It has recently been reported in the Israeli press that India paid more than double the amount for the purchase of three AWACS aircraft from Israel in March 2004. These aircraft were earlier being sold to China for US $358 million but the deal had to be aborted under US pressure. Subsequently, India agreed to buy them for US $1.1 billion–a whopping US $742 million more than the price agreed to by the Chinese. There are numerous such instances where India has paid exorbitant amounts for the defence equipment contracted. Coffin deal has already attracted considerable attention for the same reason. Inability to negotiate contracts astutely has been the biggest weakness of the entire defence procurement regime.
Recently, Russia demanded enhanced inflation index for the Sukhoi deal. It also demanded that the rouble be compared with the euro and not with the dollar as agreed to in the original contract. In the case of Gorshkov aircraft carrier, Russia has sought massive upward price revision. Apparently, India had failed to negotiate fool-proof agreements with clearly defined provisions. How else can such lacunae be explained? In almost all contracts, imprecise and flawed provisions lead to multiple interpretations during the implementation stage. Invariably it is India that suffers as vendors exploit ambiguities in the contract language, especially with respect to delivery schedules, warranties, after sales support and penalties for default.
Procurement of new equipment is carried out as per the defence procurement procedure. Once technical appraisal has identified successful vendors, the case enters commercial evaluation phase. A Commercial Negotiation Committee (CNC) is constituted under the Ministry of Defence (MOD) for the purpose. Its members are drawn from the Acquisition Wing, concerned Service headquarters, users, quality assurance directorate and R&D organisation (see box for standard composition of CNC).
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/defence%20industry/India-pays-dearly-for-poorly-negotiated-arms-deals.html
India pays dearly for poorly negotiated arms deals
By Maj Gen Mrinal Suman
Issue: Vol 23.3 Jul-Sep 2008 | Date: 27 December, 2010
How India's Cold Start is Turning the Heat on Pakistan: click here to read more
Friday, December 31, 2010
How India's Cold Start is Turning the Heat on Pakistan
By Rakesh Krishnan Simha , December 2010
Wikileaks shows Pakistan’s military brass is having nightmares about Cold Start, the Indian Army’s new blitzkrieg strategy. But will India finally end the Pakistan problem or destabilize the neighbourhood?
Pakistan’s army generals are known to walk with a swagger. They have reason to. After all, they have been ruling the country of over 200 million people like their personal fiefdom for over half a century. Also, they are in an exclusive club of one – Pakistan is the only Islamic country that possesses nuclear weapons. (Just don’t bring up the fact that these generals have lost four wars against India.) So why are they suddenly squirming after Wikileaks hit the ceiling?
According to a leaked cable, more than the al-Qaida, more than American drones or even a hostile Afghan government, what is scaring the living daylights out of the Pakistani generals is Cold Start – a brand new version of blitzkrieg being perfected by India. So deeply does it dread this war fighting doctrine that the Pakistani military has cranked up its production of nuclear weapons, sparking a nuclear arms race in the region?
COMBATING STATUS QUO
So what exactly is Cold Start and how is it changing the military equation in this part of the world? Will this new doctrine of warfare offer India more options in combating Pakistani adventurism and rolling back Islamic terrorism? Or will it contribute to destabilising the region?
To get the sub continental drift, one has to look at the Pakistani military mindset. Each of the four wars – in 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999 – was launched by the Pakistani military, which factored in two key elements. One, despite their 0-4 record against India, it is drilled into Pakistani officers and soldiers that a Pakistani is equal to 10 Indians, and therefore India’s defences should quickly collapse. There is also the bizarre belief – eerily still a serious consideration at the highest echelons of Pakistani military decision making – that heavenly intervention will be a decisive factor in India’s defeat.
Secondly, Pakistan knows if its military thrusts fail, its patrons – the US and China – can be relied upon to bring in the United Nations, work the diplomatic back channels, get the world media to raise the alarm, and issue veiled threats, bringing intense pressure upon India to call off its counterattack.
How India's Cold Start is Turning the Heat on Pakistan click here to read more
Wikileaks shows Pakistan’s military brass is having nightmares about Cold Start, the Indian Army’s new blitzkrieg strategy. But will India finally end the Pakistan problem or destabilize the neighbourhood?
Pakistan’s army generals are known to walk with a swagger. They have reason to. After all, they have been ruling the country of over 200 million people like their personal fiefdom for over half a century. Also, they are in an exclusive club of one – Pakistan is the only Islamic country that possesses nuclear weapons. (Just don’t bring up the fact that these generals have lost four wars against India.) So why are they suddenly squirming after Wikileaks hit the ceiling?
According to a leaked cable, more than the al-Qaida, more than American drones or even a hostile Afghan government, what is scaring the living daylights out of the Pakistani generals is Cold Start – a brand new version of blitzkrieg being perfected by India. So deeply does it dread this war fighting doctrine that the Pakistani military has cranked up its production of nuclear weapons, sparking a nuclear arms race in the region?
COMBATING STATUS QUO
So what exactly is Cold Start and how is it changing the military equation in this part of the world? Will this new doctrine of warfare offer India more options in combating Pakistani adventurism and rolling back Islamic terrorism? Or will it contribute to destabilising the region?
To get the sub continental drift, one has to look at the Pakistani military mindset. Each of the four wars – in 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999 – was launched by the Pakistani military, which factored in two key elements. One, despite their 0-4 record against India, it is drilled into Pakistani officers and soldiers that a Pakistani is equal to 10 Indians, and therefore India’s defences should quickly collapse. There is also the bizarre belief – eerily still a serious consideration at the highest echelons of Pakistani military decision making – that heavenly intervention will be a decisive factor in India’s defeat.
Secondly, Pakistan knows if its military thrusts fail, its patrons – the US and China – can be relied upon to bring in the United Nations, work the diplomatic back channels, get the world media to raise the alarm, and issue veiled threats, bringing intense pressure upon India to call off its counterattack.
How India's Cold Start is Turning the Heat on Pakistan click here to read more
Little For India on Chinese Platter
Kanwal Sibal, Member Advisory Board, VIF
Chinese PM Wen Jiabao’s visit has hardly done much to allay India’s fears about its hostile, powerful neighbour.
Of all the visits made by P-5 leaders to India in 2010, that of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao proved the least productive. At one level this was expected, as deep differences continue to divide India and China. At another, the visit was an occasion to make discernible progress on some outstanding issues for fostering optimism about the future. Wen Jiabao visited India last in 2005 in what, acknowledgably, was a substantial visit, with President Hu Jintao consolidating the bond in 2006. After that the relationship has developed ruptures that have remained unsealed despite return visits made to China by our Prime Minister and the President and bilateral confabulations in other forums.
The Chinese have, in fact, opened up old and new breaches in the relationship by aggressively re-iterating their claims on Arunachal Pradesh, and in particular on Tawang, questioning India’s sovereignty over J&K by fabricating the stapled visa issue even as they are entrenching themselves increasingly in POK, and engaging India in endless rounds of sterile discussions on the boundary issue. In this background if Premier Wen expressed interest in visiting India at this juncture it could be reasonably expected that he would bring something in his knapsack to reduce contentions.
Why would Premier Wen want to visit India at short notice. Some believe it is Chinese concern about the developing strategic ties between India and the US, and the fear that the US may rope India into encircling China, that prompted this visit. Others think the reform minded Chinese PM wanted to arrest the downward trend in the India-China relationship.
The fact that other P-5 leaders had visited or were visting India in quick succession might have goaded China to come too as otherwise China might lose in the powerplay taking place in its immediate neighbourhood. China has become India’s biggest trade partner and Chinese companies, especially in the telecom and power sectors, have major business opportunities in India’s growing market. Hence, commercial calculations spurred the visit, particularly as China is coming under pressure in western markets and needs to diversify. Finally, China has to be seen engaging India positively in order to give political room to pro-Chinese lobbies here to oppose the perceived westward lurch of the present government and press for a balanced Indian foreign policy.
The meagre results of Premier Wen’s visit call into question many of these assumptions. Is it that we don’t understand China’s mind, its calculations and its attitude toward us. Do the Chinese take India seriously as an adversary? Do they think tactical patch-ups and temporary palliatives are sufficient in dealing with us? Do they believe they have cornered and neutralized us through Pakistan as well as through the great economic and military gap they have created between themselves and us? Do they believe they can define the agenda of our relationship and steer us toward working within it?
On all key issues of bilateral contention Premier Wen made no concession. On the stapled visa issue he parried by suggesting that officials from both sides should discuss it further. The Chinese have created the damaging diplomatic fact of disputing our sovereignty over Kashmir that cannot be undone completely unless they formally acknowledge Kashmir as an integral part of India, which they will not do.
Even if the practice of stapled visas is discontinued they have signalled their position to Pakistan and the international community, and this challenge to India’s sovereignty, even if muted for now, can be revived in the future whenever opportune. We are rightly saying that further discussions are not needed and that the ball is in their court, but the Chinese have already scored the goal they wanted.
On terrorism Premier Wen did not express sympathy publicly for the families of the victims of the Mumbai carnage, even though all the other P-5 leaders did so expansively on site. While others demanded that Pakistan bring to justice the perpetrators of that terrorist attack, the Chinese PM remained silent.
His speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs(ICWA) also omitted any mention of terrorism, even though China feels the menace. The Joint Statement merely refers to relevant UNSC resolutions- a safe exit for China as it is already a party to them. When in Pakistan, however, the Chinese PM, in a cynical bid to release mounting pressure on its all weather friend, lauded Pakistan’s role in combatting international terrorism.
While other visiting leaders supported India’s candidature for permanent membership of the UN Security Council, the Chinese PM confined himself to the patronizing formula of supporting India’s aspiration to play a bigger role in the UN, including in the Security Council, Naturally, there was no support extended for India’s membership of the various nonproliferation and technology denial regimes, which other leaders did.
On the boundary question Premier Wen was most negative. His ICWA speech conveyed the hard message that it would “not be easy to completely resolve the question” and that it will “take a fairly long time”. He disavowed the Joint Statement that speaks of an “early resolution”.
Having already resiled from the decision to delineate the Line Of Actual Control through exchange of maps, China is now sabotaging the mechanism of the Special Representatives. For how many years are they now expected to meet to find a solution to a problem that cannot be resolved “completely”? The intention behind setting up of a new working and coordination mechanism on border affairs is not clear. What is clear is that China intends using the border issue to pressure India in the years ahead.
Premier Wen tried to shift the focus of his visit to trade as that is not a contentious issue, though we have complaints about the mounting imbalance. A two-way trade target of $100 billion by 2015 has been set up, but unless China opens up its internal market to us in IT, agricultural products and pharmaceuticals, the current trade gap of $19.2 billion will expand further, making the situation unsustainable. China is creating a powerful business lobby in India which it will use to weaken the government’s will to react strongly to Chinese political provocations We have become more vocal about our concerns, whether on the question of China respecting our sensitivities in J&K, the water issue(on which the Chinese PM was verbally accommodative in his ICWA speech), Chinese presence in POK. or the omission of the standard references to Tibet and “One China” in the Joint Statement.
All in all, Premier Wen’s visit has reinforced, not removed, our misapprehensions about China’s intentions and policies toward India.
Published in Bengal Post dated December 29, 2010
Little For India on Chinese Platter
Chinese PM Wen Jiabao’s visit has hardly done much to allay India’s fears about its hostile, powerful neighbour.
Of all the visits made by P-5 leaders to India in 2010, that of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao proved the least productive. At one level this was expected, as deep differences continue to divide India and China. At another, the visit was an occasion to make discernible progress on some outstanding issues for fostering optimism about the future. Wen Jiabao visited India last in 2005 in what, acknowledgably, was a substantial visit, with President Hu Jintao consolidating the bond in 2006. After that the relationship has developed ruptures that have remained unsealed despite return visits made to China by our Prime Minister and the President and bilateral confabulations in other forums.
The Chinese have, in fact, opened up old and new breaches in the relationship by aggressively re-iterating their claims on Arunachal Pradesh, and in particular on Tawang, questioning India’s sovereignty over J&K by fabricating the stapled visa issue even as they are entrenching themselves increasingly in POK, and engaging India in endless rounds of sterile discussions on the boundary issue. In this background if Premier Wen expressed interest in visiting India at this juncture it could be reasonably expected that he would bring something in his knapsack to reduce contentions.
Why would Premier Wen want to visit India at short notice. Some believe it is Chinese concern about the developing strategic ties between India and the US, and the fear that the US may rope India into encircling China, that prompted this visit. Others think the reform minded Chinese PM wanted to arrest the downward trend in the India-China relationship.
The fact that other P-5 leaders had visited or were visting India in quick succession might have goaded China to come too as otherwise China might lose in the powerplay taking place in its immediate neighbourhood. China has become India’s biggest trade partner and Chinese companies, especially in the telecom and power sectors, have major business opportunities in India’s growing market. Hence, commercial calculations spurred the visit, particularly as China is coming under pressure in western markets and needs to diversify. Finally, China has to be seen engaging India positively in order to give political room to pro-Chinese lobbies here to oppose the perceived westward lurch of the present government and press for a balanced Indian foreign policy.
The meagre results of Premier Wen’s visit call into question many of these assumptions. Is it that we don’t understand China’s mind, its calculations and its attitude toward us. Do the Chinese take India seriously as an adversary? Do they think tactical patch-ups and temporary palliatives are sufficient in dealing with us? Do they believe they have cornered and neutralized us through Pakistan as well as through the great economic and military gap they have created between themselves and us? Do they believe they can define the agenda of our relationship and steer us toward working within it?
On all key issues of bilateral contention Premier Wen made no concession. On the stapled visa issue he parried by suggesting that officials from both sides should discuss it further. The Chinese have created the damaging diplomatic fact of disputing our sovereignty over Kashmir that cannot be undone completely unless they formally acknowledge Kashmir as an integral part of India, which they will not do.
Even if the practice of stapled visas is discontinued they have signalled their position to Pakistan and the international community, and this challenge to India’s sovereignty, even if muted for now, can be revived in the future whenever opportune. We are rightly saying that further discussions are not needed and that the ball is in their court, but the Chinese have already scored the goal they wanted.
On terrorism Premier Wen did not express sympathy publicly for the families of the victims of the Mumbai carnage, even though all the other P-5 leaders did so expansively on site. While others demanded that Pakistan bring to justice the perpetrators of that terrorist attack, the Chinese PM remained silent.
His speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs(ICWA) also omitted any mention of terrorism, even though China feels the menace. The Joint Statement merely refers to relevant UNSC resolutions- a safe exit for China as it is already a party to them. When in Pakistan, however, the Chinese PM, in a cynical bid to release mounting pressure on its all weather friend, lauded Pakistan’s role in combatting international terrorism.
While other visiting leaders supported India’s candidature for permanent membership of the UN Security Council, the Chinese PM confined himself to the patronizing formula of supporting India’s aspiration to play a bigger role in the UN, including in the Security Council, Naturally, there was no support extended for India’s membership of the various nonproliferation and technology denial regimes, which other leaders did.
On the boundary question Premier Wen was most negative. His ICWA speech conveyed the hard message that it would “not be easy to completely resolve the question” and that it will “take a fairly long time”. He disavowed the Joint Statement that speaks of an “early resolution”.
Having already resiled from the decision to delineate the Line Of Actual Control through exchange of maps, China is now sabotaging the mechanism of the Special Representatives. For how many years are they now expected to meet to find a solution to a problem that cannot be resolved “completely”? The intention behind setting up of a new working and coordination mechanism on border affairs is not clear. What is clear is that China intends using the border issue to pressure India in the years ahead.
Premier Wen tried to shift the focus of his visit to trade as that is not a contentious issue, though we have complaints about the mounting imbalance. A two-way trade target of $100 billion by 2015 has been set up, but unless China opens up its internal market to us in IT, agricultural products and pharmaceuticals, the current trade gap of $19.2 billion will expand further, making the situation unsustainable. China is creating a powerful business lobby in India which it will use to weaken the government’s will to react strongly to Chinese political provocations We have become more vocal about our concerns, whether on the question of China respecting our sensitivities in J&K, the water issue(on which the Chinese PM was verbally accommodative in his ICWA speech), Chinese presence in POK. or the omission of the standard references to Tibet and “One China” in the Joint Statement.
All in all, Premier Wen’s visit has reinforced, not removed, our misapprehensions about China’s intentions and policies toward India.
Published in Bengal Post dated December 29, 2010
Little For India on Chinese Platter
Clash of Cultures: NATO tackles Taliban
The struggle in Afghanistan has turned into a clash of cultures different from what had generally been expected. Both the NATO effort and the Taliban opposition have changed significantly in the course of the last nine years, resulting in a much changed situation.
NATO forces moved into Afghanistan to crush the Taliban and oust al Qaeda from its strongholds and training camps. These forces quickly took control of the country, but strongly rejected any suggestion of "nation building," though NATO was instrumental in setting up democratic political institutions. But the results were a big disappointment to the Afghan population, to the Muslim World, and, indeed, to the NATO governments. NATO effectively empowered a corrupt, ineffective government that was widely despised by the population and served as a focal point for a resurgent Taliban. NATO has come to realize that Afghan stability does in fact demand nation building, or at least something like it. The threat of al Qaeda in Afghanistan has long ago faded into insignificance. The task has shifted into an effort to bring Afghanistan into the modern world, setting an example of Western support for Muslim development.
The Taliban have also changed significantly. Initially they were a medieval theocracy, reminiscent of the Spanish Inquisition, ruthless and uncompromising defenders of ascetic, medieval religious tenets. The widespread disappointment with the NATO transformation provided an opening for their resurgence. In the process, the Taliban have shifted from a claim of authority based on religious purity to authority based on force and intimidation. They live off opium production which they once sternly suppressed. They extensively employ suicide tactics alien to mainstream Muslim beliefs and to Afghan traditions. They have carried out widespread killings of respected community leaders and often innocent bystanders. They have turned into religious thugs opposing the movement of society into the modern world. Their reliance on terror tactics provides a vivid demonstration that their religious tenets have been rejected by the overwhelming majority of Afghans.
Clash of Cultures- Click here to read more
NATO forces moved into Afghanistan to crush the Taliban and oust al Qaeda from its strongholds and training camps. These forces quickly took control of the country, but strongly rejected any suggestion of "nation building," though NATO was instrumental in setting up democratic political institutions. But the results were a big disappointment to the Afghan population, to the Muslim World, and, indeed, to the NATO governments. NATO effectively empowered a corrupt, ineffective government that was widely despised by the population and served as a focal point for a resurgent Taliban. NATO has come to realize that Afghan stability does in fact demand nation building, or at least something like it. The threat of al Qaeda in Afghanistan has long ago faded into insignificance. The task has shifted into an effort to bring Afghanistan into the modern world, setting an example of Western support for Muslim development.
The Taliban have also changed significantly. Initially they were a medieval theocracy, reminiscent of the Spanish Inquisition, ruthless and uncompromising defenders of ascetic, medieval religious tenets. The widespread disappointment with the NATO transformation provided an opening for their resurgence. In the process, the Taliban have shifted from a claim of authority based on religious purity to authority based on force and intimidation. They live off opium production which they once sternly suppressed. They extensively employ suicide tactics alien to mainstream Muslim beliefs and to Afghan traditions. They have carried out widespread killings of respected community leaders and often innocent bystanders. They have turned into religious thugs opposing the movement of society into the modern world. Their reliance on terror tactics provides a vivid demonstration that their religious tenets have been rejected by the overwhelming majority of Afghans.
Clash of Cultures- Click here to read more
Tuesday, December 28, 2010
Army gets New officers’ Academy, adds Muscle with Indigenous Tank
YEAR-END REVIEW – 2010 Indian Army Highlights
PIB Tuesday, December 28, 2010
The Year 2010 marked a leap towards fulfilling the urgent need of the Army to bridge the shortfall in its Officers Cadre with the approval of the second Officers Training Academy (OTA) at Gaya in Bihar. Indigenization got a big boost as the Army decided to place an order for another 124 Main Battle Tanks MBT Arjun and conducted pre-induction trials of the 3,500 kms long Agni-3 ballistic missile. Also during the year a change of guard took place at the top with General VK Singh taking charge.
CCS nod to 2nd OTA at Gaya
In February, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) gave its nod for setting up an OTA at Gaya, the second in the country after Chennai, at an initial cost of Rupees 360 crores. Expected to start functioning by June next year, the Academy will groom 250 cadets initially and the number is expected to go up to 750 at its bloom. The step will go a long way in mitigating the shortage of officers in the one million strong Indian Army, which presently has around 36,000 Officers on roll as against a sanctioned strength of 47,000.
Army opts for 124 more MBT Arjuns
In a major thrust to the indigenization programme, the Army decided to place a fresh order for an additional 124 MBT Arjun Mark-2 tanks. This followed the success of the indigenous tank in the grueling desert trials in the first quarter of this year. The 124 tanks now being ordered are over and above the existing order of an equal number of MBT Arjun Mark-I placed with the Heavy Vehicles Factory, Avadi.
Army tests Agni-3
In February the Army conducted the successful pre-induction test firing of the Agni-3. The 17-metres long marker pen shaped missile can carry a 1.5 ton nuclear payload to a distance in a radius of 3,500 kms. The missile achieved textbook precision, attaining a maximum altitude of 350 kms and withstood temperatures in the range of 3,000 degrees Celsius during its flight.
New chief
General Vijay Kumar Singh took over charge as the 24th Chief of Army Staff on 31st March. Commissioned into the Rajput Regiment on June 14, 1970, General Singh participated in the 1971 Indo-Pak War and the IPKF Operations in Sri Lanka.
Joint Exercises, Peace Keeping
A Russian military contingent participated in the ten-day-long Indo-Russian Joint Exercise Indra-10 in the Kumaon Hills of Ranikhet, Uttarakhand in October. Earlier a contingent of the 16 Madras (Travancore) Regiment took part in the 10th edition of the Indo-US Joint Exercise Shatrujeet at Camp Pendelton, California. In October a 15-member contingent of the Botswana Defence Force participated in the Joint Exercise Milap in Dehra Dun. Seven men of the Corps of Engineers went to Cambodia to train the Royal Cambodia Armed Forces in demining, demolition and Counter-IED operations. During the three-week-long training 72 men were trained this year alone as part of the three-year-old programme.
On the flip side, an Indian Army camp in Congo operating under MONUSCO, the UN Mission at Kirumba base, came under an attack on 18th August by about 50-60 rebels, suspected to be of the Maymayi group. Three Indian Army personnel were martyred and seven wounded as the valiant men fought back the rebels. Later another attack by about 30-40 men of the same group at Rwindi was repulsed on 25th October.
CWG- Saviours in distress
When a bridge collapsed at the showpiece Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium on the eve of the Commonwealth Games in New Delhi, the Corps of Engineers of the Indian Army stepped in at the eleventh hour, laying across a temporary Bailey bridge near the venue, and, as the Defence Minister Shri AK Antony later said, “Saved the day, really saved the day.” The Army was also visible at all the venues throughout the 12-day ceremony, the tall and mustachioed armymen at the Flag Hoisting and Medal Distribution ceremonies winning applause with their immaculate turnout.
Adventure Sports – Base Jumping, first in the country
On 29th October, skydiver Lt. Colonel Satyendra Verma made a skydive from a height of 158 metres off the Pitampura TV Tower in Delhi. He thus became the first man to undertake a BASE (Building, Antenna, Spam (Bridge) or Earth Cliff) Jump in the country. PK/Raman
Army gets New officers’ Academy, adds Muscle with Indigenous Tank
PIB Tuesday, December 28, 2010
The Year 2010 marked a leap towards fulfilling the urgent need of the Army to bridge the shortfall in its Officers Cadre with the approval of the second Officers Training Academy (OTA) at Gaya in Bihar. Indigenization got a big boost as the Army decided to place an order for another 124 Main Battle Tanks MBT Arjun and conducted pre-induction trials of the 3,500 kms long Agni-3 ballistic missile. Also during the year a change of guard took place at the top with General VK Singh taking charge.
CCS nod to 2nd OTA at Gaya
In February, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) gave its nod for setting up an OTA at Gaya, the second in the country after Chennai, at an initial cost of Rupees 360 crores. Expected to start functioning by June next year, the Academy will groom 250 cadets initially and the number is expected to go up to 750 at its bloom. The step will go a long way in mitigating the shortage of officers in the one million strong Indian Army, which presently has around 36,000 Officers on roll as against a sanctioned strength of 47,000.
Army opts for 124 more MBT Arjuns
In a major thrust to the indigenization programme, the Army decided to place a fresh order for an additional 124 MBT Arjun Mark-2 tanks. This followed the success of the indigenous tank in the grueling desert trials in the first quarter of this year. The 124 tanks now being ordered are over and above the existing order of an equal number of MBT Arjun Mark-I placed with the Heavy Vehicles Factory, Avadi.
Army tests Agni-3
In February the Army conducted the successful pre-induction test firing of the Agni-3. The 17-metres long marker pen shaped missile can carry a 1.5 ton nuclear payload to a distance in a radius of 3,500 kms. The missile achieved textbook precision, attaining a maximum altitude of 350 kms and withstood temperatures in the range of 3,000 degrees Celsius during its flight.
New chief
General Vijay Kumar Singh took over charge as the 24th Chief of Army Staff on 31st March. Commissioned into the Rajput Regiment on June 14, 1970, General Singh participated in the 1971 Indo-Pak War and the IPKF Operations in Sri Lanka.
Joint Exercises, Peace Keeping
A Russian military contingent participated in the ten-day-long Indo-Russian Joint Exercise Indra-10 in the Kumaon Hills of Ranikhet, Uttarakhand in October. Earlier a contingent of the 16 Madras (Travancore) Regiment took part in the 10th edition of the Indo-US Joint Exercise Shatrujeet at Camp Pendelton, California. In October a 15-member contingent of the Botswana Defence Force participated in the Joint Exercise Milap in Dehra Dun. Seven men of the Corps of Engineers went to Cambodia to train the Royal Cambodia Armed Forces in demining, demolition and Counter-IED operations. During the three-week-long training 72 men were trained this year alone as part of the three-year-old programme.
On the flip side, an Indian Army camp in Congo operating under MONUSCO, the UN Mission at Kirumba base, came under an attack on 18th August by about 50-60 rebels, suspected to be of the Maymayi group. Three Indian Army personnel were martyred and seven wounded as the valiant men fought back the rebels. Later another attack by about 30-40 men of the same group at Rwindi was repulsed on 25th October.
CWG- Saviours in distress
When a bridge collapsed at the showpiece Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium on the eve of the Commonwealth Games in New Delhi, the Corps of Engineers of the Indian Army stepped in at the eleventh hour, laying across a temporary Bailey bridge near the venue, and, as the Defence Minister Shri AK Antony later said, “Saved the day, really saved the day.” The Army was also visible at all the venues throughout the 12-day ceremony, the tall and mustachioed armymen at the Flag Hoisting and Medal Distribution ceremonies winning applause with their immaculate turnout.
Adventure Sports – Base Jumping, first in the country
On 29th October, skydiver Lt. Colonel Satyendra Verma made a skydive from a height of 158 metres off the Pitampura TV Tower in Delhi. He thus became the first man to undertake a BASE (Building, Antenna, Spam (Bridge) or Earth Cliff) Jump in the country. PK/Raman
Army gets New officers’ Academy, adds Muscle with Indigenous Tank
Monday, December 27, 2010
Marshal of the Indian Air Force Arjan Singh visits Air Command HQ
PIB Monday, December 27, 2010
Marshal of the Indian Air Force Arjan Singh being received by the Air Marshal N.A.K. Browne, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Air Command on his visit to Headquarters Western Air Command at Subroto Park, in New Delhi on December 27, 2010. Photo no.CNR - 35766
The Marshal of the Indian Air Force Arjan Singh, visited the Western Air Command headquartered at Subroto Park, New Delhi today. On his arrival the Marshal was received by Air Marshal NAK Browne, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Air Command and was presented a Guard of Honour.
Air Marshal Browne briefed the Marshal on the achievements of the Command as well as the recent development and progress in the entire Command with respect to the modernization programme of the IAF. While addressing the officers, the Marshal expressed his satisfaction and complimented them for their dedication and professionalism. He also shared his experiences and exhorted the air warriors to keep the IAF’s flag flying high at all times.
The Marshal of the Indian Air Force has had the distinction of having the longest tenure firstly as the Air Officer Commanding of the ‘Operational Command’ which later came to be known as Western Air Command (WAC), from 1949 to 1952 and again from 1957 to 1962 when he served as the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief.
The Marshal of the Indian Air Force Arjan Singh, visited the Western Air Command headquartered at Subroto Park, New Delhi
The Marshal of the Indian Air Force Arjan Singh, visited the Western Air Command headquartered at Subroto Park, New Delhi today. On his arrival the Marshal was received by Air Marshal NAK Browne, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Air Command and was presented a Guard of Honour.
Air Marshal Browne briefed the Marshal on the achievements of the Command as well as the recent development and progress in the entire Command with respect to the modernization programme of the IAF. While addressing the officers, the Marshal expressed his satisfaction and complimented them for their dedication and professionalism. He also shared his experiences and exhorted the air warriors to keep the IAF’s flag flying high at all times.
The Marshal of the Indian Air Force has had the distinction of having the longest tenure firstly as the Air Officer Commanding of the ‘Operational Command’ which later came to be known as Western Air Command (WAC), from 1949 to 1952 and again from 1957 to 1962 when he served as the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief.
The Marshal of the Indian Air Force Arjan Singh, visited the Western Air Command headquartered at Subroto Park, New Delhi
Russia is explicit about Pak terror
December 26th, 2010 DC Correspondent
Kanwal Sibal, who was India’s ambassador to Moscow and later foreign secretary, says that it is for the first time that the Russians have been upfront and explicit about holding Pakistan accountable on the terrorism issue. In an interview to Ramesh Ramachandran, he says that this is a new language that signifies a welcome change in political line.
Q. Is the Russian connection worth nurturing, considering that lately India has developed viable relations with leading Western democracies?
A. It is very wrong to think in terms of an either-or situation because conditions of globalisation today permit us to develop strong relations with the US and continue to nurture our longstanding ties with Russia. There are gains to be made from both sides. The Cold War constraints, which India even then resisted, don’t exist anymore.
If we want to play a global role, if we want to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, this cannot be on the basis of exclusive relationships. We have to be self-confident and establish mutually-beneficial relationships with all centres of power. Our relationship with Russia is not at the expense of our other relationships and vice-versa.
Q. The outcome of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit seems to have belied the view that India’s old relationship with Russia in areas such as defence may be overshadowed. Also, two-way trade was not picking up. How do you view the matter?
A. Our defence relationship with Russia remains prolific. Almost 70 per cent of our defence supplies come from Russia; diversification of supply sources may lower this figure to 40 to 50 per cent in the decades ahead, which will be a very substantial reliance still. If you look at the range of our agreements and sourcing from Russia — the fifth generation fighter aircraft, the multi-role transport aircraft, additional T-90 tanks, Sukhoi MK30i and Mig-29K aircraft, lease of a nuclear submarine and technical help for Arihant, access to military signals from Glonass, etc — you can see the durability of our defence ties.
We are consolidating our defence ties with Russia even as we develop new partnerships because it is a trusted and reliable supplier. There is no risk with Russia of interruption of supplies in the future if the situation deteriorates in our neighbourhood. But trade, no doubt, is a very weak element in our relationship.
We have tried very hard to overcome this deficiency by setting up the India-Russia business forum, a CEOs forum, and working on a Ceca (Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement), but progress has been slow. President Medvedev’s visit, however, indicates a new dynamism on the economic front. Signs that Russia is politically more determined to expand its ties with India beyond the defence sector have become more visible. With the signing of an inter-governmental agreement on cooperation in the hydrocarbons sector, we have succeeded in our persistent efforts to get Russia to give a political push to the energy relationship. Agreements in the area of pharmaceuticals hold out hope for increased Indian sales to the expanding Russian market. So, if energy, pharmaceuticals, and the IT sector, in which potential synergies exist, come into the trade mix, our trade figures will expand.
Q. Do you see the first hints of a Moscow-Delhi axis emerging in Central Asia-Afghanistan, especially in a post-US situation in Afghanistan?
A. Such an axis cannot be realistically built as Moscow will not want to get embroiled in Afghanistan once again, and other players like Iran and China cannot be ignored. In fact, the initiative taken by Russia, Tajikistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan to discuss the future of that region was a contrary signal as India was left out — to Pakistan’s satisfaction.
Islamabad has made great efforts to deny India a role and seemed to have succeeded even with a tried and trusted friend like Russia. However, President Medvedev’s visit has removed misapprehensions that Russia was exploring options in this region without India.
For the first time the Russians have been upfront and explicit about holding Pakistan accountable on the terrorism issue, naming it, and asking it to expeditiously bring all the perpetrators, authors and accomplices of the Mumbai attacks to justice. They have also referred to the safe havens for terrorists and radical extremists in Pakistan. This is new language signifying a welcome change in political line.
Q. What should Russia be doing if its utterances on Pakistan and terrorism have to be given meaning? Politically, can it apply pressure on Pakistan? How much leverage does Moscow have with Islamabad?
A. President Medvedev’s statements on the Indian soil about Pak terror, and by those of France President Nicolas Sarkozy, amount to a form of pressure on Pakistan. The Russian President has promised stepped up anti-terror cooperation with India, including technology. He has supported firmer adherence to relevant UN resolutions. Russia can mobilise the Central Asian states against the terrorist threat from Pakistan more actively and further isolate Pakistan politically in the region.
Of course, after the Soviet debacle in Afghanistan, Russia will not want to physically intervene in the region. It will also be careful not to destabilise Pakistan to the point that it becomes more of a menace, or is incapable of extending the kind of cooperation the US wants from it. Russia will also be mindful of US interests.
The situation is exceedingly complex and no one, including the Americans, can clearly see what to do next. If the US is unable to use its leverages to make Pakistan do what it wants, it is difficult to imagine what Russia can proactively do on the ground which would meet both Russian and Indian objectives.
Ultimately, all of us have to depend in great measure on the US and its allies to make sure that they don’t allow disruptive forces to gain power in the region. To that extent, Russia, India, or for that matter even Iran, would have interest in securing the interests of the international community in Afghanistan in collaboration with the US and others. But so far, the US has not sufficiently reached out to regional countries and accommodated sufficiently their thinking in its policies.
Q. Will nurturing a Moscow-Delhi axis be to our benefit, or will the costs be too severe?
A. Talk of an axis will be an exaggeration, but enhanced cooperation has no adverse costs, only benefits. Our defence relationship remains very strong. Russia is a leading energy power. Its scientific and technological base in many areas, such as space and nuclear energy, is very strong. Who will object to expansion of our ties with Russia in these areas? The US, Europe, China? There is no such risk. Our thinking and approach is not based on exclusivity. Other countries, including China in the economic area, are ready to engage with us in spheres where mutual gains can be maximised.
Q. How do you rate Medvedev’s visit?
A. Very satisfactory. On terrorism, Pakistan, permanent membership of the Security Council, defence, energy, economic ties, visa restrictions, etc, the visit saw a conscious effort by the Russian side to move forward while removing any misgivings that might have arisen beneath the surface about Russia’s position on some of these issues. The extra effort made by Russia shows that it is no longer taking India for granted. India, of course, has never lost sight of the value of its Russia relationship.
‘Russia is explicit about Pak terror’December 26th, 2010 DC Correspondent
Kanwal Sibal, who was India’s ambassador to Moscow and later foreign secretary, says that it is for the first time that the Russians have been upfront and explicit about holding Pakistan accountable on the terrorism issue. In an interview to Ramesh Ramachandran, he says that this is a new language that signifies a welcome change in political line.
Q. Is the Russian connection worth nurturing, considering that lately India has developed viable relations with leading Western democracies?
A. It is very wrong to think in terms of an either-or situation because conditions of globalisation today permit us to develop strong relations with the US and continue to nurture our longstanding ties with Russia. There are gains to be made from both sides. The Cold War constraints, which India even then resisted, don’t exist anymore.
If we want to play a global role, if we want to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, this cannot be on the basis of exclusive relationships. We have to be self-confident and establish mutually-beneficial relationships with all centres of power. Our relationship with Russia is not at the expense of our other relationships and vice-versa.
Q. The outcome of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit seems to have belied the view that India’s old relationship with Russia in areas such as defence may be overshadowed. Also, two-way trade was not picking up. How do you view the matter?
A. Our defence relationship with Russia remains prolific. Almost 70 per cent of our defence supplies come from Russia; diversification of supply sources may lower this figure to 40 to 50 per cent in the decades ahead, which will be a very substantial reliance still. If you look at the range of our agreements and sourcing from Russia — the fifth generation fighter aircraft, the multi-role transport aircraft, additional T-90 tanks, Sukhoi MK30i and Mig-29K aircraft, lease of a nuclear submarine and technical help for Arihant, access to military signals from Glonass, etc — you can see the durability of our defence ties.
We are consolidating our defence ties with Russia even as we develop new partnerships because it is a trusted and reliable supplier. There is no risk with Russia of interruption of supplies in the future if the situation deteriorates in our neighbourhood. But trade, no doubt, is a very weak element in our relationship.
We have tried very hard to overcome this deficiency by setting up the India-Russia business forum, a CEOs forum, and working on a Ceca (Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement), but progress has been slow. President Medvedev’s visit, however, indicates a new dynamism on the economic front. Signs that Russia is politically more determined to expand its ties with India beyond the defence sector have become more visible. With the signing of an inter-governmental agreement on cooperation in the hydrocarbons sector, we have succeeded in our persistent efforts to get Russia to give a political push to the energy relationship. Agreements in the area of pharmaceuticals hold out hope for increased Indian sales to the expanding Russian market. So, if energy, pharmaceuticals, and the IT sector, in which potential synergies exist, come into the trade mix, our trade figures will expand.
Q. Do you see the first hints of a Moscow-Delhi axis emerging in Central Asia-Afghanistan, especially in a post-US situation in Afghanistan?
A. Such an axis cannot be realistically built as Moscow will not want to get embroiled in Afghanistan once again, and other players like Iran and China cannot be ignored. In fact, the initiative taken by Russia, Tajikistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan to discuss the future of that region was a contrary signal as India was left out — to Pakistan’s satisfaction.
Islamabad has made great efforts to deny India a role and seemed to have succeeded even with a tried and trusted friend like Russia. However, President Medvedev’s visit has removed misapprehensions that Russia was exploring options in this region without India.
For the first time the Russians have been upfront and explicit about holding Pakistan accountable on the terrorism issue, naming it, and asking it to expeditiously bring all the perpetrators, authors and accomplices of the Mumbai attacks to justice. They have also referred to the safe havens for terrorists and radical extremists in Pakistan. This is new language signifying a welcome change in political line.
Q. What should Russia be doing if its utterances on Pakistan and terrorism have to be given meaning? Politically, can it apply pressure on Pakistan? How much leverage does Moscow have with Islamabad?
A. President Medvedev’s statements on the Indian soil about Pak terror, and by those of France President Nicolas Sarkozy, amount to a form of pressure on Pakistan. The Russian President has promised stepped up anti-terror cooperation with India, including technology. He has supported firmer adherence to relevant UN resolutions. Russia can mobilise the Central Asian states against the terrorist threat from Pakistan more actively and further isolate Pakistan politically in the region.
Of course, after the Soviet debacle in Afghanistan, Russia will not want to physically intervene in the region. It will also be careful not to destabilise Pakistan to the point that it becomes more of a menace, or is incapable of extending the kind of cooperation the US wants from it. Russia will also be mindful of US interests.
The situation is exceedingly complex and no one, including the Americans, can clearly see what to do next. If the US is unable to use its leverages to make Pakistan do what it wants, it is difficult to imagine what Russia can proactively do on the ground which would meet both Russian and Indian objectives.
Ultimately, all of us have to depend in great measure on the US and its allies to make sure that they don’t allow disruptive forces to gain power in the region. To that extent, Russia, India, or for that matter even Iran, would have interest in securing the interests of the international community in Afghanistan in collaboration with the US and others. But so far, the US has not sufficiently reached out to regional countries and accommodated sufficiently their thinking in its policies.
Q. Will nurturing a Moscow-Delhi axis be to our benefit, or will the costs be too severe?
A. Talk of an axis will be an exaggeration, but enhanced cooperation has no adverse costs, only benefits. Our defence relationship remains very strong. Russia is a leading energy power. Its scientific and technological base in many areas, such as space and nuclear energy, is very strong. Who will object to expansion of our ties with Russia in these areas? The US, Europe, China? There is no such risk. Our thinking and approach is not based on exclusivity. Other countries, including China in the economic area, are ready to engage with us in spheres where mutual gains can be maximised.
Q. How do you rate Medvedev’s visit?
A. Very satisfactory. On terrorism, Pakistan, permanent membership of the Security Council, defence, energy, economic ties, visa restrictions, etc, the visit saw a conscious effort by the Russian side to move forward while removing any misgivings that might have arisen beneath the surface about Russia’s position on some of these issues. The extra effort made by Russia shows that it is no longer taking India for granted. India, of course, has never lost sight of the value of its Russia relationship.
‘Russia is explicit about Pak terror’December 26th, 2010 DC Correspondent
Saturday, December 25, 2010
Obama’s Afghanistan Review
21 December 2010 Af-Pak Diary-VII: Obama’s Afghanistan Review by D Suba Chandran,Deputy Director, IPCS
The much expected Afghanistan Review by Obama’s administration was finally made public during the third week of December 2010. What does this review say about Obama’s policies and strategies towards Afghanistan?
Obama said, “It's important to remember why we remain in Afghanistan. It was Afghanistan where al Qaeda plotted the 9/11 attacks that murdered 3,000 innocent people…And that's why, from the start, I've been very clear about our core goal. It's not to defeat every last threat to the security of Afghanistan, because, ultimately, it is Afghans who must secure their country. And it's not nation-building, because it is Afghans who must build their nation. Rather, we are focused on disrupting, dismantling and defeating al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and preventing its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.”
Perhaps, this is the most articulate expression of how the US (and the rest of the world) perceives their presence in Afghanistan. For long, there has been a heavy rhetoric that the war in Afghanistan is for the sake of the Afghans, and international troops stationed in the country aim to help the Afghans build their nation; ultimately leading them towards a stable democracy.
Obama should be congratulated for casting aside rhetoric and placing things in perspective by clarifying that the US is in Afghanistan to dismantle the al Qaeda, and not for a nation building project or for addressing every security threat.
But the real question is: Can the two be seen as two different processes? How did the Taliban and al Qaeda come into Afghanistan in the first place? Is that not because of the security problems of Afghanistan leading ultimately to the failure of nation-building?
Obama is right. The Afghans should ideally build their own nation and be responsible for facing national security threats. Undoubtedly, every nation in this world should engage in this process by themselves. However, in Afghanistan’s case (as in the cases of numerous countries in the Middle East, East Europe and North Africa), was this process ever allowed by the international community, especially the US and the former Soviet Union?
After shamelessly engaging in a cold war for decades and ruthlessly supporting regimes for narrow interests, both the US and the former Soviet Union systematically collapsed any nation-building process in these countries. Today, Obama has forgotten this history. It is unfortunate that the global history and problems of terrorism starts with 9/11 for many in the US. Those in the Middle East, East Europe and North Africa consider their national borders and recent history to be drawn with their own blood; thanks to the US, former Soviet Union and their proxies in the region. Al Qaeda is an expression of this anger; unless and until the international community addresses this anger, one will never be able to defeat these non-State actors. They will continue to pose a threat to international stability.
Such a myopic reading of history is likely to result in the US taking the wrong decision. Obama should understand the larger implications of his withdrawal without establishing a stable Afghanistan. Obama himself says, “In pursuit of our core goal we are seeing significant progress. Today, al Qaeda's senior leadership in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan is under more pressure than at any point since they fled Afghanistan nine years ago…It will take time to ultimately defeat al Qaeda, and it remains a ruthless and resilient enemy bent on attacking our country. But make no mistake - we are going to remain relentless in disrupting and dismantling that terrorist organization.”
What the US and the rest of the international troops have done so far in Afghanistan (and in parts of the Tribal Agencies in Pakistan) is in terms of disrupting the al Qaeda network. But their network has been neither been dismantled nor completely neutralized.
The US should not leave until and unless the Taliban and al Qaeda are completely routed. Unfortunately, Obama does not see the al Qaeda and the Taliban in the same wave length. For him, al Qaeda is a great threat that needs to be dismantled, but not the Taliban, which could be negotiated with.
Are al Qaeda and the Taliban two different entities, one of which could be neutralized and the other negotiated with? In terms of structure and leadership, undoubtedly, they are two different entities. But in terms of ideology and the threats they pose to Afghan stability – both will remain the same.
The US has a duty to perform in Afghanistan befitting its global reputation as the sole super power. If it does not, no one else will. Obama (and perhaps his advisors) refer to history to understand how Afghanistan reached this point. 9/11 was not the starting point; it was only an expression of what has gone wrong in many Muslim countries. A failure in Afghanistan will affect the American image which will ultimately strengthen the al Qaeda in the long run. In fact, this Islamic belligerence is not limited to the Middle East alone. From the US and Spain to Indonesia and the Philippines, it spreads across three continents.
Obama should remain engaged in Afghanistan. An American failure will be a recipe for disaster, with far reaching repercussions.
Af-Pak Diary-VII: Obama’s Afghanistan Review
The much expected Afghanistan Review by Obama’s administration was finally made public during the third week of December 2010. What does this review say about Obama’s policies and strategies towards Afghanistan?
Obama said, “It's important to remember why we remain in Afghanistan. It was Afghanistan where al Qaeda plotted the 9/11 attacks that murdered 3,000 innocent people…And that's why, from the start, I've been very clear about our core goal. It's not to defeat every last threat to the security of Afghanistan, because, ultimately, it is Afghans who must secure their country. And it's not nation-building, because it is Afghans who must build their nation. Rather, we are focused on disrupting, dismantling and defeating al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and preventing its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.”
Perhaps, this is the most articulate expression of how the US (and the rest of the world) perceives their presence in Afghanistan. For long, there has been a heavy rhetoric that the war in Afghanistan is for the sake of the Afghans, and international troops stationed in the country aim to help the Afghans build their nation; ultimately leading them towards a stable democracy.
Obama should be congratulated for casting aside rhetoric and placing things in perspective by clarifying that the US is in Afghanistan to dismantle the al Qaeda, and not for a nation building project or for addressing every security threat.
But the real question is: Can the two be seen as two different processes? How did the Taliban and al Qaeda come into Afghanistan in the first place? Is that not because of the security problems of Afghanistan leading ultimately to the failure of nation-building?
Obama is right. The Afghans should ideally build their own nation and be responsible for facing national security threats. Undoubtedly, every nation in this world should engage in this process by themselves. However, in Afghanistan’s case (as in the cases of numerous countries in the Middle East, East Europe and North Africa), was this process ever allowed by the international community, especially the US and the former Soviet Union?
After shamelessly engaging in a cold war for decades and ruthlessly supporting regimes for narrow interests, both the US and the former Soviet Union systematically collapsed any nation-building process in these countries. Today, Obama has forgotten this history. It is unfortunate that the global history and problems of terrorism starts with 9/11 for many in the US. Those in the Middle East, East Europe and North Africa consider their national borders and recent history to be drawn with their own blood; thanks to the US, former Soviet Union and their proxies in the region. Al Qaeda is an expression of this anger; unless and until the international community addresses this anger, one will never be able to defeat these non-State actors. They will continue to pose a threat to international stability.
Such a myopic reading of history is likely to result in the US taking the wrong decision. Obama should understand the larger implications of his withdrawal without establishing a stable Afghanistan. Obama himself says, “In pursuit of our core goal we are seeing significant progress. Today, al Qaeda's senior leadership in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan is under more pressure than at any point since they fled Afghanistan nine years ago…It will take time to ultimately defeat al Qaeda, and it remains a ruthless and resilient enemy bent on attacking our country. But make no mistake - we are going to remain relentless in disrupting and dismantling that terrorist organization.”
What the US and the rest of the international troops have done so far in Afghanistan (and in parts of the Tribal Agencies in Pakistan) is in terms of disrupting the al Qaeda network. But their network has been neither been dismantled nor completely neutralized.
The US should not leave until and unless the Taliban and al Qaeda are completely routed. Unfortunately, Obama does not see the al Qaeda and the Taliban in the same wave length. For him, al Qaeda is a great threat that needs to be dismantled, but not the Taliban, which could be negotiated with.
Are al Qaeda and the Taliban two different entities, one of which could be neutralized and the other negotiated with? In terms of structure and leadership, undoubtedly, they are two different entities. But in terms of ideology and the threats they pose to Afghan stability – both will remain the same.
The US has a duty to perform in Afghanistan befitting its global reputation as the sole super power. If it does not, no one else will. Obama (and perhaps his advisors) refer to history to understand how Afghanistan reached this point. 9/11 was not the starting point; it was only an expression of what has gone wrong in many Muslim countries. A failure in Afghanistan will affect the American image which will ultimately strengthen the al Qaeda in the long run. In fact, this Islamic belligerence is not limited to the Middle East alone. From the US and Spain to Indonesia and the Philippines, it spreads across three continents.
Obama should remain engaged in Afghanistan. An American failure will be a recipe for disaster, with far reaching repercussions.
Af-Pak Diary-VII: Obama’s Afghanistan Review
Thursday, December 23, 2010
$30bn fighter plane deal inked
Rahul Singh, Hindustan Times
New Delhi, December 21, 2010First Published: 23:55 IST(21/12/2010)
India and Russia on Tuesday finalised a contract for the biggest defence programme in the country's history — a $30-billion (Rs 1,35,000-crore) project involving the joint production of 200-250 fifth generation fighter aircraft (FGFA). The aircraft, being called the perspective multi-role fighter (PMF), will exploit the basic design of the Russian Sukhoi T-50 PAK-FA prototype, with modifications thrown in to meet the Indian Air Force's "more stringent specifications".
The 30-tonne aircraft will be a swing-role fighter with stealth features for increased survivability, advanced avionics, smart weapons, top-end mission computers and 360-degree situational awareness.
What will put the co-produced fighter in a different league is its ability to supercruise, i.e. sustain supersonic speeds in combat configuration without kicking in fuel-guzzling afterburners. Currently, the US Air Force's F-22 Raptor is the only fighter in the world that can supercruise.
The contract for the joint design and development of the FGFA was signed between Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and two Russian firsm, Sukhoi Design Bureau and Rosoboronexport. The fighter will be jointly marketed to international air forces. The first prototype flew its maiden sortie in January 2010 and has conducted more than 40 flights. The IAF hopes to induct it by 2018.
A joint statement issued by the ministry of external affairs said Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev agreed that the December 2009 pact covering bilateral military cooperation during the next decade would lead to a more substantive engagement cutting across joint research and development, manufacturing and marketing activities.
The two sides asked Islamabad to bring the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks to justice. They said that countries aiding or sheltering terrorists were as guilty of acts of terrorism as their actual perpetrators.
The two nations also agreed to reinforce bilateral defence ties by stepping up joint military exercises.
$30bn fighter plane deal inked
Critical Review: Condemned to another cycle of fighter jet imports
India will foot the bill to develop the Russian fifth generation fighter and then buy it at market price
New Delhi, December 21, 2010First Published: 23:55 IST(21/12/2010)
India and Russia on Tuesday finalised a contract for the biggest defence programme in the country's history — a $30-billion (Rs 1,35,000-crore) project involving the joint production of 200-250 fifth generation fighter aircraft (FGFA). The aircraft, being called the perspective multi-role fighter (PMF), will exploit the basic design of the Russian Sukhoi T-50 PAK-FA prototype, with modifications thrown in to meet the Indian Air Force's "more stringent specifications".
The 30-tonne aircraft will be a swing-role fighter with stealth features for increased survivability, advanced avionics, smart weapons, top-end mission computers and 360-degree situational awareness.
What will put the co-produced fighter in a different league is its ability to supercruise, i.e. sustain supersonic speeds in combat configuration without kicking in fuel-guzzling afterburners. Currently, the US Air Force's F-22 Raptor is the only fighter in the world that can supercruise.
The contract for the joint design and development of the FGFA was signed between Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and two Russian firsm, Sukhoi Design Bureau and Rosoboronexport. The fighter will be jointly marketed to international air forces. The first prototype flew its maiden sortie in January 2010 and has conducted more than 40 flights. The IAF hopes to induct it by 2018.
A joint statement issued by the ministry of external affairs said Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev agreed that the December 2009 pact covering bilateral military cooperation during the next decade would lead to a more substantive engagement cutting across joint research and development, manufacturing and marketing activities.
The two sides asked Islamabad to bring the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks to justice. They said that countries aiding or sheltering terrorists were as guilty of acts of terrorism as their actual perpetrators.
The two nations also agreed to reinforce bilateral defence ties by stepping up joint military exercises.
$30bn fighter plane deal inked
Critical Review: Condemned to another cycle of fighter jet imports
India will foot the bill to develop the Russian fifth generation fighter and then buy it at market price
Afganistan Policy: Review Won't Alter Pakistan's Behavior
December 16, 2010
Author: Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia
The Obama administration's latest Afghan strategy review correctly finds that to achieve sustainable success in the war against al-Qaeda and its affiliates and to quell the Afghan insurgency, more must be done to eliminate safe havens in Pakistan's tribal areas along the Afghan border. It concludes that progress toward this goal has been "uneven," at best.
The review goes on to suggest that the challenge of Pakistan's border areas must be addressed through better strategic balance and integration, including greater cooperation with Pakistan, more effective development strategies, and improved dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
All this is fine, but it won't be nearly enough to change Pakistani behavior. Neither U.S. dialogue nor U.S. assistance will convince Pakistan's defense and intelligence leaders that they should finally take up arms against the Afghan Taliban groups (especially the Haqqani Network and Quetta Shura) that have long enjoyed passive or active support from Islamabad. Nor will unilateral U.S. tools--drone strikes on compounds along the Afghan border and limited military incursions--do what is necessary to defeat the Taliban based inside Pakistan. The United States needs Pakistan's cooperation.
But the only way to convince Pakistani leaders to change course would be to demonstrate that the United States is serious about bringing enduring stability to Afghanistan, and that Washington's definition of Afghan stability does not leave a place for the leaders of extremist and terrorist groups now waging war from Pakistani soil. Only then might Pakistani leaders decide that a better way to protect their enduring interests in Afghanistan would be through the support of legitimate, nonviolent political actors.
The review states that the United States is clearly communicating a "commitment to a long-term relationship that is supportive of Pakistan's interests." I disagree. In fact, the review sends mixed messages to Pakistan about U.S. plans for Afghanistan and obscures the areas in which U.S. and Pakistani interests collide.
Pakistani military and intelligence leaders will see that U.S. military progress is so far "fragile and reversible," that Washington is open to some sort of "Afghan-led reconciliation" (negotiations with the Taliban), and that July 2011 will mark the beginning of a "responsible reduction" of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. They will easily interpret these findings as they have in the past: the U.S. is not yet establishing enduring security conditions in Afghanistan, Washington is looking for quick political way out of its quagmire, and Pakistan will have to face a messy post-NATO Afghanistan armed primarily with the influence of its proxy militants.
And that is not yet a recipe for the sort of timely, significant change Washington needs from Islamabad. To some extent, Pakistan will only be convinced of U.S. commitment to Afghan stability if it is a witness to unmistakable signs on the ground. That will take at least through the early summer--the Afghan fighting season--to sink in. So the declared pace of Washington's "responsible reduction" in forces will matter a great deal. Emphasizing plans to remain active in Afghanistan until 2014 and beyond--rather than 2011--is a useful but incomplete shift.
Until then, clarifying what Washington means by "Afghan-led reconciliation"--in particular by answering the question of which Taliban are reconcilable and which are not--could also send a compelling, and constructive, message to Islamabad. Finally, Washington should use opportunities like this review to make it clear that Pakistani inaction against terrorists based along the Afghan border is fundamentally at odds with enduring U.S.-Pakistani partnership.
Weigh in on this issue by emailing CFR.org.
Review Won't Alter Pakistan's Behavior
Overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review, December 2010
Author: Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia
The Obama administration's latest Afghan strategy review correctly finds that to achieve sustainable success in the war against al-Qaeda and its affiliates and to quell the Afghan insurgency, more must be done to eliminate safe havens in Pakistan's tribal areas along the Afghan border. It concludes that progress toward this goal has been "uneven," at best.
The review goes on to suggest that the challenge of Pakistan's border areas must be addressed through better strategic balance and integration, including greater cooperation with Pakistan, more effective development strategies, and improved dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
All this is fine, but it won't be nearly enough to change Pakistani behavior. Neither U.S. dialogue nor U.S. assistance will convince Pakistan's defense and intelligence leaders that they should finally take up arms against the Afghan Taliban groups (especially the Haqqani Network and Quetta Shura) that have long enjoyed passive or active support from Islamabad. Nor will unilateral U.S. tools--drone strikes on compounds along the Afghan border and limited military incursions--do what is necessary to defeat the Taliban based inside Pakistan. The United States needs Pakistan's cooperation.
But the only way to convince Pakistani leaders to change course would be to demonstrate that the United States is serious about bringing enduring stability to Afghanistan, and that Washington's definition of Afghan stability does not leave a place for the leaders of extremist and terrorist groups now waging war from Pakistani soil. Only then might Pakistani leaders decide that a better way to protect their enduring interests in Afghanistan would be through the support of legitimate, nonviolent political actors.
The review states that the United States is clearly communicating a "commitment to a long-term relationship that is supportive of Pakistan's interests." I disagree. In fact, the review sends mixed messages to Pakistan about U.S. plans for Afghanistan and obscures the areas in which U.S. and Pakistani interests collide.
Pakistani military and intelligence leaders will see that U.S. military progress is so far "fragile and reversible," that Washington is open to some sort of "Afghan-led reconciliation" (negotiations with the Taliban), and that July 2011 will mark the beginning of a "responsible reduction" of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. They will easily interpret these findings as they have in the past: the U.S. is not yet establishing enduring security conditions in Afghanistan, Washington is looking for quick political way out of its quagmire, and Pakistan will have to face a messy post-NATO Afghanistan armed primarily with the influence of its proxy militants.
And that is not yet a recipe for the sort of timely, significant change Washington needs from Islamabad. To some extent, Pakistan will only be convinced of U.S. commitment to Afghan stability if it is a witness to unmistakable signs on the ground. That will take at least through the early summer--the Afghan fighting season--to sink in. So the declared pace of Washington's "responsible reduction" in forces will matter a great deal. Emphasizing plans to remain active in Afghanistan until 2014 and beyond--rather than 2011--is a useful but incomplete shift.
Until then, clarifying what Washington means by "Afghan-led reconciliation"--in particular by answering the question of which Taliban are reconcilable and which are not--could also send a compelling, and constructive, message to Islamabad. Finally, Washington should use opportunities like this review to make it clear that Pakistani inaction against terrorists based along the Afghan border is fundamentally at odds with enduring U.S.-Pakistani partnership.
Weigh in on this issue by emailing CFR.org.
Review Won't Alter Pakistan's Behavior
Overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review, December 2010
Wednesday, December 22, 2010
Coastal Security sees a sea of change after Mumbai Mayhem
Wednesday, December 22, 2010
The Defence Minister Shri AK Antony today said the government is making all out efforts in the aftermath of the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack to ensure security of the coastal regions of the country. Addressing the Consultative Committee attached to his Ministry in New Delhi, he said, there has been a sea-change in the government’s approach to coastal security after this tragic incident. Shri Antony said the government is giving top priority to modernization of shipyards so that state-of-the –art warships can be built indigenously to global standards in the most transparent manner. He said, in future, all vessels of the Indian Navy will be built indigenously and the private sector will play a crucial role in this endeavour.
“ To be comparable with the best global shipyards, we must keep a high premium on the quality of the delivered products. Our market share in global ship building must be improved substantially on a priority basis. Our shipyards have no option, but to build state of the art infrastructure for constructing high technology warships and submarines”, he said.
Giving details of the modernization plans currently being carried out in Mazagon Dock Limited, Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Limited and Goa Shipyard Limited, Shri Antony said, these include human resource development, important components for upgradation and diversification of ship building infrastructure and implementing state of the art management tools and techniques. He said, recently, Hindustan Shipyard Limited has been transferred from the Ministry of Shipping to the Department Defence Production and a modernization programme for HSL will be finalized soon. He said the first phase of the modernization plan will be completed by the first half of 2011.
Shri Antony said, in recent years, the MoD has been able to ensure improved results in the delivery of warships and submarines. During 2009-2010, these numbers stood at 120 vessels for the Indian Navy, Coast Guard and coastal states. In the current financial year, 85 vessels have already been delivered and by March 2011, a total of 127 vessels will be delivered.
Cutting across party lines, the Members of Parliament appreciated the role of MoD in galvanizing the modernization process. The Members of Parliament who attended today’s meeting included Shri HK Dua, Shri Navin Jindal, Shri Manish Tiwari, Shri Piyus Goyal, Shri Gajanan Dharmshi Babar, Shri Brij Bhushan Sharan Singh, Shri Sudip Bandyopadhyaya, Shri NSV Chitthan, Shri Lalit Mohan Suklabaidya, Shri Gopal Singh Shekhawat and Shri Ramachandra Khuntia. The meeting was also attended by the Minister of State for Defence Shri MM Pallam Raju, the Defence Secretary Shri Pradeep Kumar, the Secretary Defence Production, Shri RK Singh, Scietific Adviser to Raksha Mantri Dr VK Saraswat, senior officials of the MoD and the Defence Shipyards.
The Members of Parliament and the officials greeted the announcement of Shri Antony about the success of DRDO in testing two Prithvi missiles within an hour’s gap earlier in the day. Sitanshu Kar
Sea Change in Government’s Approach to Coastal Security After 26/11: Antony
Related News
Keeping Pirates at Bay: Antony to Open two Coast Guard set-up in Lakshadweep
The Defence Minister Shri AK Antony today said the government is making all out efforts in the aftermath of the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack to ensure security of the coastal regions of the country. Addressing the Consultative Committee attached to his Ministry in New Delhi, he said, there has been a sea-change in the government’s approach to coastal security after this tragic incident. Shri Antony said the government is giving top priority to modernization of shipyards so that state-of-the –art warships can be built indigenously to global standards in the most transparent manner. He said, in future, all vessels of the Indian Navy will be built indigenously and the private sector will play a crucial role in this endeavour.
“ To be comparable with the best global shipyards, we must keep a high premium on the quality of the delivered products. Our market share in global ship building must be improved substantially on a priority basis. Our shipyards have no option, but to build state of the art infrastructure for constructing high technology warships and submarines”, he said.
Giving details of the modernization plans currently being carried out in Mazagon Dock Limited, Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Limited and Goa Shipyard Limited, Shri Antony said, these include human resource development, important components for upgradation and diversification of ship building infrastructure and implementing state of the art management tools and techniques. He said, recently, Hindustan Shipyard Limited has been transferred from the Ministry of Shipping to the Department Defence Production and a modernization programme for HSL will be finalized soon. He said the first phase of the modernization plan will be completed by the first half of 2011.
Shri Antony said, in recent years, the MoD has been able to ensure improved results in the delivery of warships and submarines. During 2009-2010, these numbers stood at 120 vessels for the Indian Navy, Coast Guard and coastal states. In the current financial year, 85 vessels have already been delivered and by March 2011, a total of 127 vessels will be delivered.
Cutting across party lines, the Members of Parliament appreciated the role of MoD in galvanizing the modernization process. The Members of Parliament who attended today’s meeting included Shri HK Dua, Shri Navin Jindal, Shri Manish Tiwari, Shri Piyus Goyal, Shri Gajanan Dharmshi Babar, Shri Brij Bhushan Sharan Singh, Shri Sudip Bandyopadhyaya, Shri NSV Chitthan, Shri Lalit Mohan Suklabaidya, Shri Gopal Singh Shekhawat and Shri Ramachandra Khuntia. The meeting was also attended by the Minister of State for Defence Shri MM Pallam Raju, the Defence Secretary Shri Pradeep Kumar, the Secretary Defence Production, Shri RK Singh, Scietific Adviser to Raksha Mantri Dr VK Saraswat, senior officials of the MoD and the Defence Shipyards.
The Members of Parliament and the officials greeted the announcement of Shri Antony about the success of DRDO in testing two Prithvi missiles within an hour’s gap earlier in the day. Sitanshu Kar
Sea Change in Government’s Approach to Coastal Security After 26/11: Antony
Related News
Keeping Pirates at Bay: Antony to Open two Coast Guard set-up in Lakshadweep
Tuesday, December 21, 2010
Russia remains critical to Indian security interests
Vodka Cocktails Again by Brahma Chellaney, The Economic Times, December 19, 2010
The heads of government of the UN Security Council’s permanent members have made a beeline to India in recent months, with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev being the latest. From British Prime Minister David Cameron to Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, each signed multibillion-dollar deals during his India visit. Medvedev will be no exception. Foreign governments have been courting India to try to get a piece of its lucrative, fast-growing market. But Indian diplomacy, oddly, does not lay emphasis on securing foreign contracts for domestic industry.
Russia, however, is the only P-5 state with which India has enjoyed a close, stable, enduring and mutually beneficial relationship over several decades. Unlike the vicissitudes that have characterized Indo-US ties, the Indo-Russia relationship has been relatively steady. The interests of the US and India may converge on larger Asian issues but they diverge on regional matters, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Myanmar. The vaunted Indo-US strategic partnership has turned into an opportunity for Washington to win major commercial and defence contracts and co-opt India into strategic arrangements, without a concomitant obligation to be on India’s side. By contrast, there is a greater congruence of Russian and Indian national-security objectives.
Which power is willing to sell critical military technologies, not just weapons, to India? Which power is transferring a nuclear-powered submarine on a 10-year lease to India? Which country sells India an aircraft carrier, even if an old one? Which arms supplier to New Delhi does not offer matching weapons to India’s adversaries? Russia is the common answer to all these questions. Little surprise that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, calling Russia a “tried and tested friend” of India, admitted in 2007: “Although there has been a sea-change in the international situation during the last decade, Russia remains indispensable to the core of India’s foreign-policy interests”.
For Russia, India is a force of stability in a region where Moscow, as the WikiLeaks’ disclosures have underlined, is deeply concerned about jihadists within the Pakistani establishment gaining control of weapons of mass destruction. With the US and its NATO partners now announcing plans to start within months to gradually withdraw forces from Afghanistan so as to end all combat operations by 2014, Russia and India need to work together and with countries like Iran, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to frustrate Pakistan’s aim to reinstall the Afghan Taliban in power.
However, even as Moscow tries to restore its influence in the former Soviet republics, its humiliating military retreat from Afghanistan in the late 1980s still weighs heavily on the Russian psyche. Moscow thus seems reluctant to get directly involved in Afghanistan again, with the focus of its concerns centred more on the flow of illicit drugs to Russia, where drug addiction has emerged as a major public-health problem. But with the US now set to make its own military retreat from Afghanistan, Russia and India will have little choice but to work together to avert a destabilizing power vacuum there. Otherwise, India in particular and Russia to a lesser extent will bear the brunt of the terrorism blowback from the Af-Pak belt.
In the larger Asian theatre, Russia shares a common strategic objective with India (and America) for a stable power balance in a continent that China wants to dominate. Sparsely populated Russia, the world’s wealthiest country in natural resources, and densely populated, resource-hungry China are anything but natural allies, with Han influx into the Russian Far East stoking visceral historical Russian fears of a Chinese demographic invasion. With Russia and China seemingly reverting to their traditional suspicion and competition, their two-decade-old honeymoon may now be ending.
Russia’s future, however, remains clouded by major challenges, including an excessive reliance on hydrocarbon exports to power its economy and the looming threat of depopulation. Still, it should not be forgotten that Russia remains a nuclear and missile superpower. Geopolitically, Russia is one of the most important “swing” states in the world. For example, there can be no hope of Asian power equilibrium without Russia working with India and other likeminded states.
In the Russia-US-China-India-Japan strategic pentagon in Asia, if Russia, India and Japan were to work closely together, with the US lending a helping hand, China would find itself boxed in from virtually all sides. That would not only extinguish any prospect of a Sino-centric Asia, but would create the ultimate strategic nightmare for China. After all, as the geographical hub of Asia, China is vulnerable to the same geopolitical game it plays against India — strategic encirclement. But fortunately for Beijing, recent developments have highlighted that a Russian-Japanese rapprochement remains distant.
However, the China factor that led to the 1971 Indo-Soviet friendship treaty is gaining greater salience, given the present spectre of Asian power disequilibrium.
The US and India are now strategic buddies. But Indira Gandhi entered into the friendship treaty containing a mutual-security assistance clause because she was fearful that the US and China would make serious trouble if India intervened to help East Pakistan become Bangladesh. Her fears proved right: The US responded not only by dispatching the nuclear-powered USS Enterprise aircraft carrier to the Bay of Bengal, but also (as the declassified Nixon-Kissinger transcripts later attested) by egging on China to attack India.
Indeed, former US President Richard Nixon candidly wrote in 1985: “There were three other instances [besides Vietnam] when I considered using nuclear weapons ... there was 1971, the Indo-Pak war. After Mrs. Gandhi completed the decimation of East Pakistan, she wanted to gobble up West Pakistan. At least that’s the way I read it. The Chinese were climbing the walls. We were concerned that the Chinese might intervene to stop India. We didn’t learn till later that they didn’t have that kind of conventional capability. But if they did step in, and the Soviets reacted, what would we do? There was no question what we would have done”.
Today Russia, with its vantage location in Eurasia, remains a key country for India’s long-term strategic interests. In fact, Medvedev’s visit, just nine months after Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s New Delhi trip, is part of the new tradition of an annual summit meeting — a symbol of the continuing India-Russia closeness, despite the shrinkage of economic ties.
Brahma Chellaney is the author of a 2010 international bestseller, Asian Juggernaut (HarperCollins USA).
December 19 10:39 PM | Blog it | International Security
Russia remains critical to Indian security interests
The heads of government of the UN Security Council’s permanent members have made a beeline to India in recent months, with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev being the latest. From British Prime Minister David Cameron to Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, each signed multibillion-dollar deals during his India visit. Medvedev will be no exception. Foreign governments have been courting India to try to get a piece of its lucrative, fast-growing market. But Indian diplomacy, oddly, does not lay emphasis on securing foreign contracts for domestic industry.
Russia, however, is the only P-5 state with which India has enjoyed a close, stable, enduring and mutually beneficial relationship over several decades. Unlike the vicissitudes that have characterized Indo-US ties, the Indo-Russia relationship has been relatively steady. The interests of the US and India may converge on larger Asian issues but they diverge on regional matters, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Myanmar. The vaunted Indo-US strategic partnership has turned into an opportunity for Washington to win major commercial and defence contracts and co-opt India into strategic arrangements, without a concomitant obligation to be on India’s side. By contrast, there is a greater congruence of Russian and Indian national-security objectives.
Which power is willing to sell critical military technologies, not just weapons, to India? Which power is transferring a nuclear-powered submarine on a 10-year lease to India? Which country sells India an aircraft carrier, even if an old one? Which arms supplier to New Delhi does not offer matching weapons to India’s adversaries? Russia is the common answer to all these questions. Little surprise that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, calling Russia a “tried and tested friend” of India, admitted in 2007: “Although there has been a sea-change in the international situation during the last decade, Russia remains indispensable to the core of India’s foreign-policy interests”.
For Russia, India is a force of stability in a region where Moscow, as the WikiLeaks’ disclosures have underlined, is deeply concerned about jihadists within the Pakistani establishment gaining control of weapons of mass destruction. With the US and its NATO partners now announcing plans to start within months to gradually withdraw forces from Afghanistan so as to end all combat operations by 2014, Russia and India need to work together and with countries like Iran, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to frustrate Pakistan’s aim to reinstall the Afghan Taliban in power.
However, even as Moscow tries to restore its influence in the former Soviet republics, its humiliating military retreat from Afghanistan in the late 1980s still weighs heavily on the Russian psyche. Moscow thus seems reluctant to get directly involved in Afghanistan again, with the focus of its concerns centred more on the flow of illicit drugs to Russia, where drug addiction has emerged as a major public-health problem. But with the US now set to make its own military retreat from Afghanistan, Russia and India will have little choice but to work together to avert a destabilizing power vacuum there. Otherwise, India in particular and Russia to a lesser extent will bear the brunt of the terrorism blowback from the Af-Pak belt.
In the larger Asian theatre, Russia shares a common strategic objective with India (and America) for a stable power balance in a continent that China wants to dominate. Sparsely populated Russia, the world’s wealthiest country in natural resources, and densely populated, resource-hungry China are anything but natural allies, with Han influx into the Russian Far East stoking visceral historical Russian fears of a Chinese demographic invasion. With Russia and China seemingly reverting to their traditional suspicion and competition, their two-decade-old honeymoon may now be ending.
Russia’s future, however, remains clouded by major challenges, including an excessive reliance on hydrocarbon exports to power its economy and the looming threat of depopulation. Still, it should not be forgotten that Russia remains a nuclear and missile superpower. Geopolitically, Russia is one of the most important “swing” states in the world. For example, there can be no hope of Asian power equilibrium without Russia working with India and other likeminded states.
In the Russia-US-China-India-Japan strategic pentagon in Asia, if Russia, India and Japan were to work closely together, with the US lending a helping hand, China would find itself boxed in from virtually all sides. That would not only extinguish any prospect of a Sino-centric Asia, but would create the ultimate strategic nightmare for China. After all, as the geographical hub of Asia, China is vulnerable to the same geopolitical game it plays against India — strategic encirclement. But fortunately for Beijing, recent developments have highlighted that a Russian-Japanese rapprochement remains distant.
However, the China factor that led to the 1971 Indo-Soviet friendship treaty is gaining greater salience, given the present spectre of Asian power disequilibrium.
The US and India are now strategic buddies. But Indira Gandhi entered into the friendship treaty containing a mutual-security assistance clause because she was fearful that the US and China would make serious trouble if India intervened to help East Pakistan become Bangladesh. Her fears proved right: The US responded not only by dispatching the nuclear-powered USS Enterprise aircraft carrier to the Bay of Bengal, but also (as the declassified Nixon-Kissinger transcripts later attested) by egging on China to attack India.
Indeed, former US President Richard Nixon candidly wrote in 1985: “There were three other instances [besides Vietnam] when I considered using nuclear weapons ... there was 1971, the Indo-Pak war. After Mrs. Gandhi completed the decimation of East Pakistan, she wanted to gobble up West Pakistan. At least that’s the way I read it. The Chinese were climbing the walls. We were concerned that the Chinese might intervene to stop India. We didn’t learn till later that they didn’t have that kind of conventional capability. But if they did step in, and the Soviets reacted, what would we do? There was no question what we would have done”.
Today Russia, with its vantage location in Eurasia, remains a key country for India’s long-term strategic interests. In fact, Medvedev’s visit, just nine months after Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s New Delhi trip, is part of the new tradition of an annual summit meeting — a symbol of the continuing India-Russia closeness, despite the shrinkage of economic ties.
Brahma Chellaney is the author of a 2010 international bestseller, Asian Juggernaut (HarperCollins USA).
December 19 10:39 PM | Blog it | International Security
Russia remains critical to Indian security interests
Sunday, December 19, 2010
China erases 1,600 km of Indian border
China adds new twist it knocks off 1,600 km from its definition of China’s border with India
As questions of territorial sovereignty return to the centrestage in Sino-Indian relations, Beijing has added a new twist to the long-running boundary dispute between the two countries by knocking off nearly 1,600 km from its definition of China's border with India.
A Xinhua report from Beijing earlier this week on the eve of premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India described the Sino-Indian border as nearly 2,000-km long. The Indian count of the operational border is a lot longer at nearly 3,500 km (not taking into account the line separating Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and China). The discrepancy is too large to be treated as an inadvertent error in Beijing.
So, where did the hundreds of kilometers disappear? China apparently no longer treats the line of nearly 1,600 km separating Jammu and Kashmir on the one hand and Xinjiang and Tibet on the other as a border with India.
China's recasting of the length of the border with India appears to be part of the Kashmir puzzle that Beijing has unveiled in recent years. The other pieces include the recent policy of issuing stapled visas to Indian citizens from J&K, the reluctance to host a visit by the Northern Commander of the Indian Army Lt. Gen. B.S. Jaswal, the dramatic expansion of the Chinese activity in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir that includes the modernisation of the Karakoram Highway and the plans to construct a new rail line and oil pipeline between Kashgar in Xinjiang and the Gwadar port on Pakistan's Makran coast.
Xinhua's reference to 2,000 km of Sino-Indian border was based on an official briefing by the Assistant Foreign Minister of China, Hu Zhengyue to the Beijing press corps on Monday.
China erases 1,600 km of Indian border: click here to read more
As questions of territorial sovereignty return to the centrestage in Sino-Indian relations, Beijing has added a new twist to the long-running boundary dispute between the two countries by knocking off nearly 1,600 km from its definition of China's border with India.
A Xinhua report from Beijing earlier this week on the eve of premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India described the Sino-Indian border as nearly 2,000-km long. The Indian count of the operational border is a lot longer at nearly 3,500 km (not taking into account the line separating Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and China). The discrepancy is too large to be treated as an inadvertent error in Beijing.
So, where did the hundreds of kilometers disappear? China apparently no longer treats the line of nearly 1,600 km separating Jammu and Kashmir on the one hand and Xinjiang and Tibet on the other as a border with India.
China's recasting of the length of the border with India appears to be part of the Kashmir puzzle that Beijing has unveiled in recent years. The other pieces include the recent policy of issuing stapled visas to Indian citizens from J&K, the reluctance to host a visit by the Northern Commander of the Indian Army Lt. Gen. B.S. Jaswal, the dramatic expansion of the Chinese activity in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir that includes the modernisation of the Karakoram Highway and the plans to construct a new rail line and oil pipeline between Kashgar in Xinjiang and the Gwadar port on Pakistan's Makran coast.
Xinhua's reference to 2,000 km of Sino-Indian border was based on an official briefing by the Assistant Foreign Minister of China, Hu Zhengyue to the Beijing press corps on Monday.
China erases 1,600 km of Indian border: click here to read more
Dr A Paulraj awarded the prestigious IEEE Graham Bell Medal
Indian engineer receives IEEE Graham Bell Medal By SiliconIndia
Thursday, 02 December 2010, 17:36 Hrs
Irvine: Broadcom Corporation has announced that Dr. Arogyaswami Paulraj has been named the recipient of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers' (IEEE) Alexander Graham Bell Medal, the organization's most prestigious honor. Arogyaswami has been recently joined Broadcom from Beceem Communications.
In its award statement, the IEEE's Board of Directors said that in its efforts to recognize "exceptional achievements in our profession," Dr. Paulraj was selected for pioneering contributions to the application of multiantenna technology to wireless communications systems.
Dr. Paulraj, a co-founder of Beceem Communications Inc., which Broadcom acquired last month, is a pioneer in MIMO (multiple-input, multiple-output) wireless technology, which relies on multiple radio antennas as both the transmitter and receiver to improve communications performance. An emeritus professor at Stanford University, where he supervises the Smart Antennas Research Group, Dr. Paulraj will continue as a senior technical advisor to Broadcom.
Dr. Paulraj is the author of two text books and more than 400 research papers and is an inventor on 50 plus U.S. patents. His IEEE recognitions include the Technical Achievement Award and several best paper awards. He is a member of the U.S. National Academy of Engineering, the Academy of Sciences for the Developing World and several other national academies in Sweden and India. He has also won more than a dozen national awards in India, including the Padma Bhushan, one of India's highest civilian awards. He serves on several company advisory boards, university councils, and government committees in the U.S. and India.
Indian engineer receives IEEE Graham Bell Medal
Dr. Arogyaswami Paulraj
"As a community of engineers, we at Broadcom are delighted and honored by the IEEE's selection of Dr. Paulraj for the Bell Medal," said Dr. Henry Samueli, Broadcom's co-founder and Chief Technical Officer. "This is an outstanding achievement, and all of us at Broadcom extend our collective congratulations to him, his family and all of his colleagues who have had the pleasure to work with Dr. Paulraj over the years." Dr. Paulraj, a co-founder of Beceem Communications Inc., which Broadcom acquired last month, is a pioneer in MIMO (multiple-input, multiple-output) wireless technology, which relies on multiple radio antennas as both the transmitter and receiver to improve communications performance. An emeritus professor at Stanford University, where he supervises the Smart Antennas Research Group, Dr. Paulraj will continue as a senior technical advisor to Broadcom.
Broadcom Congratulates Dr A Paulraj
Citation: Alexander Graham Bell Medal
"For poineering contributions to application of multiantenna technology to wireless communications systems."
Citation Letter: click here
Brief Bio of Professor Paulraj
Arogyaswami Paulraj is a Professor at the Department of Electrical Engineering at Stanford University since 1993. His group has developed many key fundamentals of a new field called space-time communications theory and has helped shape a worldwide research and development focus on this technology. Paulraj's career in India included development of military sonar systems (1971-82) for the Indian Navy (NDA Alumni), massively parallel computers (1987-91), and the founding three national level laboratories -- Center for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics, Center for Advanced Computing, and Central Research Laboratories (1986-91). He has received over a dozen national awards in India for his contributions and is a Fellow of Indian National Academy of Engineering.
Paulraj moved to Stanford University in 1992, and his interests has since focused on space-time wireless communications. He is the author of over 320 research papers and holds thirty US patents in wireless. He has authored two books in wireless.
Arogyaswami Paulraj Professor (Emeritus) Stanford University
Thursday, 02 December 2010, 17:36 Hrs
Irvine: Broadcom Corporation has announced that Dr. Arogyaswami Paulraj has been named the recipient of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers' (IEEE) Alexander Graham Bell Medal, the organization's most prestigious honor. Arogyaswami has been recently joined Broadcom from Beceem Communications.
In its award statement, the IEEE's Board of Directors said that in its efforts to recognize "exceptional achievements in our profession," Dr. Paulraj was selected for pioneering contributions to the application of multiantenna technology to wireless communications systems.
Dr. Paulraj, a co-founder of Beceem Communications Inc., which Broadcom acquired last month, is a pioneer in MIMO (multiple-input, multiple-output) wireless technology, which relies on multiple radio antennas as both the transmitter and receiver to improve communications performance. An emeritus professor at Stanford University, where he supervises the Smart Antennas Research Group, Dr. Paulraj will continue as a senior technical advisor to Broadcom.
Dr. Paulraj is the author of two text books and more than 400 research papers and is an inventor on 50 plus U.S. patents. His IEEE recognitions include the Technical Achievement Award and several best paper awards. He is a member of the U.S. National Academy of Engineering, the Academy of Sciences for the Developing World and several other national academies in Sweden and India. He has also won more than a dozen national awards in India, including the Padma Bhushan, one of India's highest civilian awards. He serves on several company advisory boards, university councils, and government committees in the U.S. and India.
Indian engineer receives IEEE Graham Bell Medal
Dr. Arogyaswami Paulraj
"As a community of engineers, we at Broadcom are delighted and honored by the IEEE's selection of Dr. Paulraj for the Bell Medal," said Dr. Henry Samueli, Broadcom's co-founder and Chief Technical Officer. "This is an outstanding achievement, and all of us at Broadcom extend our collective congratulations to him, his family and all of his colleagues who have had the pleasure to work with Dr. Paulraj over the years." Dr. Paulraj, a co-founder of Beceem Communications Inc., which Broadcom acquired last month, is a pioneer in MIMO (multiple-input, multiple-output) wireless technology, which relies on multiple radio antennas as both the transmitter and receiver to improve communications performance. An emeritus professor at Stanford University, where he supervises the Smart Antennas Research Group, Dr. Paulraj will continue as a senior technical advisor to Broadcom.
Broadcom Congratulates Dr A Paulraj
Citation: Alexander Graham Bell Medal
"For poineering contributions to application of multiantenna technology to wireless communications systems."
Citation Letter: click here
Arogyaswami Paulraj is a Professor at the Department of Electrical Engineering at Stanford University since 1993. His group has developed many key fundamentals of a new field called space-time communications theory and has helped shape a worldwide research and development focus on this technology. Paulraj's career in India included development of military sonar systems (1971-82) for the Indian Navy (NDA Alumni), massively parallel computers (1987-91), and the founding three national level laboratories -- Center for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics, Center for Advanced Computing, and Central Research Laboratories (1986-91). He has received over a dozen national awards in India for his contributions and is a Fellow of Indian National Academy of Engineering.
Paulraj moved to Stanford University in 1992, and his interests has since focused on space-time wireless communications. He is the author of over 320 research papers and holds thirty US patents in wireless. He has authored two books in wireless.
Arogyaswami Paulraj Professor (Emeritus) Stanford University
India needs to be more assertive with China, play Tibet card
India would be making a big mistake by equating J&K with Tibet. The Maharaja of Accession signed the Instrument of Accession by which the state became part of India. J&K has historically been part of India, culturally and politically. Conversely the Chinese invaded Tibet in 1950.
CHINA: India More Assertive, But not yet Adequately By B. Raman
India has begun being more assertive against China than it was till the end of last year, but not yet in an adequate measure so as to be able to make an impact on Chinese policy-making towards India. That is the conclusion emerging from a study of the Joint statement issued at the end of the talks between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at New Delhi on December 16, 2010.
2. In my earlier articles before the visit of Wen, I had drawn attention to two instances of welcome Indian assertiveness against China- firstly, ignoring Beijing’s unhappiness over the visit of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Tawang in India’s Arunachal Pradesh earlier this year and secondly, attending the ceremony held in Oslo on December 10 to award in absentia the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese human rights activist now in jail in China, ignoring Chinese entreaties and pressure tactics not to do so.
3. A third instance of welcome Indian assertiveness could be read between the lines while analyzing the joint statement of December 16. The standard formulation that India adheres to the one China policy and recognizes Tibet as an integral part of China has been absent. The statement issued during Wen’s previous visit to Delhi in April 2005 had said: “The Indian side reiterated that it recognized the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of the territory of the People's Republic of China and that it did not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India. The Indian side recalled that India was among the first countries to recognize that there is one China and its one China policy remains unaltered. The Indian side stated it would continue to abide by its one China policy. The Chinese side expressed its appreciation for the Indian positions.”
4. The latest statement does not incorporate any such assurances to China. This is an expression of Indian unhappiness over the Chinese coming out in recent months in indirect support of Pakistani claims of sovereignty over Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, including Gilgit and Baltistan, while diluting its post-1999 support to Indian claims of sovereignty over Jammu & Kashmir. China’s reluctance to support us on the issue of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism is a fleabite. We need not lose sleep over it. But, its abandoning the neutral policy followed by it after 1999 on Indian and Pakistani claims of sovereignty over J&K has been a serious development with likely long-term consequences and it is time we made it clear that if China does not respect India’s territorial integrity, India is no longer bound to respect China’s. That is the hint that India has hopefully conveyed to Beijing by not agreeing to incorporate the usual formulations on the so-called One China policy and Tibet.
5. We should not stop with this. We should move further forward by having a second look at our Tibetan policy, including our interactions at the official level with His Holiness the Dalai Lama. There was a welcome surge in Tibetan demonstrations in Delhi during the visit of Wen. This is a hopeful indicator that in future Indian attention to Chinese sensitivities will be in direct proportion to Chinese attention to Indian sensitivities.
6. The bilateral economic relations continue to move forward. Contracts worth US & 16 billion were signed during the visit. It was decided to try to increase the value of bilateral trade from US $ 60 billion expected by the end of this year to US $ 100 billion by 2015. Unfortunately, the economic relations have been moving forward in a direction more favourable to Chinese than Indian interests. The adverse balance of trade in India’s disfavour ( US $ 19 billion) continues to increase despite repeated Chinese assurances to redress it.
7. China has benefited enormously from the bilateral economic relations. Expectations that this could render Beijing more amenable to solving the border dispute and more sensitive to India’s major concerns over the growing China-Pakistan axis continue to be belied. The China advocated policy of keeping the border dispute in cold storage while paying more attention to the economic relations is proving to be detrimental to India. Due to the uncertainties caused by Beijing in the Arunachal Pradesh sector by further developing its infrastructure in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region and by holding two exercises by the People’s Liberation Army (Air Force) in Tibet this year----one of them involving the suspected movement of missiles by the Qinghai-Lhasa railway and the other involving air-ground exercises with live ammunition at high altitudes by combined units of the Air Force and the Artillery--- India has been forced to spend more on the development of the infrastructure in the North-East. At the same time, the lack of progress in solving the border dispute in this area has come in the way of the economic integration of Arunachal Pradesh with the rest of India.
8. By increasing its presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, China has added to the strategic threats in our Leh-Kargil sector, which would necessitate greater attention to the development of infrastructure in this sector at a time when we still seem to be struggling to develop the infrastructure and our defence capabilities in the Arunachal Pradesh sector. Our reviewing our Tibetan policy could help us in the Arunachal Pradesh sector, but not in the Kargil-Leh sector facing Gilgit-Baltistan. A review of our interactions with the nationalist elements in Xinjiang in China and in Gilgit-Baltistan is necessary in this regard.
9. A sustained Indian policy of paying more attention to developments in China’s peripheral areas has to be an important component of our policy of assertiveness. In an article of September 9, 2010, titled “One India and One China”, I wrote as follows: “Our recognition of Tibet as an integral part of China and our acceptance of the one China policy of Beijing without a quid pro quo from Beijing in the form of acceptance of J&K as an integral part of India and of the One India policy have proved counter-productive. In our anxiety to avoid adding to the tensions and distrust between the two countries, we have let Beijing dictate what should be the nature of our interactions with His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees. We avoid open interactions with His Holiness and are not even prepared to associate him with the project to revive the Nalanda University. Better relations with China on mutually and equally advantageous terms and not on terms which favour China alone, but not India should be our policy. A clear message in non-provocative language has to go to Beijing that India has been disillusioned by the self-centred policies of Beijing and its lack of reciprocity in respecting our core interests. Strategic relations have to be a two-way traffic and based on quid pro quo. For China, they are a one-way traffic benefiting only its core interests. We should no longer accept this.” (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers41/paper4026.html)
10. Those observations still remain valid. That is the inevitable conclusion from the Wen visit.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
CHINA: India More Assertive, But not yet Adequately
CHINA: India More Assertive, But not yet Adequately By B. Raman
India has begun being more assertive against China than it was till the end of last year, but not yet in an adequate measure so as to be able to make an impact on Chinese policy-making towards India. That is the conclusion emerging from a study of the Joint statement issued at the end of the talks between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at New Delhi on December 16, 2010.
2. In my earlier articles before the visit of Wen, I had drawn attention to two instances of welcome Indian assertiveness against China- firstly, ignoring Beijing’s unhappiness over the visit of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Tawang in India’s Arunachal Pradesh earlier this year and secondly, attending the ceremony held in Oslo on December 10 to award in absentia the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese human rights activist now in jail in China, ignoring Chinese entreaties and pressure tactics not to do so.
3. A third instance of welcome Indian assertiveness could be read between the lines while analyzing the joint statement of December 16. The standard formulation that India adheres to the one China policy and recognizes Tibet as an integral part of China has been absent. The statement issued during Wen’s previous visit to Delhi in April 2005 had said: “The Indian side reiterated that it recognized the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of the territory of the People's Republic of China and that it did not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India. The Indian side recalled that India was among the first countries to recognize that there is one China and its one China policy remains unaltered. The Indian side stated it would continue to abide by its one China policy. The Chinese side expressed its appreciation for the Indian positions.”
4. The latest statement does not incorporate any such assurances to China. This is an expression of Indian unhappiness over the Chinese coming out in recent months in indirect support of Pakistani claims of sovereignty over Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, including Gilgit and Baltistan, while diluting its post-1999 support to Indian claims of sovereignty over Jammu & Kashmir. China’s reluctance to support us on the issue of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism is a fleabite. We need not lose sleep over it. But, its abandoning the neutral policy followed by it after 1999 on Indian and Pakistani claims of sovereignty over J&K has been a serious development with likely long-term consequences and it is time we made it clear that if China does not respect India’s territorial integrity, India is no longer bound to respect China’s. That is the hint that India has hopefully conveyed to Beijing by not agreeing to incorporate the usual formulations on the so-called One China policy and Tibet.
5. We should not stop with this. We should move further forward by having a second look at our Tibetan policy, including our interactions at the official level with His Holiness the Dalai Lama. There was a welcome surge in Tibetan demonstrations in Delhi during the visit of Wen. This is a hopeful indicator that in future Indian attention to Chinese sensitivities will be in direct proportion to Chinese attention to Indian sensitivities.
6. The bilateral economic relations continue to move forward. Contracts worth US & 16 billion were signed during the visit. It was decided to try to increase the value of bilateral trade from US $ 60 billion expected by the end of this year to US $ 100 billion by 2015. Unfortunately, the economic relations have been moving forward in a direction more favourable to Chinese than Indian interests. The adverse balance of trade in India’s disfavour ( US $ 19 billion) continues to increase despite repeated Chinese assurances to redress it.
7. China has benefited enormously from the bilateral economic relations. Expectations that this could render Beijing more amenable to solving the border dispute and more sensitive to India’s major concerns over the growing China-Pakistan axis continue to be belied. The China advocated policy of keeping the border dispute in cold storage while paying more attention to the economic relations is proving to be detrimental to India. Due to the uncertainties caused by Beijing in the Arunachal Pradesh sector by further developing its infrastructure in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region and by holding two exercises by the People’s Liberation Army (Air Force) in Tibet this year----one of them involving the suspected movement of missiles by the Qinghai-Lhasa railway and the other involving air-ground exercises with live ammunition at high altitudes by combined units of the Air Force and the Artillery--- India has been forced to spend more on the development of the infrastructure in the North-East. At the same time, the lack of progress in solving the border dispute in this area has come in the way of the economic integration of Arunachal Pradesh with the rest of India.
8. By increasing its presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, China has added to the strategic threats in our Leh-Kargil sector, which would necessitate greater attention to the development of infrastructure in this sector at a time when we still seem to be struggling to develop the infrastructure and our defence capabilities in the Arunachal Pradesh sector. Our reviewing our Tibetan policy could help us in the Arunachal Pradesh sector, but not in the Kargil-Leh sector facing Gilgit-Baltistan. A review of our interactions with the nationalist elements in Xinjiang in China and in Gilgit-Baltistan is necessary in this regard.
9. A sustained Indian policy of paying more attention to developments in China’s peripheral areas has to be an important component of our policy of assertiveness. In an article of September 9, 2010, titled “One India and One China”, I wrote as follows: “Our recognition of Tibet as an integral part of China and our acceptance of the one China policy of Beijing without a quid pro quo from Beijing in the form of acceptance of J&K as an integral part of India and of the One India policy have proved counter-productive. In our anxiety to avoid adding to the tensions and distrust between the two countries, we have let Beijing dictate what should be the nature of our interactions with His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees. We avoid open interactions with His Holiness and are not even prepared to associate him with the project to revive the Nalanda University. Better relations with China on mutually and equally advantageous terms and not on terms which favour China alone, but not India should be our policy. A clear message in non-provocative language has to go to Beijing that India has been disillusioned by the self-centred policies of Beijing and its lack of reciprocity in respecting our core interests. Strategic relations have to be a two-way traffic and based on quid pro quo. For China, they are a one-way traffic benefiting only its core interests. We should no longer accept this.” (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers41/paper4026.html)
10. Those observations still remain valid. That is the inevitable conclusion from the Wen visit.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
CHINA: India More Assertive, But not yet Adequately
Saturday, December 18, 2010
Implications of Iran going nuclear
The Tribune Saturday, December 18, 2010, Chandigarh, India
Saudi, Pak moves need to be watched by D. Suba Chandran
One of the WikiLeaks revelations presents the note which the American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia prepared for Hillary Clinton during her visit in February 2010. The note talks about the Saudi Arabian fear of the failure of dialogue with Iran on nuclear weapons, and the King’s nuclear ambitions to protect his own interests.
According to the note prepared by Ambassador James Smith for Ms Clinton, “The King is convinced that the current U.S. engagement efforts with Tehran will not succeed; he is likely to feel grimly vindicated in his view by Ahmadinejad’s February 11 boast that having successfully enriched uranium to a level of 20 per cent, Iran “is now a nuclear nation”...The King told General Jones that if Iran succeeded in developing nuclear weapons, everyone in the region would do the same, including Saudi Arabia.”
Will Saudi Arabia wait till Iran goes overtly nuclear, or will it have already started preparing for that eventuality? This is where one has to analyse Saudi Arabia’s options in terms of looking for nuclear deterrence. Clearly, the King has three options - to develop a nuclear weapons programme for Saudi Arabia; buy nuclear weapons and delivery systems from other countries (perhaps Pakistan); and to ask for a nuclear guarantee (either from the US or Pakistan).
There have been news reports detailing the linkages between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Saudi Arabia has already established a nuclear power programme. During April this year, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz through a royal decree created the “King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KACARE)” in Riyadh. Clearly, Saudi Arabia has started its march towards a nuclear programme.
The focus of this analysis, however, is not on Saudi Arabia’s nuclear programme, but on the nature of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence in case there is an understanding between Islamabad and Riyadh on a nuclear guarantee or umbrella. In this case, if Iran goes nuclear, or if Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are convinced that Iran has a nuclear weapons programme, will the primary objective of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence remain India-specific?
As of now, there is a widespread belief that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme -fissile materials, weapons, delivery mechanisms and the nuclear strategy/doctrine — is purely India-specific. Will it continue to remain India-specific if the Iran and Saudi factors need to be taken into account?
Will Pakistan be willing to extend its arsenal and doctrines to provide a nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia and perhaps some other countries in the Gulf which fear Iran? Reports have it that there is already a secret agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, reached sometime during 2003. Perhaps true; perhaps not.
What needs to be analysed in this context is, what if Pakistan decides to extend the nuclear deterrence to include Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Gulf against a nuclear Iran? Three specific issues need to be analysed here. First, political relations between Iran and Pakistan; it is an open secret that Islamabad and Tehran have their own differences vis-Ã -vis each other, which got exacerbated since the late 1970s. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 and Zia’s Islamisation (in reality “Sunnisation”) have created a Sunni-Shia rift within Pakistan, which has increased the tensions between the two countries. To make matters worse, since the 1980s there has been an additional vigour in the Saudi-Wahabi influence in Pakistan, further vitiating the anti-Shia campaign by the sectarian organisations in Pakistan. As a result, for the last three decades, despite efforts, the political relationship between the two countries remains strained. Thus, there is no incentive for Islamabad for remaining neutral in case of an open nuclear tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The lines are already drawn and Pakistan has chosen its sides.
The only exception was the A.Q. Khan network, which helped Iran’s nuclear programme. To be fair to A.Q. Khan, his network was completely secular and was beyond any national boundaries. It was purely an economic enterprise, which looked beyond Sunni-Shia, Iran-Pakistan and Iran-Saudi Arabia calculations! Hence, Khan’s assistance to Iran’s nuclear programme should not be considered as a factor in Islamabad’s nuclear decision-making process vis-Ã -vis Tehran.
Second, how is Pakistan’s relationship likely to build in the next couple of years vis-Ã -vis Iran in terms of Islamabad’s growing influence and presence in Afghanistan? Again, it is an open secret that Islamabad is backing the Taliban to reach some kind of an agreement with President Karzai to expand its influence in Afghanistan in a post-American exit environment. Pakistan has already signed a trade and transit agreement with Afghanistan, besides concluding another agreement on gas recently with Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. Clearly, Pakistan has well positioned itself now to impose its stooges in Kabul and convert Afghanistan into its strategic backyard. Will Iran remain a mute spectator? One is likely to see an increased hostility between Islamabad and Tehran as a result of their strategic rivalry in Afghanistan.
Third, as a result of the above two issues, Pakistan is unlikely to remain unaffected in the Iran-Saudi Arabia nuclear diad. This is bound to become a triangle relationship, creating an arch of nuclear instability in the entire Middle-East. It is a different question and issue altogether if Isreal jumps into it; but for the purpose of this argument, the focus is only on the triangle. Pakistan has a history of proliferation; hence there is no reason to believe that Islamabad has not already made a deal with Saudi Arabia. In fact, there are also reports claiming the sale of Ghauri missiles to Saudi Arabia. Neither the Pakistan-Iran relations nor Islamabad’s past history of proliferation makes one feel confident that Pakistan is unlikely to work with Saudi Arabia and provide nuclear weapons or just an umbrella.
What needs to be analysed here is how this will affect Pakistan’s calculations towards its fissile materials, nuclear weapons and delivery mechanisms. It is believed that Pakistan has an adequate fissile material stockpile today to make approximately 100-plus nuclear weapons. However, this is unlikely to remain at this level if the Iran-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan nuclear triangle needs to be taken into account. In this case, Pakistan’s deterrence will not be based only against the Indian stockpile and weapons. Therefore, Pakistan’s “minimum” is unlikely to remain minimum.
Now, what are the likely implications of the above scenario? First, Pakistan is unlikely to accept the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty for its stockpile is not likely to remain focused on India alone. Thus, Obama will see his vision for nuclear disarmament breaking into pieces, in his own life time. Second, the nature of Pakistan’s arsenal then will be dependent on Iran’s stockpile and Saudi Arabia’s requirement. And this will be anything but minimum. Therefore, one could visualise a different calculation of India’s “minimum” as well. Whatever may the nature of these calculations, it is easy to conclude that the credible deterrence in South Asia is unlikely to remain minimum.
Third, the above triangle will also result in Sunni and Shia nuclear bombs, infusing a different argument into the old concept of an Islamic bomb. This in turn, will further increase the distance between Islamabad and Tehran besides vitiating the minds of the Shias and Sunnis inside Pakistan.
The writer is Deputy Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.
Implications of Iran going nuclear
Saudi, Pak moves need to be watched by D. Suba Chandran
One of the WikiLeaks revelations presents the note which the American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia prepared for Hillary Clinton during her visit in February 2010. The note talks about the Saudi Arabian fear of the failure of dialogue with Iran on nuclear weapons, and the King’s nuclear ambitions to protect his own interests.
According to the note prepared by Ambassador James Smith for Ms Clinton, “The King is convinced that the current U.S. engagement efforts with Tehran will not succeed; he is likely to feel grimly vindicated in his view by Ahmadinejad’s February 11 boast that having successfully enriched uranium to a level of 20 per cent, Iran “is now a nuclear nation”...The King told General Jones that if Iran succeeded in developing nuclear weapons, everyone in the region would do the same, including Saudi Arabia.”
Will Saudi Arabia wait till Iran goes overtly nuclear, or will it have already started preparing for that eventuality? This is where one has to analyse Saudi Arabia’s options in terms of looking for nuclear deterrence. Clearly, the King has three options - to develop a nuclear weapons programme for Saudi Arabia; buy nuclear weapons and delivery systems from other countries (perhaps Pakistan); and to ask for a nuclear guarantee (either from the US or Pakistan).
There have been news reports detailing the linkages between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Saudi Arabia has already established a nuclear power programme. During April this year, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz through a royal decree created the “King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KACARE)” in Riyadh. Clearly, Saudi Arabia has started its march towards a nuclear programme.
The focus of this analysis, however, is not on Saudi Arabia’s nuclear programme, but on the nature of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence in case there is an understanding between Islamabad and Riyadh on a nuclear guarantee or umbrella. In this case, if Iran goes nuclear, or if Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are convinced that Iran has a nuclear weapons programme, will the primary objective of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence remain India-specific?
As of now, there is a widespread belief that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme -fissile materials, weapons, delivery mechanisms and the nuclear strategy/doctrine — is purely India-specific. Will it continue to remain India-specific if the Iran and Saudi factors need to be taken into account?
Will Pakistan be willing to extend its arsenal and doctrines to provide a nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia and perhaps some other countries in the Gulf which fear Iran? Reports have it that there is already a secret agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, reached sometime during 2003. Perhaps true; perhaps not.
What needs to be analysed in this context is, what if Pakistan decides to extend the nuclear deterrence to include Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Gulf against a nuclear Iran? Three specific issues need to be analysed here. First, political relations between Iran and Pakistan; it is an open secret that Islamabad and Tehran have their own differences vis-Ã -vis each other, which got exacerbated since the late 1970s. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 and Zia’s Islamisation (in reality “Sunnisation”) have created a Sunni-Shia rift within Pakistan, which has increased the tensions between the two countries. To make matters worse, since the 1980s there has been an additional vigour in the Saudi-Wahabi influence in Pakistan, further vitiating the anti-Shia campaign by the sectarian organisations in Pakistan. As a result, for the last three decades, despite efforts, the political relationship between the two countries remains strained. Thus, there is no incentive for Islamabad for remaining neutral in case of an open nuclear tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The lines are already drawn and Pakistan has chosen its sides.
The only exception was the A.Q. Khan network, which helped Iran’s nuclear programme. To be fair to A.Q. Khan, his network was completely secular and was beyond any national boundaries. It was purely an economic enterprise, which looked beyond Sunni-Shia, Iran-Pakistan and Iran-Saudi Arabia calculations! Hence, Khan’s assistance to Iran’s nuclear programme should not be considered as a factor in Islamabad’s nuclear decision-making process vis-Ã -vis Tehran.
Second, how is Pakistan’s relationship likely to build in the next couple of years vis-Ã -vis Iran in terms of Islamabad’s growing influence and presence in Afghanistan? Again, it is an open secret that Islamabad is backing the Taliban to reach some kind of an agreement with President Karzai to expand its influence in Afghanistan in a post-American exit environment. Pakistan has already signed a trade and transit agreement with Afghanistan, besides concluding another agreement on gas recently with Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. Clearly, Pakistan has well positioned itself now to impose its stooges in Kabul and convert Afghanistan into its strategic backyard. Will Iran remain a mute spectator? One is likely to see an increased hostility between Islamabad and Tehran as a result of their strategic rivalry in Afghanistan.
Third, as a result of the above two issues, Pakistan is unlikely to remain unaffected in the Iran-Saudi Arabia nuclear diad. This is bound to become a triangle relationship, creating an arch of nuclear instability in the entire Middle-East. It is a different question and issue altogether if Isreal jumps into it; but for the purpose of this argument, the focus is only on the triangle. Pakistan has a history of proliferation; hence there is no reason to believe that Islamabad has not already made a deal with Saudi Arabia. In fact, there are also reports claiming the sale of Ghauri missiles to Saudi Arabia. Neither the Pakistan-Iran relations nor Islamabad’s past history of proliferation makes one feel confident that Pakistan is unlikely to work with Saudi Arabia and provide nuclear weapons or just an umbrella.
What needs to be analysed here is how this will affect Pakistan’s calculations towards its fissile materials, nuclear weapons and delivery mechanisms. It is believed that Pakistan has an adequate fissile material stockpile today to make approximately 100-plus nuclear weapons. However, this is unlikely to remain at this level if the Iran-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan nuclear triangle needs to be taken into account. In this case, Pakistan’s deterrence will not be based only against the Indian stockpile and weapons. Therefore, Pakistan’s “minimum” is unlikely to remain minimum.
Now, what are the likely implications of the above scenario? First, Pakistan is unlikely to accept the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty for its stockpile is not likely to remain focused on India alone. Thus, Obama will see his vision for nuclear disarmament breaking into pieces, in his own life time. Second, the nature of Pakistan’s arsenal then will be dependent on Iran’s stockpile and Saudi Arabia’s requirement. And this will be anything but minimum. Therefore, one could visualise a different calculation of India’s “minimum” as well. Whatever may the nature of these calculations, it is easy to conclude that the credible deterrence in South Asia is unlikely to remain minimum.
Third, the above triangle will also result in Sunni and Shia nuclear bombs, infusing a different argument into the old concept of an Islamic bomb. This in turn, will further increase the distance between Islamabad and Tehran besides vitiating the minds of the Shias and Sunnis inside Pakistan.
The writer is Deputy Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.
Implications of Iran going nuclear
Friday, December 17, 2010
India’s claim to the high table
Dec 15, 2010 - Satish Kumar
Global power structures have a way of adjusting themselves to the changing power realities and world leaders become instruments for the articulation of those realities. What US President Barack Obama said in the course of his address to Indian Parliament with regard to his support for India’s permanent membership of the UN Security Council was a recognition of one such reality.
By the turn of the century, the outside world started taking notice of India’s power potential because of its consistent economic growth in the previous 10 years. Global Trends 2015, a report prepared by the National Intelligence Council of the US in 2001, predicted that “India will be the unrivalled regional power with a large military — including naval and nuclear capabilities — and a dynamic and growing economy”. This view was echoed in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America released in September 2002 in the words: “The administration sees India’s potential to become one of the great democratic powers of the 21st century and has worked hard to transform our relationship accordingly”.
In the next four years, there was greater realisation of India’s growing power which found expression in the US National Security Strategy 2006: “India now is poised to shoulder global obligations in cooperation with the United States in a way befitting a major power”. By 2010, India’s enhanced military capabilities were also taken cognisance of. The Quadrennial Defence Review of the Pentagon published in February 2010 pointed out: “India’s military capabilities are rapidly improving through increased defence acquisitions, and they now include long-range maritime surveillance, maritime interdiction and patrolling, air interdiction, and strategic airlift… As its military capabilities grow, India will contribute to Asia as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond”.
Independent studies of India’s economic growth also pointed towards a promising future testifying India’s eligibility for a larger role in world affairs. A report prepared by an Indian scholar, Manmohan Agarwal, under the auspices of the Centre for International Governance Innovation in Canada in 2008, estimated that India which shared two per cent of the world gross domestic product (GDP) in 2004 is likely to increase its share to four per cent by 2025 and nine per cent by 2050. During the same period, the US share in world GDP will decline from 30 per cent in 2004 to 28 per cent in 2025 and 20 per cent in 2050.
Global Governance 2025, a report prepared by the National Intelligence Council of US and Institute of Security Studies of EU in September 2010, has predicted that India which possesses nearly eight per cent of global power in 2010 is likely to increase its share to 10 per cent in 2025. The estimate has been made on the basis of measuring GDP, defence expenditure, population and technology.
This assessment is more or less corroborated by the Delhi-based think tank, National Security Research Foundation (which I head), which has estimated in the National Security Index 2010 that India is among the top 10 powers of the world and occupies fifth position. It ranks fourth in defence capability, seventh in economic strength and third in skilled working population. It is, however, very low in technological capability and energy security, holding 34th and 33rd positions respectively.
A senior Indian diplomat who has handled difficult international negotiations in recent years has pointed out that India is a “premature power”. He says that while India’s cumulative rank in the hierarchy of powers is high, its per capita income is very low, and it will take decades before India catches up with the developed world in this respect.
I am of the view that as long as the purchasing power of the people of major developing countries is sufficiently high, it is not necessary for those countries to wait until their per capita income equals those of developed countries in order to play an important role in world affairs. What is important is their proven capability to discharge global responsibilities. In this respect, India’s record is creditworthy, especially, if we consider India’s contribution to international peacekeeping, nuclear non-proliferation, disaster management, counter piracy and non-aggression.
A section of the Indian strategic community has been found to be taking a highly cynical view of India’s attempts to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council. They point out that India should first address its innumerable domestic problems. But they fail to understand that in the era of globalisation, the decisions taken at the United Nations and other rule-making bodies of the world directly affect the destiny of millions of people of India. Unless India is a member of these bodies, it cannot favourably influence the decisions taken at these bodies.
WikiLeaks has disclosed that the US secretary of state Hillary Clinton regards India as a “self-appointed front runner” for a permanent Security Council seat along with Brazil, Germany and Japan. If that is true, Ms Clinton is quite at odds with America’s attempts to establish a comprehensive strategic partnership with India. But the lesson that India must learn from this is that the struggle for a permanent seat on the Security Council is going to be hard and long drawn. Nor should India take the US support at face value.
Besides, India must be careful in clubbing its fortunes with those of Brazil, Germany and Japan. Germany and Japan are not the powers of tomorrow. Also, their candidatures are being opposed by regional heavyweights. So also is India’s. But India must build its case on its own merit as a country of great future, and should do so through bilateral partnerships with strategically important countries rather than through group lobbying.
The writer is director, Foundation for National Security Research Foundation and former professor of diplomacy at JNU, New Delhi.
India’s claim to the high table
Global power structures have a way of adjusting themselves to the changing power realities and world leaders become instruments for the articulation of those realities. What US President Barack Obama said in the course of his address to Indian Parliament with regard to his support for India’s permanent membership of the UN Security Council was a recognition of one such reality.
By the turn of the century, the outside world started taking notice of India’s power potential because of its consistent economic growth in the previous 10 years. Global Trends 2015, a report prepared by the National Intelligence Council of the US in 2001, predicted that “India will be the unrivalled regional power with a large military — including naval and nuclear capabilities — and a dynamic and growing economy”. This view was echoed in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America released in September 2002 in the words: “The administration sees India’s potential to become one of the great democratic powers of the 21st century and has worked hard to transform our relationship accordingly”.
In the next four years, there was greater realisation of India’s growing power which found expression in the US National Security Strategy 2006: “India now is poised to shoulder global obligations in cooperation with the United States in a way befitting a major power”. By 2010, India’s enhanced military capabilities were also taken cognisance of. The Quadrennial Defence Review of the Pentagon published in February 2010 pointed out: “India’s military capabilities are rapidly improving through increased defence acquisitions, and they now include long-range maritime surveillance, maritime interdiction and patrolling, air interdiction, and strategic airlift… As its military capabilities grow, India will contribute to Asia as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond”.
Independent studies of India’s economic growth also pointed towards a promising future testifying India’s eligibility for a larger role in world affairs. A report prepared by an Indian scholar, Manmohan Agarwal, under the auspices of the Centre for International Governance Innovation in Canada in 2008, estimated that India which shared two per cent of the world gross domestic product (GDP) in 2004 is likely to increase its share to four per cent by 2025 and nine per cent by 2050. During the same period, the US share in world GDP will decline from 30 per cent in 2004 to 28 per cent in 2025 and 20 per cent in 2050.
Global Governance 2025, a report prepared by the National Intelligence Council of US and Institute of Security Studies of EU in September 2010, has predicted that India which possesses nearly eight per cent of global power in 2010 is likely to increase its share to 10 per cent in 2025. The estimate has been made on the basis of measuring GDP, defence expenditure, population and technology.
This assessment is more or less corroborated by the Delhi-based think tank, National Security Research Foundation (which I head), which has estimated in the National Security Index 2010 that India is among the top 10 powers of the world and occupies fifth position. It ranks fourth in defence capability, seventh in economic strength and third in skilled working population. It is, however, very low in technological capability and energy security, holding 34th and 33rd positions respectively.
A senior Indian diplomat who has handled difficult international negotiations in recent years has pointed out that India is a “premature power”. He says that while India’s cumulative rank in the hierarchy of powers is high, its per capita income is very low, and it will take decades before India catches up with the developed world in this respect.
I am of the view that as long as the purchasing power of the people of major developing countries is sufficiently high, it is not necessary for those countries to wait until their per capita income equals those of developed countries in order to play an important role in world affairs. What is important is their proven capability to discharge global responsibilities. In this respect, India’s record is creditworthy, especially, if we consider India’s contribution to international peacekeeping, nuclear non-proliferation, disaster management, counter piracy and non-aggression.
A section of the Indian strategic community has been found to be taking a highly cynical view of India’s attempts to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council. They point out that India should first address its innumerable domestic problems. But they fail to understand that in the era of globalisation, the decisions taken at the United Nations and other rule-making bodies of the world directly affect the destiny of millions of people of India. Unless India is a member of these bodies, it cannot favourably influence the decisions taken at these bodies.
WikiLeaks has disclosed that the US secretary of state Hillary Clinton regards India as a “self-appointed front runner” for a permanent Security Council seat along with Brazil, Germany and Japan. If that is true, Ms Clinton is quite at odds with America’s attempts to establish a comprehensive strategic partnership with India. But the lesson that India must learn from this is that the struggle for a permanent seat on the Security Council is going to be hard and long drawn. Nor should India take the US support at face value.
Besides, India must be careful in clubbing its fortunes with those of Brazil, Germany and Japan. Germany and Japan are not the powers of tomorrow. Also, their candidatures are being opposed by regional heavyweights. So also is India’s. But India must build its case on its own merit as a country of great future, and should do so through bilateral partnerships with strategically important countries rather than through group lobbying.
The writer is director, Foundation for National Security Research Foundation and former professor of diplomacy at JNU, New Delhi.
India’s claim to the high table
China: a new kind of superpower in the making
By Bhaskar Roy, former R&AW Officer
IDR Issue: Vol 25.4 Oct-Dec 2010 | Date: 13 December, 2010
The Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece, the ‘People’s Daily’ (Sept 06) announced China’s latest challenge in an article titled “China Needs Powerful Carrier Killers”. It remarked “In a bid to protect its own strategic interests, China should not only build its anti-ship missile capacity, but also possess a range of other carrier-destroying measures as well”.
Although the article names the United States and unnamed western states, the warning cannot be ignored by the smaller neighbors of China, who are perceived by Beijing to be coming under the new US influence challenge in the Asia-Pacific region. The article went on to say that, “China should let the world be aware that no foreign aircraft carrier is allowed to do whatever it wants to do in China’s waters”, but tempered it by adding it will not attack foreign aircraft carriers without a justified reason. In China’s political lexicon, its waters go beyond the UN Law of the Seas Conference (UNLOC) of territorial waters.
This kind of an article carried by the People’s Daily and its English language subsidiary, the Global Times, making it easily accessible to non-Chinese reading foreigners, cannot be ignored. Its implications are immense and can be stretched to other military and territorial areas. This article also said such capacity is necessary for an emerging power and is a necessary infrastructure for China’s military modernization.
China has always maintained that development and security go hand in hand, and are interdependent. This should be acceptable if a state ensures its security from outside attacks to concentrate on its economic, social and political development and stability. This is fair. But when a country starts going beyond its natural boundary and “covets the neighbor’s territory” and beyond, it becomes a cardinal sin.
China enjoyed a phenomenal economic growth in the last 30 years, pipping Japan to the second largest economy in the world, recently. Following its principle of mutual support, the economy put China’s military modernization on a fast road. It is now poised to set its foot prints in a large regional arc.
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted its largest ever military exercise from the west of the country to the east, ‘stride 2009’, demonstrating that it had achieved complete security for its territory. The exercise comprised four of its seven military regions, the air force, rapid action force, warfare under informatized conditions, other para-military forces and co-opted the civilian sector. It is for the first time that the PLA inducted tactical nuclear force which are embedded with PLA forces and not the 2nd Artillery, its main strategic force under direct command of the Central Military Commission (CMC).
The ‘stride’ exercise was followed by its international naval review in December, 2009 to which 45 other nations were invited. For the first time the PLA Navy (PLAN) unveiled for public view its newest nuclear submarines the SSN type-093 and SSBN Type-094. Earlier, the PLA’s 60th anniversary parade had demonstrated China’s strategic nuclear muscle capability. New missiles displaced, especially the DH-10 nuclear tipped cruise missile suggested Revolution in China’s tactical nuclear warfare. More details of the DH-10 are expected to come out gradually.
The usually opaque Chinese military deliberately displayed some capability about where it was going. While the Americans and NATO found that China was still far behind in military technology, it did awe China’s neighbors. This was precisely the intention.
Skipping over a series of developments, suffice it to say that Beijing is concentrating on a bi-polar world context with China and the USA as the two poles. The concept is not new, but in the present context replicates USA’s Obama presidency’s proposal of G-2, the US and China, as the leading global players. In G-2, Beijing saw a trap that it was being ensnared to take equal responsibility in global affairs, especially economic affairs. This is a responsibility that China does not want, and insists it is a developing country quoting various statistics and parameters.
This is the practice of the age old Chinese Art of War (Sun Zi) ‘denial and deception’ strategy, but not necessarily in that order always. With its wealth of $2.4 trillion dollars in foreign exchange, holding around $800 billion US treasury bonds, and now buying up Japanese currency, and the second largest economy, it claims the position of developing country. On the other hand, supported by its huge modernized military it has started aggressively projecting its power.
With its economic and military power, and buying political support in both pariah and poor countries, China appears to be bent upon elevating the global competition between itself and the US. It could be an effective strategy for some time, but does not have sustainability for a long and effective period. For example, Rwanda and Sudan regimes are not sustainable. North Korea is as much a card as it is a headache. But a very strong drive in Beijing, despite recent bilateral problems with the USA, is to link its place as a junior competitive partner with the US. This reflects China’s genius. Emphatic emphasis on this level of relationship with Washington hammered day in and day out can convince many, especially how the White House responds.
Part of this is reflected by a recent article in the official Global Times (Sept. 12, 2010). The article, more seriously a policy examination, titled “US contraction offers China fresh opportunities” examines how China can benefit from USA’s cyclic contraction and expansion examined by America analysts years ago. The article points out that presently the US has entered a period of contraction, engulfed by its financial crisis, forcing it to relegate the war on terror, nuclear proliferation and other security challenges and challenges from emerging powers as a lower priority, and China can take advantage of this. The article accepts that the US is the only country capable of causing substantial damage to China’s national and internal stability, but a weak America unable to contain China will ease US-China tensions, allowing space to Beijing.
This article cannot be missed by China watchers. It makes clear that the US is the only country that can contain China, but is in a kind of decline at the moment because of its economic problems which US President Barak Obama is fumbling with. The writers of this article have identified the weakness of the Obama administration, but remained careful not to project when China can or will overtake the USA. Other countries are dismissed from this equation, but Washington is warned that it is not paying enough attention to other emerging powers that can challenge the US. Although these countries are not named the indications are very clear one would be India.
Read more: click here
IDR Issue: Vol 25.4 Oct-Dec 2010 | Date: 13 December, 2010
The Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece, the ‘People’s Daily’ (Sept 06) announced China’s latest challenge in an article titled “China Needs Powerful Carrier Killers”. It remarked “In a bid to protect its own strategic interests, China should not only build its anti-ship missile capacity, but also possess a range of other carrier-destroying measures as well”.
Although the article names the United States and unnamed western states, the warning cannot be ignored by the smaller neighbors of China, who are perceived by Beijing to be coming under the new US influence challenge in the Asia-Pacific region. The article went on to say that, “China should let the world be aware that no foreign aircraft carrier is allowed to do whatever it wants to do in China’s waters”, but tempered it by adding it will not attack foreign aircraft carriers without a justified reason. In China’s political lexicon, its waters go beyond the UN Law of the Seas Conference (UNLOC) of territorial waters.
This kind of an article carried by the People’s Daily and its English language subsidiary, the Global Times, making it easily accessible to non-Chinese reading foreigners, cannot be ignored. Its implications are immense and can be stretched to other military and territorial areas. This article also said such capacity is necessary for an emerging power and is a necessary infrastructure for China’s military modernization.
China has always maintained that development and security go hand in hand, and are interdependent. This should be acceptable if a state ensures its security from outside attacks to concentrate on its economic, social and political development and stability. This is fair. But when a country starts going beyond its natural boundary and “covets the neighbor’s territory” and beyond, it becomes a cardinal sin.
China enjoyed a phenomenal economic growth in the last 30 years, pipping Japan to the second largest economy in the world, recently. Following its principle of mutual support, the economy put China’s military modernization on a fast road. It is now poised to set its foot prints in a large regional arc.
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted its largest ever military exercise from the west of the country to the east, ‘stride 2009’, demonstrating that it had achieved complete security for its territory. The exercise comprised four of its seven military regions, the air force, rapid action force, warfare under informatized conditions, other para-military forces and co-opted the civilian sector. It is for the first time that the PLA inducted tactical nuclear force which are embedded with PLA forces and not the 2nd Artillery, its main strategic force under direct command of the Central Military Commission (CMC).
The ‘stride’ exercise was followed by its international naval review in December, 2009 to which 45 other nations were invited. For the first time the PLA Navy (PLAN) unveiled for public view its newest nuclear submarines the SSN type-093 and SSBN Type-094. Earlier, the PLA’s 60th anniversary parade had demonstrated China’s strategic nuclear muscle capability. New missiles displaced, especially the DH-10 nuclear tipped cruise missile suggested Revolution in China’s tactical nuclear warfare. More details of the DH-10 are expected to come out gradually.
The usually opaque Chinese military deliberately displayed some capability about where it was going. While the Americans and NATO found that China was still far behind in military technology, it did awe China’s neighbors. This was precisely the intention.
Skipping over a series of developments, suffice it to say that Beijing is concentrating on a bi-polar world context with China and the USA as the two poles. The concept is not new, but in the present context replicates USA’s Obama presidency’s proposal of G-2, the US and China, as the leading global players. In G-2, Beijing saw a trap that it was being ensnared to take equal responsibility in global affairs, especially economic affairs. This is a responsibility that China does not want, and insists it is a developing country quoting various statistics and parameters.
This is the practice of the age old Chinese Art of War (Sun Zi) ‘denial and deception’ strategy, but not necessarily in that order always. With its wealth of $2.4 trillion dollars in foreign exchange, holding around $800 billion US treasury bonds, and now buying up Japanese currency, and the second largest economy, it claims the position of developing country. On the other hand, supported by its huge modernized military it has started aggressively projecting its power.
With its economic and military power, and buying political support in both pariah and poor countries, China appears to be bent upon elevating the global competition between itself and the US. It could be an effective strategy for some time, but does not have sustainability for a long and effective period. For example, Rwanda and Sudan regimes are not sustainable. North Korea is as much a card as it is a headache. But a very strong drive in Beijing, despite recent bilateral problems with the USA, is to link its place as a junior competitive partner with the US. This reflects China’s genius. Emphatic emphasis on this level of relationship with Washington hammered day in and day out can convince many, especially how the White House responds.
Part of this is reflected by a recent article in the official Global Times (Sept. 12, 2010). The article, more seriously a policy examination, titled “US contraction offers China fresh opportunities” examines how China can benefit from USA’s cyclic contraction and expansion examined by America analysts years ago. The article points out that presently the US has entered a period of contraction, engulfed by its financial crisis, forcing it to relegate the war on terror, nuclear proliferation and other security challenges and challenges from emerging powers as a lower priority, and China can take advantage of this. The article accepts that the US is the only country capable of causing substantial damage to China’s national and internal stability, but a weak America unable to contain China will ease US-China tensions, allowing space to Beijing.
This article cannot be missed by China watchers. It makes clear that the US is the only country that can contain China, but is in a kind of decline at the moment because of its economic problems which US President Barak Obama is fumbling with. The writers of this article have identified the weakness of the Obama administration, but remained careful not to project when China can or will overtake the USA. Other countries are dismissed from this equation, but Washington is warned that it is not paying enough attention to other emerging powers that can challenge the US. Although these countries are not named the indications are very clear one would be India.
Read more: click here
Indian Government- No Captain on the Bridge!
NO CAPTAIN ON THE BRIDGE! by Carl H. Gomes. (Alternate title: Sleeping on watch!)
“Captain on the bridge!” That’s a term that all naval personnel will recognise. In the US Navy, as soon as the Captain is sighted entering the bridge, the announcement is made, “Captain on the bridge!” at which everyone on the bridge springs to attention momentarily. This is both a mark of respect and an acknowledgement of his authority on board. This practice is not observed in the Commonwealth navies but the authority of the Captain is still sacrosanct.
The Captain of a warship is the lord and master of that vessel – in the merchant navy he is called the Master. He is required to have a firm grasp of all that is happening on board his ship because everything is done in his name and he is ultimately responsible for all acts of omission and commission. In short, the buck stops with him. He takes the bouquets as well as the brickbats and faces the music and even the noose if something should go wrong even if he has committed no mistake himself. When a ship performs all her tasks efficiently, it is usually said that the captain “runs a tight ship”. To do this he is assisted by his departmental heads and their assistants, to whom he delegates authority. Each of them has some discretionary powers and enjoys full departmental autonomy needed for the smooth and efficient functioning of the ship. This is true whether it is a huge aircraft carrier or a small frigate or destroyer. This allows the captain to concentrate on his main job of navigating uncharted waters, safely negotiating known and unknown hazards and maintaining the fighting efficiency of the ship in order to take on the enemy with all the resources at his command. No departmental head can ever dream of overruling the captain or doing his own thing and all important decisions are usually taken after due consultation. If anyone did so, he would be dumped overboard in a manner of speaking and face swift disciplinary action. The degree of camaraderie and cooperation that exists between the captain and his men depends on his personality but ultimately he is the BOSS!
One would imagine that all this applies to the ship of state too, where the head of state (Prime Minister or President, as the case may be) is the captain and his ministers are the departmental heads. They of course have enormous discretionary powers and wield immense authority because they enjoy a greater degree of autonomy. At the end of the day, they too are accountable to and have to take orders from the PM/President. But if he abdicates his responsibility and behaves like a mouse, it is inevitable that the flunkies are going to roar like lions while he cowers in fear.
That is exactly what is happening in the case of Manmohan Singh in the wake of the 2G scam which happened only because he failed to crack the whip. He was found sleeping at the wheel before as in the CWG case and the rotting food grains fiasco! He has no qualms about passing the buck when caught and takes shelter behind his cloak of personal integrity, as if it absolves him of all responsibility. What he does not realise is that the common citizen (aam admi) knows the emperor has no clothes – even if the media is unable to notice! He holds his tongue when he is on terra firma (mathrubhumi) but waxes eloquent once he is airborne in our equivalent of Air Force One. But now instead of coming out and confronting the opposition, he has other people running interference for him while he hides behind a facade of respectability. But how long can the obnoxious spokesmen and trouble shooters shield him? He should just step out and take it on the chin like a man. If the opposition wants a JPC, give it to them – but governance must not stop. This session of parliament was wasted because of his stubbornness. One gets the distinct impression that there is no one at the helm and that the ship of state is drifting rudderless as the seas get choppier and choppier and the people on board get more and more (sea) sick. The ship is floundering because he is unable to anticipate and avoid the perils despite the warning signs and he is actually putting it in harm’s way as in the case of the appointment of the CVC, who now hangs like a millstone around his neck.
He seems to prefer the company of other captains like Obama, Sarkozy, Merkel, etc., to the bedlam of his fellow parliamentarians because the former shower praise while the latter rains abuses.
So it is pretty evident that the captain is not on the bridge. He is not even in command of his ship!
- C.H. Gomes.
Note: The Bridge of a ship is a room or compartment from where command and control is exercised. When a ship is underway the bridge is manned by an OOW (Officer of the Watch) assisted by an AB (Able seaman) acting as a lookout and at times another junior officer (midshipman or cadet). During critical manoeuvres/actions, the Captain himself will be on the bridge supported by his XO (Executive Officer), an OOW, an AB and sometimes a navigator, if required.
The author is a retired Commander of the Indian Navy.
“Captain on the bridge!” That’s a term that all naval personnel will recognise. In the US Navy, as soon as the Captain is sighted entering the bridge, the announcement is made, “Captain on the bridge!” at which everyone on the bridge springs to attention momentarily. This is both a mark of respect and an acknowledgement of his authority on board. This practice is not observed in the Commonwealth navies but the authority of the Captain is still sacrosanct.
The Captain of a warship is the lord and master of that vessel – in the merchant navy he is called the Master. He is required to have a firm grasp of all that is happening on board his ship because everything is done in his name and he is ultimately responsible for all acts of omission and commission. In short, the buck stops with him. He takes the bouquets as well as the brickbats and faces the music and even the noose if something should go wrong even if he has committed no mistake himself. When a ship performs all her tasks efficiently, it is usually said that the captain “runs a tight ship”. To do this he is assisted by his departmental heads and their assistants, to whom he delegates authority. Each of them has some discretionary powers and enjoys full departmental autonomy needed for the smooth and efficient functioning of the ship. This is true whether it is a huge aircraft carrier or a small frigate or destroyer. This allows the captain to concentrate on his main job of navigating uncharted waters, safely negotiating known and unknown hazards and maintaining the fighting efficiency of the ship in order to take on the enemy with all the resources at his command. No departmental head can ever dream of overruling the captain or doing his own thing and all important decisions are usually taken after due consultation. If anyone did so, he would be dumped overboard in a manner of speaking and face swift disciplinary action. The degree of camaraderie and cooperation that exists between the captain and his men depends on his personality but ultimately he is the BOSS!
One would imagine that all this applies to the ship of state too, where the head of state (Prime Minister or President, as the case may be) is the captain and his ministers are the departmental heads. They of course have enormous discretionary powers and wield immense authority because they enjoy a greater degree of autonomy. At the end of the day, they too are accountable to and have to take orders from the PM/President. But if he abdicates his responsibility and behaves like a mouse, it is inevitable that the flunkies are going to roar like lions while he cowers in fear.
That is exactly what is happening in the case of Manmohan Singh in the wake of the 2G scam which happened only because he failed to crack the whip. He was found sleeping at the wheel before as in the CWG case and the rotting food grains fiasco! He has no qualms about passing the buck when caught and takes shelter behind his cloak of personal integrity, as if it absolves him of all responsibility. What he does not realise is that the common citizen (aam admi) knows the emperor has no clothes – even if the media is unable to notice! He holds his tongue when he is on terra firma (mathrubhumi) but waxes eloquent once he is airborne in our equivalent of Air Force One. But now instead of coming out and confronting the opposition, he has other people running interference for him while he hides behind a facade of respectability. But how long can the obnoxious spokesmen and trouble shooters shield him? He should just step out and take it on the chin like a man. If the opposition wants a JPC, give it to them – but governance must not stop. This session of parliament was wasted because of his stubbornness. One gets the distinct impression that there is no one at the helm and that the ship of state is drifting rudderless as the seas get choppier and choppier and the people on board get more and more (sea) sick. The ship is floundering because he is unable to anticipate and avoid the perils despite the warning signs and he is actually putting it in harm’s way as in the case of the appointment of the CVC, who now hangs like a millstone around his neck.
He seems to prefer the company of other captains like Obama, Sarkozy, Merkel, etc., to the bedlam of his fellow parliamentarians because the former shower praise while the latter rains abuses.
So it is pretty evident that the captain is not on the bridge. He is not even in command of his ship!
- C.H. Gomes.
Note: The Bridge of a ship is a room or compartment from where command and control is exercised. When a ship is underway the bridge is manned by an OOW (Officer of the Watch) assisted by an AB (Able seaman) acting as a lookout and at times another junior officer (midshipman or cadet). During critical manoeuvres/actions, the Captain himself will be on the bridge supported by his XO (Executive Officer), an OOW, an AB and sometimes a navigator, if required.
The author is a retired Commander of the Indian Navy.
Thursday, December 16, 2010
Overall Internal Security Situation Stable
Thursday, December 16, 2010 15:39 IST Ministry of Home Affairs
Overall Internal Security Situation Remains Under Control
Series of Measures Taken to Build Capacity
YEAR-END REVIEW MHA – 2010
The year 2010 witnessed several measures taken by the Government to build the capacity of the nation to meet internal security challenges. As a result, India is better prepared today to deal with these challenges than it was two years ago.
The overall internal security situation in the country remained largely under control during 2010. After a cycle of violence since June, the situation in Jammu & Kashmir has considerably improved since September. In the North Eastern States, the overall security situation has substantially improved in 2010 as compared to the situation in the previous year. The Naxal violence continued unabated, but security forces are engaging naxalites in the areas dominated by them with a view to re-establishing the authority of the civilian government. The communal situation throughout the country remained peaceful. The judgment in the Ram Janmabhoomi- Babri Masjid title suits was delivered on September 30, 2010. In anticipation of the judgment, CPMFs were deployed in Uttar Pradesh and other States. The situation remained peaceful following the judgment.
The year saw peaceful completion of Commonwealth Games in New Delhi.
A peaceful 14-month period was rudely interrupted by a bomb blast in Pune on February 13, 2010 that resulted in 17 deaths. In December, there was a blast in Varanasi in which two persons lost their lives.
Some of the key initiatives and achievements of the Ministry of Home Affairs during 2010 are listed below:
Coastal Security Strengthened
Under the ongoing Coastal Security Scheme, 169 interceptor boats were delivered up to November 2010 against a delivery target of 192 boats. Delivery of 204 boats, approved under the Scheme, is likely to be completed by January, 2011
The Coastal Security Scheme phase I will come to an end on March 31, 2011. Coastal Security Scheme phase II, at an estimated cost of Rs.1,580 crore, has been approved and it includes setting up of more police stations, acquiring boats, vehicles and other equipment, and constructing jetties.
Situation in J&K Improves
Jammu & Kashmir witnessed a revival of stone-pelting and attacks on security forces during the year. The Prime Minister convened a meeting of all political parties of Jammu and Kashmir on August 10, 2010. An All Party delegation visited Jammu & Kashmir on September 21-22, 2010. Upon its return, the Union Home Minister submitted a report to the Prime Minister. On September 25, 2010, the CCS considered the report and approved an 8-point plan for J&K. In pursuance of this plan, the Central Government has released Rs.100 crore to the Government of J&K for grants to schools and colleges for improvement and addition to the existing infrastructure. The Centre has also authorized payment of Rs.5 lakh to the families of each of the deceased in the civil disturbances. Orders were issued appointing Dr. Dileep Padgaonkar, Prof. M.M. Ansari and Prof Radha Kumar as interlocutors to hold sustained and uninterrupted dialogue with all sections of the people of J&K. Two Special Task Forces were constituted on October 13, 2010, one each for Jammu and Ladakh, to examine the developmental needs of the regions with particular reference to deficiencies in infrastructure.
A new scheme for assistance towards property damaged during action by CPMFs/Army in J&K was announced on June 3, 2010. The scheme provides for compensation of Rs. 10 lakh with 70% for capital assets and the remaining 30% for movable property.
The annual Amarnathji Yatra concluded on August 24, 2010. Since July 1, 2010 a total of 458,000 pilgrims visited the shrine. Full security was provided to the yatra and no incident of violence was reported.
Situation in North-East Improves
The Regional Coordination Mechanism to facilitate 24x7 sharing and follow-up of information among the North Eastern States has become operational.
Tripartite talks with the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM) on their demands are continuing.
Several groups such as NDFB (Pro-talk), DHD (Nunisa), DHD(J) and UPDS in Assam and ANVC in Meghalaya are holding talks with the Government of India and the State Government concerned. Shri P C Haldar is the Interlocutor.
Talks with the NSCN (IM) on their demands are continuing with Shri R S Pandey representing the Government of India.
After overcoming many difficulties, repatriation of Bru migrants from Tripura to Mizoram resumed on November 3, 2010.
Naga groups imposed a blockade on NH-39 with effect from April 24, 2010 protesting the holding of elections to the Autonomous District Councils in Manipur. CPMF companies were deployed for security of NH-39 and NH-53. Through patient negotiations with different Naga groups, the blockade of NH-39 was lifted on June 18, 2010.
Steps Taken to Fight Naxal Menace
Naxal violence continued to cause concern. In Dantewada, Chhattisgarh, 75 CPRF and 1 State police personnel were killed by the CPI (Maoist) in an ambush on April 6, 2010.
Unified Commands have been created in the States of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and West Bengal.
The honorarium for SPOs has been raised from Rs. 1,500 to Rs. 3,000 per month. The ratio of cost sharing per SPO between the Centre and the States has been fixed at 80:20. 12,000 additional SPOs have been sanctioned to Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra and Orissa.
On July 14, 2010, the Prime Minister chaired a meeting the Governors/Chief Ministers of 7 LWE-affected States in New Delhi.
On the development front, Government has approved an ambitious integrated action plan for sixty districts, affected by Left Wing Extremism. It is proposed to make a block grant of 25 crore to each district for the remaining four months of 2010-11 and 30 crore to each district for 2011-12.
Census and NPR
The work on Census 2011 began on April 1, 2010. By the end of November, 2010, data collection for House listing & Housing Census and for the National Population Register (NPR) was completed in all States/UTs except in a few villages of Chhattisgarh and West Bengal. Data collection and printing of Local Register of Usual Residents for creation of NPR in the coastal villages has been completed in all project States/UTs, namely, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Puducherry, Kerala, Goa, Lakshadweep, Daman & Diu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Andaman & Nicobar Islands, West Bengal and Maharashtra.
Capacity Addition
At the Central level, 31,584 vacancies were filled in 2009-10 and 14,506 vacancies up to November in 2010-11. 11,985 posts have been sanctioned to the NSG for the four regional hubs, the two regional centres and the operational force at Manesar. Additional posts have been sanctioned for CISF and new battalions for SSB.
Huge amounts have been provided for procurement of equipment by the CPMFs. Funds have been released to the States under the Modernisation of Police Force Scheme, Security Related Expenditure and Special Infrastructure Scheme.
Fencing, roads and flood-lighting works on the borders are in progress. More BOPs are being constructed on the India-Bangladesh and India-Pakistan borders. A comprehensive project for construction of border roads along the India-Nepal border, India-Bhutan border and India-Pakistan border at an estimated cost of 5,662 crore has been approved and the work will commence on April 1, 2011. Construction of 21 roads totaling 653.40 kms. on the Indo-China border is in progress.
All Forensic Science Laboratories are being upgraded and strengthened.
Training capacity is being expanded significantly. Intelligence Bureau is setting up 4 more Regional Training Centres.
Steps Initiated in Other Areas
A mission mode project on Immigration, Visa and Foreigners Registration & Tracking (IVFRT) has been approved. This project would network 169 Missions, 77 ICPs (Immigration Check Posts), 7 FRROs (Foreigners Regional Registration Offices), and FROs (Foreigners Registration Offices) in the State/District Headquarters with the Central Foreigners Bureau(CFB) at a total cost of Rs. 1,011 crore by September, 2014. At the end of November 2010, all 77 ICPs were computerized and 70 ICPs were networked with CFB.
A new service ‘Online Indian Citizenship’ has been introduced to enable persons to file applications online for grant of Indian citizenship.
A comprehensive scheme to strengthen law enforcement capability to deal with human trafficking was approved in June, 2010. The scheme includes establishment of Integrated Anti-Human Trafficking Units (IAHTU) in 335 police districts and Training of Trainers who would eventually train 10,000 police officers.
The India-USA Counter Terror Cooperation Initiative was signed on July 23, 2010.
In-principle approval has been given to the establishment of NATGRID.
The Indian Mujahideen and all its formations and front organizations were declared terrorist organizations on June 2, 2010.
NIA was given access to David Coleman Headley in the United States.
The Union Home Minister visited the UK during March 20-23, 2010. The purpose was to visit key establishments in the intelligence community of that country.
The Union Home Minister visited Islamabad, Pakistan from June 25-26, 2010 to attend the Third SAARC Conference of Interior/Home Ministers.
A five-member Committee chaired by Mr. Justice (Retd.) B.N. Srikrishna was constituted on February 3, 2010 for consultations on the situation in Andhra Pradesh.
Work on the Integrated Check Posts began at Attari, Raxaul and Jogbani.
6,000 rescue personnel including NDRF and ITBP personnel were deployed to handle the aftermath of the cloud burst in Leh, J&K in August. More than 8,000 persons were evacuated.
A Conference of Chief Ministers on Internal Security was held on February 7, 2010. *****OK/KS
Overall Internal Security Situation Remains Under Control
Overall Internal Security Situation Remains Under Control
Series of Measures Taken to Build Capacity
YEAR-END REVIEW MHA – 2010
The year 2010 witnessed several measures taken by the Government to build the capacity of the nation to meet internal security challenges. As a result, India is better prepared today to deal with these challenges than it was two years ago.
The overall internal security situation in the country remained largely under control during 2010. After a cycle of violence since June, the situation in Jammu & Kashmir has considerably improved since September. In the North Eastern States, the overall security situation has substantially improved in 2010 as compared to the situation in the previous year. The Naxal violence continued unabated, but security forces are engaging naxalites in the areas dominated by them with a view to re-establishing the authority of the civilian government. The communal situation throughout the country remained peaceful. The judgment in the Ram Janmabhoomi- Babri Masjid title suits was delivered on September 30, 2010. In anticipation of the judgment, CPMFs were deployed in Uttar Pradesh and other States. The situation remained peaceful following the judgment.
The year saw peaceful completion of Commonwealth Games in New Delhi.
A peaceful 14-month period was rudely interrupted by a bomb blast in Pune on February 13, 2010 that resulted in 17 deaths. In December, there was a blast in Varanasi in which two persons lost their lives.
Some of the key initiatives and achievements of the Ministry of Home Affairs during 2010 are listed below:
Coastal Security Strengthened
Under the ongoing Coastal Security Scheme, 169 interceptor boats were delivered up to November 2010 against a delivery target of 192 boats. Delivery of 204 boats, approved under the Scheme, is likely to be completed by January, 2011
The Coastal Security Scheme phase I will come to an end on March 31, 2011. Coastal Security Scheme phase II, at an estimated cost of Rs.1,580 crore, has been approved and it includes setting up of more police stations, acquiring boats, vehicles and other equipment, and constructing jetties.
Situation in J&K Improves
Jammu & Kashmir witnessed a revival of stone-pelting and attacks on security forces during the year. The Prime Minister convened a meeting of all political parties of Jammu and Kashmir on August 10, 2010. An All Party delegation visited Jammu & Kashmir on September 21-22, 2010. Upon its return, the Union Home Minister submitted a report to the Prime Minister. On September 25, 2010, the CCS considered the report and approved an 8-point plan for J&K. In pursuance of this plan, the Central Government has released Rs.100 crore to the Government of J&K for grants to schools and colleges for improvement and addition to the existing infrastructure. The Centre has also authorized payment of Rs.5 lakh to the families of each of the deceased in the civil disturbances. Orders were issued appointing Dr. Dileep Padgaonkar, Prof. M.M. Ansari and Prof Radha Kumar as interlocutors to hold sustained and uninterrupted dialogue with all sections of the people of J&K. Two Special Task Forces were constituted on October 13, 2010, one each for Jammu and Ladakh, to examine the developmental needs of the regions with particular reference to deficiencies in infrastructure.
A new scheme for assistance towards property damaged during action by CPMFs/Army in J&K was announced on June 3, 2010. The scheme provides for compensation of Rs. 10 lakh with 70% for capital assets and the remaining 30% for movable property.
The annual Amarnathji Yatra concluded on August 24, 2010. Since July 1, 2010 a total of 458,000 pilgrims visited the shrine. Full security was provided to the yatra and no incident of violence was reported.
Situation in North-East Improves
The Regional Coordination Mechanism to facilitate 24x7 sharing and follow-up of information among the North Eastern States has become operational.
Tripartite talks with the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM) on their demands are continuing.
Several groups such as NDFB (Pro-talk), DHD (Nunisa), DHD(J) and UPDS in Assam and ANVC in Meghalaya are holding talks with the Government of India and the State Government concerned. Shri P C Haldar is the Interlocutor.
Talks with the NSCN (IM) on their demands are continuing with Shri R S Pandey representing the Government of India.
After overcoming many difficulties, repatriation of Bru migrants from Tripura to Mizoram resumed on November 3, 2010.
Naga groups imposed a blockade on NH-39 with effect from April 24, 2010 protesting the holding of elections to the Autonomous District Councils in Manipur. CPMF companies were deployed for security of NH-39 and NH-53. Through patient negotiations with different Naga groups, the blockade of NH-39 was lifted on June 18, 2010.
Steps Taken to Fight Naxal Menace
Naxal violence continued to cause concern. In Dantewada, Chhattisgarh, 75 CPRF and 1 State police personnel were killed by the CPI (Maoist) in an ambush on April 6, 2010.
Unified Commands have been created in the States of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and West Bengal.
The honorarium for SPOs has been raised from Rs. 1,500 to Rs. 3,000 per month. The ratio of cost sharing per SPO between the Centre and the States has been fixed at 80:20. 12,000 additional SPOs have been sanctioned to Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra and Orissa.
On July 14, 2010, the Prime Minister chaired a meeting the Governors/Chief Ministers of 7 LWE-affected States in New Delhi.
On the development front, Government has approved an ambitious integrated action plan for sixty districts, affected by Left Wing Extremism. It is proposed to make a block grant of 25 crore to each district for the remaining four months of 2010-11 and 30 crore to each district for 2011-12.
Census and NPR
The work on Census 2011 began on April 1, 2010. By the end of November, 2010, data collection for House listing & Housing Census and for the National Population Register (NPR) was completed in all States/UTs except in a few villages of Chhattisgarh and West Bengal. Data collection and printing of Local Register of Usual Residents for creation of NPR in the coastal villages has been completed in all project States/UTs, namely, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Puducherry, Kerala, Goa, Lakshadweep, Daman & Diu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Andaman & Nicobar Islands, West Bengal and Maharashtra.
Capacity Addition
Training capacity is being expanded significantly. Intelligence Bureau is setting up 4 more Regional Training Centres.
Steps Initiated in Other Areas
The Union Home Minister visited the UK during March 20-23, 2010. The purpose was to visit key establishments in the intelligence community of that country.
Overall Internal Security Situation Remains Under Control
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