When
talking to uniformed officers in higher military training institutions
and
orums, I try to emphasise the perils of an industrial age military. The country has far
to go to get anywhere near the technologically-efficient, cyber-savvy, 21st-century
modern armed forces of the world. By this measure the United States military, on a
scale of one to 10, scores 10. The next most proficient armed services in terms of
being operationally networked with modern weapons is the British military, scoring
seven. The Indian armed services, by this reckoning, rate a miserable two or less.
orums, I try to emphasise the perils of an industrial age military. The country has far
to go to get anywhere near the technologically-efficient, cyber-savvy, 21st-century
modern armed forces of the world. By this measure the United States military, on a
scale of one to 10, scores 10. The next most proficient armed services in terms of
being operationally networked with modern weapons is the British military, scoring
seven. The Indian armed services, by this reckoning, rate a miserable two or less.
We
are lucky that the minor foe the Indian military considers its chief
adversary and is most prepared to fight — Pakistan — has armed
forces on
par with our own, quality-wise. It is the Chinese People’s
Liberation
Army (PLA), however, that in bulk may resemble its Indian
counterpart,
but is undergoing transformation. Because anything the
Chinese undertake
to do they do with thoroughness, strategic
foresight and speed. The
PLA, with rapid modernisation underway,
expects to get near enough to
the US’ standard of military proficiency
by 2035, give or take five
years. The danger is real, in the event, that the
Indian military will
be left so far behind, that inside of 15 years it may
be reduced to near
impotence in hostilities involving the PLA.
That
the country is stuck with a military that apparently cannot think
straight is in part because there is so little meaningful strategic
thinking being done by the uniformed brass when making force
planning
and acquisition decisions. Modernising, for example, is just
another
word for a series of programmes to replace one-for-one
weapon systems
already in the employ of the various combat arms.
This
sad state of affairs persists because there is no single officer in
the
military tasked with the responsibility for creating an integrated
force. Thus, the three armed services are on different wavelengths
and
time-tables to achieve intra-service connectivity, for instance,
without
any regard to connecting with each other. Hence, the Air
Force claims
it will be on a comprehensive communications grid by
2015, the Navy is
almost there, while the Army still has far to go.
The
Task Force on National Security has submitted its report to the
government. Cleverly, it has recommended the appointment of a
fourth
four-star officer as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee
(CCOS),
with the three service chiefs as members alongside. This
gets around the
tricky problem of a five-star rank officer as Chief of
Defence Staff
(CDS), out-ranking, and, therefore, lording it over the
three services
chiefs. In theory, the service chiefs would be free to
disagree with the
chairman, but, with the Integrated Defence Staff
and the Strategic
Forces Command, with nuclear weapons under its
control, reporting to
CCOS, what the military will, in effect, have is a
CDS by another name.
Also
mooted is a scheme for cross-postings of military officers in the
MEA
at many levels, including as joint secretaries, the creation of a
bureau
of political-military affairs, endowing the Vice-Chiefs of Staff
of the
three armed services with financial powers akin to that of the
defence
secretary, and posting of a Major-General-rank officer or
equivalent
from Navy or Air Force as additional secretary in the
ministry of
defence (MoD). Further, the Task Force has advised
drafting a National
Security Doctrine (NSD), and for each of the
services to configure their
separate service doctrines in line with
the NSD.
But
the government in its wisdom made the Task Force’s report
and
recommendations run the gauntlet of inter-ministerial process of
consultation. A decade ago the recommendation for a CDS by the
Committee
on Higher Defence Organisation chaired by K.C. Pant
was killed by a
similar process. This time around though, the
inter-ministerial process
is sought to be constrained and time-bound.
The
Cabinet Committee on Security will then be convened to weigh
the Task
Force’s recommendations in the light of MoD’s formal
reactions, should
these differ, and approve, amend, or turn down
each recommendation in
turn. With Cabinet approval in hand, the
recommendations are expected to
be swiftly implemented.
The
fact that the consultative process is not an open-ended, time
wasting,
bureaucratic obstacle race, and that no individual armed
service or
ministry can veto the Task Force’s recommendations, is
at once the main
innovation and a relief this time around.
The writer is a professor at the Centre for Policy Research, New
Delhi
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