The lying season by Masood Hasan Posted by admin on May 29th, 2011
The new mantra in Pakistan is, ‘By all that I hold holy, i.e., my properties, my bank accounts, my assets and all my worldly goods, I swear to tell lies, only lies and nothing but lies, so help me God.’ Lying is now the official language of the country’s leadership, civil or military. For the people of Pakistan lying is easy to accept. Leaders have always lied. It’s the sheer quantity of it that’s floored them and the brazen, shameless manner it’s been thrown in their faces. The last person who spoke the truth cannot be located for love or money. Some say he could be in Abbottabad.
One hears that the dreaded pollen virus that lays Islamabad flat every year has more or less given it a miss. What has been unleashed instead is a virulent virus that’s travelled faster than a Blackhawk, Tarbela to Abbottabad. This virus has downed the army, the air force and the navy in the twinkling of an eye. The civil leadership about which nothing is civil has been lying for so long that even if it was provided the truth and bribed to speak it, the result would be more lying. The SOP is to lie and deny all the bad news. In some cases twist it and make it complimentary. (Rehman Malik congratulating nation on beating off the TTP in Karachi).
However what’s worrying is that after years of practice no two officials can manufacture a good lie. All that they do is keep mumbling and bumbling and issue contradictory stories. These are instantly denied within hours, the media is blamed and fresh lies are cooked up which too are denied. By this time, the average Joe Bloke is holding his head, if he still has one left after all the battering it has received from no power, no law, no order and only inflation. He cannot think and he cannot tell which is what or as is often the case here, what is which. The rulers, past and present – those whom God in his infinite wisdom has chosen to preside over our puny lives, cannot understand that it is not the shameless lying the Pakistanis find offensive. It is the accompanying implication that is. Simply that you are brain dead morons and so stupid that we can spin any thing and you will buy it. Although Pakistanis have lost all self respect, this last insult is a bit too much to stomach but then who is asking them any way? If this is a rule of the people’s functional democracy, I was abducted thrice by Martians.
Only the armed forces and its attendant side kicks could BS their way over the highly embarrassing and still extremely controversial Bin Laden caper. To say they were caught with their pants down would be highly unfair. Our defenders were in their pajamas or boxer shorts, the action having started rather late in the night.
Once things started to unravel, the lying factory went on an emergency non stop shift. Anyone who was anyone started issuing statements, one after another, often vying for print and air space. Did any two people agree on one lie? Sorry no. The joke was that the chief would say one thing and his entire establishment, quite another. To add more comedy and buffoonery to the proceedings, Lionel Richie (or ‘Hello’ Mr Rehman Malik, of the shiny polyester suits, matching florid neckties, pseudo silk handkerchiefs and an Afro that would gain him instant citizenship in any African tribe) joined in the tribal stew party giving the heady broth a good stir. That was all that we needed unless you wish to mention the FO (no it is not what you think the initials mean), which was on its own kick and loving their carefully worded painstaking handouts which had the same credibility as Jabba the Hut’s Diet Plan for Weight Watchers.
In the ensuing mess the opinion on the street was that either we were incompetent or guilty as hell, everyone hoped it would be the former. We weren’t the only ones who had lost their marbles. The US churned out such a cock-and-bull story with zero credibility that it self detonated within 48 hours. And this from a country that gave us Mission Impossible! The ‘plot’ sold to the public complete with the dump-in-the-sea sequence had the world in stitches. Even the carefully framed, now-famous picture of Obama and his tense cabinet watching the Osama operation, went down the other way. The controversies remain because of excessive lying. Our radars for example. Were they on? Were they off? Bit of both? Annual Maintenance? In rest mode? Come on guys; give us a break for once! Even the Three Stooges could have done better.
Hardly had the Blackhawks been hosed down, Bagram or Tarbela – take your pick than the PNS Mehran embarrassment began. Another classic botch up, another full-scale lying epidemic. The gory details we all know. The least the chief could do was quit for the honour of the navy but he instead donned fatigues (which battle are you fighting Admiral?), hissed over to PNS Mehran in his sparkling, dazzling pristine white BMW with its four gleaming stars. Hallelujah! The base in the meantime is blown to smithereens, including the pricey two Orions. That loss a cool US$ 72m (replacements have already been asked for). Instead of coming clean, the navy goes into denial mode. In an embarrassing long time that it takes our Seals, SSG Commandos and all the others to neutralise the attackers, we have lost some innocent men who were merely reacting to the explosions and didn’t have a clue what was going on. So much for naval Intel. I am sure that the place has already been hosed down – the navy likes to keep everything sparkling white, the debris of the attack hauled out of sight but all that does not absolve the naval high command of gross failure or the deaths in vain of that young lieutenant and other men, not to mention the two dozen or so injured.
There are no resignations in sight. The base commander is unceremoniously transferred, but wait. It was a routine matter. Was in the pipeline for months. Tie me to an anchor and sink me guys. In fact we know too well there won’t be any resignations. God forbid if there were, think of the terrible consequences. No, no, we cannot have them. But you want some lies manufactured? Sure can do. The chief looks the nation in the eye and with a straight face categorically states that there was no security lapse. It’s the funniest thing since comedian Rangeela slipped on a banana peel. Wreaths are sent to the families of the dead and Mr Malik, who has the same sensitivity as a bull in a china shop, actually announces a medal for the slain young naval officer. What a crass touch!
And so it goes on. The farce that is Pakistan. We are shamed before the world, the laughing stock, the butt of all jokes. In all this, as if afflicted by a stroke, the president is so silent that the sphinx sounds like a chatterbox. Strange are the ways of the Republic!
The Lying Season by Massod Hasan
LOVE of Money: Pak lies beat Indian Scamsters- 2G, Adarsh and CWG
Monday, May 30, 2011
Sunday, May 29, 2011
Pakistan Karachi Attack- Terror Twist
25 May 2011 Last updated at 08:16 ET 'New kind of militant' behind Pakistan Karachi attack By Syed Shoaib Hasan BBC News, Karachi
Officials say the attack was too professional to be the handiwork of the
The deadly 15-hour siege on Pakistan's Mehran naval airbase in Karachi on Monday was carried out by attackers with military-level training, raising suspicions they had inside help.
Questions are being asked about the security of Pakistan's vital military installations after a well-organised group of gunmen held off Pakistan's equivalent of the US Navy Seals - the Special Services Group-Navy (SSG-N) - for 15 hours.
The SSG-N is said to be the most formidable fighting force in Pakistan, but - for a few hours at least - they appeared to be at the mercy of a brazen group of fighters.
"They weren't any ordinary militants - certainly not the Taliban," said one security official, who wished to remain unnamed.
"The aim of all Taliban attacks is maximum death and destruction - these men were very focused on what they were after."
Speed and organisation
From the beginning it was clear the attackers had an intricate knowledge of the base and its vulnerable areas. They were tactically assured and the operation had clearly been long in the planning.
"They came over the wall cutting the wire on the eastern side of the base," another official told the BBC, adding that it was one of the weak points. The militants knew and exploited this - just one piece of inside knowledge they had.
"That side is just next to the runway - and the guard tower is at a distance because planes land regularly."
The first time the militants were seen was when they appeared on the runway, weapons at the ready. "The [navy] men couldn't believe their eyes," says the official.
A number of officials listed to me their observations, which reinforced the conviction that they were being confronted with a new kind of militant attack:
Military formation: One injured sailor told an official that the attackers "moved and dressed like us". The militants moved in tactical military formation and spoke in military parlance. They spoke between themselves in Urdu, as well as a foreign language.
Clothing and equipment: The militants wore combat fatigues, according to officials - and had night vision goggles, carrying rocket propelled grenades [RPGs]. "It takes months of training for ease with the goggles, and years to be expert," an official told me.
Tactics and a plan: One witness said that even though the militants had clear sight of them, "they ignored us... Instead, they just aimed RPGs at the two Orions [planes] parked on the tarmac." They were clearly under instructions to destroy military hardware. They also changed tactics easily and broke away in groups, which clearly had different aims.
Crack shots: "They were excellent shots - as good as any we have," said a security official involved in the operation. They used their night vision goggles to maximum effect, witnesses say - and that was an advantage they had until the SSG-N team arrived at the scene. When the gun battle began, one security official said, it was clear that these men could "hold their own" in a firefight. The fact that they had M16 carbines and sniper rifles also set them apart.
Officials says all of this is in strong contrast to the Taliban, who adopt an equally brutal but more chaotic mode of attack. "Their best weapon is the suicide bomber - they are notoriously poor shots," one official told me.
"They were the exception to every rule of Pakistan militant tactics.
"They were also not about killing people," the official said. "It was clear they were interested in the destruction of equipment, a much more 'military' aim."
Shock and disbelief
It was only the sheer numbers of the naval personnel that prevented further damage to the aircraft in the base, one naval spokesman said.
Even so, the ferocity, speed and organisation of the onslaught still came as a shock. The planes were in flames and a gun battle was being fought within minutes.
The incident has drawn comparisons with the 2008 Mumbai (Bombay) attacks But one of the attackers in particular caught the attention of those who were watching and bearing the brunt of the attack.
"A small young man with a light beard who later dropped his M16 for two Uzi submachine guns. He was particularly deadly - he killed one soldier with a single shot at over 600 yards."
Another clue as to the level of their training and proficiency was their ability to change tactics. One witness recounted how in the midst of the firefight the attackers appeared to change their minds and back off.
They appeared to be going for the barracks housing the Chinese engineers. Another firefight broke out until a new detachment of naval marines got to the Chinese barracks. The militants, when they realised what was happening, opened fire on the armoured vehicles the Chinese engineers were being taken away in.
Inside help
Everything about the attack pointed to a detailed knowledge of the barracks. After the Chinese engineers were taken away, they broke up into groups and one group took refuge in a nearby barracks.
"They used the building to maximum effect - they knew it and the surrounding area inside out," the official said.
"We later discovered plans to the whole compound on them."
The SSG-N finally got into the barracks and killed the remaining militants. The attackers had clearly come prepared for a long siege, bringing bags of dried fruit as rations.
Officials dismiss the explanation that the attack was in retaliation for Osama Bin Laden's death. "This took months of planning - the only parallel I can think of is Mumbai [Bombay]," one said.
Gunmen killed 165 people in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and India has repeatedly accused Pakistan and its ISI intelligence agency of involvement in them.
"This maybe the first attack of its kind [in Pakistan]," the security official said. "But it's definitely not the last."
Officials say the only other time they have encountered such ferocity and training is in fighting al-Qaeda militants - especially Chechens and Uzbeks - in Pakistan's tribal areas.
"The way they went about their business - I could almost say they were our own commandos," says the security official. He is not the only one who thinks that some of those involved in the attack may be serving military personnel or ex-servicemen.
'New kind of militant' behind Pakistan Karachi attack By Syed Shoaib Hasan BBC
Officials say the attack was too professional to be the handiwork of the
The deadly 15-hour siege on Pakistan's Mehran naval airbase in Karachi on Monday was carried out by attackers with military-level training, raising suspicions they had inside help.
Questions are being asked about the security of Pakistan's vital military installations after a well-organised group of gunmen held off Pakistan's equivalent of the US Navy Seals - the Special Services Group-Navy (SSG-N) - for 15 hours.
The SSG-N is said to be the most formidable fighting force in Pakistan, but - for a few hours at least - they appeared to be at the mercy of a brazen group of fighters.
"They weren't any ordinary militants - certainly not the Taliban," said one security official, who wished to remain unnamed.
"The aim of all Taliban attacks is maximum death and destruction - these men were very focused on what they were after."
Speed and organisation
From the beginning it was clear the attackers had an intricate knowledge of the base and its vulnerable areas. They were tactically assured and the operation had clearly been long in the planning.
"They came over the wall cutting the wire on the eastern side of the base," another official told the BBC, adding that it was one of the weak points. The militants knew and exploited this - just one piece of inside knowledge they had.
"That side is just next to the runway - and the guard tower is at a distance because planes land regularly."
The first time the militants were seen was when they appeared on the runway, weapons at the ready. "The [navy] men couldn't believe their eyes," says the official.
A number of officials listed to me their observations, which reinforced the conviction that they were being confronted with a new kind of militant attack:
Military formation: One injured sailor told an official that the attackers "moved and dressed like us". The militants moved in tactical military formation and spoke in military parlance. They spoke between themselves in Urdu, as well as a foreign language.
Clothing and equipment: The militants wore combat fatigues, according to officials - and had night vision goggles, carrying rocket propelled grenades [RPGs]. "It takes months of training for ease with the goggles, and years to be expert," an official told me.
Tactics and a plan: One witness said that even though the militants had clear sight of them, "they ignored us... Instead, they just aimed RPGs at the two Orions [planes] parked on the tarmac." They were clearly under instructions to destroy military hardware. They also changed tactics easily and broke away in groups, which clearly had different aims.
Crack shots: "They were excellent shots - as good as any we have," said a security official involved in the operation. They used their night vision goggles to maximum effect, witnesses say - and that was an advantage they had until the SSG-N team arrived at the scene. When the gun battle began, one security official said, it was clear that these men could "hold their own" in a firefight. The fact that they had M16 carbines and sniper rifles also set them apart.
Officials says all of this is in strong contrast to the Taliban, who adopt an equally brutal but more chaotic mode of attack. "Their best weapon is the suicide bomber - they are notoriously poor shots," one official told me.
"They were the exception to every rule of Pakistan militant tactics.
"They were also not about killing people," the official said. "It was clear they were interested in the destruction of equipment, a much more 'military' aim."
Shock and disbelief
It was only the sheer numbers of the naval personnel that prevented further damage to the aircraft in the base, one naval spokesman said.
Even so, the ferocity, speed and organisation of the onslaught still came as a shock. The planes were in flames and a gun battle was being fought within minutes.
The incident has drawn comparisons with the 2008 Mumbai (Bombay) attacks But one of the attackers in particular caught the attention of those who were watching and bearing the brunt of the attack.
"A small young man with a light beard who later dropped his M16 for two Uzi submachine guns. He was particularly deadly - he killed one soldier with a single shot at over 600 yards."
Another clue as to the level of their training and proficiency was their ability to change tactics. One witness recounted how in the midst of the firefight the attackers appeared to change their minds and back off.
They appeared to be going for the barracks housing the Chinese engineers. Another firefight broke out until a new detachment of naval marines got to the Chinese barracks. The militants, when they realised what was happening, opened fire on the armoured vehicles the Chinese engineers were being taken away in.
Inside help
Everything about the attack pointed to a detailed knowledge of the barracks. After the Chinese engineers were taken away, they broke up into groups and one group took refuge in a nearby barracks.
"They used the building to maximum effect - they knew it and the surrounding area inside out," the official said.
"We later discovered plans to the whole compound on them."
The SSG-N finally got into the barracks and killed the remaining militants. The attackers had clearly come prepared for a long siege, bringing bags of dried fruit as rations.
Officials dismiss the explanation that the attack was in retaliation for Osama Bin Laden's death. "This took months of planning - the only parallel I can think of is Mumbai [Bombay]," one said.
Gunmen killed 165 people in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and India has repeatedly accused Pakistan and its ISI intelligence agency of involvement in them.
"This maybe the first attack of its kind [in Pakistan]," the security official said. "But it's definitely not the last."
Officials say the only other time they have encountered such ferocity and training is in fighting al-Qaeda militants - especially Chechens and Uzbeks - in Pakistan's tribal areas.
"The way they went about their business - I could almost say they were our own commandos," says the security official. He is not the only one who thinks that some of those involved in the attack may be serving military personnel or ex-servicemen.
'New kind of militant' behind Pakistan Karachi attack By Syed Shoaib Hasan BBC
Saturday, May 28, 2011
Eurofighter Scam: MOD and Airforce Manipulated
The Sunday Guardian UK- Typhoon blew off US fighter by JOYEETA BASU 1st May 
The Eurofighter Typhoon has emerged as the number one aircraft, ahead of Dassault's Rafale, in a Ministry of Defence evaluation for the $10 billion MMRCA (Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) contract. But a decision between the two will be taken after a final evaluation. According to sources, Boeing's F/A-18 Super Hornet was placed third, Saab's Gripen fourth, Lockheed Martin's F-16 fifth and the Russian Mig 35 sixth.
F/A-18 lost out to its European counterparts because it was inadequate to meet India's needs. It did not perform well at the trials, especially in Ladakh's Leh where its engines refused to start, say sources. F/A-18 was also perceived to be too heavy and so lacking in speed and manoeuvrability. It is a 30-year-old aircraft with technology dating back to the 1980s.
The Eurofighter Typhoon was perceived to have several advantages over its competitors, especially over the aircraft on offer from the United States. It is the only fourth generation MMRCA in the world. It has better air to air, and air to ground capabilities that can be carried out simultaneously. As the Typhoon is a new fighter aircraft the potential for growth and upgrade is huge, lasting between 40-50 years. The Typhoon has a large supply base available, as it is in service with many Air Forces, such as, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain and also Saudi Arabia. The Typhoon is also offering weapons packages that include the lethal Meteor missile, which is a radar guided beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile. New technologies also mean low lifecycle cost. The cost of ownership is also low.
The Eurofighter Typhoon is a collaborative effort by Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK and will not come saddled with the intrusive end user monitoring agreement and the end user verification agreement that all US aircraft will be burdened with. These US Congress-mandated monitoring agreements demand that client states give the US the right to access and inspect the materiel bought from that country. Transfer of high-level technology will also be easier with the European aircraft than the US F-18/A.
During a recent meeting in Paris, sources in the French aircraft industry had said that their Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon were the two best aircraft on offer. The Gripen manufactured by Saab was dismissed as too small and lacking in power. Rafale was described as an "omni-role aircraft with low penetration." The French perceived the F-16 as an old aircraft. The MoD here was not keen on the F-16 primarily because Pakistan already has that.
According to a source, "Russia was never really in the game as the IAF wanted a non Russian platform and the Mig 35 was far from ready, only in a developmental stage. Gripen and the F-16 were also ruled out as the IAF wanted a twin engine aircraft and in the case of the F-16 the fact that Pakistan has it, precluded it from serious consideration."
The French were, however, wary of US President Barack Obama's capacity to influence India's decision. "It's difficult to say who'll get the MMRCA contract, but Eurofighter Typhoon is our main competitor," a source said.
The decision in favour of the Typhoon and Rafale was swung by the IAF, which conducted what sources described as "an immaculate selection process". Defence Minister A.K. Antony was also clear that merit would be the only factor that would decide the selection. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh too could not exert himself on a resolute defence minister as that would have laid him bare to another charge of cozying up to the US.
But the United States is unlikely to give up easily. Sources say that lobbying on behalf of the US has already started, with some senior journalists involved in the process. There are fears within defence circles that pressure will be applied on the MoD to either give the contract to F-18/A or to cancel the contract altogether. There are also fears that the US will make it difficult for both Eurofighter and Rafale, whoever wins the contract, to transfer any American technology they might be having. The US might also try to arm-twist India by threatening to put Indian companies back on the entities list.
Meanwhile, Janata Party president Subramanian Swamy has sent a letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh alleging that there was a "pre-determined decision to favour the French aircraft" and this was an "outcome of several conversations between the wife of French President Ms. Carla Bruni and the Chairperson of the National Advisory Council Ms. Sonia Gandhi, and surprisingly also with two foreign nationals who are the sisters of Ms. Sonia Gandhi".
Swamy, alleged in his letter, that "based on some credible information" given to him on the "conversation" between Carla Bruni and Sonia Gandhi's sisters, "there has been an agreement of the French to pay a hefty bribe for favouring the purchase of French aircrafts".
Typhoon blew off US fighter by JOYEETA BASU
Reported in Indian Defence: click here
French Bribes- says Dr Swamy
The US aircraft which has been deleted from the shortlist may or may not be the best for our Air Force (it has to be determined by your experts), but the US has a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act which makes it almost impossible to give bribes. The French, however, while dealing with a foreign country have a much more relaxed attitude to bribes paid abroad to secure contracts and this attitude has become a part of their mental makeup of contempt for the foreigner, especially us Indians.
F/A-18 lost out to its European counterparts because it was inadequate to meet India's needs. It did not perform well at the trials, especially in Ladakh's Leh where its engines refused to start, say sources. F/A-18 was also perceived to be too heavy and so lacking in speed and manoeuvrability. It is a 30-year-old aircraft with technology dating back to the 1980s.
The Eurofighter Typhoon was perceived to have several advantages over its competitors, especially over the aircraft on offer from the United States. It is the only fourth generation MMRCA in the world. It has better air to air, and air to ground capabilities that can be carried out simultaneously. As the Typhoon is a new fighter aircraft the potential for growth and upgrade is huge, lasting between 40-50 years. The Typhoon has a large supply base available, as it is in service with many Air Forces, such as, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain and also Saudi Arabia. The Typhoon is also offering weapons packages that include the lethal Meteor missile, which is a radar guided beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile. New technologies also mean low lifecycle cost. The cost of ownership is also low.
The Eurofighter Typhoon is a collaborative effort by Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK and will not come saddled with the intrusive end user monitoring agreement and the end user verification agreement that all US aircraft will be burdened with. These US Congress-mandated monitoring agreements demand that client states give the US the right to access and inspect the materiel bought from that country. Transfer of high-level technology will also be easier with the European aircraft than the US F-18/A.
During a recent meeting in Paris, sources in the French aircraft industry had said that their Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon were the two best aircraft on offer. The Gripen manufactured by Saab was dismissed as too small and lacking in power. Rafale was described as an "omni-role aircraft with low penetration." The French perceived the F-16 as an old aircraft. The MoD here was not keen on the F-16 primarily because Pakistan already has that.
According to a source, "Russia was never really in the game as the IAF wanted a non Russian platform and the Mig 35 was far from ready, only in a developmental stage. Gripen and the F-16 were also ruled out as the IAF wanted a twin engine aircraft and in the case of the F-16 the fact that Pakistan has it, precluded it from serious consideration."
The French were, however, wary of US President Barack Obama's capacity to influence India's decision. "It's difficult to say who'll get the MMRCA contract, but Eurofighter Typhoon is our main competitor," a source said.
The decision in favour of the Typhoon and Rafale was swung by the IAF, which conducted what sources described as "an immaculate selection process". Defence Minister A.K. Antony was also clear that merit would be the only factor that would decide the selection. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh too could not exert himself on a resolute defence minister as that would have laid him bare to another charge of cozying up to the US.
But the United States is unlikely to give up easily. Sources say that lobbying on behalf of the US has already started, with some senior journalists involved in the process. There are fears within defence circles that pressure will be applied on the MoD to either give the contract to F-18/A or to cancel the contract altogether. There are also fears that the US will make it difficult for both Eurofighter and Rafale, whoever wins the contract, to transfer any American technology they might be having. The US might also try to arm-twist India by threatening to put Indian companies back on the entities list.
Meanwhile, Janata Party president Subramanian Swamy has sent a letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh alleging that there was a "pre-determined decision to favour the French aircraft" and this was an "outcome of several conversations between the wife of French President Ms. Carla Bruni and the Chairperson of the National Advisory Council Ms. Sonia Gandhi, and surprisingly also with two foreign nationals who are the sisters of Ms. Sonia Gandhi".
Typhoon blew off US fighter by JOYEETA BASU
Reported in Indian Defence: click here
French Bribes- says Dr Swamy
The US aircraft which has been deleted from the shortlist may or may not be the best for our Air Force (it has to be determined by your experts), but the US has a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act which makes it almost impossible to give bribes. The French, however, while dealing with a foreign country have a much more relaxed attitude to bribes paid abroad to secure contracts and this attitude has become a part of their mental makeup of contempt for the foreigner, especially us Indians.
Friday, May 27, 2011
Terrorism: Money Laundering Trail to be Tracked
DD News 27 May 2011
US offers assistance in dealing with money laundering
The United States has offered assistance to India to deal with money laundering and fake currency menace, besides cooperation in issues related to cross-border terrorism.
The visiting Secretary of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Janet Napolitano called on Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee in New Delhi on Friday and the two leaders explored the areas of bilateral cooperation.
"Napolitano sought cooperation and offered assistance in money laundering, counterfeiting of currency, cross-border terrorism, cyber security, secured cargo...," a finance ministry statement said on Friday.
In the meeting, Mukherjee stressed on the need for cooperation in investigations relating to money laundering, drug-money flow, stashing of black money abroad and transfer-pricing mechanism.
The two sides also decided to establish a new chapter in US-India cooperation in various areas relating to finance ministry with particular emphasis on Customs issues.
"(the two also) noted the excellent cooperation between Indian Customs and US Customs and agreed to explore new areas of mutual interest to safeguard the security of the global supply chain," the release said. (DD-27.5)
US offers assistance in dealing with money laundering
Related reading
27/05/2011-India in world's most difficult neighbourhood: Chidambaram
Cut Corruption to Combat Terrorism
Anna warns govt: No hanky panky with Lokpal bill
US offers assistance in dealing with money laundering
The United States has offered assistance to India to deal with money laundering and fake currency menace, besides cooperation in issues related to cross-border terrorism.
The visiting Secretary of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Janet Napolitano called on Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee in New Delhi on Friday and the two leaders explored the areas of bilateral cooperation.
"Napolitano sought cooperation and offered assistance in money laundering, counterfeiting of currency, cross-border terrorism, cyber security, secured cargo...," a finance ministry statement said on Friday.
In the meeting, Mukherjee stressed on the need for cooperation in investigations relating to money laundering, drug-money flow, stashing of black money abroad and transfer-pricing mechanism.
The two sides also decided to establish a new chapter in US-India cooperation in various areas relating to finance ministry with particular emphasis on Customs issues.
"(the two also) noted the excellent cooperation between Indian Customs and US Customs and agreed to explore new areas of mutual interest to safeguard the security of the global supply chain," the release said. (DD-27.5)
US offers assistance in dealing with money laundering
Related reading
27/05/2011-India in world's most difficult neighbourhood: Chidambaram
Cut Corruption to Combat Terrorism
Anna warns govt: No hanky panky with Lokpal bill
Wednesday, May 25, 2011
Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Arsenal Safety Endangered
South Asia Analysis Paper no. 4505 25-May-2011 by Dr Subhash Kapila
Introductory Observations
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal safety has been a source of serious concern for the international community ever since Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal came into existence. Initially, international concerns focused on the unreliability of Pakistan as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in nuclear stability, Pakistan’s propensity for conflict including nuclear conflict against India and nuclear weapons proliferation to ‘rogue nations’.
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal safety acquired menacing contours more significantly ever since 9/11when Pakistan emerged as the repository of nuclear weapon’s proliferation and also the repository and citadel of Islamic Jihadi terrorism.
Osama Bin Laden’s 9/11 was hatched, planned, and launched from the soil of Pakistan-Occupied Afghanistan and Pakistani soil itself and facilitated in a major way by Pakistan Army’s notorious intelligence agency, the ISI.
The United States major unstated military concern ever since has been focused on the eventuality of Pakistani nuclear weapons or nuclear materiel’s for making a ‘dirty bomb’ falling into the hands of the various terrorist organizations affiliated to Pakistan Army’s ISI..
From 2006 onwards, Pakistani terrorist organizations at repeated intervals have endangered Pakistan’s nuclear weapons storage sites and production complexes by launching attacks or moving into threatening proximity to locations like the Sargodha Air Base and the Wah military complex. In 2010 they had swooped from Swat to close to another Pakistan Air Force Base housing nuclear strike aircraft and the Pakistan Army was forced to move on threats of direct US military intervention.
Overtly, the United States pretends to agree with Pakistan Army’s assertions that its nuclear weapons arsenal is safe and secure in the hands of Pakistan Army’s special security organizations created for this purpose.
However, the United States misplaced trust on Pakistan Army’s iron-clad guarantees on the safety of its nuclear weapons arsenal is taking a beating and wearing thin with repetitive incidents of Pakistani terrorist attacks on vital Pakistan Army installations and the General Headquarters itself.
In all such terrorists attacks on “High Security& Heavily Fortified Complexes” the common assessment of respected analysts has been that these would not have been possible without ‘insider complicity’ from within Pakistan Army’s security organizations.
This weeks audacious attacks on the Pakistan Navy Aviation Base at Mehran in close proximity of the Karachi International Airport and alongside the Pakistan Air Force Base, once again brings renewed focus on the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal.
It would therefore be in order to renew ones focus on the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal once again when contextually Pakistan-United States strategic partnership itself stands endangered and dangers of Pakistan’s implosion from within exist. The main theme of this Paper is examined under the following heads:
Pakistan Army’s Nuclear Weapons Arsenal: Vulnerabilities of Storage Sites and Location of Production Complexes
Imperatives of Constant Shifting & Its Vulnerabilities
Islamist Sympathizers Within Pakistan Army Officers and Soldiery
The China Factor in Pakistan Army’s Nuclear Weapons Arsenal Safety
Pakistan’s Fail-Safe Measures Not Credible
Pakistan Army’s Nuclear Weapons Arsenal: Vulnerabilities of Storage Sites and Location of Production Complexes
Pakistan in the initial stages had selected its nuclear weapons production complexes and storage sites related to its perceived military threat from India. To keep them out of reach from Indian air strikes it sited all its nuclear weapons sites on its Western peripheries or very nearly so.
Ironically, Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons storage sites and production complexes now fall into the very areas of Pakistani terrorist organizations sway or in close proximity to such areas.
With Pakistan Army having a tenuous hold on its Western frontier explosive regions, its nuclear weapons storage sites and production complexes perforce cannot be shifted. Currently they stand at increased risk of attacks and penetration by terrorist organizations which perceive that the Pakistan Army has sold its soul to the Americans and fighting America’s war against them.
With the Pakistan Army itself as the main target of the Pakistani Taliban and it being besieged on other fronts, one wonders what military effectiveness the Pakistan Army can employ to combat its many threats not the least being the safety of its nuclear weapons arsenal.
Imperatives of Constant Shifting and Its Vulnerabilities
Pakistan Army is faced with a piquant situation where military imperatives exist for it to constantly shuttle its nuclear weapons storage sites even when they are stored in de-mated mode.
More than the Indian strikes threat, the Pakistan Army and its military hierarchy have become paranoid about the likelihood of a United States surgical strike to take out its nuclear weapons arsenal. This is found in the utterances of Pakistani Generals and analysts.
The shuttling around of Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons offers increased exposure to Pakistani terrorist organizations when such strategic assets are on the move irrespective of the most intense security cover provided.
Another aspect that finds mention in Pakistani discourse on the subject is that the Pakistan Army has the propensity to move its tactical nuclear weapons every time Pakistani terrorist attacks take place against India and the dangers of an Indian riposte. Under such situations Pakistani nuclear weapons assets are once again exposed to increased risk of falling in terrorists hands.
Some even go to the extent of suggesting that Pakistani terrorist organizations may deliberately engineer a Mumbai 26/11 type attack so that in the ensuing scenario they can lay their hands on a Pakistan Army nuclear asset.
The reverse should also be accepted as a possibility in that the ISI engineers such an incident in which a plausible deniability exit would exist if it perceives that Pakistan strategic ends are being served.
Islamist Sympathizers Within Pakistan Army Officers and Soldiery
The real threat to Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons arsenal is not from the terrorists organizations per se. For such organizations to breach the multi-layered security that is claimed to be in place by the Pakistan Army would be a daunting task as breaching each ring would start alarm bells ringing and invite preemptive actions before the inner ring is breached.
The real threat to the safety and security to Pakistan Army’s nuclear arsenal is posed from within by Islamist fundamentalist sympathizers amongst the Pakistan Army officers and soldiery. It is these elements who would act as the Trojan Horse for facilitating an inside access to Pakistani nuclear weapons arsenal.
It is these elements who can be instrumental in passing-on nuclear radioactive materials for a ‘dirty bomb’ to terrorists’ organization. In this connection the reliability of Pakistani nuclear scientists is also worrisome as the past record shows.
The Pakistan Army would like the United States to believe that the selection and screening process for personnel of the security set-up for their nuclear weapons arsenal is stringent and credible. However that argument does not carry weight when a whole string of inside jobs in terrorists attacks against Pakistan military targets are taken into account.
The China Factor in Pakistan Army’s Nuclear Weapons Arsenal Safety
The Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons arsenal owes its existence, follow-up production of increased number of nuclear weapons and technology updates to China. China therefore has a vested interest in the safety and security of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. This vested interest arises not from any urges of being a responsible stakeholder in regional nuclear stability and security.
China’s vested interest in the security of the Pakistan nuclear weapons arsenal stems from its strategic imperatives in the continued existence of a credible nuclear weapons arsenal of Pakistan to serve the ends of China’s Grand Strategy focused on India and the United States.
If Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal is breached then surely it would invite United States military intervention and taking out of the Pakistan nuclear weapons capabilities. That would be a strategic catastrophe for China.
Would China be involved or is already involved in the security set-up of Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons arsenal is something only the United States, Pakistan and China would know?
Relatedly, it was strange that at the PNS MEHRAN attack by the Pakistani Taliban there were both Chinese and US military personnel at the same base. What were the Chinese doing there when the Pakistani Naval Aviation Base had only US origin aircraft stationed there?
Pakistan’s Fail-Safe Measures Not Credible
Much has been written about the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons security and fail-safe measures put into existence with millions of US dollars spent for this purpose. Much is also talked about the Permissive Action Links (PAL) mechanisms in place.
Experts point out that PAL comes into play only when the nuclear warhead is mated with the delivery system and not before. Therefore even if the United States is in a position to electronically jam Pakistani PAL systems to prevent launch of nuclear strikes, the United States with the information available in the public domain is not in a position to ensure that nuclear warheads or related nuclear materiel enroute for mating do not fall into the hands of terrorists organizations targeting the United States and India.
That can only be ensured by the Pakistan Army and by all current patterns the Pakistan Army either by incompetence or due to complicity with terrorists’ organizations by Islamist fundamentalists within its officers and soldiery, has been unable to ensure.
The credibility of the fail-safe systems of Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons arsenal is therefore questionable?
Concluding Observations
Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons arsenal safety stands seriously endangered from the twin dangers of a deliberate operation by Pakistan Army’s former terrorists organizations affiliates and the bigger danger of an ‘insider job’ facilitating the former by Islamist fundamentalists sympathizers within Pakistan Army officers and soldiery. It also adds to the trust-deficit in this critical field.
The Pakistan Army hierarchy has become paranoid about the likelihood of the United States military intervention to take out its nuclear weapons arsenal. This complicates the safety of Pakistani nuclear arsenal in multiple ways. The reliability of the Pakistan Army in such a scenario becomes doubly doubtful.
With dangers of Pakistan’s internal implosion and strategic denouement in US-Pakistan strategic relationship and the ensuing trust-deficit, the credibility and the trust in the Pakistan Army to safeguard its nuclear weapons becomes that much eroded.
The United States alone has to ensure the neutralization of the Pakistan Army nuclear weapons arsenal.
PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARSENAL SAFETY ENDANGERED
Introductory Observations
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal safety has been a source of serious concern for the international community ever since Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal came into existence. Initially, international concerns focused on the unreliability of Pakistan as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in nuclear stability, Pakistan’s propensity for conflict including nuclear conflict against India and nuclear weapons proliferation to ‘rogue nations’.
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal safety acquired menacing contours more significantly ever since 9/11when Pakistan emerged as the repository of nuclear weapon’s proliferation and also the repository and citadel of Islamic Jihadi terrorism.
Osama Bin Laden’s 9/11 was hatched, planned, and launched from the soil of Pakistan-Occupied Afghanistan and Pakistani soil itself and facilitated in a major way by Pakistan Army’s notorious intelligence agency, the ISI.
The United States major unstated military concern ever since has been focused on the eventuality of Pakistani nuclear weapons or nuclear materiel’s for making a ‘dirty bomb’ falling into the hands of the various terrorist organizations affiliated to Pakistan Army’s ISI..
From 2006 onwards, Pakistani terrorist organizations at repeated intervals have endangered Pakistan’s nuclear weapons storage sites and production complexes by launching attacks or moving into threatening proximity to locations like the Sargodha Air Base and the Wah military complex. In 2010 they had swooped from Swat to close to another Pakistan Air Force Base housing nuclear strike aircraft and the Pakistan Army was forced to move on threats of direct US military intervention.
Overtly, the United States pretends to agree with Pakistan Army’s assertions that its nuclear weapons arsenal is safe and secure in the hands of Pakistan Army’s special security organizations created for this purpose.
However, the United States misplaced trust on Pakistan Army’s iron-clad guarantees on the safety of its nuclear weapons arsenal is taking a beating and wearing thin with repetitive incidents of Pakistani terrorist attacks on vital Pakistan Army installations and the General Headquarters itself.
In all such terrorists attacks on “High Security& Heavily Fortified Complexes” the common assessment of respected analysts has been that these would not have been possible without ‘insider complicity’ from within Pakistan Army’s security organizations.
This weeks audacious attacks on the Pakistan Navy Aviation Base at Mehran in close proximity of the Karachi International Airport and alongside the Pakistan Air Force Base, once again brings renewed focus on the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal.
It would therefore be in order to renew ones focus on the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal once again when contextually Pakistan-United States strategic partnership itself stands endangered and dangers of Pakistan’s implosion from within exist. The main theme of this Paper is examined under the following heads:
Pakistan Army’s Nuclear Weapons Arsenal: Vulnerabilities of Storage Sites and Location of Production Complexes
Pakistan in the initial stages had selected its nuclear weapons production complexes and storage sites related to its perceived military threat from India. To keep them out of reach from Indian air strikes it sited all its nuclear weapons sites on its Western peripheries or very nearly so.
Ironically, Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons storage sites and production complexes now fall into the very areas of Pakistani terrorist organizations sway or in close proximity to such areas.
With Pakistan Army having a tenuous hold on its Western frontier explosive regions, its nuclear weapons storage sites and production complexes perforce cannot be shifted. Currently they stand at increased risk of attacks and penetration by terrorist organizations which perceive that the Pakistan Army has sold its soul to the Americans and fighting America’s war against them.
With the Pakistan Army itself as the main target of the Pakistani Taliban and it being besieged on other fronts, one wonders what military effectiveness the Pakistan Army can employ to combat its many threats not the least being the safety of its nuclear weapons arsenal.
Imperatives of Constant Shifting and Its Vulnerabilities
Pakistan Army is faced with a piquant situation where military imperatives exist for it to constantly shuttle its nuclear weapons storage sites even when they are stored in de-mated mode.
More than the Indian strikes threat, the Pakistan Army and its military hierarchy have become paranoid about the likelihood of a United States surgical strike to take out its nuclear weapons arsenal. This is found in the utterances of Pakistani Generals and analysts.
The shuttling around of Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons offers increased exposure to Pakistani terrorist organizations when such strategic assets are on the move irrespective of the most intense security cover provided.
Another aspect that finds mention in Pakistani discourse on the subject is that the Pakistan Army has the propensity to move its tactical nuclear weapons every time Pakistani terrorist attacks take place against India and the dangers of an Indian riposte. Under such situations Pakistani nuclear weapons assets are once again exposed to increased risk of falling in terrorists hands.
Some even go to the extent of suggesting that Pakistani terrorist organizations may deliberately engineer a Mumbai 26/11 type attack so that in the ensuing scenario they can lay their hands on a Pakistan Army nuclear asset.
The reverse should also be accepted as a possibility in that the ISI engineers such an incident in which a plausible deniability exit would exist if it perceives that Pakistan strategic ends are being served.
Islamist Sympathizers Within Pakistan Army Officers and Soldiery
The real threat to Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons arsenal is not from the terrorists organizations per se. For such organizations to breach the multi-layered security that is claimed to be in place by the Pakistan Army would be a daunting task as breaching each ring would start alarm bells ringing and invite preemptive actions before the inner ring is breached.
The real threat to the safety and security to Pakistan Army’s nuclear arsenal is posed from within by Islamist fundamentalist sympathizers amongst the Pakistan Army officers and soldiery. It is these elements who would act as the Trojan Horse for facilitating an inside access to Pakistani nuclear weapons arsenal.
It is these elements who can be instrumental in passing-on nuclear radioactive materials for a ‘dirty bomb’ to terrorists’ organization. In this connection the reliability of Pakistani nuclear scientists is also worrisome as the past record shows.
The Pakistan Army would like the United States to believe that the selection and screening process for personnel of the security set-up for their nuclear weapons arsenal is stringent and credible. However that argument does not carry weight when a whole string of inside jobs in terrorists attacks against Pakistan military targets are taken into account.
The China Factor in Pakistan Army’s Nuclear Weapons Arsenal Safety
The Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons arsenal owes its existence, follow-up production of increased number of nuclear weapons and technology updates to China. China therefore has a vested interest in the safety and security of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. This vested interest arises not from any urges of being a responsible stakeholder in regional nuclear stability and security.
China’s vested interest in the security of the Pakistan nuclear weapons arsenal stems from its strategic imperatives in the continued existence of a credible nuclear weapons arsenal of Pakistan to serve the ends of China’s Grand Strategy focused on India and the United States.
If Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal is breached then surely it would invite United States military intervention and taking out of the Pakistan nuclear weapons capabilities. That would be a strategic catastrophe for China.
Would China be involved or is already involved in the security set-up of Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons arsenal is something only the United States, Pakistan and China would know?
Relatedly, it was strange that at the PNS MEHRAN attack by the Pakistani Taliban there were both Chinese and US military personnel at the same base. What were the Chinese doing there when the Pakistani Naval Aviation Base had only US origin aircraft stationed there?
Pakistan’s Fail-Safe Measures Not Credible
Much has been written about the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons security and fail-safe measures put into existence with millions of US dollars spent for this purpose. Much is also talked about the Permissive Action Links (PAL) mechanisms in place.
Experts point out that PAL comes into play only when the nuclear warhead is mated with the delivery system and not before. Therefore even if the United States is in a position to electronically jam Pakistani PAL systems to prevent launch of nuclear strikes, the United States with the information available in the public domain is not in a position to ensure that nuclear warheads or related nuclear materiel enroute for mating do not fall into the hands of terrorists organizations targeting the United States and India.
That can only be ensured by the Pakistan Army and by all current patterns the Pakistan Army either by incompetence or due to complicity with terrorists’ organizations by Islamist fundamentalists within its officers and soldiery, has been unable to ensure.
The credibility of the fail-safe systems of Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons arsenal is therefore questionable?
Concluding Observations
Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons arsenal safety stands seriously endangered from the twin dangers of a deliberate operation by Pakistan Army’s former terrorists organizations affiliates and the bigger danger of an ‘insider job’ facilitating the former by Islamist fundamentalists sympathizers within Pakistan Army officers and soldiery. It also adds to the trust-deficit in this critical field.
The Pakistan Army hierarchy has become paranoid about the likelihood of the United States military intervention to take out its nuclear weapons arsenal. This complicates the safety of Pakistani nuclear arsenal in multiple ways. The reliability of the Pakistan Army in such a scenario becomes doubly doubtful.
With dangers of Pakistan’s internal implosion and strategic denouement in US-Pakistan strategic relationship and the ensuing trust-deficit, the credibility and the trust in the Pakistan Army to safeguard its nuclear weapons becomes that much eroded.
The United States alone has to ensure the neutralization of the Pakistan Army nuclear weapons arsenal.
PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARSENAL SAFETY ENDANGERED
Terrorists manipulating investments and projects in India?
25/05/2011
Headley says Major Iqbal is 'Chaudhery Khan', 26/11 mastermind
Chicago: The mysterious Major Iqbal, who India suspects is a Pakistani army officer in ISI, has now been identified as 'Chaudhery Khan' by Mumbai terror accused David Headley who said he is the mastermind of the 26/11 attacks plot.
50-year-old Headley also told a Chicago court during the trial of 26/11 co-accused Tahawwur Rana that an attempt to take the attackers to Mumbai in September 2008 failed as a boat in which they were to sail was lost.
He said before the jury that according to Major Iqbal, in September they lost the Pakistani boat which was supposed to take the attackers to sea for some distance after which they were to be shifted to an Indian fishing boat.
Iqbal also told Headley that they had lost 12 life jackets meant for the attackers.
Headley, a Pakistan-American, said that Major Iqbal, whose name keeps cropping up in the testimony, used the ID of 'Chaudhery Khan', made key decisions and was indeed the mastermind of the 26/11 plot.
The federal prosecutors presented to the court additional evidences linking strong connection between Headley and the ISI officials. Through records of several emails exhibited in the court federal prosecutors established beyond doubt that Headley was in constant contact with ISI officials, in particular Major Iqbal, and his handlers in Pakistan.
In an email dated April 23, 2008, Headley sends Chaudhery Khan information on commercially available spy cameras and pen spy cameras.
Headley also conceded that he met Major Iqbal several time before the Mumbai attacks during which he issued specific instructions on every step right from establishing an office in Mumbai, to recruiting retired military personnel, making surveillance, giving list of targets and closing the Mumbai office.
"Major Iqbal told me the Chabad House would be added on whatever list (of targets) there was because it was a front office for the Mossad" - Israel's intelligence agency, Headley said, adding that Major Iqbal "seemed upset the (Mumbai) airport was not included" as a target.
Headley also testified that New Delhi-based National Defence College is on the hit-list of terrorists as another 26/11 plotter Illiyas Kashmiri believes in this way he can kill more Indian brigadiers than what the Pakistan Army could not do in four wars with India.
Within a few months of the Mumbai strikes, Kashmiri, who also has emerged as a mastermind of 26/11, met Headley and asked him to go to India again to do surveillance of the National Defence College in New Delhi and a number of Chhabad Houses in various cities of India.
When Headley, accompanied by Major Abdur Rehman Pasha - one of his handlers, went to see Kashmiri in Waziristan in February 2009, he among the Lashkar-e-Taiba circles had emerged as a "surveillance expert" thus a key element of the planning of the terrorist attack.
Pasha told him that if "we were able to conduct" attack on NDC then "we will be able to kill more Brigadiers than Pakistan has done in the four wars" with India.
Apprehending his arrest after the Mumbai attacks during his India visit, Headley wrote a will and emailed it to Rana, as to what should be done to his wives and children in the event of his death or arrest.
During his stay in Mumbai, Headley wanted to make friendship with Rajaram Rege, whom he described as Shiv Sena PRO, so as to gain access to the party.
Rege was apparently also looking to gain intimacy with the Mumbai terror accused to bag some multi-billion Indian contracts for US companies.
"If anybody from USA or any country wants a venture or invest in India I am the ideal person for them. Projects worth Rs 10,000 crores sanctioned by government are with me. Are you getting my point????" Rege wrote in an email to Headley on May 19, 2008, according to a copy of the email produced in the court by federal prosecutors.
Rege went ahead to lure Headley to get him big contacts in India because of his strong political connections.
"As you know that I am politically and socially very well connected here in Bombay (Mumbai), Gujarat and Delhi.
Delhi is the place here central govt of India (Prime Minister India) rules. I have very strong personal relations with people ruling Mumbai (Maharashtra), Gujarat and Delhi," he wrote.
Headley told federal prosecutors that he sought guidance from his handlers in Pakistan as to how to respond to Rege's email.
Rege, he noted, was considered by them an entry point into Shiv Sena, whom they considered as a terrorist outfit and had hatched plans to assassinate its leaders.
On May 23, 2008, Headley responded to Rege's email asking the latter how projects would be financially beneficial to him. Source: PTI
Headley says Major Iqbal is 'Chaudhery Khan', 26/11 mastermind
Related reading
NDTV tracks Headley's contacts in Pakistan
Comment: Could the 2G scam and CWG scam be the handiwork of terrorists?
Headley says Major Iqbal is 'Chaudhery Khan', 26/11 mastermind
Chicago: The mysterious Major Iqbal, who India suspects is a Pakistani army officer in ISI, has now been identified as 'Chaudhery Khan' by Mumbai terror accused David Headley who said he is the mastermind of the 26/11 attacks plot.
50-year-old Headley also told a Chicago court during the trial of 26/11 co-accused Tahawwur Rana that an attempt to take the attackers to Mumbai in September 2008 failed as a boat in which they were to sail was lost.
He said before the jury that according to Major Iqbal, in September they lost the Pakistani boat which was supposed to take the attackers to sea for some distance after which they were to be shifted to an Indian fishing boat.
Iqbal also told Headley that they had lost 12 life jackets meant for the attackers.
Headley, a Pakistan-American, said that Major Iqbal, whose name keeps cropping up in the testimony, used the ID of 'Chaudhery Khan', made key decisions and was indeed the mastermind of the 26/11 plot.
The federal prosecutors presented to the court additional evidences linking strong connection between Headley and the ISI officials. Through records of several emails exhibited in the court federal prosecutors established beyond doubt that Headley was in constant contact with ISI officials, in particular Major Iqbal, and his handlers in Pakistan.
In an email dated April 23, 2008, Headley sends Chaudhery Khan information on commercially available spy cameras and pen spy cameras.
Headley also conceded that he met Major Iqbal several time before the Mumbai attacks during which he issued specific instructions on every step right from establishing an office in Mumbai, to recruiting retired military personnel, making surveillance, giving list of targets and closing the Mumbai office.
"Major Iqbal told me the Chabad House would be added on whatever list (of targets) there was because it was a front office for the Mossad" - Israel's intelligence agency, Headley said, adding that Major Iqbal "seemed upset the (Mumbai) airport was not included" as a target.
Headley also testified that New Delhi-based National Defence College is on the hit-list of terrorists as another 26/11 plotter Illiyas Kashmiri believes in this way he can kill more Indian brigadiers than what the Pakistan Army could not do in four wars with India.
Within a few months of the Mumbai strikes, Kashmiri, who also has emerged as a mastermind of 26/11, met Headley and asked him to go to India again to do surveillance of the National Defence College in New Delhi and a number of Chhabad Houses in various cities of India.
When Headley, accompanied by Major Abdur Rehman Pasha - one of his handlers, went to see Kashmiri in Waziristan in February 2009, he among the Lashkar-e-Taiba circles had emerged as a "surveillance expert" thus a key element of the planning of the terrorist attack.
Pasha told him that if "we were able to conduct" attack on NDC then "we will be able to kill more Brigadiers than Pakistan has done in the four wars" with India.
Apprehending his arrest after the Mumbai attacks during his India visit, Headley wrote a will and emailed it to Rana, as to what should be done to his wives and children in the event of his death or arrest.
During his stay in Mumbai, Headley wanted to make friendship with Rajaram Rege, whom he described as Shiv Sena PRO, so as to gain access to the party.
Rege was apparently also looking to gain intimacy with the Mumbai terror accused to bag some multi-billion Indian contracts for US companies.
"If anybody from USA or any country wants a venture or invest in India I am the ideal person for them. Projects worth Rs 10,000 crores sanctioned by government are with me. Are you getting my point????" Rege wrote in an email to Headley on May 19, 2008, according to a copy of the email produced in the court by federal prosecutors.
Rege went ahead to lure Headley to get him big contacts in India because of his strong political connections.
"As you know that I am politically and socially very well connected here in Bombay (Mumbai), Gujarat and Delhi.
Delhi is the place here central govt of India (Prime Minister India) rules. I have very strong personal relations with people ruling Mumbai (Maharashtra), Gujarat and Delhi," he wrote.
Headley told federal prosecutors that he sought guidance from his handlers in Pakistan as to how to respond to Rege's email.
Rege, he noted, was considered by them an entry point into Shiv Sena, whom they considered as a terrorist outfit and had hatched plans to assassinate its leaders.
On May 23, 2008, Headley responded to Rege's email asking the latter how projects would be financially beneficial to him. Source: PTI
Headley says Major Iqbal is 'Chaudhery Khan', 26/11 mastermind
Related reading
NDTV tracks Headley's contacts in Pakistan
Comment: Could the 2G scam and CWG scam be the handiwork of terrorists?
Tuesday, May 24, 2011
Related reading
Pakistan Vox Populi
We Pakistanis can't even take care of what we currently have. There is no Gas, electricity or water for our nation, what are we going to give the Kashmiri's, our misery!. They are better off with India, that is the true reality. We Pakistanis kill one another more frequently and in greater numbers than the Indians do to the Kashmiri's. Pakistani politicians to this day continue to use the Kashmir issue to divert the uneducated populations attention away from their corrupt ways. Time to let everyone to live in peace.
from: Ikram
Posted on: May 24, 2011
Pakistan Spy Agency Tied to Militant Groups and Mumbai Mayhem
By Sebastian Rotella, Published: May 23 Washington Post
CHICAGO — A confessed Pakistani American terrorist took the stand in a Chicago courtroom Monday and described a close alliance between Pakistan’s intelligence service and the Lashkar-i-Taiba terrorist group, alleging that Pakistani officers recruited him and played a central role in planning the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
David Coleman Headley’s long-awaited testimony at the start of a trial with international repercussions resolved one question at the outset: Federal prosecutors did not hesitate to connect Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) to the attacks that killed 166 people, including six Americans.
Headley has pleaded guilty to doing reconnaissance in Mumbai and is the star government witness against his alleged accomplice, Tahawwur Rana. Headley testified that Lashkar “operated under the umbrella of the ISI” even after the group was banned in Pakistan in 2001.
The ISI and Lashkar “coordinated with each other,” Headley testified. “And ISI provided assistance to Lashkar: financial, military and moral support.”
After he trained three years with Lashkar, Headley said, a “Major Ali” of the ISI recruited him when he was briefly detained near the Afghanistan border in 2006. Ali referred him to an officer known as Major Iqbal, who became Headley’s handler and worked separately but in coordination with Lashkar chiefs, directing Headley’s reconnaissance in India and providing $25,000 to fund his mission.
Before reporting to Lashkar, Headley testified, he always reported first to Iqbal. Iqbal participated in key aspects of the Mumbai plot, such as target selection, the route for an amphibious attack and a proposed safe house for Lashkar gunmen, Headley said.
“This was being coordinated,” he said. “But the instructions emanated from Major Iqbal.”
Pakistani officials have repeatedly denied any ISI role in the Mumbai attacks. But Monday’s testimony is likely to intensify allegations that Pakistan plays a double game in the fight against terrorism, especially after Osama bin Laden was found hiding in a military town deep inside Pakistan.
After more than a year of official silence about the sensitive case, the prosecution’s examination of Headley quickly laid out evidence implicating the ISI in a sophisticated commando-style attack that was designed to kill Americans, Jews and other Westerners.
To corroborate Headley’s allegations, Justice Department prosecutors displayed evidence of his e-mail exchanges and phone calls with Iqbal. Headley testified that Iqbal had acquired a phone number with a New York area code and told him to call it while in Mumbai to avoid detection “because all calls, almost, from India to Pakistan are monitored.”
The case rests largely on the credibility of Headley, a former drug dealer and DEA informant. Headley has spent months helping the prosecution prepare and has cooperated enthusiastically in drug cases in the past.
But he seemed remarkably subdued Monday. The tall, broad-shouldered and balding 50-year-old took the stand wearing a blue track suit and a solemn expression. Assistant U.S. Attorney Daniel Collins asked him repeatedly to speak more loudly. The multilingual, well-traveled Headley, who speaks with a trace of a Pakistani accent, often sighed or sounded exasperated as he responded.
David Headley, witness in terror trial, ties Pakistani spy agency to militant group
Related Reading
Headley's diary provides telephone numbers of Pak handlers
CHICAGO — A confessed Pakistani American terrorist took the stand in a Chicago courtroom Monday and described a close alliance between Pakistan’s intelligence service and the Lashkar-i-Taiba terrorist group, alleging that Pakistani officers recruited him and played a central role in planning the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
David Coleman Headley’s long-awaited testimony at the start of a trial with international repercussions resolved one question at the outset: Federal prosecutors did not hesitate to connect Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) to the attacks that killed 166 people, including six Americans.
Headley has pleaded guilty to doing reconnaissance in Mumbai and is the star government witness against his alleged accomplice, Tahawwur Rana. Headley testified that Lashkar “operated under the umbrella of the ISI” even after the group was banned in Pakistan in 2001.
The ISI and Lashkar “coordinated with each other,” Headley testified. “And ISI provided assistance to Lashkar: financial, military and moral support.”
After he trained three years with Lashkar, Headley said, a “Major Ali” of the ISI recruited him when he was briefly detained near the Afghanistan border in 2006. Ali referred him to an officer known as Major Iqbal, who became Headley’s handler and worked separately but in coordination with Lashkar chiefs, directing Headley’s reconnaissance in India and providing $25,000 to fund his mission.
Before reporting to Lashkar, Headley testified, he always reported first to Iqbal. Iqbal participated in key aspects of the Mumbai plot, such as target selection, the route for an amphibious attack and a proposed safe house for Lashkar gunmen, Headley said.
“This was being coordinated,” he said. “But the instructions emanated from Major Iqbal.”
Pakistani officials have repeatedly denied any ISI role in the Mumbai attacks. But Monday’s testimony is likely to intensify allegations that Pakistan plays a double game in the fight against terrorism, especially after Osama bin Laden was found hiding in a military town deep inside Pakistan.
After more than a year of official silence about the sensitive case, the prosecution’s examination of Headley quickly laid out evidence implicating the ISI in a sophisticated commando-style attack that was designed to kill Americans, Jews and other Westerners.
To corroborate Headley’s allegations, Justice Department prosecutors displayed evidence of his e-mail exchanges and phone calls with Iqbal. Headley testified that Iqbal had acquired a phone number with a New York area code and told him to call it while in Mumbai to avoid detection “because all calls, almost, from India to Pakistan are monitored.”
The case rests largely on the credibility of Headley, a former drug dealer and DEA informant. Headley has spent months helping the prosecution prepare and has cooperated enthusiastically in drug cases in the past.
But he seemed remarkably subdued Monday. The tall, broad-shouldered and balding 50-year-old took the stand wearing a blue track suit and a solemn expression. Assistant U.S. Attorney Daniel Collins asked him repeatedly to speak more loudly. The multilingual, well-traveled Headley, who speaks with a trace of a Pakistani accent, often sighed or sounded exasperated as he responded.
David Headley, witness in terror trial, ties Pakistani spy agency to militant group
Related Reading
Headley's diary provides telephone numbers of Pak handlers
Whose side is Pakistan's ISI really on?
It has been accused of supporting al-Qaida and double-dealing with the CIA. At the same time the ISI, Pakistan's powerful intelligence service, is being targeted by Islamist extremists. In the wake of Osama bin Laden's death, what role will it play? by Declan Walsh The Guardian, Thursday 12 May 2011
If there was one telling moment in Pakistan in the 10 days since Osama bin Laden's death, when a Hollywood-style American assault on a suburban house left the country reeling, torn between anger, shame and denial, it occurred late one evening on a prime-time television show hosted by Kamran Khan.
Chatshow hosts are the secular mullahs of modern Pakistan: fist-banging populists who preach to the nation over supper, often through a rightwing lens. Khan, a tubby 50-year-old journalist with neat glasses and a small chin, is the biggest of them. Every night on Geo, the largest channel, he rails against "corrupt" civilian politicians and America, and lionises the armed forces; some colleagues nickname him "the brigadier". But as the country seethed over Bin Laden last week, Khan tore off his metaphorical stripes and stamped them into the ground.
The army had failed its people, he railed. To Pakistan's shame US soldiers had invaded the country; their finding Bin Laden in Abbottabad, two hours north of Islamabad, was a disgrace. The country's "two-faced" approach to extremism had disastrously backfired, he said, reeling off a list of atrocities – New York, Bali, London, Madrid – linked to Pakistan. "We have become the world's biggest haven of terrorism," he declared. "We need to change." Viewers watched in astonishment. The unprecedented attack targeted not only the army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, but also the most sensitive policies of the military's premier spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). Feared, reviled and admired in equal measure, the ISI is considered the embodiment of army power in Pakistan, the object of hushed deference. But now, as one US official told me, "the world has changed". And the ISI finds itself in the line of fire.
The Bin Laden debacle has triggered a blizzard of uncomfortable questions, the sharpest come from Washington. How, President Barack Obama wondered aloud last Sunday, could Bin Laden shelter for years in a garrison town that is home to three regimental headquarters, the local version of Sandhurst, and thousands of soldiers? One retired US officer who has served in the region told me he had been mulling the same question. "All those times we drove up to Abbottabad, and we could have taken out our pistols and done the job ourselves," he said. The CIA chief Leon Panetta, meanwhile, says he didn't warn the ISI about the special forces raid because he feared word might leak to the al-Qaida leader. Behind the pointed statements lies an urgent question: was the ISI hiding Bin Laden?
The answer may lie inside the ISI's headquarters in Abpara, on the edge of Islamabad. The entrance, beside a private hospital, is suitably discreet: no sign, just a plainclothes officer packing a pistol who direct visitors through a chicane of barriers, soldiers and sniffer dogs. But inside, past the smooth electric gates, lies a neatly tended cluster of adobe buildings separated by smooth lawns and tinkling fountains that resembles a well-funded private university. Cars purr up to the entrance of the central building, a modern structure with a round, echoing lobby. On the top floor sits the chief spy: the director general Ahmed Shuja Pasha, a grey-haired 59-year-old three-star general. One American counterpart describes him as "brilliant and extremely intelligent . . . Thoughtful, pensive and extremely well read; if he was in the US military he would be a very successful officer."
Pasha and the ISI are the heart of Pakistan's "establishment" – a nebulous web of generals, bureaucrats and hand-picked politicians (not always elected ones) who form the DNA of Pakistan's defence and security policies. It has at least 10,000 employees (some say twice as many), mixing serving army officers, many on three-year rotations from other services, with thousands of civilian employees, from suited analysts to beefy street spies. In theory they answer to the prime minister; in reality they are a tool of the army chief, Kayani. To supporters, the ISI safeguards national security – monitoring phones, guarding the country's nuclear weapons. But to its many critics, the ISI is the army's dirty tricks department, accused of abduction and assassination, vote-rigging and torture, and running Islamist terrorist outfits. "The ISI," said Minoo Bhandara, an outspoken Parsi businessman who ran a brewery across the road from army headquarters before he died in 2008, "is an institution full of intelligence but devoid of wisdom."
Oddly, it was founded by an Australian. As Pakistan recovered from its disastrous first war with India in 1948, Major General R Cawthorne, on secondment from the British army, decided the fledgling military needed a proper intelligence outfit. The first decades were inauspicious. The ISI mishandled the 1965 war with India and failed to predict the East Pakistan conflict in 1971, which sundered Pakistan in two and created Bangladesh. All changed, however, eight years later when Soviet tanks rolled into Afghanistan on Christmas Day 1979. The decade-long war of resistance – bankrolled by the United States, fought by Afghans and Arabs, but largely run by the ISI from Pakistan's tribal areas – revolutionised the agency's fortunes. It ran a network of secret training camps along the Afghan border that trained more than 80,000 fighters. It controlled a weapons pipeline, funded by the CIA and Saudi intelligence, that smuggled Kalashnikovs and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles from Karachi to the Khyber Pass. And it grew powerful and rich.
A legendary figure from that period was a man named Colonel Imam, whom I first met five years ago. He was tall and burly, with a thick beard and a crooked smile that suggested several missing teeth. He wore a white turban and an olive-green, British issue second world war-issue paratroop jacket, which he told me he had been wearing since he joined the army in 1971. During the 80s, Imam ran many of the ISI training camps, becoming popular among ethnic Pashtun fighters for his love of Islam and his fondness for killing Soviets. "Those were wonderful times," he told me. Although his real name was Sultan Amir, to the Afghans he became "Colonel Imam". "I loved the fight. And the mujahideen were very fond of me," he said with a smile.
The US liked him too. On the wall of his Rawalpindi home hung war trophies from the 80s – daggers, faded photos, a Russian general's gun – but on the table sat a chunk of the Berlin wall, cased in glass. "To one who helped deliver the first blow," it read. "The Americans gave me that," he said.
With the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the CIA largely abandoned Pakistan. But the spirit of "jihad" – fighters imbued with Islamist vim – lived on in the ISI. Pakistani officers, having imbibed too much of their own ideology, transformed the spy agency. It started to support Islamist groups across Asia – Bangladesh, Uzbekistan, Burma, India – and the US placed Pakistan on a terrorist watchlist. In 1993, Javed Ashraf Qazi, a secular-minded general officer, was sent in to clean up the mess. "I was shocked at what I found," he tells me. Senior ISI officers had jettisoned their uniforms for shalwar kameez; their subordinates would disappear off to the mosque for hours on end. The ISI had bought a hotel in Bangkok, probably to facilitate gun-running. The outgoing spy chief, Javed Nasir, was a playboy turned zealot who had grown a scraggly beard and refused to shake women's hands. On his first day in the office Qazi found him running out of the door to a Muslim missionary conference. "When people say the ISI is a rogue agency, it was true in those days," he says.
Qazi fired the ideologues, sold the hotel and ordered his subordinates to wear their uniforms (some struggled to fit in them). "We cleaned it up," says Qazi, who later became a minister under Pervez Musharraf.
But the ISI was not done with jihad; it had merely narrowed its focus. The proof is on the wall of Qazi's home. I notice an unusual rifle hanging on the wall. It is an Indian service rifle, Qazi admits half bashfully – a present from one of the "mujahideen" fighters the ISI started to send into Indian-occupied Kashmir from the mid 90s, when he was in charge. "We turned a blind eye to some groups," he says. They included Lashkar-e-Toiba, he admits – the terrorist outfit that in 2008 would attack hotels and train stations in the Indian city of Mumbai, killing 170 people.
In the early 90s, the ISI also started to support an obscure Islamist movement in Afghanistan called the Taliban. Colonel Imam was sent back into Afghanistan to advise the one-eyed Taliban leader Mullah Omar. They had history: Imam, it turned out, had trained Omar back in the mujahideen camps in the 80s. With ISI backing, the Taliban swept to power in Kabul; at the UN in New York, a beleaguered Afghan official complained that Imam was the "de facto governor" of the newly conquered territories. "Ah, they are naughty people," Imam told me of the Taliban with his shy smile. "Rough people, good fighters, but respected. And they were all my friends."
Over the past decade, however, the ISI has professed to have abandoned jihad. As American troops swarmed across Afghanistan, in search of Bin Laden in late 2001, President General Pervez Musharraf disavowed the Taliban, sacked his most Islamist generals (including the then ISI director, Mahmud Ahmed) and brought Colonel Imam home. The following January he made a signature speech banning a slew of jihadi groups. "We need to rid society of extremism," he declared.
On the ground, though, things have looked different. US diplomatic cables released through WikiLeaks last year claimed the ISI was still covertly supporting the Afghan Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Haqqani network, as part of its decades-old grudge match with India. And despite billions of dollars in American assistance, wrote ambassador Anne Patterson, "no amount of money" was likely to make the army – or the ISI – change direction.
Simultaneously, though, the ISI has become a victim of jihadi violence. The Pakistani Taliban – related to the Afghan movement, but separate, and heavily influenced by al-Qaida – is seeking to oust the Pakistani state. The ISI, deemed to have betrayed them, has become the enemy. Hundreds of ISI officials have died in recent years, killed in bombings of buses and offices, and ISI spies have been beheaded in the tribal belt. In the latest atrocity on 8 March a massive car bomb outside an ISI office in Faisalabad destroyed an airline office and killed 32 people.
I last saw Colonel Imam in January 2010 at his home in Rawalpindi. He joked about media articles describing him as the "father of the Taliban". Weeks later he set off for Waziristan with another former ISI man, Khawaja, and a British journalist, Asad Qureshi, who had been commissioned by Channel 4, to interview the Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud. But the Taliban took them hostage. After a few weeks Khawaja was executed, after confessing on video to being a "CIA spy". Qureshi was released in September after his family paid a hefty ransom. Then last January, a video of Imam surfaced showing him kneeling before a group of masked, armed men. Mehsud appeared, and said a few words. Then a Talib opened fire, pumped Imam with bullets.
"When you're Frankenstein, and you create a lot of baby monsters who are running round your ankles looking sort of cute, they eventually grow up to be recalcitrant adults," a US official tells me in Islamabad. "And you hope you can get them back into the fold so they become useful. But the Pakistanis can't control everything they create."
Could the ISI's complex policy towards jihadi militants have caused it to harbour Bin Laden? Its many critics have little doubt, particularly in Afghanistan; last week the former Kabul spy chief Amrullah Saleh said he warned Musharraf about Bin Laden four years ago, only to be rowdily shouted down. Now Musharraf himself admits it's a possibility, albeit one limited to "rogue" officers. Yesterday he told ABC News there was a "possibility" of a "lower-level operative . . . following a policy of his own and violating the policy from above". But could it be done with the knowledge of the top generals? Opinion is split between agnostics and sceptics. "Did Pasha know? It's entirely implausible that he didn't," says a former western military official who has worked in Pakistan. A senior diplomat sees it differently. Perhaps the ISI is neither complicit or incompetent, he says. Maybe they just didn't look. "Looking for Osama may not have been a big priority when not finding him earns you billions of dollars a year, and if you did the Americans would leave the region," he says.
The ISI itself points to its consistent record in fighting al-Qaida. Over the past decade it has rounded up hundreds of Islamist suspects, many dispatched to Guantánamo Bay. They include the most notorious al-Qaida henchmen: Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, architect of the 9/11 attacks, snatched from a Rawalpindi safehouse in 2003; Ramzi bin al-Shibh, captured after a gun battle a year earlier; Abu Faraj al-Libi, then the al-Qaida number three, arrested in Mardan in 2005 by ISI commandos wearing burka disguises. Not finding Bin Laden was "a failure on our side," admits an ISI official. "Unfortunate, but a fact. We are good but we are not God."
Yet the questions remain. How did Bin Laden avoid ISI surveillance in a military area, just a few hundred metres from a major military base, in a zone where military intelligence traditionally keeps a close eye? And what about the army major who recently built his house just behind Osama's? Did he not wonder about his neighbour with the barbed-wire fence and the security cameras perched on the wall? "I find it entirely implausible that the military and intelligence agencies knew nothing," says Dr Farzana Sheikh, author of Making Sense of Pakistan. "There must have been knowledge at the highest levels." But, along with so many other critics, she concedes "there is no proof". In a country where so many pressing mysteries remain unresolved – from the plane crash that killed General Zia ul-Haq in 1988, to the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in 2007 – few are holding their breath.
There could, at least, be accountability, although hopes are fading fast. As television anchors raged and criticism of the army swelled last week, some hoped Pakistan's civilian leadership would seize the moment to claw back part of the power it has ceded over the past 30 years. Yet those hopes were dashed on Monday when prime minister Gilani stood up in parliament for a stout defence of the generals. "The ISI is a national asset," he said. The battle, if it had ever been contemplated, was lost.
In America the scrutiny will not vanish so easily. Angry congressional leaders have called for Pakistan's $3bn annual aid package to be slashed; hostile media coverage portraying the ISI as an enemy unit is growing. Government officials, however, are more circumspect. With Nato's main military supply line running through Pakistan, other al-Qaida figures still at large including Bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and a peace settlement to be negotiated in Afghanistan, many quietly speak of the need to eventually patch up the Pakistan relationship – although few doubt that it has been utterly changed over the past 10 days. "We can't break it, it's too important," says one US official. "We're going to have to sit down across the table and try and tell some truths to each other."
Still, he adds: "There are degrees in truth. We would like to have a degree of the truth."
American popular opinion may be less nuanced. The forthcoming trial of David Headley, an American jihadi accused of helping Lashkar-e-Taiba carry out the Mumbai attacks, is likely to bring fresh accusations of ISI "double-game". And movie culture is likely to have a strong influence. Even before Bin Laden died an action thriller called tentatively "Kill Bin Laden", by Oscar-winning director Kathryn Bigelow, was in the works. Now many more will surely follow. In the coming months, casting directors will start seeking actors to play macho navy Seals, a tense American president and an elusive Saudi fugitive. And, almost certainly, they will be looking for a clutch of double-dealing Pakistani spies. In the ISI, Hollywood may have found a new bad guy
Whose side is Pakistan's ISI really on?
If there was one telling moment in Pakistan in the 10 days since Osama bin Laden's death, when a Hollywood-style American assault on a suburban house left the country reeling, torn between anger, shame and denial, it occurred late one evening on a prime-time television show hosted by Kamran Khan.
Chatshow hosts are the secular mullahs of modern Pakistan: fist-banging populists who preach to the nation over supper, often through a rightwing lens. Khan, a tubby 50-year-old journalist with neat glasses and a small chin, is the biggest of them. Every night on Geo, the largest channel, he rails against "corrupt" civilian politicians and America, and lionises the armed forces; some colleagues nickname him "the brigadier". But as the country seethed over Bin Laden last week, Khan tore off his metaphorical stripes and stamped them into the ground.
The army had failed its people, he railed. To Pakistan's shame US soldiers had invaded the country; their finding Bin Laden in Abbottabad, two hours north of Islamabad, was a disgrace. The country's "two-faced" approach to extremism had disastrously backfired, he said, reeling off a list of atrocities – New York, Bali, London, Madrid – linked to Pakistan. "We have become the world's biggest haven of terrorism," he declared. "We need to change." Viewers watched in astonishment. The unprecedented attack targeted not only the army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, but also the most sensitive policies of the military's premier spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). Feared, reviled and admired in equal measure, the ISI is considered the embodiment of army power in Pakistan, the object of hushed deference. But now, as one US official told me, "the world has changed". And the ISI finds itself in the line of fire.
The Bin Laden debacle has triggered a blizzard of uncomfortable questions, the sharpest come from Washington. How, President Barack Obama wondered aloud last Sunday, could Bin Laden shelter for years in a garrison town that is home to three regimental headquarters, the local version of Sandhurst, and thousands of soldiers? One retired US officer who has served in the region told me he had been mulling the same question. "All those times we drove up to Abbottabad, and we could have taken out our pistols and done the job ourselves," he said. The CIA chief Leon Panetta, meanwhile, says he didn't warn the ISI about the special forces raid because he feared word might leak to the al-Qaida leader. Behind the pointed statements lies an urgent question: was the ISI hiding Bin Laden?
The answer may lie inside the ISI's headquarters in Abpara, on the edge of Islamabad. The entrance, beside a private hospital, is suitably discreet: no sign, just a plainclothes officer packing a pistol who direct visitors through a chicane of barriers, soldiers and sniffer dogs. But inside, past the smooth electric gates, lies a neatly tended cluster of adobe buildings separated by smooth lawns and tinkling fountains that resembles a well-funded private university. Cars purr up to the entrance of the central building, a modern structure with a round, echoing lobby. On the top floor sits the chief spy: the director general Ahmed Shuja Pasha, a grey-haired 59-year-old three-star general. One American counterpart describes him as "brilliant and extremely intelligent . . . Thoughtful, pensive and extremely well read; if he was in the US military he would be a very successful officer."
Pasha and the ISI are the heart of Pakistan's "establishment" – a nebulous web of generals, bureaucrats and hand-picked politicians (not always elected ones) who form the DNA of Pakistan's defence and security policies. It has at least 10,000 employees (some say twice as many), mixing serving army officers, many on three-year rotations from other services, with thousands of civilian employees, from suited analysts to beefy street spies. In theory they answer to the prime minister; in reality they are a tool of the army chief, Kayani. To supporters, the ISI safeguards national security – monitoring phones, guarding the country's nuclear weapons. But to its many critics, the ISI is the army's dirty tricks department, accused of abduction and assassination, vote-rigging and torture, and running Islamist terrorist outfits. "The ISI," said Minoo Bhandara, an outspoken Parsi businessman who ran a brewery across the road from army headquarters before he died in 2008, "is an institution full of intelligence but devoid of wisdom."
Oddly, it was founded by an Australian. As Pakistan recovered from its disastrous first war with India in 1948, Major General R Cawthorne, on secondment from the British army, decided the fledgling military needed a proper intelligence outfit. The first decades were inauspicious. The ISI mishandled the 1965 war with India and failed to predict the East Pakistan conflict in 1971, which sundered Pakistan in two and created Bangladesh. All changed, however, eight years later when Soviet tanks rolled into Afghanistan on Christmas Day 1979. The decade-long war of resistance – bankrolled by the United States, fought by Afghans and Arabs, but largely run by the ISI from Pakistan's tribal areas – revolutionised the agency's fortunes. It ran a network of secret training camps along the Afghan border that trained more than 80,000 fighters. It controlled a weapons pipeline, funded by the CIA and Saudi intelligence, that smuggled Kalashnikovs and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles from Karachi to the Khyber Pass. And it grew powerful and rich.
A legendary figure from that period was a man named Colonel Imam, whom I first met five years ago. He was tall and burly, with a thick beard and a crooked smile that suggested several missing teeth. He wore a white turban and an olive-green, British issue second world war-issue paratroop jacket, which he told me he had been wearing since he joined the army in 1971. During the 80s, Imam ran many of the ISI training camps, becoming popular among ethnic Pashtun fighters for his love of Islam and his fondness for killing Soviets. "Those were wonderful times," he told me. Although his real name was Sultan Amir, to the Afghans he became "Colonel Imam". "I loved the fight. And the mujahideen were very fond of me," he said with a smile.
The US liked him too. On the wall of his Rawalpindi home hung war trophies from the 80s – daggers, faded photos, a Russian general's gun – but on the table sat a chunk of the Berlin wall, cased in glass. "To one who helped deliver the first blow," it read. "The Americans gave me that," he said.
With the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the CIA largely abandoned Pakistan. But the spirit of "jihad" – fighters imbued with Islamist vim – lived on in the ISI. Pakistani officers, having imbibed too much of their own ideology, transformed the spy agency. It started to support Islamist groups across Asia – Bangladesh, Uzbekistan, Burma, India – and the US placed Pakistan on a terrorist watchlist. In 1993, Javed Ashraf Qazi, a secular-minded general officer, was sent in to clean up the mess. "I was shocked at what I found," he tells me. Senior ISI officers had jettisoned their uniforms for shalwar kameez; their subordinates would disappear off to the mosque for hours on end. The ISI had bought a hotel in Bangkok, probably to facilitate gun-running. The outgoing spy chief, Javed Nasir, was a playboy turned zealot who had grown a scraggly beard and refused to shake women's hands. On his first day in the office Qazi found him running out of the door to a Muslim missionary conference. "When people say the ISI is a rogue agency, it was true in those days," he says.
Qazi fired the ideologues, sold the hotel and ordered his subordinates to wear their uniforms (some struggled to fit in them). "We cleaned it up," says Qazi, who later became a minister under Pervez Musharraf.
But the ISI was not done with jihad; it had merely narrowed its focus. The proof is on the wall of Qazi's home. I notice an unusual rifle hanging on the wall. It is an Indian service rifle, Qazi admits half bashfully – a present from one of the "mujahideen" fighters the ISI started to send into Indian-occupied Kashmir from the mid 90s, when he was in charge. "We turned a blind eye to some groups," he says. They included Lashkar-e-Toiba, he admits – the terrorist outfit that in 2008 would attack hotels and train stations in the Indian city of Mumbai, killing 170 people.
In the early 90s, the ISI also started to support an obscure Islamist movement in Afghanistan called the Taliban. Colonel Imam was sent back into Afghanistan to advise the one-eyed Taliban leader Mullah Omar. They had history: Imam, it turned out, had trained Omar back in the mujahideen camps in the 80s. With ISI backing, the Taliban swept to power in Kabul; at the UN in New York, a beleaguered Afghan official complained that Imam was the "de facto governor" of the newly conquered territories. "Ah, they are naughty people," Imam told me of the Taliban with his shy smile. "Rough people, good fighters, but respected. And they were all my friends."
Over the past decade, however, the ISI has professed to have abandoned jihad. As American troops swarmed across Afghanistan, in search of Bin Laden in late 2001, President General Pervez Musharraf disavowed the Taliban, sacked his most Islamist generals (including the then ISI director, Mahmud Ahmed) and brought Colonel Imam home. The following January he made a signature speech banning a slew of jihadi groups. "We need to rid society of extremism," he declared.
On the ground, though, things have looked different. US diplomatic cables released through WikiLeaks last year claimed the ISI was still covertly supporting the Afghan Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Haqqani network, as part of its decades-old grudge match with India. And despite billions of dollars in American assistance, wrote ambassador Anne Patterson, "no amount of money" was likely to make the army – or the ISI – change direction.
Simultaneously, though, the ISI has become a victim of jihadi violence. The Pakistani Taliban – related to the Afghan movement, but separate, and heavily influenced by al-Qaida – is seeking to oust the Pakistani state. The ISI, deemed to have betrayed them, has become the enemy. Hundreds of ISI officials have died in recent years, killed in bombings of buses and offices, and ISI spies have been beheaded in the tribal belt. In the latest atrocity on 8 March a massive car bomb outside an ISI office in Faisalabad destroyed an airline office and killed 32 people.
I last saw Colonel Imam in January 2010 at his home in Rawalpindi. He joked about media articles describing him as the "father of the Taliban". Weeks later he set off for Waziristan with another former ISI man, Khawaja, and a British journalist, Asad Qureshi, who had been commissioned by Channel 4, to interview the Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud. But the Taliban took them hostage. After a few weeks Khawaja was executed, after confessing on video to being a "CIA spy". Qureshi was released in September after his family paid a hefty ransom. Then last January, a video of Imam surfaced showing him kneeling before a group of masked, armed men. Mehsud appeared, and said a few words. Then a Talib opened fire, pumped Imam with bullets.
"When you're Frankenstein, and you create a lot of baby monsters who are running round your ankles looking sort of cute, they eventually grow up to be recalcitrant adults," a US official tells me in Islamabad. "And you hope you can get them back into the fold so they become useful. But the Pakistanis can't control everything they create."
Could the ISI's complex policy towards jihadi militants have caused it to harbour Bin Laden? Its many critics have little doubt, particularly in Afghanistan; last week the former Kabul spy chief Amrullah Saleh said he warned Musharraf about Bin Laden four years ago, only to be rowdily shouted down. Now Musharraf himself admits it's a possibility, albeit one limited to "rogue" officers. Yesterday he told ABC News there was a "possibility" of a "lower-level operative . . . following a policy of his own and violating the policy from above". But could it be done with the knowledge of the top generals? Opinion is split between agnostics and sceptics. "Did Pasha know? It's entirely implausible that he didn't," says a former western military official who has worked in Pakistan. A senior diplomat sees it differently. Perhaps the ISI is neither complicit or incompetent, he says. Maybe they just didn't look. "Looking for Osama may not have been a big priority when not finding him earns you billions of dollars a year, and if you did the Americans would leave the region," he says.
The ISI itself points to its consistent record in fighting al-Qaida. Over the past decade it has rounded up hundreds of Islamist suspects, many dispatched to Guantánamo Bay. They include the most notorious al-Qaida henchmen: Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, architect of the 9/11 attacks, snatched from a Rawalpindi safehouse in 2003; Ramzi bin al-Shibh, captured after a gun battle a year earlier; Abu Faraj al-Libi, then the al-Qaida number three, arrested in Mardan in 2005 by ISI commandos wearing burka disguises. Not finding Bin Laden was "a failure on our side," admits an ISI official. "Unfortunate, but a fact. We are good but we are not God."
Yet the questions remain. How did Bin Laden avoid ISI surveillance in a military area, just a few hundred metres from a major military base, in a zone where military intelligence traditionally keeps a close eye? And what about the army major who recently built his house just behind Osama's? Did he not wonder about his neighbour with the barbed-wire fence and the security cameras perched on the wall? "I find it entirely implausible that the military and intelligence agencies knew nothing," says Dr Farzana Sheikh, author of Making Sense of Pakistan. "There must have been knowledge at the highest levels." But, along with so many other critics, she concedes "there is no proof". In a country where so many pressing mysteries remain unresolved – from the plane crash that killed General Zia ul-Haq in 1988, to the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in 2007 – few are holding their breath.
There could, at least, be accountability, although hopes are fading fast. As television anchors raged and criticism of the army swelled last week, some hoped Pakistan's civilian leadership would seize the moment to claw back part of the power it has ceded over the past 30 years. Yet those hopes were dashed on Monday when prime minister Gilani stood up in parliament for a stout defence of the generals. "The ISI is a national asset," he said. The battle, if it had ever been contemplated, was lost.
In America the scrutiny will not vanish so easily. Angry congressional leaders have called for Pakistan's $3bn annual aid package to be slashed; hostile media coverage portraying the ISI as an enemy unit is growing. Government officials, however, are more circumspect. With Nato's main military supply line running through Pakistan, other al-Qaida figures still at large including Bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and a peace settlement to be negotiated in Afghanistan, many quietly speak of the need to eventually patch up the Pakistan relationship – although few doubt that it has been utterly changed over the past 10 days. "We can't break it, it's too important," says one US official. "We're going to have to sit down across the table and try and tell some truths to each other."
Still, he adds: "There are degrees in truth. We would like to have a degree of the truth."
American popular opinion may be less nuanced. The forthcoming trial of David Headley, an American jihadi accused of helping Lashkar-e-Taiba carry out the Mumbai attacks, is likely to bring fresh accusations of ISI "double-game". And movie culture is likely to have a strong influence. Even before Bin Laden died an action thriller called tentatively "Kill Bin Laden", by Oscar-winning director Kathryn Bigelow, was in the works. Now many more will surely follow. In the coming months, casting directors will start seeking actors to play macho navy Seals, a tense American president and an elusive Saudi fugitive. And, almost certainly, they will be looking for a clutch of double-dealing Pakistani spies. In the ISI, Hollywood may have found a new bad guy
Whose side is Pakistan's ISI really on?
Saturday, May 21, 2011
Not a Chinese Century, An Indo-American One
Not a Chinese Century, An Indo-American One By Daniel Twining
China's three decades of explosive growth and increasing influence on the global stage have often led to talk of the country dominating the 21st century. But Daniel Twining, an Asia specialist at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, argues that democratic values and strategic interests shared by India and the US could upend this expectation as the two countries pull closer together.
The strategic alienation of India from the United States was one of the great anomalies of the Cold War. The rapprochement of the world¡¯s biggest democracies from 2000 to the present is one of the key dividends of the new world order that emerged after the end of US-Soviet rivalry and the dawning of the modern era of globalization. India, which will soon have the world¡¯s third-largest economy and its largest population, is increasingly central to the future of the global order; the US National Intelligence Council has called it the decisive; swing state; in the international system. India's posture is thus central to the long-term position of the US and other democracies.
Yet India was once marginalized from the world order. From independence in 1947 through the end of the Cold War, structural constraints imposed by the US-Soviet global rivalry, India's pursuit of non-alignment and internal development and security challenges made it difficult for a desperately poor country with an economy growing at only 1-2 percent annually to play a wider international role. India is only now making an impact on world politics after effectively sitting on (or being relegated to) the sidelines. India's awakening could change the world as profoundly as has the rise of China, and for the better.
From Low Profile to Player
India's low international profile during the second half of the 20th century was in fact an historical anomaly: during the British colonial period, the Raj was the strategic keystone of a global empire. Under the British Empire, Indian armies served in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and China. Indian wealth — India's economy was the world's second largest, after only China's, until the early 19th century — underwrote Britain's imperial ambitions and catalyzed British industry in ways that ultimately made it possible for a small island nation to stand down a more powerful Germany in two world wars. Indeed, in the early 1940s, Prime Minister Winston Churchill was convinced that Britain could keep up the fight against the Axis powers even if German forces occupied England — thanks to the manpower, materiel and geopolitical reach of its Indian empire.
India helped the Allies win the Second World War, although the ideals of freedom for which they fought energized the Indian independence struggle. From 1947, independent India pursued its own course of Soviet-style economic centralization at home and non-alignment abroad, which later morphed into a tacit alliance with the Soviet Union as Washington tied up with Indian adversaries Pakistan (from 1954) and China (from 1971). As a result of this, New Delhi pursued foreign policies that isolated it from the world's developed democracies.
India was further alienated by Western support for a global order that appeared to discriminate against it. Unlike China, India was excluded from membership in the United Nations Security Council. Because China tested nuclear weapons before the international non-proliferation regime took effect while India did not, China's nuclear arsenal was legitimized, and its right to nuclear weapons and trade affirmed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). By contrast, India's later nuclear tests rendered it a rogue state under international law, subjecting it to sanctions on technology trade that undercut its security and limited its economic prospects.
China's supply of advanced nuclear and missile components to Pakistan beginning in the 1980s contravened Beijing's NPT obligations but the West looked the other way, thus reinforcing Indian perceptions of the great powers hypocrisy and hostility to India's legitimate security requirements. This sentiment was crystallized when US President Bill Clinton and Chinese President Jiang Zemin, meeting in Beijing, jointly condemned India's 1998 nuclear weapons tests and called for tough international sanctions. That India¡¯s leaders justified the tests with reference to the growing threat they perceived from China, which Clinton's 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review had identified as a potential peer competitor to the US, only intensified the irony of the American position.
Redrawing American Policy
Conflicts deriving from Washington's status as the ringleader of what Indians called an international "technology apartheid" designed to keep India down formed the legacy that both countries began working together to overturn a decade ago. 6 New hopes for the relationship were symbolized by former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's declaration that India and America were natural allies, a formulation embraced by Clinton in 2000 when he became the first American head of state to visit India since Jimmy Carter.
In fact, India's 1998 nuclear tests awakened Washington to the potential of Indian power, a converging threat assessment of China's growing strength, and the possibilities for Indo-American cooperation to shape a balance of power that might restrain it.
President George W. Bush assumed office with a view of India as a future world power, a frontline Asian balancer and a pluralistic democracy with which America should naturally cooperate in world affairs. But New Delhi's exclusion from an international nuclear order that had been constructed by Washington and its allies to contain India stood in the way of normal relations. Hence the Bush administration¡¯s revolutionary campaign from
2005 to 2008 to upend four decades of Western policy and integrate India into the international nuclear club, with its ensuing rights and responsibilities. India's normalization as a nuclear power gave it access to the international trade in civilian nuclear components. It promised to substantially boost India's energy production in ways that would fuel long-term economic development. It also made possible dramatically expanded high-tech trade and cooperation with the US.
Although often difficult to work with, India proved itself worthy of this sea change in its relations with America and the world. To overcome parliamentary opposition to the nuclear deal, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh submitted his government to a high-stakes confidence vote — the first time an Indian government had put its survival on the line over a question of foreign policy, no less one involving a strategic partnership with India's old nemesis, the US. Singh and his allies argued that India¡¯s future prosperity, security and prestige hinged on this strategic opening to the West. By enacting the nuclear deal, they argued, India would finally assume its seat at the top table of world politics — and with American sponsorship. They prevailed, and in doing so sharpened India¡¯s trajectory into the first tier of great powers.
Although often difficult to work with, India proved itself worthy of this sea change in its relations with America and the world. To overcome parliamentary opposition to the nuclear deal, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh submitted his government to a high-stakes confidence vote — the first time an Indian government had put its survival on the line over a question of foreign policy, no less one involving a strategic partnership with India¡¯s old nemesis, the US. Singh and his allies argued that India's future prosperity, security and prestige hinged on this strategic opening to the West. By enacting the nuclear deal, they argued, India would finally assume its seat at the top table of world politics — and with American sponsorship. They prevailed, and in doing so sharpened India's trajectory into the first tier of great powers.
After a difficult first year and a half in office, President Barack Obama ultimately followed in the footsteps of Presidents Clinton and Bush in embracing India as an indispensable American partner in an emerging multipolar world. During his November 2010 trip to New Delhi, Obama put to bed a notion that had held sway earlier in his administration that a US-China could jointly manage Asia and the world; he rejected a re-hyphenation of Indo-Pakistani relations that many misguidedly had urged on him; and he took ownership of a relationship with New Delhi that had been on the rocks since he took office.
Obama's vision of a transformative partnership with India — to manage global diplomatic and security challenges, enhance prosperity in both countries and promote good governance in Asia and beyond — was bracing. It helped mitigate concerns in Washington that Obama does not care about the balance of power in Asia. His administration clearly does — thanks largely to China's new assertiveness in relation to the US and its friends in Asia. Obama's passage to India also underlined a historic, bipartisan American belief that democracies make the best allies in world affairs.
In New Delhi, Obama made a strong case for the exceptionalism of Indo-US ties — and for a far-reaching partnership that would help chart the course of the 21st century:
Now, India is not the only emerging power in the world. But the relationship between our countries is unique ... We are two great republics dedicated to the liberty and justice and equality of all people. And we are two free-market economies where people have the freedom to pursue ideas and innovation that can change the world. And that's why I believe that India and America are indispensable partners in meeting the challenges of our time.
This statement made Obama the third successive US president to express America's core interest in India's rise and success as a future democratic superpower.
Read more: Not a Chinese Century, An Indo-American One By Daniel Twining
China's three decades of explosive growth and increasing influence on the global stage have often led to talk of the country dominating the 21st century. But Daniel Twining, an Asia specialist at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, argues that democratic values and strategic interests shared by India and the US could upend this expectation as the two countries pull closer together.
The strategic alienation of India from the United States was one of the great anomalies of the Cold War. The rapprochement of the world¡¯s biggest democracies from 2000 to the present is one of the key dividends of the new world order that emerged after the end of US-Soviet rivalry and the dawning of the modern era of globalization. India, which will soon have the world¡¯s third-largest economy and its largest population, is increasingly central to the future of the global order; the US National Intelligence Council has called it the decisive; swing state; in the international system. India's posture is thus central to the long-term position of the US and other democracies.
Yet India was once marginalized from the world order. From independence in 1947 through the end of the Cold War, structural constraints imposed by the US-Soviet global rivalry, India's pursuit of non-alignment and internal development and security challenges made it difficult for a desperately poor country with an economy growing at only 1-2 percent annually to play a wider international role. India is only now making an impact on world politics after effectively sitting on (or being relegated to) the sidelines. India's awakening could change the world as profoundly as has the rise of China, and for the better.
From Low Profile to Player
India's low international profile during the second half of the 20th century was in fact an historical anomaly: during the British colonial period, the Raj was the strategic keystone of a global empire. Under the British Empire, Indian armies served in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and China. Indian wealth — India's economy was the world's second largest, after only China's, until the early 19th century — underwrote Britain's imperial ambitions and catalyzed British industry in ways that ultimately made it possible for a small island nation to stand down a more powerful Germany in two world wars. Indeed, in the early 1940s, Prime Minister Winston Churchill was convinced that Britain could keep up the fight against the Axis powers even if German forces occupied England — thanks to the manpower, materiel and geopolitical reach of its Indian empire.
India helped the Allies win the Second World War, although the ideals of freedom for which they fought energized the Indian independence struggle. From 1947, independent India pursued its own course of Soviet-style economic centralization at home and non-alignment abroad, which later morphed into a tacit alliance with the Soviet Union as Washington tied up with Indian adversaries Pakistan (from 1954) and China (from 1971). As a result of this, New Delhi pursued foreign policies that isolated it from the world's developed democracies.
India was further alienated by Western support for a global order that appeared to discriminate against it. Unlike China, India was excluded from membership in the United Nations Security Council. Because China tested nuclear weapons before the international non-proliferation regime took effect while India did not, China's nuclear arsenal was legitimized, and its right to nuclear weapons and trade affirmed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). By contrast, India's later nuclear tests rendered it a rogue state under international law, subjecting it to sanctions on technology trade that undercut its security and limited its economic prospects.
China's supply of advanced nuclear and missile components to Pakistan beginning in the 1980s contravened Beijing's NPT obligations but the West looked the other way, thus reinforcing Indian perceptions of the great powers hypocrisy and hostility to India's legitimate security requirements. This sentiment was crystallized when US President Bill Clinton and Chinese President Jiang Zemin, meeting in Beijing, jointly condemned India's 1998 nuclear weapons tests and called for tough international sanctions. That India¡¯s leaders justified the tests with reference to the growing threat they perceived from China, which Clinton's 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review had identified as a potential peer competitor to the US, only intensified the irony of the American position.
Redrawing American Policy
Conflicts deriving from Washington's status as the ringleader of what Indians called an international "technology apartheid" designed to keep India down formed the legacy that both countries began working together to overturn a decade ago. 6 New hopes for the relationship were symbolized by former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's declaration that India and America were natural allies, a formulation embraced by Clinton in 2000 when he became the first American head of state to visit India since Jimmy Carter.
In fact, India's 1998 nuclear tests awakened Washington to the potential of Indian power, a converging threat assessment of China's growing strength, and the possibilities for Indo-American cooperation to shape a balance of power that might restrain it.
President George W. Bush assumed office with a view of India as a future world power, a frontline Asian balancer and a pluralistic democracy with which America should naturally cooperate in world affairs. But New Delhi's exclusion from an international nuclear order that had been constructed by Washington and its allies to contain India stood in the way of normal relations. Hence the Bush administration¡¯s revolutionary campaign from
2005 to 2008 to upend four decades of Western policy and integrate India into the international nuclear club, with its ensuing rights and responsibilities. India's normalization as a nuclear power gave it access to the international trade in civilian nuclear components. It promised to substantially boost India's energy production in ways that would fuel long-term economic development. It also made possible dramatically expanded high-tech trade and cooperation with the US.
Although often difficult to work with, India proved itself worthy of this sea change in its relations with America and the world. To overcome parliamentary opposition to the nuclear deal, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh submitted his government to a high-stakes confidence vote — the first time an Indian government had put its survival on the line over a question of foreign policy, no less one involving a strategic partnership with India's old nemesis, the US. Singh and his allies argued that India¡¯s future prosperity, security and prestige hinged on this strategic opening to the West. By enacting the nuclear deal, they argued, India would finally assume its seat at the top table of world politics — and with American sponsorship. They prevailed, and in doing so sharpened India¡¯s trajectory into the first tier of great powers.
Although often difficult to work with, India proved itself worthy of this sea change in its relations with America and the world. To overcome parliamentary opposition to the nuclear deal, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh submitted his government to a high-stakes confidence vote — the first time an Indian government had put its survival on the line over a question of foreign policy, no less one involving a strategic partnership with India¡¯s old nemesis, the US. Singh and his allies argued that India's future prosperity, security and prestige hinged on this strategic opening to the West. By enacting the nuclear deal, they argued, India would finally assume its seat at the top table of world politics — and with American sponsorship. They prevailed, and in doing so sharpened India's trajectory into the first tier of great powers.
After a difficult first year and a half in office, President Barack Obama ultimately followed in the footsteps of Presidents Clinton and Bush in embracing India as an indispensable American partner in an emerging multipolar world. During his November 2010 trip to New Delhi, Obama put to bed a notion that had held sway earlier in his administration that a US-China could jointly manage Asia and the world; he rejected a re-hyphenation of Indo-Pakistani relations that many misguidedly had urged on him; and he took ownership of a relationship with New Delhi that had been on the rocks since he took office.
Obama's vision of a transformative partnership with India — to manage global diplomatic and security challenges, enhance prosperity in both countries and promote good governance in Asia and beyond — was bracing. It helped mitigate concerns in Washington that Obama does not care about the balance of power in Asia. His administration clearly does — thanks largely to China's new assertiveness in relation to the US and its friends in Asia. Obama's passage to India also underlined a historic, bipartisan American belief that democracies make the best allies in world affairs.
In New Delhi, Obama made a strong case for the exceptionalism of Indo-US ties — and for a far-reaching partnership that would help chart the course of the 21st century:
Now, India is not the only emerging power in the world. But the relationship between our countries is unique ... We are two great republics dedicated to the liberty and justice and equality of all people. And we are two free-market economies where people have the freedom to pursue ideas and innovation that can change the world. And that's why I believe that India and America are indispensable partners in meeting the challenges of our time.
This statement made Obama the third successive US president to express America's core interest in India's rise and success as a future democratic superpower.
Read more: Not a Chinese Century, An Indo-American One By Daniel Twining
China to provide Pakistan 50 Thunder jets
Press Trust of India, Updated: May 19, 2011 16:36 IST
Beijing: China has agreed to immediately provide Pakistan 50 new JF-17 Thunder multi-role jets under a co-production agreement even as talks are on for more fighter aircraft including those with stealth technology.
China will immediately provide 50 JF-17 Thunder aircraft to Pakistan, an unnamed official was quoted as saying by the Dawn daily.
"We will get these planes in weeks," he said, adding that a formal agreement to that effect was likely to be signed today.
The official said Pakistan and China were already jointly producing the JF-17 aircraft, but these 50 planes would be equipped with more sophisticated avionics.
He said the war planes to be fully funded by China would help bolster Pakistan's defence and add to tactical capability of its air force.
The News daily reported that it is likely that these planes will be supplied by June next year.
It added that the two countries are also discussing the supply of Chinese J-20 stealth jets and Xiaolong/FC-1 multi-purpose light fighter aircraft to Pakistan.
They are discussing the mode of payment and the number of planes to be provided to Pakistan, the report said. With the supply of the new fighters, Pakistan Air Force will now have a total of 260 Chinese jets, making them the mainstay of the force.
Meanwhile, in a sign of greater cooperation between the two countries, China will also launch a satellite for Pakistan on August 14.
The satellite will supply "multifarious data" to Pakistan, the report said.
Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, who was on a visit to China, said both sides had agreed to increase defence cooperation and China had assured Pakistan of help in enhancing the capacity of its armed forces.
Read more at:
China to provide Pakistan 50 Thunder jets, talks for stealth on
Beijing: China has agreed to immediately provide Pakistan 50 new JF-17 Thunder multi-role jets under a co-production agreement even as talks are on for more fighter aircraft including those with stealth technology.
China will immediately provide 50 JF-17 Thunder aircraft to Pakistan, an unnamed official was quoted as saying by the Dawn daily.
"We will get these planes in weeks," he said, adding that a formal agreement to that effect was likely to be signed today.
The official said Pakistan and China were already jointly producing the JF-17 aircraft, but these 50 planes would be equipped with more sophisticated avionics.
He said the war planes to be fully funded by China would help bolster Pakistan's defence and add to tactical capability of its air force.
The News daily reported that it is likely that these planes will be supplied by June next year.
It added that the two countries are also discussing the supply of Chinese J-20 stealth jets and Xiaolong/FC-1 multi-purpose light fighter aircraft to Pakistan.
They are discussing the mode of payment and the number of planes to be provided to Pakistan, the report said. With the supply of the new fighters, Pakistan Air Force will now have a total of 260 Chinese jets, making them the mainstay of the force.
Meanwhile, in a sign of greater cooperation between the two countries, China will also launch a satellite for Pakistan on August 14.
The satellite will supply "multifarious data" to Pakistan, the report said.
Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, who was on a visit to China, said both sides had agreed to increase defence cooperation and China had assured Pakistan of help in enhancing the capacity of its armed forces.
Read more at:
China to provide Pakistan 50 Thunder jets, talks for stealth on
Friday, May 20, 2011
Post-Osama Events May Impact Security : Antony
Ministry of Defence 20-May, 2011 16:44 IST
The Defence Minister Shri AK Antony today asked the top brass of the Indian Armed Forces to continuously assess the security situation in our strategic neighbourhood in the aftermath of the elimination of Osama Bin Laden and remain prepared for any eventualities. Describing the US operations in Pakistan as ‘a watershed in the global war on terror’, Shri Antony said the event has ‘internationally stamped’ Pakistan’s position as the core of terrorist activities in the region. Addressing the Unified Commanders Conference here, he said the ripples of this event will have wide ranging impact on our strategic neighbourhood.
Shri Antony said the security situation in Pakistan continues to be a cause for concern. He said despite supporting the war on terror, China continues to remain its main strategic partner. The Defence Minister said if any real progress is to be made in improving bilateral relations, Pakistan must take concrete action to dismantle terrorist infrastructure on its soil.
The two day annual conference was attended among others by the Minister of State for Defence Dr MM Pallam Raju, the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal PV Naik, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Nirmal Verma, Chief of Army Staff Gen VK Singh and the Defence Secretary Shri Pradeep Kumar.
The Defence Minister said India has always desired friendly relation with all its neighbours. He said though we are not unduly concerned over China’s moves to modernize and upgrade its military capability, we must on our part, keep up the ongoing process of upgrading our military structure. He expressed the hope that progress will be made in discussion with China on border dispute.
Dwelling on the ground situation in Jammu & Kashmir shri Antony said it has shown improvement over the past few months. The violence level has declined and the political processes have come to the forefront, due in a large measure, to the sustained efforts of our security forces. He, however, said that the armed forces need to keep up the vigil to ensure that the levels of violence are kept to the minimum. ‘This calls for a lot of restraint and upholding the human rights of the local people, without compromising over all our preparedness to meet any evil designs’. Shri Antony said the summer months will be a crucial test of our response mechanism.
Referring to modernization in the armed forces shri Antony called upon the top brass to adopt a change in world view. “just as the old brick and morter economies have given way to the new economic architecture across the world, so too modernization of our armed forces must chart a new path. The thrust for modernization and change has to be necessarily top driven and that is where your role assumes a crucial significance”.
Turning to the welfare of the armed forces shri Antony said we have taken all possible steps to ensure that the soldiers and their families are cared for and looked after well. However, the onus of translating the government’s intentions into reality lies with the commanders as the best of schemes and mechanisms can fail due to lack of proper and effective implementation, he said.
The Defence Minister informed the gathering that to address the issue of existing shortage of officers in the armed forces, an additional squadron is being raised at National Defence Academy. This squadron will have a capacity of 120 cadets and the total authorized capacity of NDA would be enhanced from 1800 to 1920 cadets.
Shri Antony complimented the armed forces for the quick rescue and relief operations during floods and mud slides in Leh and the delivery of aid to the affected people. SK/NN (Release ID :72223)
Post-Osama Events May Impact Security : Antony
How Al Qaeda's terror franchises work
The Defence Minister Shri AK Antony today asked the top brass of the Indian Armed Forces to continuously assess the security situation in our strategic neighbourhood in the aftermath of the elimination of Osama Bin Laden and remain prepared for any eventualities. Describing the US operations in Pakistan as ‘a watershed in the global war on terror’, Shri Antony said the event has ‘internationally stamped’ Pakistan’s position as the core of terrorist activities in the region. Addressing the Unified Commanders Conference here, he said the ripples of this event will have wide ranging impact on our strategic neighbourhood.
Shri Antony said the security situation in Pakistan continues to be a cause for concern. He said despite supporting the war on terror, China continues to remain its main strategic partner. The Defence Minister said if any real progress is to be made in improving bilateral relations, Pakistan must take concrete action to dismantle terrorist infrastructure on its soil.
The two day annual conference was attended among others by the Minister of State for Defence Dr MM Pallam Raju, the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal PV Naik, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Nirmal Verma, Chief of Army Staff Gen VK Singh and the Defence Secretary Shri Pradeep Kumar.
The Defence Minister said India has always desired friendly relation with all its neighbours. He said though we are not unduly concerned over China’s moves to modernize and upgrade its military capability, we must on our part, keep up the ongoing process of upgrading our military structure. He expressed the hope that progress will be made in discussion with China on border dispute.
Dwelling on the ground situation in Jammu & Kashmir shri Antony said it has shown improvement over the past few months. The violence level has declined and the political processes have come to the forefront, due in a large measure, to the sustained efforts of our security forces. He, however, said that the armed forces need to keep up the vigil to ensure that the levels of violence are kept to the minimum. ‘This calls for a lot of restraint and upholding the human rights of the local people, without compromising over all our preparedness to meet any evil designs’. Shri Antony said the summer months will be a crucial test of our response mechanism.
Referring to modernization in the armed forces shri Antony called upon the top brass to adopt a change in world view. “just as the old brick and morter economies have given way to the new economic architecture across the world, so too modernization of our armed forces must chart a new path. The thrust for modernization and change has to be necessarily top driven and that is where your role assumes a crucial significance”.
Turning to the welfare of the armed forces shri Antony said we have taken all possible steps to ensure that the soldiers and their families are cared for and looked after well. However, the onus of translating the government’s intentions into reality lies with the commanders as the best of schemes and mechanisms can fail due to lack of proper and effective implementation, he said.
The Defence Minister informed the gathering that to address the issue of existing shortage of officers in the armed forces, an additional squadron is being raised at National Defence Academy. This squadron will have a capacity of 120 cadets and the total authorized capacity of NDA would be enhanced from 1800 to 1920 cadets.
Shri Antony complimented the armed forces for the quick rescue and relief operations during floods and mud slides in Leh and the delivery of aid to the affected people. SK/NN (Release ID :72223)
Post-Osama Events May Impact Security : Antony
How Al Qaeda's terror franchises work
Thursday, May 19, 2011
Matt Gurney: Pakistan can’t be trusted with nuclear weapons
Matt Gurney May 2, 2011 – 10:47 AM ET | Last Updated: May 2, 2011 2:45 PM ET
It will be a long time before every detail of the death of Osama bin Laden at the hands of U.S. special forces is known. Indeed, in the short term, much of the information that does come out must be taken with a grain of salt, as both the United States military, government and the Pakistani leadership have reasons to hide or misrepresent the facts of what was obviously a highly sensitive mission. But what we do know doesn’t look good on our so-called Pakistani allies: bin Laden wasn’t hiding in some dank cave, but was in fact living in a newly built mansion in an affluent Pakistani city, apparently within a 10 minute walk — a mere thousand yards — of a Pakistani military academy where the best of Pakistan’s officers are trained. And that’s not even to mention the three whole regiments of army troops that were also based in the city.
No one should doubt that there are honourable elements within the Pakistani government and security forces, who recognize the threat posed by Islamic radicalism and the benefits of aligning their country with the West. But there should be equally little doubt that however large those elements may be, they do not have full control of their country and its military forces. The government of Pakistan is divided up into competing factions, with their own agendas and plots against each other. This breeds instability and the risk of rapid shifts in the balance of power within Pakistan.
The military has typically been considered the most reliable, pro-Western element of the Pakistani power structure, in contrast with the thoroughly Islamist and pro-Taliban intelligence services and the weak civilian government trapped between them. But now we discover that the world’s most wanted man, the leading terrorist of our time, was living practically within shouting distance of a major Pakistani military facility in a heavily garrisoned city. That leaves us with two equally unpalatable possibilities: the military is either not as aligned with the West as we had assumed, or is simply incompetent.
Neither option is good. In recent years, major activity has been observed at many of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons facilities, as the country is believed to be both enlarging and modernizing its stockpile of nuclear warheads. Estimates as to the size of the Pakistani arsenal have now at least doubled to somewhere between one and two hundred bombs, and the bombs themselves are, thanks to modernization, becoming smaller and more powerful at the same time. It is likely that Pakistani nuclear weapons are now capable of achieving yields that would be measured in the hundreds of kilotons — many times more powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Japan in 1945, and certainly capable of hollowing out any major city.
Pakistan has repeatedly tried to reassure the world that its arsenal is safe and secure, and a 2008 U.S. Congressional report noted that the weapons are stored in secure underground facilities, unassembled, and separate from their launchers. But while that might sound comforting, the fact remains that the security of these weapons rests in the hands of those who somehow missed bin Laden’s mansion just down the street from their training facility, who receive their information from the same intelligence services that consider the Taliban a strategic asset, not an enemy.
It is obvious why Pakistan feels it needs nuclear weapons — only through their power can they hope to stave off an attack by the much more economically and military powerful Indians. They will never give them up. But the risk posed by leaving the ultimate weapon in such obviously unreliable hands cannot be overstated. For the sake of the world’s safety, we must hope that the United States keeps a close eye on where these weapons are stored, and is prepared to do what’s necessary to prevent them from ever falling into the wrong hands — even if that involves the rapid, surgical use of some of America’s own stockpile of nuclear warheads to destroy the bunkers where Pakistan keeps theirs.
National Post
mgurney@nationalpost.com
Follow Matt Gurney on Twitter: @mattgurney
Matt Gurney: Pakistan can’t be trusted with nuclear weapons
Related Reading
Pakistan’s Nuclear and Missile Weapons Programme
Pakistan Rushing Weapons Grade Nuclear Reactor
It will be a long time before every detail of the death of Osama bin Laden at the hands of U.S. special forces is known. Indeed, in the short term, much of the information that does come out must be taken with a grain of salt, as both the United States military, government and the Pakistani leadership have reasons to hide or misrepresent the facts of what was obviously a highly sensitive mission. But what we do know doesn’t look good on our so-called Pakistani allies: bin Laden wasn’t hiding in some dank cave, but was in fact living in a newly built mansion in an affluent Pakistani city, apparently within a 10 minute walk — a mere thousand yards — of a Pakistani military academy where the best of Pakistan’s officers are trained. And that’s not even to mention the three whole regiments of army troops that were also based in the city.
No one should doubt that there are honourable elements within the Pakistani government and security forces, who recognize the threat posed by Islamic radicalism and the benefits of aligning their country with the West. But there should be equally little doubt that however large those elements may be, they do not have full control of their country and its military forces. The government of Pakistan is divided up into competing factions, with their own agendas and plots against each other. This breeds instability and the risk of rapid shifts in the balance of power within Pakistan.
The military has typically been considered the most reliable, pro-Western element of the Pakistani power structure, in contrast with the thoroughly Islamist and pro-Taliban intelligence services and the weak civilian government trapped between them. But now we discover that the world’s most wanted man, the leading terrorist of our time, was living practically within shouting distance of a major Pakistani military facility in a heavily garrisoned city. That leaves us with two equally unpalatable possibilities: the military is either not as aligned with the West as we had assumed, or is simply incompetent.
Neither option is good. In recent years, major activity has been observed at many of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons facilities, as the country is believed to be both enlarging and modernizing its stockpile of nuclear warheads. Estimates as to the size of the Pakistani arsenal have now at least doubled to somewhere between one and two hundred bombs, and the bombs themselves are, thanks to modernization, becoming smaller and more powerful at the same time. It is likely that Pakistani nuclear weapons are now capable of achieving yields that would be measured in the hundreds of kilotons — many times more powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Japan in 1945, and certainly capable of hollowing out any major city.
Pakistan has repeatedly tried to reassure the world that its arsenal is safe and secure, and a 2008 U.S. Congressional report noted that the weapons are stored in secure underground facilities, unassembled, and separate from their launchers. But while that might sound comforting, the fact remains that the security of these weapons rests in the hands of those who somehow missed bin Laden’s mansion just down the street from their training facility, who receive their information from the same intelligence services that consider the Taliban a strategic asset, not an enemy.
It is obvious why Pakistan feels it needs nuclear weapons — only through their power can they hope to stave off an attack by the much more economically and military powerful Indians. They will never give them up. But the risk posed by leaving the ultimate weapon in such obviously unreliable hands cannot be overstated. For the sake of the world’s safety, we must hope that the United States keeps a close eye on where these weapons are stored, and is prepared to do what’s necessary to prevent them from ever falling into the wrong hands — even if that involves the rapid, surgical use of some of America’s own stockpile of nuclear warheads to destroy the bunkers where Pakistan keeps theirs.
National Post
mgurney@nationalpost.com
Follow Matt Gurney on Twitter: @mattgurney
Matt Gurney: Pakistan can’t be trusted with nuclear weapons
Related Reading
Pakistan’s Nuclear and Missile Weapons Programme
Pakistan Rushing Weapons Grade Nuclear Reactor
Solar plane makes maiden international flight
By Christopher Le Coq BRUSSELS | Sat May 14, 2011 3:16am IST
BRUSSELS (Reuters) - A solar energy plane made the world's first international flight powered by the sun on Friday to show the potential for pollution-free air travel.
The Solar Impulse took off from an airfield at Payerne in western Switzerland on Friday morning and landed at Brussels airport after a 13-hour flight.
"The objective is to demonstrate what we can do with existing technology in terms of renewable energy and energy savings," project co-founder and pilot Andre Borschberg told Reuters by telephone during the flight.
Borschberg believes such solar-harnessing technology can be used to power cars and homes. "It is symbolic to be able to go from one place to another using solar energy," he said.
The Solar Impulse project began in 2003 with a 10-year budget of 90 million euros ($128 million) and has involved engineers from Swiss lift maker Schindler and research aid from Belgian chemicals group Solvay.
The plane, which requires 12,000 solar cells, embarked on its first flight in April 2010 and completed a 26-hour flight, a record flying time for a solar powered aircraft, three months later.
With an average flying speed of 70 km/h (44 mph), Solar Impulse is not an immediate threat to commercial jets, which can easily cruise at more than 10 times the speed. A flight from Geneva from Brussels can take little more than an hour.
Project leaders acknowledged it had been a major challenge to fit a slow-flying plane into the commercial air traffic system.
Friday's flight was Solar Impulse's fifth. Previous flights did not leave Switzerland. A larger prototype is scheduled to fly around the world in 2013.
(Additional reporting by David Brunnstrom; editing by David Stamp)
Solar plane makes maiden international flight
The Solar Impulse took off from an airfield at Payerne in western Switzerland on Friday morning and landed at Brussels airport after a 13-hour flight.
"The objective is to demonstrate what we can do with existing technology in terms of renewable energy and energy savings," project co-founder and pilot Andre Borschberg told Reuters by telephone during the flight.
Borschberg believes such solar-harnessing technology can be used to power cars and homes. "It is symbolic to be able to go from one place to another using solar energy," he said.
The Solar Impulse project began in 2003 with a 10-year budget of 90 million euros ($128 million) and has involved engineers from Swiss lift maker Schindler and research aid from Belgian chemicals group Solvay.
The plane, which requires 12,000 solar cells, embarked on its first flight in April 2010 and completed a 26-hour flight, a record flying time for a solar powered aircraft, three months later.
With an average flying speed of 70 km/h (44 mph), Solar Impulse is not an immediate threat to commercial jets, which can easily cruise at more than 10 times the speed. A flight from Geneva from Brussels can take little more than an hour.
Project leaders acknowledged it had been a major challenge to fit a slow-flying plane into the commercial air traffic system.
Friday's flight was Solar Impulse's fifth. Previous flights did not leave Switzerland. A larger prototype is scheduled to fly around the world in 2013.
(Additional reporting by David Brunnstrom; editing by David Stamp)
Solar plane makes maiden international flight
Wednesday, May 18, 2011
Goof Up: Wanted in Pakistan terrorist found in India
Failure to Formally Communicate Arrest of Khan Wazhul Kamar to CBI Resulted in his Name Being Retained
Red Notices (RNs) are issued by the Interpol on the request of the CBI (designated nodal agency in the Government of India) for persons required/wanted/fugitives from justice by various Indian police and investigating agencies and who are believed to be absconding from India. Once the RN is issued by the Interpol, a copy of the same is circulated to the Immigration authorities within India in the form of additions to the ‘look out notice’ list.
2. At the request of the Mumbai Police dated 02.01.2004, the CBI proposed and got a RN [A-367/3-2004] published from the Interpol with regard to Khan Wazhul Kamar. The RN notice was published on 16.03.2004 and this was communicated by CBI to Mumbai Police on 18.03.2004.
3. When the Home Secretary level Talks took place on 28-29th March, 2011, as per the usual practice of providing a list of criminals and terrorists suspected to be in Pakistan, a list was handed over including the name of Khan Wazhul Kamar. The list given to Pakistan in the bilateral talks held on 6th March 2007 at Islamabad also included the name of Khan Wazhul Kamar.
4. It now transpires that the Mumbai Police arrested Khan Wazhul Kamar on 21.05.2010. However, this information of arrest and the request for consequent deletion of the RN was not sent by the Mumbai Police to the CBI. There were further enquiries by CBI with Mumbai Police on the subject-person on 27.01.2011. To this query, Mumbai Police vide letter dated 17.05.2011 has requested the cancelation of RN as “the subject is no more wanted by Mumbai Police on account of his arrest by Mumbai Police on 21.05.2010”.
5. However, it has been gathered that the Mumbai Police had, in January 2011, conveyed to the IB’s office in Mumbai that Khan Wazhul Kamar had been arrested. This information, unfortunately, was not reflected in the list of fugitives maintained by the authorities and was overlooked while the list was prepared in March 2011.
6. It will, therefore, be clear that the failure to formally communicate the fact of the arrest of the subject person on 21.05.2010 to the CBI has resulted in the name being retained by CBI. It is possible that the said failure was the result of a genuine oversight by the Mumbai police. At the same time, there was also a lapse on the part of IB in not reflecting the information received by it while preparing the list in March 2011.
Failure to Formally Communicate Arrest of Khan Wazhul Kamar to CBI Resulted in his Name Being Retained
Comment: The right boot does not know where the left boot is marching. The multi unidirectional intelligence agencies are a force unto themselves- just poofing away the tax payers and public money. The Home Minister is as clueless as the Police at Large. Terrorists are free birds in the Indian Sub Continent.
Red Notices (RNs) are issued by the Interpol on the request of the CBI (designated nodal agency in the Government of India) for persons required/wanted/fugitives from justice by various Indian police and investigating agencies and who are believed to be absconding from India. Once the RN is issued by the Interpol, a copy of the same is circulated to the Immigration authorities within India in the form of additions to the ‘look out notice’ list.
2. At the request of the Mumbai Police dated 02.01.2004, the CBI proposed and got a RN [A-367/3-2004] published from the Interpol with regard to Khan Wazhul Kamar. The RN notice was published on 16.03.2004 and this was communicated by CBI to Mumbai Police on 18.03.2004.
3. When the Home Secretary level Talks took place on 28-29th March, 2011, as per the usual practice of providing a list of criminals and terrorists suspected to be in Pakistan, a list was handed over including the name of Khan Wazhul Kamar. The list given to Pakistan in the bilateral talks held on 6th March 2007 at Islamabad also included the name of Khan Wazhul Kamar.
4. It now transpires that the Mumbai Police arrested Khan Wazhul Kamar on 21.05.2010. However, this information of arrest and the request for consequent deletion of the RN was not sent by the Mumbai Police to the CBI. There were further enquiries by CBI with Mumbai Police on the subject-person on 27.01.2011. To this query, Mumbai Police vide letter dated 17.05.2011 has requested the cancelation of RN as “the subject is no more wanted by Mumbai Police on account of his arrest by Mumbai Police on 21.05.2010”.
5. However, it has been gathered that the Mumbai Police had, in January 2011, conveyed to the IB’s office in Mumbai that Khan Wazhul Kamar had been arrested. This information, unfortunately, was not reflected in the list of fugitives maintained by the authorities and was overlooked while the list was prepared in March 2011.
6. It will, therefore, be clear that the failure to formally communicate the fact of the arrest of the subject person on 21.05.2010 to the CBI has resulted in the name being retained by CBI. It is possible that the said failure was the result of a genuine oversight by the Mumbai police. At the same time, there was also a lapse on the part of IB in not reflecting the information received by it while preparing the list in March 2011.
Failure to Formally Communicate Arrest of Khan Wazhul Kamar to CBI Resulted in his Name Being Retained
Comment: The right boot does not know where the left boot is marching. The multi unidirectional intelligence agencies are a force unto themselves- just poofing away the tax payers and public money. The Home Minister is as clueless as the Police at Large. Terrorists are free birds in the Indian Sub Continent.
Can bribes be a new weapon to combat Pakistan, Taliban and Terrorists?
No race can be congenitally corrupt. But can a race be corrupted by its culture? To know why Indians are corrupt let’s look elsewhere. What patterns and practices distinguish us?
Analysis on corruption in India does not address its cultural aspect. We see nothing peculiar about corruption in India (except that it is everywhere). We see many corrupt individuals in a system unable to correct itself.
Our media reports corruption episodically. One independent incident of greed follows another.
Let us set all that aside and look at it differently. No race can be congenitally corrupt. But can a race be corrupted by its culture? To know why Indians are corrupt let’s look elsewhere. What patterns and practices distinguish us?
First: Religion is transactional in India.
We give God cash and anticipate an out-of-turn reward. Our plea acknowledges we aren’t really deserving. The cash compensates for our lack of merit.
In the world outside the temple walls, such a transaction has a name: “bribe”.
In India God accepts cash from us, not good work, for which there is no reward. We don’t expect something from God in return for sweeping our neighbourhood streets. We go with money.
Observe this in another way.
Why does the wealthy Indian give not cash to temples, but gold crowns and such baubles?
To ensure his gift isn’t squandered on feeding the poor. Our pay-off is for God. It’s wasted if it goes to man. See what this has produced.
In June 2009, The Hindu published a report of Karnataka minister G. Janardhan Reddy gifting a crown of gold and diamonds worth Rs. 45 crore to Tirupati.
According to the temple’s website, Tirupati got 3,200kg silver and 2.4kg of diamonds in just one year. The temple encourages such giving, according to a report in The Telegraph in April 2010. Those who gifted a kilo of gold, worth over Rs. 21 lakh, got “VIP darshan” (which means cutting the queue) of the idol.
In 2007, Vellore’s Sripuram temple was built with 1,500kg of gold. By weight alone it is worth Rs. 325 crore.
In May 2010, according to The Economic Times, 1,075kg of gold was deposited by Tirupati with the State Bank of India (SBI) for safe keeping.
In 2009, 500kg was deposited with the Indian Overseas Bank.
In June 2004, Business Standard reported that Tirupati couldn’t melt down 8,000kg of gifted gold ornaments because devotees had stuck precious stones to their gift. This 8 tonnes of metal, worth Rs. 1,680 crore but actually useless, was gathering dust in temple vaults.
On 11 February, according to The Hindu Business Line, 1,175kg of gold was deposited with SBI, and the temple trustees had yet another 3,000kg of gold handy.
What will they do with all this metal? Gold-plate the walls of the temple (lending new meaning to the phrase “India Shining”). This work was halted by the Andhra Pradesh high court in December. Not because it was wasteful—such things aren’t vulgar to Indians—but because it might have damaged wall inscriptions.
India’s temples collect so much of this stuff they don’t know what to do with it.
In February, 17 tonnes of silver, worth Rs. 117 crore, was found in an Odisha temple. The priests say they had no idea it was even there. But the devotee keeps giving.
Tirupati alone gets between 800kg (The Economic Times’ estimate) and 1,825kg (The Telegraph’s estimate) of gold a year.
When God accepts money in return for his favours, what is wrong with my doing the same thing? Nothing. This is why Indians are so easily corruptible. Our culture accommodates such transactions morally. This is key. There is no real stigma. The demonstrably corrupt Indian leader can harbour hope of a comeback, unthinkable in the West.
Our moral ambiguity towards corruption is also visible in our history. This is our second point.
Our gold-plated culture of corruption
We succeeded in the IAC Kidnap episode by bribing Terrorists
Indian Airlines Corporation (IAC) aircraft, held at Kandahar, demanded the release of Maulana Masood Azhar and Millions of Dollars as ransom to release the hijacked Passengers.... Read More
Smarting, Pak Army chief warns US, India
Kayani’s blunt warnings came after he met with his top 11 commanders at their monthly conference at the Army Headquarters at Rawalpindi. The meeting comes at a time when the reputation of the Army, the most powerful and privileged force in Pakistan, has been severely undermined by the raid.
That American helicopters could fly into Pakistan, carrying a team to kill the world’s most wanted terrorist and then fly out undetected has produced a stunned silence from the military and its intelligence service that some interpret as embarrassment, even humiliation. The raid has provoked a crisis of confidence for what was long seen as the one institution that held together a nation dangerously beset by militancy and chronically weak civilian governments.
Smarting, Pak Army chief warns US, India- Read more
Stealth drones used to watch over bin Laden- Washington Post
Analysis on corruption in India does not address its cultural aspect. We see nothing peculiar about corruption in India (except that it is everywhere). We see many corrupt individuals in a system unable to correct itself.
Our media reports corruption episodically. One independent incident of greed follows another.
Let us set all that aside and look at it differently. No race can be congenitally corrupt. But can a race be corrupted by its culture? To know why Indians are corrupt let’s look elsewhere. What patterns and practices distinguish us?
First: Religion is transactional in India.
We give God cash and anticipate an out-of-turn reward. Our plea acknowledges we aren’t really deserving. The cash compensates for our lack of merit.
In the world outside the temple walls, such a transaction has a name: “bribe”.
In India God accepts cash from us, not good work, for which there is no reward. We don’t expect something from God in return for sweeping our neighbourhood streets. We go with money.
Observe this in another way.
Why does the wealthy Indian give not cash to temples, but gold crowns and such baubles?
To ensure his gift isn’t squandered on feeding the poor. Our pay-off is for God. It’s wasted if it goes to man. See what this has produced.
In June 2009, The Hindu published a report of Karnataka minister G. Janardhan Reddy gifting a crown of gold and diamonds worth Rs. 45 crore to Tirupati.
According to the temple’s website, Tirupati got 3,200kg silver and 2.4kg of diamonds in just one year. The temple encourages such giving, according to a report in The Telegraph in April 2010. Those who gifted a kilo of gold, worth over Rs. 21 lakh, got “VIP darshan” (which means cutting the queue) of the idol.
In 2007, Vellore’s Sripuram temple was built with 1,500kg of gold. By weight alone it is worth Rs. 325 crore.
In May 2010, according to The Economic Times, 1,075kg of gold was deposited by Tirupati with the State Bank of India (SBI) for safe keeping.
In 2009, 500kg was deposited with the Indian Overseas Bank.
In June 2004, Business Standard reported that Tirupati couldn’t melt down 8,000kg of gifted gold ornaments because devotees had stuck precious stones to their gift. This 8 tonnes of metal, worth Rs. 1,680 crore but actually useless, was gathering dust in temple vaults.
On 11 February, according to The Hindu Business Line, 1,175kg of gold was deposited with SBI, and the temple trustees had yet another 3,000kg of gold handy.
What will they do with all this metal? Gold-plate the walls of the temple (lending new meaning to the phrase “India Shining”). This work was halted by the Andhra Pradesh high court in December. Not because it was wasteful—such things aren’t vulgar to Indians—but because it might have damaged wall inscriptions.
India’s temples collect so much of this stuff they don’t know what to do with it.
In February, 17 tonnes of silver, worth Rs. 117 crore, was found in an Odisha temple. The priests say they had no idea it was even there. But the devotee keeps giving.
Tirupati alone gets between 800kg (The Economic Times’ estimate) and 1,825kg (The Telegraph’s estimate) of gold a year.
When God accepts money in return for his favours, what is wrong with my doing the same thing? Nothing. This is why Indians are so easily corruptible. Our culture accommodates such transactions morally. This is key. There is no real stigma. The demonstrably corrupt Indian leader can harbour hope of a comeback, unthinkable in the West.
Our moral ambiguity towards corruption is also visible in our history. This is our second point.
Our gold-plated culture of corruption
We succeeded in the IAC Kidnap episode by bribing Terrorists
Indian Airlines Corporation (IAC) aircraft, held at Kandahar, demanded the release of Maulana Masood Azhar and Millions of Dollars as ransom to release the hijacked Passengers.... Read More
Smarting, Pak Army chief warns US, India
Kayani’s blunt warnings came after he met with his top 11 commanders at their monthly conference at the Army Headquarters at Rawalpindi. The meeting comes at a time when the reputation of the Army, the most powerful and privileged force in Pakistan, has been severely undermined by the raid.
That American helicopters could fly into Pakistan, carrying a team to kill the world’s most wanted terrorist and then fly out undetected has produced a stunned silence from the military and its intelligence service that some interpret as embarrassment, even humiliation. The raid has provoked a crisis of confidence for what was long seen as the one institution that held together a nation dangerously beset by militancy and chronically weak civilian governments.
Smarting, Pak Army chief warns US, India- Read more
Stealth drones used to watch over bin Laden- Washington Post
Effects-based operations
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Effects-Based Operations (EBO) is a United States military concept which emerged during the 1991 Gulf War for the planning and conduct of operations combining military and non-military methods to achieve a particular effect. The doctrine was developed to take advantage of advancements in weaponry and tactics, from an emerging understanding that attacking a second-order target may have first order consequences for a variety of objectives, wherein the Commander's intent can be satisfied with a minimum of collateral damage or risk to his own forces.
EBO has been an emerging concept, with multiple views [1] on what it meant and how it could be implemented. Most notably, military scientists at the Air Force Research Lab, the Army Research Lab and DARPA engaged in research to develop automated tools to annotate options and recommend courses of action. This is hard science and tools are slow to be implemented. For air forces, it supported the ability for a single aircraft to attack multiple targets, unlike tactics of previous wars, which used multiple aircraft to attack single targets, usually to create destruction without thought of later re-use by allied forces or friendly civilians.
EBO concepts emphasise the importance of technological sophistication in the Information Age, arguing that casualties can be avoided on both sides by taking advantage of the technological advances made since the end of the Cold War - for example, by utilising precision munitions and UAV attack drones. EBO concepts traditionally take a "systemic approach" to the enemy, arguing that the enemy's centre of gravity can be disrupted by attacking the command and control "mainframe" and the "support nodes" surrounding this central mainframe.
In 2008, Joint Forces Command stopped using the term "effects-based" after failure of the Army-led TEBO JCTD. The concept remains valid in the US Air Force.
Contents
1 Definition
1.1 Batschelet's Seven attributes of EBO
1.2 Center of gravity
2 Effects-based thinking
3 EBO in practice
4 EBO Out of Favor
5 See also
6 References
Definition
As defined by the United States military Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), effects-based operations are "a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or effect on the enemy through the synergistic and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at all levels of conflict." The intent and desired outcome of an effects-based approach is to employ forces that paralyze the enemy forces and minimize its ability to engage friendly forces in close combat.[2]
Rather than focusing specifically on causing casualties and physical destruction resulting in the attrition or annihilation of enemy forces, effects-based operations emphasizes end-state goals first, and then focuses on the means available to achieve those goals. For instance, psychological operations, electronic warfare, logisitical disruptions and other non-lethal means can be used to achieve the demoralization or defeat of an enemy force while minimizing civilian casualties or avoiding the destruction of infrastructure. While effects-based operations does not rule out lethal operations, it places them as options in a series of operational choices for military commanders.
Batschelet's Seven attributes of EBO
JFCOM's description of the doctrine is quoted by LTC (now BG) Allen Batschelet, author of the April 2002 study Effects-based operations: A New Operational Model?[3] He was later appointed in 2004 as commander of the Fires Brigade, the newly-reorganized 4th Infantry Division Artillery Brigade which deployed to Iraq to implement such theories in practice.
According to Batschelet's paper, seven elements comprise and differentiate EBO:
Focus on Decision Superiority
Applicability in Peace and War (Full-Spectrum Operations)
Focus Beyond Direct, Immediate First-Order Effects
Understanding of the Adversary’s Systems
Ability of Disciplined Adaptation
Application of the Elements of National Power
Ability of Decision-Making to Adapt Rules and Assumptions to Reality
Center of gravity
The core of the doctrine, to support superior decision-making and to understand the enemy's systems, lies in determining and calculating the philosophical (not physical) center of gravity (COG) of the combatants. "COGs are those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight" (such as leadership, system essentials, infrastructure, population, and field military). A similar modeling scheme refers to these as National Elements of Value (NEV). A relative weighting is made as to which of the elements are most critical to be targeted by operations.[4]
Effects-based thinking
EBO is less of a thing and more of a mindset. Except in cases where this developer or that has sought to use the term for their software application, EBO does not replace existing systems or core concepts. EBO is instead:
• a fully developed theory grounded in effects-based thinking; • a process to facilitate development of an organizational culture of EBO processes; and
• a lexicon that promotes understanding through a common language.[5] EBO seeks to understand the causal linkages between events, actions and results. EBO is most useful in understanding secondary and tertiary consequences to actions. For example, the effect of feeding a hungry child could be accomplished by handing the child a meal, directing the child and/or guardian to a soup kitchen or food pantry, or by providing the child or the guardian a job as a means to earn sufficient ongoing income to afford daily meals.
EBO in practice
Although it was not called EBO at the time, the strategic bombing of Nazi rail lines from the manufacturing centers in Normandy to the interior of Germany disrupted critical resupply channels, weakening Germany's ability to maintain an effective war effort. Removing a few key bridges had the same effect as large-scale bombing.[6]
The first examples of consciously using effects-based approach of limited military actions to create strategic effects with little collateral damage occurred when the US dropped CBU-94B anti-electrical cluster bombs filled with 147 reels of fine conductive fiber. These were employed on high-voltage electrical transmission lines leading to Serbia to short them and "knock the lights out." On the first attack, these knocked out 70% of the electrical power supply, crippling the enemy's command and control and air defense networks.
During the first Gulf War in 1990 and 91, USAF LtCol (now Ret LtGen) Dave Deptula argued against the dominant view of targeting for destruction, instead opting for alternate and unconventional means to achieve desired effects. For example, as chief air power planner, he chose to target the Iraqi air defenses first, removing opposition that would have kept subsequent missions from creating effective precision attacks. This allowed him to achieve desired effects with far fewer munitions, reserving those critical assets for future missions.[7][8]
The January –February 2004 issue of Field Artillery magazine featured a report on the implementation of Effects-Based Operations in Afghanistan "to help shape an environment that enables the reconstruction of the country as a whole."[9] United States policy objectives are to create a "government of Afghanistan committed to and capable of preventing the re-emergence of terrorism on Afghan soil." All mission efforts are undertaken with that end-state goal in mind. To coordinate endeavors, the US military maintains a Joint Effects Coordination Board (JECB) chaired by the Director of the Combined/Joint Staff (DCJS) which serves to select and synchronize targets and determine desired effects across branches and operational units. Besides representatives from combat maneuver organizations, staff also is drawn from the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Public Affairs (PA). Weekly Joint Effects Working Group (JEWG) targeting team meetings provide recommendations and updates to the JECB based on three priorities:
Enable Afghan institutions
Assist in removing the causes of instability
Deny the enemy sanctuary and counter terrorism.
The result is a three-week-ahead planning window, or battle rhythm, to produce the desired effects of the commanders, as defined in operations orders (OPORDs) every three weeks and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) each week to update the standing OPORDs. Activities include both lethal and non-lethal missions, including civil-military, public affairs, reconstruction, intelligence and psychological operations and feedback as well as conventional combat and fire support missions.
An FA lieutenant, as an “Effects Support Team” (EST) leader, must understand how to employ lethal and non-lethal assets to realize the maneuver company commander’s vision of future operations. He must be able to work with civil affairs teams, special operations, coalition and host-nation forces, as well as NGOs and OGAs.[9]
This requires a shift away from "hot steel" (artillery fire) as a solution to all problems, and a focus on integration of multiple dimensions and methods to achieve desired results.
A recent study concluded that a contributing factor to the Israeli Defense Force's defeat in the Israeli-Hezbollah Conflict in the Summer of 2006 was due in large part to an over reliance on EBO concepts.[10]
EBO Out of Favor
In 2008, Joint Forces Command, the caretaker of US Military Joint Warfighting doctrine, noted the failure of US Army's Theater EBO software development and issued memorandum and a guidance documents from then commander, Marine General James Mattis, on Effects Based Operations. In these documents dated 14 August 2008 Mattis says, "Effective immediately, USJFCOM will no longer use, sponsor or export the terms and concepts related to EBO...in our training, doctrine development and support of JPME (Joint Professional Military Education)." Mattis went on to say, "...we must recognize that the term "effects-based" is fundamentally flawed, has far too many interpretations and is at odds with the very nature of war to the point it expands confusion and inflates a sense of predictability far beyond that which it can be expected to deliver."[11]
The US Air Force, however, still supports both the concept and implementation of EBO-based technologies. It remains an approved tenet of the Air Operations Center Concept of Operations.
Effects Based Operations
Effects-Based Operations (EBO) is a United States military concept which emerged during the 1991 Gulf War for the planning and conduct of operations combining military and non-military methods to achieve a particular effect. The doctrine was developed to take advantage of advancements in weaponry and tactics, from an emerging understanding that attacking a second-order target may have first order consequences for a variety of objectives, wherein the Commander's intent can be satisfied with a minimum of collateral damage or risk to his own forces.
EBO has been an emerging concept, with multiple views [1] on what it meant and how it could be implemented. Most notably, military scientists at the Air Force Research Lab, the Army Research Lab and DARPA engaged in research to develop automated tools to annotate options and recommend courses of action. This is hard science and tools are slow to be implemented. For air forces, it supported the ability for a single aircraft to attack multiple targets, unlike tactics of previous wars, which used multiple aircraft to attack single targets, usually to create destruction without thought of later re-use by allied forces or friendly civilians.
EBO concepts emphasise the importance of technological sophistication in the Information Age, arguing that casualties can be avoided on both sides by taking advantage of the technological advances made since the end of the Cold War - for example, by utilising precision munitions and UAV attack drones. EBO concepts traditionally take a "systemic approach" to the enemy, arguing that the enemy's centre of gravity can be disrupted by attacking the command and control "mainframe" and the "support nodes" surrounding this central mainframe.
In 2008, Joint Forces Command stopped using the term "effects-based" after failure of the Army-led TEBO JCTD. The concept remains valid in the US Air Force.
Contents
1 Definition
1.1 Batschelet's Seven attributes of EBO
1.2 Center of gravity
2 Effects-based thinking
3 EBO in practice
4 EBO Out of Favor
5 See also
6 References
Definition
As defined by the United States military Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), effects-based operations are "a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or effect on the enemy through the synergistic and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at all levels of conflict." The intent and desired outcome of an effects-based approach is to employ forces that paralyze the enemy forces and minimize its ability to engage friendly forces in close combat.[2]
Rather than focusing specifically on causing casualties and physical destruction resulting in the attrition or annihilation of enemy forces, effects-based operations emphasizes end-state goals first, and then focuses on the means available to achieve those goals. For instance, psychological operations, electronic warfare, logisitical disruptions and other non-lethal means can be used to achieve the demoralization or defeat of an enemy force while minimizing civilian casualties or avoiding the destruction of infrastructure. While effects-based operations does not rule out lethal operations, it places them as options in a series of operational choices for military commanders.
Batschelet's Seven attributes of EBO
JFCOM's description of the doctrine is quoted by LTC (now BG) Allen Batschelet, author of the April 2002 study Effects-based operations: A New Operational Model?[3] He was later appointed in 2004 as commander of the Fires Brigade, the newly-reorganized 4th Infantry Division Artillery Brigade which deployed to Iraq to implement such theories in practice.
According to Batschelet's paper, seven elements comprise and differentiate EBO:
Focus on Decision Superiority
Applicability in Peace and War (Full-Spectrum Operations)
Focus Beyond Direct, Immediate First-Order Effects
Understanding of the Adversary’s Systems
Ability of Disciplined Adaptation
Application of the Elements of National Power
Ability of Decision-Making to Adapt Rules and Assumptions to Reality
Center of gravity
The core of the doctrine, to support superior decision-making and to understand the enemy's systems, lies in determining and calculating the philosophical (not physical) center of gravity (COG) of the combatants. "COGs are those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight" (such as leadership, system essentials, infrastructure, population, and field military). A similar modeling scheme refers to these as National Elements of Value (NEV). A relative weighting is made as to which of the elements are most critical to be targeted by operations.[4]
Effects-based thinking
EBO is less of a thing and more of a mindset. Except in cases where this developer or that has sought to use the term for their software application, EBO does not replace existing systems or core concepts. EBO is instead:
• a fully developed theory grounded in effects-based thinking; • a process to facilitate development of an organizational culture of EBO processes; and
• a lexicon that promotes understanding through a common language.[5] EBO seeks to understand the causal linkages between events, actions and results. EBO is most useful in understanding secondary and tertiary consequences to actions. For example, the effect of feeding a hungry child could be accomplished by handing the child a meal, directing the child and/or guardian to a soup kitchen or food pantry, or by providing the child or the guardian a job as a means to earn sufficient ongoing income to afford daily meals.
EBO in practice
Although it was not called EBO at the time, the strategic bombing of Nazi rail lines from the manufacturing centers in Normandy to the interior of Germany disrupted critical resupply channels, weakening Germany's ability to maintain an effective war effort. Removing a few key bridges had the same effect as large-scale bombing.[6]
The first examples of consciously using effects-based approach of limited military actions to create strategic effects with little collateral damage occurred when the US dropped CBU-94B anti-electrical cluster bombs filled with 147 reels of fine conductive fiber. These were employed on high-voltage electrical transmission lines leading to Serbia to short them and "knock the lights out." On the first attack, these knocked out 70% of the electrical power supply, crippling the enemy's command and control and air defense networks.
During the first Gulf War in 1990 and 91, USAF LtCol (now Ret LtGen) Dave Deptula argued against the dominant view of targeting for destruction, instead opting for alternate and unconventional means to achieve desired effects. For example, as chief air power planner, he chose to target the Iraqi air defenses first, removing opposition that would have kept subsequent missions from creating effective precision attacks. This allowed him to achieve desired effects with far fewer munitions, reserving those critical assets for future missions.[7][8]
The January –February 2004 issue of Field Artillery magazine featured a report on the implementation of Effects-Based Operations in Afghanistan "to help shape an environment that enables the reconstruction of the country as a whole."[9] United States policy objectives are to create a "government of Afghanistan committed to and capable of preventing the re-emergence of terrorism on Afghan soil." All mission efforts are undertaken with that end-state goal in mind. To coordinate endeavors, the US military maintains a Joint Effects Coordination Board (JECB) chaired by the Director of the Combined/Joint Staff (DCJS) which serves to select and synchronize targets and determine desired effects across branches and operational units. Besides representatives from combat maneuver organizations, staff also is drawn from the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Public Affairs (PA). Weekly Joint Effects Working Group (JEWG) targeting team meetings provide recommendations and updates to the JECB based on three priorities:
Enable Afghan institutions
Assist in removing the causes of instability
Deny the enemy sanctuary and counter terrorism.
The result is a three-week-ahead planning window, or battle rhythm, to produce the desired effects of the commanders, as defined in operations orders (OPORDs) every three weeks and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) each week to update the standing OPORDs. Activities include both lethal and non-lethal missions, including civil-military, public affairs, reconstruction, intelligence and psychological operations and feedback as well as conventional combat and fire support missions.
An FA lieutenant, as an “Effects Support Team” (EST) leader, must understand how to employ lethal and non-lethal assets to realize the maneuver company commander’s vision of future operations. He must be able to work with civil affairs teams, special operations, coalition and host-nation forces, as well as NGOs and OGAs.[9]
This requires a shift away from "hot steel" (artillery fire) as a solution to all problems, and a focus on integration of multiple dimensions and methods to achieve desired results.
A recent study concluded that a contributing factor to the Israeli Defense Force's defeat in the Israeli-Hezbollah Conflict in the Summer of 2006 was due in large part to an over reliance on EBO concepts.[10]
EBO Out of Favor
In 2008, Joint Forces Command, the caretaker of US Military Joint Warfighting doctrine, noted the failure of US Army's Theater EBO software development and issued memorandum and a guidance documents from then commander, Marine General James Mattis, on Effects Based Operations. In these documents dated 14 August 2008 Mattis says, "Effective immediately, USJFCOM will no longer use, sponsor or export the terms and concepts related to EBO...in our training, doctrine development and support of JPME (Joint Professional Military Education)." Mattis went on to say, "...we must recognize that the term "effects-based" is fundamentally flawed, has far too many interpretations and is at odds with the very nature of war to the point it expands confusion and inflates a sense of predictability far beyond that which it can be expected to deliver."[11]
The US Air Force, however, still supports both the concept and implementation of EBO-based technologies. It remains an approved tenet of the Air Operations Center Concept of Operations.
Effects Based Operations
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