a freelance journalist focusing on the Africa, the Middle East and South and Central Asia. He has covered many of the world's conflicts-both major and minor-since 9/11 as a frontline reporter. He blogs at the-war-diaries.com. Follow Derek on Twitter @DerekHenryFlood |
Thursday, February 28, 2013
The Art of Cyberwar
Feb. 20, 2013 -- The New York Times’ front-page report this
week that the Chinese army is hacking into America’s most sensitive
computer networks from a 12-story building outside Shanghai might
finally persuade skeptics that the threat of “cyber warfare” isn’t the
fevered fantasy of Richard Clarke, the producers of Die Hard 4, or the generals at the ever-growing U.S. Cyber Command. Alas, it’s real.
But
what is the threat? Few of those in the know believe that some fine
day, out of the blue, China will zap the programs that run our power
grids, gas lines, waterworks, or banking systems, sending our
economy—and much else—into a tailspin. Even if the Chinese could pull
off such a feat with one keystroke, it’s hard to imagine what they’d
accomplish, especially since their fortunes are wrapped up with our own.
The
more worrisome threat is subtler: that
the Chinese (or some other powers) will use their ability to wreak
cyberhavoc as leverage to strengthen their position, and weaken ours, in
a diplomatic crisis or a conventional war.
For
instance, in a brewing conflict over Taiwan or the South China Sea
(areas where China has asserted claims aggressively in recent years),
would an American president respond with full military force if he knew
that the Chinese would retaliate by turning out all the lights on the
Eastern Seaboard? A
familiar concept in strategic war games is “escalation-dominance.” The
idea is that victory goes to the player who can take a conflict to the
next level of violence in a way that inflicts enormous damage on his
opponent but very little on himself. The expected outcome of the
next round is so obvious that the opponent decides not to escalate; the
dominant player thus controls the subsequent course of the battle and
possibly wins the war.
Real
war is messier than war games. Escalation holds risks all round. The
two sides might have different perceptions of which one is dominant. Or
the dominant side might miscalculate the opponent’s strategic
priorities. For instance, China might think the American president
values
uninterrupted electricity on the East Coast more than a free,
independent Taiwan—but that thought might be mistaken. Still,
leaders in war and crisis do take these kinds of factors into account.
Many surrenders in history have been prompted less by the damage already
absorbed than by fears of the damage to come.
And
China is not the only foe or rival whose calculations are complicating
this new cyber world. Iran is another. Last summer, all of a sudden, a
computer virus
nicknamed Shamoonerased
three-quarters of the Aramco oil company’s corporate files, replacing
much of it with images of a burning American flag. It is widely believed
that the Iranians planted the “kill switch” in retaliation for the
U.S.-Israeli Stuxnet virus that disabled the centrifuges in their
nuclear
program.
The
implicit message sent not only to the United States but also, and
perhaps more importantly, to its Arab commercial partners: Don’t mess
with us, or we will mess with you. The Shamoon virus is now regarded as
the hint of another consequence that we’d likely face in the aftermath
of a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Will it deter such a
strike or serve as the final straw in a pile of risks that deters us
from striking (or deters the West’s Arab allies from playing whatever
part they might play in an attack)? Hard to say, but the Iranians
probably
intended the virus to have that effect.
So, what to do about all this? The
basic task is to dissuade potential foes from thinking that they would
gain escalation-dominance by launching, or having the ability to launch,
a cyberattack on America’s infrastructure.
A
popular notion of how to do this is to threaten “retaliation in
kind”—or, taking a phrase from the nuclear-deterrence playbook, “mutual
assured destruction.” This threat has its place in cyberwar but also its
limits, because the United States is far more dependent on computer
networks, in every aspect of its national security and its daily
economic life, than China, Iran, or any other prospective foe or rival.
Retaliation in kind might not serve as a sufficient deterrent because it
would inflict much less damage on them than their first strike would
inflict on us.
A better, but much harder, way is to defend the critical infrastructure in the first place. There are limits to this, too. First,
we’re in too deep; we can’t untether our economy from the Internet any
more than we can detour all road traffic off the interstate. Second,
there is no such thing as a perfect defense; if well-funded,
well-trained predators want to get in, they will get in. Still, there
are ways to wall off or split up the most critical segments of
infrastructure—and to
monitor further efforts to break in. If they
haven’t already, the private companies responsible for this
infrastructure should start to take these steps immediately. That is the point behind President Obama’s recent executive order on cybersecurity. In recent years, Congress has rejected bills requiring
Internet service providers to follow government standards on security
for various reasons, many of them legitimate. The executive order at
least allows government agencies to share information with ISPs, some of
it classified, on how to meet these standards themselves. It’s a good
first step.
But there’s another way to stave off the danger of cyberwar, and that’s diplomacy. In his extremely important 2010 book Cyber War,
Richard Clarke likened the current era to the decade after the first
atomic bombs, when American, then Soviet, scientists built these weapons
of enormous destructiveness—but before politicians or strategists
devised ways of thinking about them rationally: how to control them,
deter their use, or limit their damage if a war couldn’t be deterred.
It’s time to move on to the next era, when this sort of thinking did occur, not just in secretive
research tanks but also in open discussions and international negotiations. Clarke,
who was chief of counterterrorism and cybersecurity for Presidents
Clinton and Bush, spells out ways that concepts from nuclear arms
control—inspections and verification, no first use, and ideas from other
accords, including the Geneva Conventions—might be applied to
cyberweapons.
In
any case, it’s sheer silliness, at this point, to keep cyber issues off
the table for fear of upsetting the sensitivities of Chinese officials
(who deny that they have offensive cyberwarfare programs) and
thus possibly triggering a diplomatic crisis. A crisis already looms
from all sides of the globe; the United States, after all, has an
offensive cyberwarfare program, too. Best to deal with it head-on, and
soon.
Fred Kaplan is Slate's "War
Stories" columnist and author of the book, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War.
|
WITH CORRUPTION
RIDDEN ADMINISTRATION , BUDGET MEANS NOTHING
When the
Finance Minister allots funds in his budget under various schemes and claims that
all these schemes are ultimately for the benefit of the economically deprived section of the society,
the common men inevitably view such budget proposals with scepticism and disinterest.
The fact
is that there is no project of the government today where substantial amount of
funds are not syphoned away by the politicians , government officials at
various levels and business men ; all at the cost the aam admi for whom such projects and funds are supposed to be ultimately
intended. In India , it has become a
hopeless situation , with the Prime Minister of India not seem to be concerned
about the level of corruption and nepotism in his administration. He conveniently keeps his eyes and
mouth closed , while the fact is that
he has all the powers to enforce probity in public life , if only he has the desire,
will and administrative acumen.
This
budget which the Prime Minister and Finance minister claim as one of
thoughtful exercise , is a wasteful document as far as the common man is
concerned, who now realises that anything positive can happen in the country
only with the eradication of corruption.
In such corrupt conditions, the budget is a proposal in vacuum, as the
implementing machinery continues to remain dishonest.
N.S.Venkataraman
Nandini Voice for The Deprived
Email:- nsvenkatchennai@gmail.com
Monday, February 25, 2013
|
1971 War Eperience of 7 (Hunter) Squadron
This was sent to me by an old Seven Squadron (The Battleaxes) mate, Shiv Kumar Sharma, it is a very interesting account of his part in the 1971 War with Pakistan. And now 38 years later his feelings for all the lives that have been lost and the "couldn't care less attitude of the politicians...
Hi
Here is another very stirring, personal, day by day, blow by blow
account of air war, from his diary of 1971, by venerable HK Singh,
told in his modest and unassuming manner. He was a Hunter Pilot, one
who fought and survived. Thanks Johnson Chacko, Unni Katha for
forwarding this to me and forgive me for circulating it. It is a story
that warms the cockles and hence needs wider circulation.
Don’t miss the Post Script at the very end. I wish there was some way
to send a copy to the past and present Supreme Commanders, and the
rather shameless PM & Def Minister – men of straw.
Best regards
Story Of A Hunter Pilot - 71 War
Day One
CO came to our rooms the previous evening with the news that the
'Balloon had gone up' in the western sector so we were ‘On’ the next
morning. Briefing at 5 am. Told us he would be at the Bar later to
ensure nobody had more than 3 drinks and it would be closed on time. I
thought some of us may not be there the next evening but quickly
banished the thought.
After the Met briefing we got the FLOT (Forward Line Of Own Troops)
briefing by the GLO (Army Major) to ensure we engaged targets only
beyond that. To our utter dismay one senior guy questioned the GLO's
brief by quoting BBC news, betraying his anxiety, while the others
were putting up a brave face.
After that we checked that all Indian tags on under clothes etc were
removed. Then we were given a revolver each with 12 rounds and a
Bangla Deshi flag which was supposed to be shown to the Mukti Bahani
if shot down. It would get us help. We also got a money belt with 200
Paki rupees.
I flew two missions the first day which were a life changing
experience. I found my anxiety vanished when my engine roared to life.
The best part was firing a long burst at the Lal Minir Hat Control
tower. Boss shouted ‘Good Burst Laddie’ as the glass shattered. It was
like throwing a glass on the wall in the bar.
We lost two A/C and one pilot Andre D'Costa.
Guptji had his hydraulics shot up and a single out board drop tank
hang up, so had to eject overhead at 10G. It was like a demo ejection.
In the evening we brought Sandra (Mrs D'Costa ) and the kids to the
mess and clumsily tried to give them hope. His body was never found in
the marshy area where he went down.
Someone put on the Pak radio news on a transistor and the announcer
said that Pak troops had reached Siliguri. I remember telling the
Barman Dey "Dekho bahar koi paki officers ghoom raha hai to andar
drink ke liye bulao"
Tomorrow will be another day, as it sunk in to live from day to day.
HKS
Day Two
The second day started early too. I was to continue in the same
formation led by the boss Bunny Coelho. Our deputy leader Guptaji who
was shot down, on day one, was replaced as he was hurt from the
ejection.
Our targets were Ferries and bridges. No ‘Air Opposition’ was
expected as Dacca and other bases were subjected to a severe pounding
and neutralized on the first day itself. We later learned that there
was no credible Air Power retained to defend against IAF strikes. It
was said that the few pilots left, fled to W-Pak via Burma. Under this
‘Favourable Air Situation’ the Army I believe made a beeline for Dacca
skirting all resistance en-route and moving by day light too.
The fire power of the Hunter's 30mm x 4 Aden guns using HE ammo (not
used before in practice firing on the Range) was deadly. When I fired
a 3 to 4 second burst on train nothing happened for a sec and then the
bogie just blew off the rails. Why was this train moving about in the
day? By the time we swung around for the second pass, we drew heavy
small arms fire. Some bullet holes under wing but not in any critical
area.
So this was a troop train needing to move urgently enough, to risk day movement.
Another unforgetful sad sight was the masses of people scrambling for
cover if by chance we flew over a refugee camp (there were many near
the border).To see this mass of humanity trying to outrun a fighter,
told it's own story. Perhaps to these hapless people the sound and
sight of a screaming jet was associated with the imminence of death
being rained on them. We would waggle wings to show our friendly
status.
Another rather funny, somehow encouraging sight would be the DSC
guards, patrolling the taxi tracks and near the ORR, making crude
signs when we taxied past them. These signs wished the pilot luck and
conveyed to him to sock it hard to the enemy. This was followed by a
sharp rifle salute J.
The Hunter has two globular pods on either side of the four Front Guns
,where the links deposit after rounds are fired. These are called
'Sabrina'. I believe after some well endowed film star. After a
mission, when the Airmen would strip Sabrina, the links would fall to
the ground with a clanging sound. This would result in an impromptu
Bhangra with cheering and shouting.
I always left my jacket with the airman who helped me strap up and
told him I would be back to claim it. This became a sort of ritual
hand over/take over, with the take over after returning, accompanied
with clapping and cheering.
That evening when thinking of the front gun burst on the train, I
realized that I may have killed some people. But when I recalled the
many flashes from the ground near the target on which I was firing in
a dive, I said to myself, that they were trying to get me too for
those flashes were real anti- aircraft fire. It was a matter of one
getting the other. So it is better to thank your stars, that you are
still alive today, for tomorrow is another round in this deadly game
being played by both sides for the honour and freedom of our
countries. At least that is what most of felt back then.
At the end of day two, we were told to pack our bags as the squadron
was told to move to the western sector the next day
We did not lose any pilot or airplane the second day.
HKS
Day Three
This was a day of no action.
The CO was only told to move the Squadron to Kanpur. Further Orders
would be given on reaching there. Transport support arrived early and
we loaded up. Surprisingly we saw our squadron Doc Jackie Gupta arrive
fully geared up. He announced that he would move with the squadron.
This was the 'Battle Axes' josh.
So we ferried all the available aircraft with loaded/armed Front Guns
only to Kanpur. From Kanpur we were ordered to fly to Hindon, where we
reached late afternoon. Unexciting day.
Someone's brother came in from Delhi in an Ambassador car so a few of
us drove off to have a meal in a Delhi's Moti Mahal, in Darya Ganj
under Black Out conditions. We were clad in Flying suits (transport
support had not reached with personal baggage). The owners refused to
bill us and with folded hands wished us luck with the Punjabi blessing
'Jinde Raho' (May you live long). We stayed in town with friends to
return early the next day to learn that the Squadron was to move to
NAL forward base near Bikaner, Rajasthan.
Day Four
That day was my mother's birthday. The first thought in the morning
was that it is not a good day to buy it (get killed). However, there
were no strike missions on this day too.
We received orders to proceed to NAL forward base at Bikaner. Take
off was delayed due to the Hindon Fog.
The ferry was completed early afternoon. NAL turned out to be a pretty
desolate place in the Rajasthan Desert.. The Base was active as a
Mystere squadron was already operating from there. The airfield had
been bombed a few times in the past few days. The A/C were parked in
Blast Pens but there was no ORR or crew room. Only a small underground
Base Ops Complex.
The day ended with the Transport support Packet being given CAP
(Combat Air Patrol) cover for arrival and unloading.
Again after take off it was escorted 100 miles out by a dusk patrol,
a two ship formation with Guns, loaded up. Never seen a Packet being
unloaded and departing so fast.
Some of us were dispersed to the SU Officers mess in town while others
stayed on base. Fighter Controllers were nice lot. Meeting them
personally created a good sense of camaraderie, for these guys gave
Radar Cover for missions flown in the next few days.
The town group was given a requisitioned civil Jonga Taxi as aircrew
transport, driven by a local civilian driver named Jetharam. Wonder
what was his security clearance for he could see whatever was going,
as he was around the whole day.
Extra Messing special was, you guessed it Bikaneri Bhujia.
Day Five
Came in early with Jetharam for briefing at the Base Ops. There were
no targets allocated so we could not decide what armament should be
loaded up and the drop tank configuration. It made Chief Bhasin"s work
tentative. Typical order "Keep both Bombs and rockets on the cradles"
Boss reassured Bhasin he would get the time needed to configure the
planes. Then Indian ingenuity chipped in "Configure 4 a/c with Bombs
and 4 others with Rockets”. Problem solved (When two 1000 lb Bombs are
carried under wing then only two fuel drops tanks can be attached
reducing strike range. However Rocket pods allow four drop tanks to be
attached)
Later in the morning two search and destroy missions were ordered.
‘Look for enemy Tanks on the other side of the border’, was the
briefing. Boss decided to go with T-10 rockets with Guns always
remaining loaded with HE/AP (High Explosive/Armour Piercing) Rounds
The mission did not see anything worthwhile to report. Secondary
targets were engaged. The story was the same for all missions flown
that day including one flown by me.
Nobody reported any anti-aircraft fire nor did anybody take any hits.
On the Air Defence side the ORP aircraft were static the whole day.
A CAP was mounted at dusk to shake off the monotony and get into the air.
Logistics were poor. Food was a problem and operating from open Blast
pens in the desert meant being exposed both to cold and heat as the
day dragged on. Back at the Mess, sleeping on the carpet became
irritating as most of us were wondering what was the purpose of coming
to this disorganized place. People wanted some action which was
missing after the first two days. Even the PAF bombers did not come
that night.
HKS
Day Six
This day started with a briefing by the Oi/c Base ops who was the
Mission Liaison with Command HQ, and the day ended with losing our
Boss who was shot down. Once again the missions being ordered were
more of search and destroy type. Radar Cover was limited. Flying deck
level made navigation difficult in the desert especially when weaving
all the time. Ammo was T-10 rockets and Guns.
No military movement were spotted. Later we changed our tactics and
decided to operate at around 5000 feet as some loiter time during the
mission. This exposed us to the enemy radar with chances of drawing
enemy fighters to engage us. It also improved our vision field and
contact with our own radar. The scope of the mission was increased by
adding this sort of offensive sweep element .We were rearing to engage
enemy fighters if they came for us. All of us had practiced plenty of
low level dog fighting in the run up to this war. However there was no
joy. No grief, as well for our two a/c formation could have been
bounced by a formation of four or more enemy fighters. To avoid any
nasty surprises we remained in our territory near the border and under
Radar Cover of our SU. Perhaps we were looking for the thrust by the
Enemy Armour which actually happened at Longewala, way to the south
and therefore we saw nothing.
Pilots started taking on sundry targets and sometimes the ordnance was
inappropriate for the target engaged. Nobody wanted to return with
his weapon load not discharged. Boss was shot down near a huge
bridge which he and his wing man were engaging with T-10 Rockets. He
was seen to eject from a burning a/c by his wing man. Apparently he
ejected almost on the border during a 1800 turn. Enemy troops got to
him first and he was taken prisoner. Had the dive direction been
easterly instead of westerly, he would have ejected well in our
territory after taking a hit. Lesson brought home again for future
attacks on targets close to the border like Army Co-op.
Boss came back after 18 months. He then told us that after his
capture there was a heated argument amongst his captors ,with him
standing right there. Some soldiers wanted to kill him then and there
to avenge the death of some colleagues by his attack, while others
wanted to hand him over to their superiors and claim a reward for
shooting down his a/c. Lucky for him that the latter prevailed. He
recounted a funny story of PAF pilot's wives coming in a group to look
at IAF pilots behind bars, in the POW camp . One ofour guys asked
them loudly " what did you expect to see Monkeys? You should have
brought peanuts to throw at us" They were embarrassed and left
quickly.
I did two useless missions that day. Fired rockets on a rather big
factory type structure and the second time on a power station, both
the times on the way back to base.
.
As Adjutant, another problem was brewing up. The Airmen were
accommodated in a school building where they were told to cook their
own food. This was becoming an issue as we had no cooks. Plus the men
had to report before dawn and work till dusk. Looked bad. Officiating
CO Allan Ally asked me to handle it as he was too busy with ops
matters. In turn I told JWO Bhasin (one of the best I have seen) to
detail some men of the non-ops trades to manage the cooking whilst I
tried to get local help
Back to the mess. Three regulation shots and Bhujia, both Bikaneri and
'do aanda ka' and yet another day behind me with another looming ahead
in this deadly scenario of living from day to day.
Day Seven
In the morning we were visited by the Governor of Rajasthan Shri Barkatullah Khan and his charming wife. They brought buckets of Rasagollas as a gift. However they were off the mark when it came to what we were doing operationally which was good enough for us. In an
impeccable accent, Mrs Khan congratulated us for creating History. apparently she thought we were the Hunter Squadron which had put to the sword the enemy Armour thrust at Longewala. The Film 'Border' was
later made on this heroic action by the Hunter jocks operating from Jamnagar, not us at NAL.
This day was not very different from the last two as far as Operations were concerned, except for one incident which is still vividly etched in my memory and I still wonder about it. We got a new CO, Wg Cdr NC Suri, who was in the DASI Team before being assigned this job. He was a very experienced Hunter jock, having commanded a type Squadron. I was designated to be his wing man. One mission was flown by me that day. We were on a Tac/Recee in the area near the town of Bhawalpur in enemy territory. I spotted dust being kicked up which was linked to some vehicle movement. I manoeuvred into position for an attack. In the dive my gun safety catch was unlocked and my finger ready to squeeze the trigger. When almost in the firing range, I clearly saw that the moving target was a black Car. I did not fire but made a low pass telling my wing man to hold fire and also buzz the still moving car which he did.
Usually on hearing the sound of jets, vehicles immediately stop, the drivers expecting an attack. They get away from the vehicle to avoid being killed. But not this one, it just kept going. I made another dive attack but just could not get myself to fire. A one second FG
burst would have blown up this car to smithereens. I called 'Disengaging' and asked my wing man to join up as we headed back.
To this day I wonder who could have been at the wheel of that car so oblivious of death screaming above their heads. Perhaps some pretty Damsel on her way to a rendezvous, lost in her own thoughts, unaware
of the raging war.
The new boss was clearly unhappy with the task assigned to the Squadron. He was instrumental in getting the HQ to reconsider our deployment and the next day we learned that we were slated to move to Pathankot, where the real action was.
Some Airmen began complaining that it was difficult to work without proper food. It became my unpleasant duty to make everyone 'fall in' and remind them that we were at war and we had to take the problems in our stride and work till we dropped. Pilots were flying missions after
popping Rasagollas. Refusal to work in the war Zone was a serious offense swiftly punishable by a Field Court Martial and a firing squad. I have to confess that earlier JWO Bhasin had used similar words and requested me to back him by repeating the same." After all I have to
get work out of them", he had said. Nothing like a seasoned Warrant Officer on the side of a young Adjutant.
By the evening it was confirmed that we were going to move the next day. Jetharam drove us back to the Mess, via the market place. He treated us to hot tea and ‘Kachuries’ as a crowd gathered. It was his way of
saying "Thank You" HKS
When back to base after the war, this story about that talk between Bhasin and me leaked out. At a victory Rum Punch some airmen showed their anger but things settled down when I said we had no choice but
to keep things going and apologized for that empty threat. Their anger quickly dissipated after I did a couple of arms locked Chug Lug (Bottoms Up) with the angry Airmen.
Day Eight
The A/C were readied for the ferry to Pathankot via Hindon. Front Guns were armed with a four drop tank configuration. Take off was delayed due to Fog in Hindon. One A/C had to be ferried to the Repair Depot at Kanpur after 'Patch' repair to the bullet holes. It needed major doing up.
Surprisingly one of the Senior Operational Pilots wanted to go. He was the guy who had seen earlier Boss eject from his burning A/C. Normally this ferry job would be given to a junior guy and there were many available. The CO let him go. He never re-joined the Squadron
till after the day the war was over. The war exposure affected this guy so much that he committed suicide a few months later. Nobody knew about PTSD those days, nor did this guy get any medical help as far as we knew.
Here is another very stirring, personal, day by day, blow by blow
account of air war, from his diary of 1971, by venerable HK Singh,
told in his modest and unassuming manner. He was a Hunter Pilot, one
who fought and survived. Thanks Johnson Chacko, Unni Katha for
forwarding this to me and forgive me for circulating it. It is a story
that warms the cockles and hence needs wider circulation.
Don’t miss the Post Script at the very end. I wish there was some way
to send a copy to the past and present Supreme Commanders, and the
rather shameless PM & Def Minister – men of straw.
Best regards
Story Of A Hunter Pilot - 71 War
Day One
CO came to our rooms the previous evening with the news that the
'Balloon had gone up' in the western sector so we were ‘On’ the next
morning. Briefing at 5 am. Told us he would be at the Bar later to
ensure nobody had more than 3 drinks and it would be closed on time. I
thought some of us may not be there the next evening but quickly
banished the thought.
After the Met briefing we got the FLOT (Forward Line Of Own Troops)
briefing by the GLO (Army Major) to ensure we engaged targets only
beyond that. To our utter dismay one senior guy questioned the GLO's
brief by quoting BBC news, betraying his anxiety, while the others
were putting up a brave face.
After that we checked that all Indian tags on under clothes etc were
removed. Then we were given a revolver each with 12 rounds and a
Bangla Deshi flag which was supposed to be shown to the Mukti Bahani
if shot down. It would get us help. We also got a money belt with 200
Paki rupees.
I flew two missions the first day which were a life changing
experience. I found my anxiety vanished when my engine roared to life.
The best part was firing a long burst at the Lal Minir Hat Control
tower. Boss shouted ‘Good Burst Laddie’ as the glass shattered. It was
like throwing a glass on the wall in the bar.
We lost two A/C and one pilot Andre D'Costa.
Guptji had his hydraulics shot up and a single out board drop tank
hang up, so had to eject overhead at 10G. It was like a demo ejection.
In the evening we brought Sandra (Mrs D'Costa ) and the kids to the
mess and clumsily tried to give them hope. His body was never found in
the marshy area where he went down.
Someone put on the Pak radio news on a transistor and the announcer
said that Pak troops had reached Siliguri. I remember telling the
Barman Dey "Dekho bahar koi paki officers ghoom raha hai to andar
drink ke liye bulao"
Tomorrow will be another day, as it sunk in to live from day to day.
HKS
Day Two
The second day started early too. I was to continue in the same
formation led by the boss Bunny Coelho. Our deputy leader Guptaji who
was shot down, on day one, was replaced as he was hurt from the
ejection.
Our targets were Ferries and bridges. No ‘Air Opposition’ was
expected as Dacca and other bases were subjected to a severe pounding
and neutralized on the first day itself. We later learned that there
was no credible Air Power retained to defend against IAF strikes. It
was said that the few pilots left, fled to W-Pak via Burma. Under this
‘Favourable Air Situation’ the Army I believe made a beeline for Dacca
skirting all resistance en-route and moving by day light too.
The fire power of the Hunter's 30mm x 4 Aden guns using HE ammo (not
used before in practice firing on the Range) was deadly. When I fired
a 3 to 4 second burst on train nothing happened for a sec and then the
bogie just blew off the rails. Why was this train moving about in the
day? By the time we swung around for the second pass, we drew heavy
small arms fire. Some bullet holes under wing but not in any critical
area.
So this was a troop train needing to move urgently enough, to risk day movement.
Another unforgetful sad sight was the masses of people scrambling for
cover if by chance we flew over a refugee camp (there were many near
the border).To see this mass of humanity trying to outrun a fighter,
told it's own story. Perhaps to these hapless people the sound and
sight of a screaming jet was associated with the imminence of death
being rained on them. We would waggle wings to show our friendly
status.
Another rather funny, somehow encouraging sight would be the DSC
guards, patrolling the taxi tracks and near the ORR, making crude
signs when we taxied past them. These signs wished the pilot luck and
conveyed to him to sock it hard to the enemy. This was followed by a
sharp rifle salute J.
The Hunter has two globular pods on either side of the four Front Guns
,where the links deposit after rounds are fired. These are called
'Sabrina'. I believe after some well endowed film star. After a
mission, when the Airmen would strip Sabrina, the links would fall to
the ground with a clanging sound. This would result in an impromptu
Bhangra with cheering and shouting.
I always left my jacket with the airman who helped me strap up and
told him I would be back to claim it. This became a sort of ritual
hand over/take over, with the take over after returning, accompanied
with clapping and cheering.
That evening when thinking of the front gun burst on the train, I
realized that I may have killed some people. But when I recalled the
many flashes from the ground near the target on which I was firing in
a dive, I said to myself, that they were trying to get me too for
those flashes were real anti- aircraft fire. It was a matter of one
getting the other. So it is better to thank your stars, that you are
still alive today, for tomorrow is another round in this deadly game
being played by both sides for the honour and freedom of our
countries. At least that is what most of felt back then.
At the end of day two, we were told to pack our bags as the squadron
was told to move to the western sector the next day
We did not lose any pilot or airplane the second day.
HKS
Day Three
This was a day of no action.
The CO was only told to move the Squadron to Kanpur. Further Orders
would be given on reaching there. Transport support arrived early and
we loaded up. Surprisingly we saw our squadron Doc Jackie Gupta arrive
fully geared up. He announced that he would move with the squadron.
This was the 'Battle Axes' josh.
So we ferried all the available aircraft with loaded/armed Front Guns
only to Kanpur. From Kanpur we were ordered to fly to Hindon, where we
reached late afternoon. Unexciting day.
Someone's brother came in from Delhi in an Ambassador car so a few of
us drove off to have a meal in a Delhi's Moti Mahal, in Darya Ganj
under Black Out conditions. We were clad in Flying suits (transport
support had not reached with personal baggage). The owners refused to
bill us and with folded hands wished us luck with the Punjabi blessing
'Jinde Raho' (May you live long). We stayed in town with friends to
return early the next day to learn that the Squadron was to move to
NAL forward base near Bikaner, Rajasthan.
Day Four
That day was my mother's birthday. The first thought in the morning
was that it is not a good day to buy it (get killed). However, there
were no strike missions on this day too.
We received orders to proceed to NAL forward base at Bikaner. Take
off was delayed due to the Hindon Fog.
The ferry was completed early afternoon. NAL turned out to be a pretty
desolate place in the Rajasthan Desert.. The Base was active as a
Mystere squadron was already operating from there. The airfield had
been bombed a few times in the past few days. The A/C were parked in
Blast Pens but there was no ORR or crew room. Only a small underground
Base Ops Complex.
The day ended with the Transport support Packet being given CAP
(Combat Air Patrol) cover for arrival and unloading.
Again after take off it was escorted 100 miles out by a dusk patrol,
a two ship formation with Guns, loaded up. Never seen a Packet being
unloaded and departing so fast.
Some of us were dispersed to the SU Officers mess in town while others
stayed on base. Fighter Controllers were nice lot. Meeting them
personally created a good sense of camaraderie, for these guys gave
Radar Cover for missions flown in the next few days.
The town group was given a requisitioned civil Jonga Taxi as aircrew
transport, driven by a local civilian driver named Jetharam. Wonder
what was his security clearance for he could see whatever was going,
as he was around the whole day.
Extra Messing special was, you guessed it Bikaneri Bhujia.
Day Five
Came in early with Jetharam for briefing at the Base Ops. There were
no targets allocated so we could not decide what armament should be
loaded up and the drop tank configuration. It made Chief Bhasin"s work
tentative. Typical order "Keep both Bombs and rockets on the cradles"
Boss reassured Bhasin he would get the time needed to configure the
planes. Then Indian ingenuity chipped in "Configure 4 a/c with Bombs
and 4 others with Rockets”. Problem solved (When two 1000 lb Bombs are
carried under wing then only two fuel drops tanks can be attached
reducing strike range. However Rocket pods allow four drop tanks to be
attached)
Later in the morning two search and destroy missions were ordered.
‘Look for enemy Tanks on the other side of the border’, was the
briefing. Boss decided to go with T-10 rockets with Guns always
remaining loaded with HE/AP (High Explosive/Armour Piercing) Rounds
The mission did not see anything worthwhile to report. Secondary
targets were engaged. The story was the same for all missions flown
that day including one flown by me.
Nobody reported any anti-aircraft fire nor did anybody take any hits.
On the Air Defence side the ORP aircraft were static the whole day.
A CAP was mounted at dusk to shake off the monotony and get into the air.
Logistics were poor. Food was a problem and operating from open Blast
pens in the desert meant being exposed both to cold and heat as the
day dragged on. Back at the Mess, sleeping on the carpet became
irritating as most of us were wondering what was the purpose of coming
to this disorganized place. People wanted some action which was
missing after the first two days. Even the PAF bombers did not come
that night.
HKS
Day Six
This day started with a briefing by the Oi/c Base ops who was the
Mission Liaison with Command HQ, and the day ended with losing our
Boss who was shot down. Once again the missions being ordered were
more of search and destroy type. Radar Cover was limited. Flying deck
level made navigation difficult in the desert especially when weaving
all the time. Ammo was T-10 rockets and Guns.
No military movement were spotted. Later we changed our tactics and
decided to operate at around 5000 feet as some loiter time during the
mission. This exposed us to the enemy radar with chances of drawing
enemy fighters to engage us. It also improved our vision field and
contact with our own radar. The scope of the mission was increased by
adding this sort of offensive sweep element .We were rearing to engage
enemy fighters if they came for us. All of us had practiced plenty of
low level dog fighting in the run up to this war. However there was no
joy. No grief, as well for our two a/c formation could have been
bounced by a formation of four or more enemy fighters. To avoid any
nasty surprises we remained in our territory near the border and under
Radar Cover of our SU. Perhaps we were looking for the thrust by the
Enemy Armour which actually happened at Longewala, way to the south
and therefore we saw nothing.
Pilots started taking on sundry targets and sometimes the ordnance was
inappropriate for the target engaged. Nobody wanted to return with
his weapon load not discharged. Boss was shot down near a huge
bridge which he and his wing man were engaging with T-10 Rockets. He
was seen to eject from a burning a/c by his wing man. Apparently he
ejected almost on the border during a 1800 turn. Enemy troops got to
him first and he was taken prisoner. Had the dive direction been
easterly instead of westerly, he would have ejected well in our
territory after taking a hit. Lesson brought home again for future
attacks on targets close to the border like Army Co-op.
Boss came back after 18 months. He then told us that after his
capture there was a heated argument amongst his captors ,with him
standing right there. Some soldiers wanted to kill him then and there
to avenge the death of some colleagues by his attack, while others
wanted to hand him over to their superiors and claim a reward for
shooting down his a/c. Lucky for him that the latter prevailed. He
recounted a funny story of PAF pilot's wives coming in a group to look
at IAF pilots behind bars, in the POW camp . One ofour guys asked
them loudly " what did you expect to see Monkeys? You should have
brought peanuts to throw at us" They were embarrassed and left
quickly.
I did two useless missions that day. Fired rockets on a rather big
factory type structure and the second time on a power station, both
the times on the way back to base.
.
As Adjutant, another problem was brewing up. The Airmen were
accommodated in a school building where they were told to cook their
own food. This was becoming an issue as we had no cooks. Plus the men
had to report before dawn and work till dusk. Looked bad. Officiating
CO Allan Ally asked me to handle it as he was too busy with ops
matters. In turn I told JWO Bhasin (one of the best I have seen) to
detail some men of the non-ops trades to manage the cooking whilst I
tried to get local help
Back to the mess. Three regulation shots and Bhujia, both Bikaneri and
'do aanda ka' and yet another day behind me with another looming ahead
in this deadly scenario of living from day to day.
Day Seven
In the morning we were visited by the Governor of Rajasthan Shri Barkatullah Khan and his charming wife. They brought buckets of Rasagollas as a gift. However they were off the mark when it came to what we were doing operationally which was good enough for us. In an
impeccable accent, Mrs Khan congratulated us for creating History. apparently she thought we were the Hunter Squadron which had put to the sword the enemy Armour thrust at Longewala. The Film 'Border' was
later made on this heroic action by the Hunter jocks operating from Jamnagar, not us at NAL.
This day was not very different from the last two as far as Operations were concerned, except for one incident which is still vividly etched in my memory and I still wonder about it. We got a new CO, Wg Cdr NC Suri, who was in the DASI Team before being assigned this job. He was a very experienced Hunter jock, having commanded a type Squadron. I was designated to be his wing man. One mission was flown by me that day. We were on a Tac/Recee in the area near the town of Bhawalpur in enemy territory. I spotted dust being kicked up which was linked to some vehicle movement. I manoeuvred into position for an attack. In the dive my gun safety catch was unlocked and my finger ready to squeeze the trigger. When almost in the firing range, I clearly saw that the moving target was a black Car. I did not fire but made a low pass telling my wing man to hold fire and also buzz the still moving car which he did.
Usually on hearing the sound of jets, vehicles immediately stop, the drivers expecting an attack. They get away from the vehicle to avoid being killed. But not this one, it just kept going. I made another dive attack but just could not get myself to fire. A one second FG
burst would have blown up this car to smithereens. I called 'Disengaging' and asked my wing man to join up as we headed back.
To this day I wonder who could have been at the wheel of that car so oblivious of death screaming above their heads. Perhaps some pretty Damsel on her way to a rendezvous, lost in her own thoughts, unaware
of the raging war.
The new boss was clearly unhappy with the task assigned to the Squadron. He was instrumental in getting the HQ to reconsider our deployment and the next day we learned that we were slated to move to Pathankot, where the real action was.
Some Airmen began complaining that it was difficult to work without proper food. It became my unpleasant duty to make everyone 'fall in' and remind them that we were at war and we had to take the problems in our stride and work till we dropped. Pilots were flying missions after
popping Rasagollas. Refusal to work in the war Zone was a serious offense swiftly punishable by a Field Court Martial and a firing squad. I have to confess that earlier JWO Bhasin had used similar words and requested me to back him by repeating the same." After all I have to
get work out of them", he had said. Nothing like a seasoned Warrant Officer on the side of a young Adjutant.
By the evening it was confirmed that we were going to move the next day. Jetharam drove us back to the Mess, via the market place. He treated us to hot tea and ‘Kachuries’ as a crowd gathered. It was his way of
saying "Thank You" HKS
When back to base after the war, this story about that talk between Bhasin and me leaked out. At a victory Rum Punch some airmen showed their anger but things settled down when I said we had no choice but
to keep things going and apologized for that empty threat. Their anger quickly dissipated after I did a couple of arms locked Chug Lug (Bottoms Up) with the angry Airmen.
Day Eight
The A/C were readied for the ferry to Pathankot via Hindon. Front Guns were armed with a four drop tank configuration. Take off was delayed due to Fog in Hindon. One A/C had to be ferried to the Repair Depot at Kanpur after 'Patch' repair to the bullet holes. It needed major doing up.
Surprisingly one of the Senior Operational Pilots wanted to go. He was the guy who had seen earlier Boss eject from his burning A/C. Normally this ferry job would be given to a junior guy and there were many available. The CO let him go. He never re-joined the Squadron
till after the day the war was over. The war exposure affected this guy so much that he committed suicide a few months later. Nobody knew about PTSD those days, nor did this guy get any medical help as far as we knew.
Finally we reached Pathankot late in the afternoon. We learned that the two Hunter Squadrons operating from there since the beginning of the war had taken heavy losses and were sent to Hindon the same day for R&R. Five pilots killed in one of the Squadrons and two lost by the other. They had been in a tough fight. In comparison we had one killed, and one taken POW with one safe ejection
We settled down quickly in the crew room of one of the Squadron's that had ferried out. Things were pretty organized. The base was being bombed multiple times a day, so procedures during an attack had to be
followed to the hilt. There was a ‘Pilot Dispersal Plan’ in place. Not more than six pilots were to stay in one building, so that casualties would be reduced in case the building took a direct bomb hit. This was also to ensure that there were guys available to fly the next day.
I was amongst the lucky six who were to stay in a Hotel in town. It was called the ‘Airlines Hotel’. We landed up there late evening to be allotted three rooms for the six of us. We ordered a good meal which was a luxury after NAL. As adjutant I signed the bill and the six of us knocked off on a comfortable bed in a heated room. It was un-said but surely everyone knew that tomorrow would be a day perhaps more challenging than any we had seen thus far.
Day Nine
We left our hotel early when it was still dark and reported to the Squadron. The bosses were huddled in the underground Base Ops complex which was the nerve Centre of all Operations.
When a mission was ordered the pilots selected for it would be driven to the Base Ops for briefing. After that they remained there in an separate room and did not get to speak with anyone who was not a part of their Mission. There was a senior escort with them at all times after the mission briefing. When the time came to go, we were taken straight to the aircraft from the base ops. This ensured we did not discuss our mission details with anyone.. This 'need to know' policy was to prevent information being passed to enemy intelligence,
suspected of infiltrating our security. During previous missions it was reported that the enemy knew the mission call sign, frequency and had given R/T calls to them to split the formation over the target, thus losing mutual cross cover. Enemy fighters were able to shoot down one formation leader, after his wing man was told to turn the wrong way. There was radio jamming too.Boss decided that any manoeuvre ordered by a mission leader would be by using our short name and not mission call sign.
My only mission that day was a bomb attack on a enemy Railway Yard of a town close to the border. The aim was cause enough damage to the yard so as to disrupt movement of supplies by rail, to their forward
line of troops, during the night. We struck late afternoon, to give less time for repair. Encountered heavy anti-aircraft fire like they were expecting us, but no enemy fighters were spotted. Our formation was escorted by two Gnats to cover our tail and take on enemy fighters, in case we were bounced. If something like that happened,
our 'Jettison Live' guard was open. ‘Jettison bombs and engage’, was the briefing. ‘Keep going towards home after neutralizing enemy positional advantage. It is not heroic to engage in a extended dog fight in enemy territory and be unable to make it back, running short
on fuel, or worse, having to eject in enemy territory’, we were told.
Our usual ordnance was 2x1000 pounders and guns. A two pass attack was usually made with the Gnats circling above. When finished we went ‘Buster Power’ (full throttle) and hugged the ground. The escort
formation had a tough time keeping up. There was usually a CAP over base for our recovery. My A/C had no bullet hits. Wing man's fin had some proximity damage by shrapnel from a AA shell burst. Gun Camera film showed a direct hit by the bombs and a punishing long FG burst in the second pass. When debrief over, it was back to the crew room.
Returned to the Hotel, after dark, in a covered one ton to avoid being seen by the public, wearing our G-suits. Matters were becoming standard. Order some good hot food, a couple of shots, eat and off to bed, privately thanking our stars, to be back.
Day Ten
This day was more or less like the previous one except that I did not lead a mission but flew wing man to Boss.
The target was a Radar Tower which was engaged in the morning. The briefing pictures showed it looked like a Water Reservoir. It was said to be heavily defended as it was vital to the enemy in detecting incoming Army Support missions, in the 'Chicken Neck Area', where a
raging Ground Battle was going on. Two SU-7's had taken bad hits, with one ejection, trying to neutralize this target the previous day.
Ours was going to be a two ship formation armed with Rockets and Guns. We would be escorted by two MIG 21's. A Hunter had the same fire power as a SU-7, but would present a smaller target to the Anti Aircraft
Batteries. After a section Take off we were on our way with the MIGs covering us. Visibility was pretty limited. Boss was an ace Navigator and made a flawless run from IP (Initial Point) where I moved to a
Tactical Starboard position from the Open Battle. We pulled up on dot at the PUP. Boss rolled in and I followed. The target appeared bang on at the nose. The MIG leader called "Tail Clear". We fired our Rockets in sequence and then my concentration was not to lose Boss in that poor visibility. We turned around and pulled up for the FG Run. Perfect manoeuvre and the Tower appeared in the front wind shield and I was able to track it with minimum correction. I had lagged a bit to
squeeze in a longer burst after Boss pulled out. I was able to press home a longish burst with my pipper riding the target.
"Catch Up" was the only call by boss.
I replied "Contact" as we started our home run. The MIG leader gave a cool call "With you Tiger Leader, Tail Clear" Recovered at Base uneventfully. No hits on any of the A/C. Perhaps the poor visibility helped. Have to say Boss's excellent positioning allowed me to make a pretty
good attack. After seeing the Gun Camera film, boss looked at me and just nodded his head and said, ‘go and relax’. We were later told that intelligence reported that the Tower was rendered Non-Ops for a couple of days.
Back to Squadron, I asked the Armourer, how many rounds were fired from my kite? ( A/C were called Kites). He said 386, and that Boss had already called from Base Ops, and asked him. I should have thought
so. Knowing that and seeing my tracking on the film, would allow damage assessment. With Four guns firing at 80/rounds/Sec/per gun, that made it a little more than a one 'sec' burst.
That afternoon some Major from the Army HQ called me to ask how I was. He said my father in Bombay, wanted to know. This was the state of communication. Back at the Hotel the locals had come to know that some Pilots were staying there. People gathered outside with Parathas, milk/ lassi and sweets. So much affection shown, it made it a moving experience. We mingled freely receiving their good wishes and blessings. There was not even a guard outside.
I suppose those days Wars were fought on the Battle field by Men and not like today, by raining death on innocent women and children.
Day Eleven
We were getting the news from the east that the Army was making good progress and Dacca was being bombed by Daks and Caribous. ‘This war may end soon’, was the rumour going around. Hearing such things one cannot help thinking 'Hope I am OK when that happens'. Anyway another day was on us and a job had to be done
The Hunter has an Armament Safety Plug which makes all electrical armament circuits live when connected. It is plugged in just before TaxI out to ensure safety, in that no Armament is discharged inadvertently on the ground. The final action which makes the weapons LIVE to be fired is the retraction of the under carriage after
takeoff.
I was to again fly today as wing-man to Boss in a strike on another Rail Head. We finished the Briefing. The TOT was around noon. Start up, Taxi out and a line up for a right echelon section takeoff was uneventful. We were rolling for takeoff with the nose wheel off the ground when I felt a lurch to the left, and the A/C started pulling that a way. I applied rudder to correct and yanked her off the ground seconds ahead of Boss, who perhaps did not notice what was going on to his right. My mind was racing as Boss put his wheels up and started to
pull away. On instinct I put my under carriage up, so as not to lag and got back into position. We continued on our mission with no R/T call by me, reporting the suspected Tyre Blow Out. No call from ATC too, perhaps they could see that well from the Bunker they were
operating from.
The tester burst went off OK (short Gun Burst fired after crossing the border to check whether firing circuits were functional). I maintained the ‘Open Battle Position’ in the run in from IP. In the Pull Up I fanned out as this was an area target and could be simultaneously tracked. The attack was executed with precision with direct hits and
long FG runs fired in parallel dives taking on different targets. My Bombs hit one end of the huge yard and the guns ripped open a few of what looked like storage sheds. Boss gathered up the formation by throwing a turn into me as I slipped into an open battle position . MIGs were on the ball as Boss called 'Buster' and we hugged the deck on the way home.
After peel off at base, our escort MIGs set up a CAP for our Landing as there was an Air Raid Warning in place. On ‘Down Wind’ I transmitted " Suspect Left Tyre Burst, Will be landing on Right Edge , request assistance". Due to the Air Raid Warning there was no time for any fly past inspection, by ATC, who were anyway located in a Bunker.
I landed and managed to control the A/C and keep it on the concrete and cleared the runway. ATC said "Jump out and get away from the A/C." I stood up on the seat with the Ejection seat pin still out, managed to slide down over the nose and drop to the ground in front of
the a/c.
No fire Tenders arrived, due to the Air Raid Alert. Luckily I was OK and there was no Fire at the shredded out tyre with an exposed rim, nor on the opposite side where heavy differential braking had occurred. Not healthy to be on the Runway during an Air raid, I started running away from my A/C. Memories of four Mirages tearing up
their Target with long walking bursts were fresh enough to make me run as fast as I could. There is nothing more vulnerable than a sitting duck in the open during an Air Raid. The Raid did not happen, so an ALR jeep picked me up after the 'All Clear' was sounded.
We went through the usual de-brief my attack film showed a good job done. No hits taken by anybody.
Afterwards I was sipping a cuppa when Boss called me aside.
‘Tell me boy, do you have some sort of meter or Tyre pressure gauge in the cockpit?’ he asked.
‘How could you know in the air that your Left Tyre has burst?’
I just kept looking at him.
‘Tell me when did it burst?’ he asked. Was it on take off ?’
I sheepishly replied.
He went ballistic, calling me a ‘mission crazy mad man who retracted a burning wheel into the tyre bay of a fully armed A/C’.
‘You could have blown up your A/C’, he repeated a few times before telling me to get the hell out of his sight..
Later in the crew room we discussed this amongst us and I realized how close I may have come to killing myself. I should have kept the wheels down and aborted the mission. But then Boss would have had to abort too, as he could not go without a wing man. A senior pilot had
gone alone, a few days ago. He was pounced upon by enemy fighters and shot down quite easily, after being sandwiched.
Looking back, I feel this was no dumb display of bravado but a reflex action in a hyper charged environment where most of us wanted to get the job done. All I remember clearly is that I wanted to get back into position. Lagging by a wing-man is a cardinal sin. Boss put up my name
for a Vir Chakra that day. but did not tell me or congratulate me, he simply scowled at me J
That was another day behind us.
HKS
Day Twelve
A fighter Pilot's biggest nightmare is not getting killed but having to Eject in Enemy territory and that too near the Target which has been just attacked. Capture by angry civilians is about the worst thing that can happen to someone shot down.
All of us were required to memorize a personal background cover up story, in case captured. A rather useless ploy to sell to angry people who have been just been bombed by you and your colleagues. They are
going to let you have it, story or no story. Anyway I had decided I would pretend to be a 'Parsi Bawa' as I could speak Gujarati and hope like hell that would spare the thrashing I believe there were Parsi Pilots in the PAF. We had heard stories about Pilots being caught by
the civilian mob after ejection. One guy had his own gun put to his head and the trigger pulled. Luckily the bloke had not loaded it, and the bullets were shoved into some pocket of his G-suit. The crowd then shouted 'Russian Russian' as they beat him, thinking that the Russians
were flying and fighting with us just like the CIA was doing in PAF. This Anglo Indian could not speak Hindi to save his skin. The local Police arrived and took him away before too much damage was done.
Another guy was shot down in a dog fight over an enemy Airfield He was captured by local guards. PAF Officers came over in a jeep and took him to their crew room with his guard. There he met the pilot who had shot him down, a senior Sqn Ldr of PAF. They shook hands and our young Flying Officer was de-briefed about his mistakes which got him shot down. He was told that, he fought well for his experience. Bad luck that his adversary was far more experienced. This guy was treated well, till he was taken away by the MPs (Military Police) who were not so well disposed to Pilots to start with, leave alone a downed enemy.
Some guys were not so lucky, for today we learned from our
Intelligence that one pilot who was shot down whilst attacking a Rail Head was captured by a civilian mob. They beat him mercilessly and dragged him to the town square. There he was mutilated, tortured and
finally his throat was slit. This was cold blooded murder. After hearing this, some of us decided not to remove our Ejection Seat Safety Pin. This would prevent us from ejecting in a dire situation, when panic could set in. ‘Better to go down with the A/C’, we decided.
Boss told us we could take on ‘Targets of Opportunity’ after engaging our primary Target. That meant a sort of free for all. He thought we would vent off some of our anger that way. Today I flew two identical missions with our Target being the same Rail Head in a town close to
the border. The first mission was uneventful but let me talk about the second.
I was to lead a two A/C strike with 2x1000 lbs Bombs and Guns. My No 2 was a Mumbai Bandra boy and I was from Khar. We were escorted by Gnats lead by my course mate, ‘Son Of Rock Bedi’. Fate had decided to
pitch in our lot for this daunting task. We struck late evening with a dusk recovery. One cannot screw up when the attacking such a large Target. Our Bombs were on the button, as ‘Son of Rock’ shouted encouragement circling above the yard. I remember him screaming 'Chak
De, Chak De’, on R/T. In the second pass I opened up my Guns on some built up structures which could be in use for anything. I could see flashes of anti-aircraft fire coming from the ground, so I gave a pretty long burst. One can see AA fire in front, as you enter the dive, but as you come closer the firing stops. Perhaps the gunners
anticipating your burst scamper for cover. No 2 called 'No Fire' and caught up, with me in the turn. ‘Son Of Rock’ positioned slightly above and behind us. I called 480 Kts to give the Gnats some leverage, as I hit the deck. Past experience had shown they had problems keeping up LL if we went ‘Buster’ and flew in excess of 500 Kts. I
must admit that if any fear of getting shot/bounced ever went through my mind, it was at the time of a getaway after the attack was executed. An over whelming ' get the hell out of here' feeling would come over me. This would vanish on first contact with friendly Radar, as we entered our own territory, squawking the designated IFF code
(Identify Friend or Foe). It was a relief to hear Radar's call '
Blood Stone Leader Identified, Your tail is clear' to which I replied 'All Four'. Meaning nobody was left behind.
After landing I saw that I had taken hits under wing and near the tail cone from a small calibre AA fire. Thank God for self -sealing fuel tanks. In the de-brief Boss asked my No.2 why did he not fire his Guns? He bluntly replied he will not fire unless he can positively identify the target as Military. He added that some guys were fighting a personal war, but he had nothing personal to settle with the enemy. No comment from Boss. This goes to show the latitude given to individuals, even during a War. Boss then asked me what I had fired upon? I said built up structures near the Yard. Possibly storage sheds. Boss gave me a hard look, and told me for the record,
‘Opportunity Targets meant Military Targets’.
'Yes Sir' was my reply, and we left in the sealed one ton for ‘Hotel Airline’.
As the days rolled on, the crowd outside the Hotel would swell in the evening and wait to meet us, patiently standing the cold. This evening we were blessed by an old lady who had brought 'Krah Parsad' for all of us after offering prayers for our well being.
HKS
Day Sixteen
Throughout the last fifteen days no Pilot in our Squadron was bounced and had to engage in air combat. Perhaps one of the reasons was that an ‘Airfield Strike’ was not given to us. No complaints on that, for enemy Airfields were pretty well defended and their Radar cover did
not allow any surprise element. They were always waiting at ‘Action Stations’ when the Strike came as we had seen others take losses. Most Airfield strikes were also engaged by enemy fighters both in the Approach as well as Get Away phase.
When attacking an Airfield certain points had to be kept at the back of your mind. During an attack, if AA (Anti Aircraft) fire was encountered, no worry about enemy fighters when pressing home the attack No AA fire will come up if their own fighters are milling around in the same sky. Therefore lack of AA fire meant their Fighters are on patrol somewhere above or behind us. Ironically we had to revise these tactics on the last day, though we did not know it would be so, at the time of flying the mission
I was to be No.2 in a four A/C formation strike on a enemy Airfield. Boss was to lead. Ammo was 2x1000 lbs each. The two MIG Escorts were armed with a single Gun and two wing tip Air to Air Missiles. We took off in pairs, with Boss throwing an Orbit for the MIGs to get into position and then set course. Speed 420 kts which afforded manoeuvreability both in a turn and the vertical plane, if bounced. Boss's TOT was to the second and the two of us pulled up for the single pass, Bomb Attack. The MIGs pulled up behind us creating some lateral separation so that they could see our tails and
would able to roll on to any bogey, who came between us and the MIGs. AA was seen so the attack was pressed home without worrying about being bounced. My Bombs were unloaded on a Hangar whilst Boss went
for the Intersection. No 3 & 4 continued skirting the Air field, keeping low so they could clear the tails of both the Hunters and the MIGs above them. We dropped our load at 3000 ft AGL, turned hard to avoid Debris Damage and continued the dive to get low. As we hit the deck, I could see No 3& 4 pulling up on my right and the MIGs above them, so cross cover was maintained.
Called ‘Tail Clear’ as Boss threw a turn into 3&4 as they pulled out,
crossed over right to left, behind and slightly above us and
reversed. This allowed them to quickly join up in a open battle
position. The MIGs who had kept an eye on everything going on below
them, dropped one each, outside the flanks of our formation as we set
course for base. We were keeping our eyes peeled. Must have flown
about 20 miles when the MIG leader called ' Bogey, 4 o clock, high,
2000 yds’.
Boss yelled 'Hard Starboard'.
We turned level giving the Bogey the Gun, whilst the MIGs pulled up.
The ‘Bogey’, a single Mirage, had to engage in a turning fight with
either the Hunters or go for the MIGs. If he had done that he would
have been sandwiched. Fighting 6 to 1 no matter how good your A/C
maybe, is not healthy, even in your own air space.
He did what was the best in his situation. He turned 180, slammed open
his Burners and vanished.
Boss called ‘Reverse' and the formation turned towards home.
Why the single interceptor? Or was it that we saw only one? Perhaps
the Mirage was trying to sneak in a missile attack but could not get a
'look down' lock on due to the terrain. The important thing was he was
spotted and engaged, before any damage was done.
Uneventful recovery.
Back at the Base Ops the AOC called us and said ‘Good Job Boys, the
bloody war is over’.
There was no Debrief J
The ‘All Missions On Standby’ signal had come from WAC, when we were still in the Air. Later in the day, came the declaration of an Unilateral Cease Fire, by the PM of India. .
Back to the Hotel when it was still day time.
The people in the street, stopped to cheer when we arrived.
Even the waiters thumped our backs.
Lots of handshakes all around.
Generally the public appeared 'Happy' that it was over.
A distinguished looking Sikh Gentleman came over to the Hotel. He
introduced himself as the ‘President of the Pathankot Truck Owners
Association’. He invited us to Dinner at his place that evening. Many
prominent business folks were also present there. Lots of praise and
kudos. Lots of Scotch too. We hit the sack that night just happy that
it was over and we were lucky to come through in one piece.
HKS
Post Script
38 Years Later and Till the End
I read in the News, that on 14 Dec 2009 our Defense Minister Informed
the Lok Sabha, that his Ministry had received ‘NINE BOXES’ of Medals
returned by Retired Servicemen to Protest the Non-Settlement of their
demand for 'One Rank One Pension'. Strangely nobody wanted to know the actual number of Medals in those boxes. No awkward questions were
asked. No mention of any Uproar or a heated Debate , over this
disclosure. Seems like it was pretty acceptable to the House, for the
Ex-Servicemen , to take this unprecedented action.
Would this Minister and the Honorable Members be so unperturbed , if
this was 14 Dec 71? Wonder how many medals in those boxes, were those earned in the 71 War.
Today I also read that 38 years after this Victory the same Minister
has stated that a Memorial will be built for those who made the
supreme sacrifice in 71. I also read about a group of
Ex-Servicemen knocking the doors of the Supreme Court to get Justice,
from the very Country whose Freedom they fought for and died. Have
these erstwhile warriors become greedy or unreasonable? The people
deserve to know the answer.
Strangely whenever their cases come up for hearing they are decided in
their favour. No one could ever imagine in 71, that they would live to
see soldiers return the medals they earned with their blood, sweat and
tears. Battle honours are the pride and glory for which a soldier is
ready to die. They are given by our Country. Have those soldiers lost
faith in the country? It cannot be. My Log book is in front of me. The
page open is Dec 71. I ask myself, ‘Will I do it again?’
I realize that some of my comrades did not live long enough to ask
this question.
We went out to fight in support of each other, for our squadron,
regiments and our pride. All of this helped conquer 'Fear'. I would
do it again and again if called upon to do so. Life has dealt me a
good hand, but I can never forget my days as a 'Battle Axe. I
remember the faces of widows and small children whose bread winner
never came home. I owe them. We all owe them. They were ordinary men
who paid with their lives to achieve the extra- ordinary, which the
nation today calls 'Victory Day'. However, does the nation really
care, or is it just theatrics ?
Jai Hind
Regards,
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