Wednesday, March 6, 2013

How Iran Went Nuclear

Veteran weapons inspector Olli Heinonen on how the U.N.'s 'Stockholm Syndrome' has aided Tehran's drive for the bomb—and why an unsettling secret may be lurking in the Iranian desert.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323978104578329890771686954.html?

By DAVID FEITH

Cambridge, Mass.
It has been more than three years since President Obama revealed the existence of the secret Iranian nuclear facility at Fordo—a uranium-enrichment plant buried deep inside a mountain and surrounded by missile silos and anti-aircraft batteries. Is the world due for another surprise soon?
If anyone has standing to speculate, it is Olli Heinonen, who says he first "got a whiff" of Fordo six years before Mr. Obama acknowledged it. In the fall of 2003, Mr. Heinonen was in his office at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna when a man appeared unannounced. The "walk-in"—whom Mr. Heinonen hasn't previously discussed, and whose nationality he won't disclose—claimed that Iran was replicating its existing uranium-enrichment facility in an underground site near the holy city of Qum. And so it was, as the IAEA and Western spy agencies later confirmed.
But that isn't all the walk-in shared in 2003. Also under construction in Iran, he said, was a duplicate of the Arak heavy-water facility designed to produce plutonium. In other words, the walk-in said that Iran had at least two secret sites, and he was correct on the first. What about the second—is there a plutonium facility that remains secret today?

Enlarge Image

Ken Fallin

Mr. Heinonen can't say as we sit in his office at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, where he has been a senior fellow since retiring as IAEA deputy director-general in 2010. Yet he offers a warning based on his 27 years of IAEA nuclear-inspection work in Iran, North Korea, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere:
"People talk a lot about how intelligence has penetrated all this," he says of Iran's weapons program, "but if you go back to the nuclear programs which have been revealed [elsewhere], they all came with a surprise. If there is no undeclared installation today . . . it will be the first time in 20 years that Iran doesn't have one."
A native of Finland, Mr. Heinonen speaks in upbeat, accented English, though his message is a grim one for a grim time. In February alone, North Korea conducted its third and most successful nuclear test; Iran announced plans to install advanced centrifuges that could speed its uranium enrichment by 200%; satellite photos published in Britain's Telegraph newspaper suggested that some operations have begun at the Arak facility; multilateral talks with Iran mostly yielded plans for more talks (again); Iran rebuffed America's offer of direct talks (again); and the Senate confirmed as defense secretary a man who couldn't articulate whether the U.S. intends to prevent an Iranian bomb or live with it.
Mr. Heinonen is emphatic that the IAEA is in the prevention business, yet he also explains that Iran might be past the nuclear point of no return—and that years of IAEA missteps are partly to blame.
Even assuming that Iran's regime has no secret facilities, it could go the North Korea route—defined by Mr. Heinonen as deciding "Enough is enough, to heck with this, we'll build a nuclear weapon"—in "a month or two," he says. The precise timing would depend on how (and how well) Iranian engineers go about enriching their uranium stocks to weapons-grade purity. But in any case, Mr. Heinonen notes, Iran's breakout would likely outpace the ability of the "international community" to respond.
First, IAEA inspectors would have to detect the breakout. This could take up to two weeks because they visit Iran's major uranium-enrichment facility about 24 times a year. (Roughly half of the visits are announced, meaning inspectors give the Iranians 10 days' notice, and the rest are unannounced, meaning about two hours' notice at any time of day.) Once inside, inspectors would quickly recognize from the enrichment machinery that Iran was dashing to a bomb, says Mr. Heinonen, but that would hardly be the end of the story.

The inspectors would formally alert the IAEA board, which takes "a few days' time." The board would meet and pass a resolution (which "needs a few days") and then engage the United Nations Security Council ("also not an overnight decision"). "In reality," he says, "one month is gone. Well, during that one month [Iran] may have achieved their goal, at least to have enough high-enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon. What next?" Iran would have become the world's ninth confirmed nuclear state.

Mr. Heinonen's implication is that an Iranian bomb is now simply a matter of Tehran's will, not capability—despite two decades of international effort to prevent it. How did this happen?

Short of military force, there is only so much that outsiders can do to stop a determined regime. But in Iran's case, Mr. Heinonen says, matters weren't helped when the IAEA developed "Stockholm Syndrome," akin to hostages who identify with their kidnappers. Though he praises the professionalism of the IAEA's world-wide efforts on nuclear safety, Mr. Heinonen is mystified by parts of its record on Iran.

Mohamed ElBaradei's tenure as the IAEA's director-general from 1997-2009 wasn't distinguished by its vigilance regarding Iran. He constantly downplayed suspicions (both from Western governments and within his own agency) about Iranian activity, and in 2008 he blessed almost all of Iran's claims about its nuclear program as "consistent" with IAEA findings. He also wrote articles criticizing international nonproliferation policies for favoring nuclear haves over have-nots.

Mr. ElBaradei's willingness to give rogue regimes the benefit of the doubt extended to Syria: After Israel bombed a site in the Syrian desert in 2007, he told the New Yorker magazine that it was "unlikely that this building was a nuclear facility." In fact it was—supplied by North Korea, no less.

Of Mr. ElBaradei, Mr. Heinonen says, "We had our differences." He praises his former boss for raising concern about the possible military dimension of Iran's nuclear program in 2004, but he notes that two events seemed to affect Mr. ElBaradei's determination.
One was the U.S.-led war in Iraq, which Mr. ElBaradei "felt was unjust," Mr. Heinonen says, and was launched on what Mr. ElBaradei regarded as "a pretext" that the Bush administration might also invoke to attack Iran. The other was the Nobel Peace Prize awarded in 2005 to Mr. ElBaradei and the IAEA. "It had an impact"—a softening one—"on the way we dealt with [Iran]," Mr. Heinonen says.

The main problem, however, was an entrenched practice of credulous diplomacy, says Mr. Heinonen. "If you ask whether things went wrong in 2003 and 2004, actually I would say it went wrong much earlier. It went wrong at the time of Hans Blix"—the IAEA chief at the time—"in 1993 and 1994."

That is when IAEA officials conducted "transparency visits" in Iran, prompted by various concerns, including that China had secretly diverted two tons of uranium to the Islamic Republic. As Mr. Heinonen tells it, inspectors declared "Everything is OK, we saw nothing." Actually, he notes, "there were two laboratories which were undeclared and became obvious during this visit."

Yet the IAEA stayed mum and remained so for three years while Iran delayed putting the facilities under agency safeguards. "This was never mentioned in public," says Mr. Heinonen, adding that as he rose through the agency he learned of other such nondisclosures by Vienna's supposed enforcers of transparency.

"I cannot understand logically why you would behave like that," he says, though he notes that the "Iranians are very good negotiators."

To this day, Iranian negotiators manage to dampen IAEA criticism despite Tehran's continued obstructionism. Inspectors have been blocked for years from the suspicious Parchin complex and from Arak, too, for the past 18 months. But by making promising public statements—like those this week announcing further negotiations in March and April—the Iranians "build a kind of hope, and the diplomats buy it," Mr. Heinonen says.

Speaking of hope, the former inspector says that he still sees a chance for a U.S.-Iran grand bargain. In his view, the Iranian regime isn't a "homogenous" revolutionary group bent on getting the bomb. "If you look," some members of the Tehran establishment may be "pretty hardline" but "are more oriented on having business relations with the outside world."

Such figures, he says, can exert a moderating influence on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Here Mr. Heinonen cites a 2003 episode in which former Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani helped convince the supreme leader to reverse his public position against signing an additional-protocol agreement with the IAEA.

Then again, as Mr. Heinonen confirms, Iran cheated on that agreement and terminated its implementation after two years, so it doesn't inspire much confidence. If a grand—and honest—bargain can't be struck, and Iran is recognized as a de facto or overt nuclear power, then what? Will the Middle East see a nuclear-arms race as rival nations try to catch up?

"Yes, it might, but not overnight," Mr. Heinonen says. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and others would need five to 10 years to build a bomb "even in a crash course."
Yet that is only if the countries are "starting from zero," he notes. Saudi Arabia may already be on the move.

In 2011, the kingdom announced plans to build 16 nuclear power reactors by 2030. "That's actually a funny number," Mr. Heinonen says—just what a country would need to justify developing domestic fuel-cycle capabilities that could have both civilian and military uses. "If you want to maintain your own uranium enrichment, that's the right number. . . . It's a perfect match." He adds: "Remember, there was no one military program which took place without civilian. It's always under the civilian umbrella."

For now, Mr. Heinonen is most concerned about Pakistan. The country is unstable, its nuclear arsenal huge, and "they are building these tactical nuclear weapons, which means that they need to move them around. . . . So how do you maintain the control?"
Any warehouse or convoy poses a proliferation risk. "Look at what happened with A.Q. Khan," he says, referring to the godfather of the Pakistani bomb who sold nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea and Libya. "Either the military was entirely incompetent, or they knew what Khan was doing. . . . I think they all knew about it, and some of them got their own kickbacks."

An afternoon with Mr. Heinonen provides a sobering counterpoint to happy talk from the Obama administration about "a world without nuclear weapons." Mr. Heinonen, in his engineer's uniform of tie and short-sleeve button-down shirt, maintains a certain equanimity about world affairs. Yet the parade of horribles rolls on.

Mr. Feith is an assistant editorial features editor at the Journal.

COMMENT: The Pakistan angle has not been covered in this write up. Pakistan gave
Iran considerable nuclear know how, as early as late 1980s!!! This is the impression I got when I visited Iran in 1991. (HS)

A version of this article appeared March 2, 2013, on page A13 in the U.S. edition of The Wall Street Journal, with the headline: How Iran Went Nuclear.

Military Deployment in Afghanistan is not in India’s National Interests

Amar Ramdasani

February 22, 2013

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/MilitaryDeploymentinAfghanistanisnotinIndiasNationalInterests_mbhalla_220213

With the US military involvement in Afghanistan nearing end by 2014, there are muted voices in India’s strategic community advocating deployment of the Indian military under a UN mandate in Afghanistan. Continuing for over more than a decade now, the Afghan war has perhaps been the longest war in US history. With over 2,500 coalition personnel killed and hundreds of billions spent and no long term solution yet in sight, it is worth asking whether a military involvement in Afghanistan would be in India’s interests.
The security situation in Afghanistan remains fragile and the spread and intensity of attacks by the Taliban and their supporters follow a cyclical pattern. It is now known that even the combined strategic, technological and economic strengths of some of the world’s advanced countries including this century’s lone superpower have not been able to totally neutralise armed irregulars in Afghanistan.

A Carnegie report assesses that the Afghan political system’s centre of gravity—the east and the Kabul region—is gravely threatened by a Taliban advance that will take place in the spring of 2013 following the winter lull in fighting, and that 17 out of 34 provinces are likely to be under the control of the Taliban within months of the withdrawal of ISAF from Afghanistan.

The situation in Afghanistan is thus essentially that of a strategic stalemate. Given this prevailing murky ground situation, should India risk an extended military deployment in Afghanistan? The simple answer is No.

The issue that needs to be considered while taking a call on an Indian military deployment in Afghanistan is that of Pakistan’s known complicity in the Afghan problem. It is well known that the documents made available by WikiLeaks in 2010 suggest that Pakistan allows representatives of its spy service to meet directly with the Taliban in secret strategy sessions to organize networks of militant groups that fight against American soldiers in Afghanistan, and even hatch plots to assassinate Afghan leaders.

The killing of Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad in a secret raid by US Special Forces has further exposed the duplicity and complicity of the Pakistani establishment.

Therefore, the burning issue is can Pakistan be relied to abandon this duplicity should a UN mandated peace keeping force be deployed in AfPak? It would be naïve to be led into this kind of belief. On the contrary, given Pakistan’s known antipathy towards India’s growing clout in Afghanistan, Pakistan may just up the ante in Jammu & Kashmir, where the grit, toil and perseverance demonstrated over the past three decades by the Indian Armed Forces in containing terrorism has now begun to show results.

It is time for India to consolidate the gains made in Jammu & Kashmir, instead of allowing itself to be dragged into a proxy war in a foreign land under the facade of a Rising Regional Power.

According to a U.S. Congressional Research Service report titled “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11” issued on March 29, 2011, over the past decade, the U.S. has spent $ 806 billion in Iraq and $ 444 billion in Afghanistan; at approximately 100 billion dollars a year, besides over 2000 fatalities till date. Can the UN or any other nation afford to commit such massive resources to the Afghan conflict on a recurring basis that is going to remain open ended for several years?

There is no denying the fact that a politically and economically stable Afghanistan is a strategic priority for India. It is also well understood that that a Taliban fundamentalist regime backed by Pakistan would not be in India’s security interests? Afghanistan is also a bridge to the landlocked, resource rich, Central Asian Region (CAR) where India wants to pursue its economic, energy and security interests. All these points are well taken. But the question that remains unanswered is: Which core/vital Indian national security interests stand threatened by ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan that needs to be secured through a hard power projection? None is the obvious answer!!

Therefore, propositions like “a bigger military presence Afghanistan is essential” and “India must shape Afghanistan’s future”, and “an Indian military involvement in Afghanistan will shift the battleground away from Kashmir and the Indian mainland” are untenable. In fact, such a course of action may prove to be counterproductive. As a recent Rand study has observed: “Not only would such an effort require large amounts of money and manpower, it may also inspire Islamabad – which would almost certainly view increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan as a strategic defeat – to strike back at India as a result”.

Recommendations

India must not view Afghanistan through a Pakistani Prism. India’s policy in Afghanistan must be Afghan centric and not Pakistan Centric! Given the prevailing flux, India must pursue what has been aptly called as a “no strings- attached strategy” in Afghanistan, encompassing institution building, capacity enhancement, reconstruction assistance, soft power projection, and outreach to all major Afghan ethnic groups.
Measures that India could take are:

Diplomatic

New Delhi must vigorously strive for and support a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic Afghan government. This requires a consultative approach with all regional players, particularly with Iran and Russia, to ensure that Pakistani proxies do not successfully come to the centre stage in a post-ISAF political order in Afghanistan.
Strengthen ties with the all ethnic groups, viz., Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras, in Afghanistan. Reengaging the Northern Alliance will also significantly address India’s apprehensions with regard to Pakistan.

Military

Establish an Indian Military Training Team in Afghanistan (IMTRAT-Afghanistan). Large scale military training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) needs to institutionalised through the establishment of an Indian Military Training Team in Afghanistan, if requested by Afghanistan. Given India’s rich experience in handling insurgencies, such a training establishment will significantly bolster the capacity of the ANSF to deal with internal challenges themselves.
Deployment of Indian Military Observers. Indian Military Observers can be deployed as part of a future UN/Regional Military Observer Group in Afghanistan post ISAF withdrawal in 2014.
Military Deployment. It would be more prudent to Wait & Watch. Should the situation stabilise with a stable National Unity Government, the deployment of up to a Battalion Group (in the time frame 2017-2020) and a Brigade Group (in the time frame of 2020-2025) only as part of a UN-mandated Peacekeeping Force may be considered.
Military Equipment. Small arms, artillery guns, tanks, ammunition, vehicles, helicopters & Tactical Communication Equipment, etc. can be gifted to the Afghan National Security Forces.

Economic & Developmental Assistance

Besides the promised economic aid, deployment of Civil Reconstruction teams, establishment of hospitals and other mega projects like road-rail network, schools, telecommunications, airlines, food storage, electricity, water, sanitation, etc. need to be given a fillip. In the longer run, besides ensuring development, these projects would generate employment and wean the Afghan youth away from the fundamentalist ideology.

Conclusion

The Afghanistan conflict reflects long-standing rivalries among the different ethnic and tribal groups within the country, but it has long been exacerbated by outside powers seeking to protect or advance their own interests. New Delhi must not complicate matters further by viewing Afghanistan as a battleground between India and Pakistan. Instead, India, as a responsible regional power, should steer Afghanistan towards political stability, security through an inclusive government, economic growth, reconstruction and regional integration, which is what that country needs the most.
Col. Amar Ramdasani, YSM is presently Director, Medium & Short Term Force Structuring (PP& FS), HQ IDS, New Delhi.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Military Deployment in Afghanistan is not in India’s National Interests

Amar Ramdasani

February 22, 2013

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/MilitaryDeploymentinAfghanistanisnotinIndiasNationalInterests_mbhalla_220213

Recommendations

Diplomatic

New Delhi must vigorously strive for and support a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic Afghan government. This requires a consultative approach with all regional players, particularly with Iran and Russia, to ensure that Pakistani proxies do not successfully come to the centre stage in a post-ISAF political order in Afghanistan.
Strengthen ties with the all ethnic groups, viz., Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras, in Afghanistan. Reengaging the Northern Alliance will also significantly address India’s apprehensions with regard to Pakistan.

Military

Establish an Indian Military Training Team in Afghanistan (IMTRAT-Afghanistan). Large scale military training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) needs to institutionalised through the establishment of an Indian Military Training Team in Afghanistan, if requested by Afghanistan. Given India’s rich experience in handling insurgencies, such a training establishment will significantly bolster the capacity of the ANSF to deal with internal challenges themselves.
Deployment of Indian Military Observers. Indian Military Observers can be deployed as part of a future UN/Regional Military Observer Group in Afghanistan post ISAF withdrawal in 2014.
Military Deployment. It would be more prudent to Wait & Watch. Should the situation stabilise with a stable National Unity Government, the deployment of up to a Battalion Group (in the time frame 2017-2020) and a Brigade Group (in the time frame of 2020-2025) only as part of a UN-mandated Peacekeeping Force may be considered.
Military Equipment. Small arms, artillery guns, tanks, ammunition, vehicles, helicopters & Tactical Communication Equipment, etc. can be gifted to the Afghan National Security Forces.

Economic & Developmental Assistance

Besides the promised economic aid, deployment of Civil Reconstruction teams, establishment of hospitals and other mega projects like road-rail network, schools, telecommunications, airlines, food storage, electricity, water, sanitation, etc. need to be given a fillip. In the longer run, besides ensuring development, these projects would generate employment and wean the Afghan youth away from the fundamentalist ideology.

Conclusion

Empowering the Military by Lt Gen Prakash Katoch in IDR 3/3/2013http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/empowering-the-military/

Situations in counter insurgency environment cause their own stress on soldiers especially when politicians and officials play their dirty games.

Three days after the operation, DC Kupwara (under militant threat, militant sympathy or for money offered by militants) himself lodged an FIR that the army had raped 100 women in that single night including a 60 year old woman.

How do you insulate the soldier from unwarranted surmounting stress of false accusations of serious crimes like rape including ignominy during the attachments and long winded inquiries while media cries blue murder and tarnishes the image of individual (s) and the Army? Can you gauge the effect of undue additional stress levels caused by regular spate of false human rights abuse allegations (94-95% as per NHCR) on soldiers in addition to combat stress? During 1990-91, a village called Kushan Pushpora in Kupwara District of J&K was searched during a winter night of continuous snow and rain. More than one unit was involved. Three days after the operation, DC Kupwara (under militant threat, militant sympathy or for money offered by militants) himself lodged an FIR that the army had raped 100 women in that single night including a 60 year old woman. It created a national and international furor. What followed was a spate of commissions and inquiries, eventually all proving after a year plus that the allegations were baseless.

More recently, media frenzy and State politics in J&K accused army personnel with the rape and killing two women at Shopian in J&K, later proved to be a case of drowning. In insurgency areas, media too at times is under terrorist threat or is available on hire – which may perhaps be a global phenomenon. However, a former joint Director IB writes in his book ‘Open Secrets’, “The susceptibility of the fourth estate to the intelligence community had tied our hands down. They are one of the too many holy Indian cows. Some of them, as described by a senior member of the fourth estate, ‘taxi on hire’. Any paymaster can hire this particular brand.”

…politicians continue to play their own games and actually enjoy the military being shown in poor light.

As for insurgencies, neither the State nor the Centre actually have the will, or shall we say desire to finish insurgency because of the benefits that accrue – including unlimited funds sans accountability. Therefore, politicians continue to play their own games and actually enjoy the military being shown in poor light. So, where is the question of clamping down on a lower functionary like DC Kupwara from making false accusations or more importantly, take action against him when the malicious FIR filed by him proved grossly wrong.

During the obnoxious episode of General VK Singh, former Army Chief who refused to toe the corrupt, the murky dealings of the politician-bureaucrat-contractor mafia (land, arms and equipment) was investigated and aired by ETV. This had similarly emerged when another upright officer, Lieutenant General HS Panag, was shunted out from Northern Command in 2008. Then you had ‘up for sale’ type of media fellows, known to own properties beyond their means, who reported the conspiracy of an army coup. A slimy colleague even put the photograph of a serving military chief on the front cover, captioning it “Self Before Service” without a care what would be the fallout on the military. He was obviously rewarded handsomely by the mafia. This fellow would never have the guts to write anything in a similar fashion against even a low level police officer. The simple reason is that this so called editor knows that he would be bamboozled out of shape and breath should he dare to do so. But one can play upon the military anyway which you like, when the Defence Minister shrugs off saying his hands are tied and the Supreme Commander refuses to even meet delegations of military veterans with petitions written in blood and returning their medals including gallantry awards. Take the recent VVIP Helicopter scam, where media is focusing on a former military chief.

Do they have the guts to interview the then DG Acquisition of MoD? Surely the media is aware that the DG Acquisition is the lynchpin in any procurement and is the man who negotiates pricing and that every time an Empowered Committee flies out, the DG Acquisition or his representatives, flies out separately from the rest of the committee, stays separately while abroad, is the man whose signatures eventually seals the deal and ensures the pre-decided booty distribution. Neha Thirani wrote in the New York Times on 2^nd April 2012, “Corruption in India’s Ministry of Defense runs deep and wide, judging by the accusations made by defense officials in the past few months. Maybe that shouldn’t be a surprise. In the frequent cases of corruption that have surfaced in the ministry over the years, incidents of graft have implicated everyone from petty officers to the highest ranks in the department.”

“Corruption in India’s Ministry of Defense runs deep and wide, judging by the accusations made by defense officials in the past few months. Maybe that shouldn’t be a surprise.

The beauty of the set up is that the politician is dependent on the bureaucrat for advice and the latter is not accountable and couldn’t care less. That is why we don’t even have a National Security Strategy. In 2005, a three star officer heading Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was briefing the NSA on how the military can help draft the National Security Strategy. After listening for about an hour, the NSA abruptly cut off the presentation saying all this was fine but could he be advised how to deal with Nepal? He was told that some five months back a net assessment study on Nepal had been forwarded to him replete with evaluation that events would play out in Nepal in five phases, and that the second phase was under play right now. The NSA was blank and admitted that he was not even aware of such a document.

During the first Indo-US DPG meeting held at New Delhi, the US delegation was flabbergasted to know that our MoD has no personnel from the military on permanent absorption or deputation. They wondered how our MoD could function in the first place. More recently, The Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), Washington, highlighted the “Indian Defence Ministry’s (MoD) inability to discuss policy and strategy.” Antony as one of the longest serving Defence Minister is culpable of not undoing the hawkish negative bureaucratic control (without any expertise in military affairs) over the military, excluding the military from crucial strategic decision-making and not reviewing the entire rubric of higher defence management and role of bureaucracy factoring the reports of scores of committees – all of which adversely affects national security. He has made no effort to remodel civil-military relations and has gone for blacklisting firms at the first instance to push his clean image but without making alternative procurement arrangements to fill up critical deficiencies. He has not been able to remodel DRDO and the OFB and make them accountable, bringing us to a sorry state where the military has to import even assault rifles and carbines.

The Defence Minister (as the Prime Minister) may plead he is clean but he can hardly dust off the reflection of the murky dealings by his subordinates. That is the reason why HQ IDS has not been permitted to integrate with the MoD – so that bureaucratic accountability can continue to be avoided and more importantly the mafia links remain dappled.

…why HQ IDS has not been permitted to integrate with the MoD – so that bureaucratic accountability can continue to be avoided and more importantly the mafia links remain dappled.

There is a reason why today the MoD is being referred to as MAD (Ministry Against Defence) and MoD’s bureaucrat headed Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare (DESW) called the Department of Stone Walling; ample proof of the negative and adverse stance by both existing. The 4th Pay Commission had granted military officers in 1986 rank pay (upto brigadier rank) in addition to basic pay. The MoD bureaucrats scuttled these orders and in conjunction the Controller of Defence Accounts deducted the rank pay from emoluments of thousands of effected officers despite appeal after appeal. It is only in September 2012, that the Supreme Court ordered that the blocked rank pay. The bureaucracy then pleaded citing financial constraints that arrears get paid not with effect from 1986 not 2006, and at only 6% interest. The Supreme Court order that all disbursement be completed within three months was circumvented on pretext of workload and unavailability of records though lakhs of rupees were allotted years back for automation of the Controller of Defence Accounts. Can you ever expect the Defence Minister to conduct an inquiry into the culpability of the bureaucrats of MoD for this gross injustice to the military or is he and his predecessors party to all this? Will the present ‘clean’ Defence Minister do this even now knowing that some of the affected officers have passed away, even martyred in conflict, and no arrears can reach their next of kin when the Controller of Defence Accounts wants every officer to submit a performa before any arrears can be allotted.

Ironically, when the case of rank pay was being fought in court, the Solicitor General of India told the court that Services Headquarters were opposed to giving back the rank pay to these officers – blatant and malicious lie to mislead the Court for which, he should have actually be held in contempt and perjury. Payment of these arrears not with effect from 1986 but 2006 (20 years gap) and that too at only 6% interest implies affected officers get perhaps only one third of what they should have actually got. There are understandably financial constraints but do keep in mind media reports of six paintings of the spouse of the ‘clean’ Defence Minister bought by Air India for Rupees 25 crores, even while incurring a daily loss of Rupees 5 crores. Significantly, MoD accepted that the Supreme Court judgment in rank pay case would involve re-fixation of not only the Fourth Pay Commission, but would affect successive pay commissions. However, they have now refused to implement what they admitted in court.

Just about 20,000 officers are being given arrears, that too from 2006 instead of from 1986 instead of benefiting all pay scales and pensions of service officers in all subsequent pay commissions. The Supreme Court judgement in the rank pay case is actually being deliberately defrauded by MoD through minimal implementation. The 6^thPay Commission granted Non Functional Advancement to all central services officers but deliberately denied this to Defence Services. This is yet another example of intentionally harming the military. The manner in which the prestige of the military is being attacked and personnel denied their emoluments is unbelievable. One fine morning, media prominently displayed grossly false news – “OROP Sanctioned – Government Allots 2300 Crores”. The President of Indian Ex-Servicemen Association met the Defence Minister and points out the phoniness. The Defence Minister acknowledged the folly (which was obviously deliberate) but did nothing to ensure even a press note rectifying it. It is not that the public is unconcerned. TR Ramaswami, former banker with SBI Group and DSP Merrill Lynch Ltd writes, “We need a permanent solution to this tussle over emoluments so that the armed forces need only confront the enemies of the nation.”

We neither have a National Security Strategy or an Internal Security Strategy

What does the military do in such an environment? How can the military be empowered? How do they get the much needed politico-military connect; to make the politician concerned about the military, which in turn would reign in the bureaucracy, improve civil-military relations and bring the military into the inner hierarchical circle of all matters military that would in turn improve national security? Frankly no elaborate net assessment or appreciation is required. If you can appreciate the solitary factor that makes the politician drool, you know the panacea. Yes, unequivocally it is the votebank. The irony is that provision already exists for the military to empower themselves through this. The problem is that either the military is unaware or the commanders are too scared they might be labeled ‘political’. Nothing can be more stupid than the latter because exercising one’s franchise is a democratic right and in fact, denying it to your subordinates is being undemocratic where the Election Commission of India has authorized every soldier who is serving for six months or more on the day of election in any part of India to vote in the State elections (of the State he is serving in) as well as the Municipal Elections of the Municipality covering the place of the soldier’s current posting.Deliberate ill equipping and lack of modernization of the military is another aspect. If the deliberate leak of a former Army Chief to the Prime Minister sent shock waves in the general public, the deficiencies by themselves are drummed into the hierarchy (Prime Minster and Defence Minister included) during the Military Commanders Conference every six months, as also during the periodic Unified Commanders Conference. The idea of the leak was to reinforce the requirement of big ticket acquisitions from where hefty bribes accrue. We neither have a National Security Strategy or an Internal Security Strategy (latter apparent with the gross mishandling of the Maoist insurgency) which obviates the compulsion to look at procurements holistically. That is why we have aberrations like the over Rupees 36000 crores deal on 12 x VVIP helicopters while there is crying need for attack and troop lift helicopters. Arming and equipping of the soldiers at the cutting edge continues to be ignored across the entire security sector. Ironically, although a former Prime Minister was rumoured to be a CIA agent, no government or media functionary has ever been labeled an ISI agent other than low level functionaries caught for passing on military secrets. The straight answer is there is a whole bunch of them, working in cohorts with each other and the arms-land mafia, ensuring the military remains unprepared and attacking the military morale.

The standing MLA (with a feline surname) at Mathura made a beeline to the Station Commander offering Rupees 10 lakhs (promising more would follow) and requested the Station Commander to issue orders for all ranks at Mathura to vote for his party.

In 2007, when the UP State elections were announced, the army garrisons at Mathura, Allahabd and Kanpur notified the civil authorities that all ranks posted at these garrisons fulfilling the six month criteria will be participating in the State elections. The list of eligible all ranks were forwarded and voter identity cards requested. Simultaneously, some veterans took it upon themselves to send RTIs to concerned MLAs and MPs asking for details of what action had been taken by them in last five years for helping veterans and serving soldiers families in their areas, and what expenditure was made from the enormous area development funds at their disposal to improve the infrastructure in the cantonments. The effect was electric to say the least. The standing MLA (with a feline surname) at Mathura made a beeline to the Station Commander offering Rupees 10 lakhs (promising more would follow) and requested the Station Commander to issue orders for all ranks at Mathura to vote for his party. Needless to mention that the moneybag was returned and he was politely told it does not happen in the military like this. Eligible all ranks would vote but everyone is unto himself and no central orders would be issued whom to vote for. The MLA still wanted the Station Commander to keep the moneybag but the latter declined. At Allahabad, an illegal encroachment on cantonment land had just been removed after proper court order. The lady heading a political party in her quest to garner votes of the evicted rang up the party President in Delhi, who in turn rang up the Defence Minister. Lo and behold, HQ Central Command was asked to order an inquiry into the evictions. Obviously, nothing came out of it but when the army informed the civil authorities they would participate in state elections, the lady heading the particular political party ended up wanting to know when the Divisional Commander at Allahabad could find time to have a meal with her. Incidentally couple of years later, this lady’s house was ransacked and burnt by goons’ courtesy political opponents. There were demands by political parties to hold election rallies within cantonments but this was not permitted. The Army did take part in the 2005 UP State Elections. Civil authorities expressed inability to issue so many voter cards in such short span but set up separate special booths exclusive for military where individuals vote after showing their service identity cards. The MLA who won from Mathura, came to Station Headquarters subsequently and queried how could he assist in improving the roads, lighting etc over the next five years.

The military has the power to empower itself. Will the commanders take the initiative? Shouldn’t the Chiefs order that all ranks must not be denied their franchise? Empowerment will come a

Musharraf to be back home
His expectations and the reality in Pakistan
by Rana Banerji

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2013/20130305/edit.htm#4

ON March 1, former Pakistan President Gen Pervez Musharraf (retd) announced in Dubai that he would return to Pakistan one week after the installation of a caretaker government to contest parliamentary elections under the banner of his political party, All-Pakistan Muslim League (APML), formed in June 2010. He had promised to return last year as well but deferred it at the last minute, ostensibly on the advice of his friends in the Army who feared for his life and safety.
The present, the government at the Centre and the provincial governments, including the National and Provincial Assemblies, are expected to be dissolved by presidential proclamation around March 15, which would make Musharraf's promised return date coincide very nearly with Pakistan's National Day on March 23, a moment permitting a diversionary impact by appeal to patriotic fervour.
Musharraf announced a four-point agenda — focusing on internal stability, regional peace, international acceptability and socio-economic development — and stressed that it was “now or never” for him to go back to “his beloved homeland”, to fight against many serious problems facing Pakistan, including religious terrorism, which was “eating us from inside”. In a message intended for his many detractors and political enemies, especially Nawaz Sharif, whose PML(N) has been given the edge in most recent opinion polls, he indicated that he would be seeking reconciliation on return.
If Musharraf does live up to his promise this time, he will have to face up to arrest warrants issued in at least two specific cases by anti-terrorism courts in Sibi, Dera Bugti, accusing him of involvement in the murder of Nawab Akbar Bugti in August 2006 and in the Benazir Bhutto assassination case of December 2007. He also faces a summons from the one-man Commission of Enquiry on the Lal Masjid case set up recently under Justice Shahzado Sheikh of the Federal Shariah Court, where he or his legal counsel have so far refused to appear. Though not likely to be found personally culpable for actions claimed to have been undertaken pursuant to “public purpose” and “national securiy”, Musharraf has said he will have his lawyers ready to deal with these cases legally. He may even have calculated to seek some political mileage before the elections if he is temporarily incarcerated.
Earlier, there were moves also to drag Musharraf into treason proceedings under Article 6 of the 1973 Constitution, both for violation of his oath as an Army officer indulging in politics under Article 244 of the Constitution and malafide promulgation of the November 3, 2007, emergency, followed by the dismissal of the Supreme Court bench headed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. Though the latter has no love lost for him, the absence of dissolved legislatures may preclude serious pursuit of this option at present.
For the caretaker administration, which will be having its hands full with implementing the election agenda, the prospect of evolving appropriate state responses to contentious litigation arising from Musharraf's return will pose a needless headache. There will be additional responsibility to provide adequate security as Musharraf will face a serious enough threat from both Islamic radicals belonging to the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP), who tried to assassinate him twice earlier in December 2003 as also from Baloch nationalists. The Bannu jail-break in April 2012 saw 150 Taliban militants taking security officials by complete surprise and releasing, among others, Adnan Rashid, one of the serving other ranks personnel held from the air force cell which was busted after the attacks on Musharraf.
Meanwhile, Shahzain Bugti, grandson and legally anointed heir of the Bugti clan, has already announced a Rs 10 million “head money” award according to tribal customs to anybody who will kill him!
If Musharraf is able to overcome all these hurdles before the elections and actually contest, his APML, comprising lightweight though moneyed lawyers like Saif Ali Khan and some retired Army loyalists like Maj-Gen Rashid Quereshi, would make a marginal impact only, possibly eating into votes of the two mainstream parties in the urban areas of Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad as also weakening the impact of Imran Khan's Tehrik-e-Insaaf (TI) as a viable “third option”.
The Army may view the prospect of Musharraf's return with mixed feelings. On the one hand, Army Chief Gen Ashfaq Pervez Kayani remains personally beholden to him for having selected him for the top job in November 2007 over the claims of an equally deserving three-star General, Tariq Majeed, who was later given the ceremonial sop of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. On the other, institutionally, the Army would not be too happy to see him humiliated or berated in courts beyond a point. Also, Musharraf would be looking to the Army to provide him fairly foolproof security cover. If something untoward is attempted or happens to him, seen to be emerging either from Islamist or Baloch nationalist quarters, this may not augur well for the Army's image in civil society for its inability to protect its own former Chief.
In terms of Musharraf's electoral prospects, the Army would surely have assessed carefully that his performance may not significantly alter political equations likely to lead to a “hung parliament” situation. If he does unexpectedly better, it could suit the Army to add another pro-establishment string to their bow, but this seems unlikely at present.
In the ultimate analysis, Musharraf's decision to return may be conditioned by last minute assessments from the Army and the ISI on how the various factors outlined above are likely to pan out. Security may be cited as a reason if he defers his return again. Otherwise, electorally, it may well turn out to be a damp squib.
The writer is a former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India.

Taiwan Challenges Its Neighbors

By Ted Galen Carpenter - March 4, 2013

The territorial disputes between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors over islands in the South China Sea have received considerable attention from an anxious international community. There has been even more global angst about the flare up of tensions between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Concern about those feuds—especially the Sino-Japanese confrontation—is understandable, given the potential for miscalculation and escalation.
But it’s important to note that there is another, increasingly assertive party to both disputes: Taiwan. And the Taiwanese have not been shy about pressing their claims. That adds a volatile element to the controversies.

Taipei has not only asserted ownership of portions of the South China Sea; it has managed to establish a significant physical presence there. Taiwan controls the Pratas—the largest island group, known locally as the Donghsa Islands—and Taiping, the largest of the hotly contested Spratly Islands. In September 2012, a group of thirty prominent Taiwanese, including national legislators, landed on Taiping to inspect the security situation. The coast guard conducted a live-fire exercise for the delegation during that visit, much to the annoyance of countries with competing claims.
The Taiwanese government summarily rejected all complaints. “Taiping Island is part of the Republic of China’s territory,” stated Wang kuo-jan, an official with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in response to Vietnam’s diplomatic protest. He added that “no one has the right to protest over Taiwan’s exercise of its sovereignty rights there.”
But incidents between Taipei and other claimants in the South China Sea have been mild compared to the tensions with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Matters came to a head in late September 2012 when a comic-opera naval battle involving water cannons erupted between Japanese patrol ships and a flotilla of dozens of Taiwanese fishing boats and coast guard vessels.
It might be tempting to smirk at such an episode, but anti-Japanese ethnic animosity has flared on Taiwan. Indeed, there have been angry demonstrations in Taiwanese cities, punctuated by burning the Japanese flag, just as on the mainland. Thus far, there has been markedly more hostility directed against Tokyo’s claims than against Beijing’s. Indeed, PRC officials have sought to spin Taiwan’s conduct as proof that “all Chinese,” irrespective of political differences on other issues, consider the islands Chinese territory.
Some of the underlying reasons for Taiwan’s territorial claims in the South China and East China seas are not hard to discern. There are vast, valuable fishing waters in both arenas, and commercial fishing is a crucial industry in Taiwan. It also is increasingly likely that there are large reservoirs of oil and natural gas under those waters. In other words, substantial economic stakes are involved in the territorial disputes, and neither Taiwan nor any other claimant is about to abandon such potential riches.
But in Taiwan’s case, another factor also may be at play, especially with regard to the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue. Taipei has called for trilateral talks to resolve that controversy, thus challenging the global perception that it is a purely bilateral controversy between Tokyo and Beijing. Taiwanese officials are also pressing for multilateral negotiations regarding the various claims in the South China Sea. Taking a more proactive stance on the territorial disputes—which has clearly been the case over the past year—might be a clever ploy to gain de facto recognition as a sovereign actor from Beijing, Tokyo, and other governments. Even though none of those countries is willing to establish formal relations with Taipei, they may have to deal with Taiwan as a key party to what are becoming ever more dangerous disputes.
Being accorded such respect, however grudgingly, would have implications for Taiwan’s international position. The island’s diplomatic status hangs by a thread, with only about two dozen nations maintaining official ties to Taipei. And all of them are small nations that Taiwan has effectively bribed with financial inducements to refrain from switching diplomatic recognition to Beijing. That fading strategy cannot endure much longer—especially as China’s economic resources and influence continue to mount.
Injecting itself as a major player in volatile territorial disputes may be a last-ditch, substitute strategy for gaining international recognition and respect. In any case, Taiwan is now a wild card in what are already some tense, worrisome confrontations. Washington and other governments need to carefully monitor this latest troubling development.

Ted Galen Carpenter is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of eight books on international affairs, including Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America (2008).

This article appeared in National Interest (Online) on February 28, 2013. It is reprinted with the permission of the Cato Institute.

India-China shibboleths take time to dissipate

http://blogs.rediff.com/mkbhadrakumar/2013/03/05/india-china-shibboleths-take-time-to-dissipate/

Two years back at a rare colloquium with Delhi’s China watchers, when I mentioned that from an Indian perspective China should be regarded as a ‘factor of stability’ in relation to the worsening Afghan situation, eyebrows were raised and vague traces of condescending smile began spreading on many familiar faces suggesting I was an innocent abroad trespassing into a mystique land where I might lose my way.

Today, we are a lot closer to that maverick idea, which was obviously struggling to be born. No doubt, the proposed idea of an ‘Afghan dialogue’ between India and China took its time to mature, but its raison d’etre was never in doubt.

This may sound a paradox, but India and China do share a lot of common ground on the Afghan problem. First and foremost, both are stakeholders in Afghanistan’s stabilization. Both have searing experiences of terror radiating from the Afghan-Pakistan border regions and they shudder to think of Afghanistan becoming a revolving door for international terrorists.

Neither India nor China abhors Islamism as such but both are acutely conscious of the dangers posed by radical Islamist groups. Thus, Afghanistan as a country of observant Muslims is an idea that neither would have a problem with, but both India and China disfavor a takeover in Kabul by the Taliban.

Neither is a great game player in the big league, associated with the rival projects of Russia’s Eurasian Union or the United States’ New Silk Road Initiative, but both could take advantage of the regional stability and development that these enterprises of the great powers may come to offer.

Most important, neither India nor China will get involved on the ground militarily in Afghanistan, while the anticipated post-2014 security vacuum worries them. Arguably, both countries would tacitly welcome the continued commitment — military and civilian — of the ‘international community’ to the stability and security of Afghanistan although they remain sceptical about long-term military presence by outside powers.

But then, there is also going to be an element of competition. India seems destined to ‘lose’ in the competition over accessing the vast resources of Central Asia and Afghanistan. The dismal truth is that India has no transportation route connecting Afghanistan. And none is likely to be available for the foreseeable future.

This is where China scores. The fact remains that China has an integrated regional vision whereas we seem to lack it, as evident from the volatile ties with Pakistan and the indifferent relationship with Iran. Thus, Gwadar becomes not only a fantastic gateway for Xinjiang (and Central Asian countries) but also holds the potential to create a template in the overall matrix aimed at harmonizing the Chinese and US regional objectives in Central Asia.

Having said all that, there are specific Chinese concerns in Afghanistan. Let me quote from a commentary in the Global Times newspaper recently:

“For China, there are two worst-case scenarios. The first is one where the US stabilizes Afghanistan, establishes a steady government, and then builds frontline bases. This way, the US could drive a wedge into Central Eurasia, and contain China from both sides. This was one of the collateral strategic goals of the US entry into Afghanistan in 2001. However, Afghanistan has proved a strategic burden, not an asset, to the US, dissipating many of China’s traditional security concerns.

“The second scenario is one where Afghanistan falls into anarchy with the US exit, becoming a breeding ground for international terrorism and drug trade. This will pose serious nontraditional security challenges to China.

“If it remains an onlooker, Afghanistan may be in turmoil and China may suffer, but if China intervenes actively, it may sink into mire like the US, and become the main target of international terrorism. As a result, China should take the initiative in Afghan affairs, while avoiding the failure of the US intervention.”

I took the liberty of quoting extensively from the commentary (here) to underscore that China has genuine compulsions to enter into an ‘Afghan dialogue’ with India.

Suffice to say, a lot of common ground exists for kickstarting a Sino-Indian ‘Afghan dialogue’. Such a dialogue, if it gains traction, would also serve the purpose of building mutual confidence and trust regarding each other’s regional policies in general. Which, in turn, could have positive fallouts for India-China normalization.

The normalization process is proceeding well. As I wrote earlier too, 2012 has been a truly transformative year and our policymakers have done exceedingly well. As recently as in 2006-2007, we were marvelling at the idea of a quadripartite alliance of Asian democracies under the US’s mentorship; as recently as in 2009, we were contemplating how to fasten the ‘global commons’. (Robert Kaplan wrote a full book on it.)

Indeed, both were geopolitical projects with a barely hidden ‘anti-China’ bias. We have come a long way from there, thanks largely to fortuitous circumstances. Yet, some of our pundits conceive the ‘Indo-Pacific’ as our country’s ’sphere of influence’. The doctrine of ‘Indo-Pacific’ — comprising the swathe of the globe stretching from the Strait of Hormuz to Vanuatu — is probably intended as a red herring to China. Shibboleths don’t dissipate easily. We hardly jettisoned one — ’string of pearls’ — with great hesitation.

Posted in Diplomacy, Politics.

Tagged with Afghanistan, Eurasia Union, Gwadar, India-China, Indo-Pacific, New Silk Road, Taliban.

By M K Bhadrakumar – March 5, 2013