Report My Signal- Professional Matters

Monday, February 25, 2013

India: Still at the Center of the Indian Ocean

India nurtures close security ties with island states in ocean that bears its name

Nilanthi Samaranayake

YaleGlobal, 22 February 2013

ALEXANDRIA, VA: Is India’s influence declining in the ocean named after the country? That seems to be the conclusion of some analysts after Maldives’ cancellation of an airport development contract with an Indian company in November. These concerns are elevated by China’s increased engagement with smaller states in the Indian Ocean, including Maldives. Given the legacy of the 1962 war between China and India and ongoing competition for influence, New Delhi is right to have suspicions about Beijing’s intentions in its neighborhood and whether smaller Indian Ocean countries are playing the two sides off each other. But the fact is that India’s position in the region remains strong due to longstanding and growing security cooperation with smaller neighbors as well as the Indian Navy’s expanding capabilities. Just in the past week, New Delhi’s influence has been underscored by former Maldives President Mohamed Nasheed’s decision to seek refuge in the Indian High Commission in Male after a Maldivian court ordered his arrest.

India is a rising naval power and has the natural advantage of geography in the surrounding ocean. Moreover, India is connected to smaller countries in the region through entrenched ethnic and historical ties. President Mohamed Waheed has discussed Maldives’ “preferential relationship” with India, and a former Maldivian foreign minister has stated that “nothing will change the fact that we are only 200 miles from Trivandrum,” referring to Maldives’ proximity to the Indian city. India feels security obligations to regional states and has displayed its operational reach through campaigns in Sri Lanka and Maldives. In 1987, it intervened in the Sri Lankan civil war through the Indian Peace Keeping Force. Likewise, Indian armed forces intervened in Maldives in 1988 following a coup, and after the 2004 tsunami the Indian Navy was first to provide critical disaster relief to Sri Lanka, Maldives and Indonesia.

Aside from such extraordinary circumstances, India has enduring and growing military relationships with island nations in the Indian Ocean.
India deputes a navy officer to manage the National Coast Guard of Mauritius, where two-thirds of the public is of Indian origin.

In 2007, New Delhi built a monitoring station in Madagascar that relays intelligence back to Mumbai and Kochi.

India is also installing a network of coastal radars in all 26 Maldivian atolls that feed back to India.

The Indian Navy and Coast Guard frequently assist Seychelles, Maldives and Mauritius in maintaining security by providing maritime surveillance, hydrographic surveys, training, and maritime military equipment and repair, in addition to engaging these countries in exercises.

In contrast, China has not provided such maritime assistance, except for two patrol craft and training to Seychelles. India concluded the DOSTI exercise with Maldives in April, even adding Sri Lanka to this two-decade bilateral engagement. The three countries will soon sign anagreement to advance maritime domain awareness in the region.

India’s military ties with postwar Sri Lanka are now deeper with the resumption of the SLINEX naval exercise in 2011, and the two countries began an annual dialogue between their defense secretaries in 2012.

Beyond bilateral relationships, New Delhi is gradually assuming a greater leadership role in Indian Ocean institutions, such as the economic and diplomatic forum Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). Far from India’s influence waning, all these measures reinforce the country’s strong security relationships with Indian Ocean countries.

As seen in India’s security activities with states in its neighborhood, defense cooperation is a normal occurrence and not a cause for concern in its current form in the Indian Ocean. While some observers were unnerved by the Maldivian defense minister’s visit to China after the airport deal collapsed, a similar trip occurred in 2009 during the presidency of Nasheed, who was seen as a pro-India leader. The 2012 visit resulted in minimal security cooperation: China agreed to provide a $3.2 million marine ambulance for the archipelagic nation.

China’s defense cooperation with Sri Lanka was once more robust, with Beijing giving Colombo critical weapons systems to fight the Tamil Tiger insurgency, but has eased since the conclusion of the civil war. Nonetheless, Chinese Minister of National Defense Liang Guanglie recently promised Sri Lanka $100 million to develop military infrastructure in the country’s north and east, he was careful not to antagonize New Delhi. Following his visit to Sri Lanka, Liang traveled to India for confidence-building discussions on border tensions.

Despite India’s entrenched ties with smaller island states in the Indian Ocean, these countries are constrained by limited resources and accept infrastructure assistance from any country that can offer it – from Japan, South Korea and Iran as well as from China. Smaller countries seek to develop their economies without having to choose between India and China. In fact, New Delhi has not always been receptive to their requests for development assistance and should not be surprised when China steps in to fill this role. Sri Lanka, for example, consulted India first to build a port in Hambantota, but New Delhi declined. Colombo subsequently accepted Chinese funding rather than pass up an opportunity to develop a possible transshipment hub in South Asia.

Furthermore, Beijing’s economic engagement with smaller South Asian states offers benefits for India. Until New Delhi is prepared to increase its investment in regional infrastructure development, China’s road, rail, seaport and airport projects will improve trade and connectivity for the betterment of the entire South Asian region, which the World Bank and Asian Development Bank consider to be among the least integrated regions in the world.

Still, New Delhi should not take for granted its dominant position in the Indian Ocean. The rejection in Maldives, though its significance should not be overstated, serves as a wakeup call for India to invest more in developing its backyard. Scholar Rani Mullen finds that India’s provision of aid lacks a cohesive strategy. India’s intelligence organization Research and Analysis Wing recently called on the government to provide more economic investment and technological expertise in Maldives and Nepal, following analysis of China’s IT and telecom industries’ interest in these countries.

Also, a Jane’s Defence Weekly article reported last July that National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon called on Indian envoys posted in neighborhood countries to discuss ways to facilitate often delayed infrastructure assistance through the new Development Partnership Agency. Officials conceded that New Delhi’s assistance projects carried on “interminably” and that ties to regional states were “limited and haphazard.”

Despite the failed airport deal with Maldives, New Delhi is not in danger of losing its privileged place in the Indian Ocean. This transactional thinking ignores India’s longstanding security ties with regional states, which have been expanding and will continue to do so. At the time of writing, Nasheed waits in the Indian High Commission while Maldives’ High Court and police force seek India’s assistance with bringing him into custody. Although the High Commissioner has not yet made a decision, the episode displays India’s persisting influence in the region.

That being said, China will increasingly pursue economic opportunities in the Indian Ocean, and the smaller states will accept Chinese assistance as they seek to develop their economies. But this is not a zero-sum game and does not translate to India losing its strategic advantage in a region whose very geography is a metaphor for the country’s centrality and growing influence.

China: Post- Party Congress Scenario: Policy Indicators in Two Speeches of Xi Jinping by D S Rajan

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1170

With an eye on discerning any policy indications, the rest of the world is paying attention to the two speeches made by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping in the post-Party Congress period – first in early December 2012 and the second on late January 2013.

Full texts of the two speeches have not so far been officially released in the People’s Republic of China (PRC); but their summaries are now in the public domain. The overseas Chinese language media have carried reports on the first speech, based on a report from a source with credentials in China and the state Chinese language media in the PRC have revealed features of the second speech.

The first ‘Southern Tour’ speech of Xi Jinping made early December 2012 appears to be important in the matter of understanding Xi Jinping’s outlook on the political and economic reforms in the country. It was under circulation within the party in the middle January 2012. The website www.dw.de, of 25 January 2013 and China Digital Times of 26 January 2013 carry an analysis in Chinese language, of the speech, done by Gao Yu, a Chinese journalist based in Beijing, a former employee of the China News Agency (Zhong Xin She) and Economics Weekly of China and a detainee for her participation in the 1989 students movement.

An important portion of the speech was devoted to answering the questions – Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate and what lessons the CCP can learn from the collapse of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Viewing that the main reason for the collapse was that “the ideals and beliefs had been shaken in the Soviet Union”, Xi Jinping in his speech, said, “In the end, the ruler’s flag over the city tower changed overnight. It’s a profound lesson for us! Dismissing the history of the Soviet Union and the CPSU, dismissing Lenin and Stalin, and dismissing everything else are to engage in historic nihilism, which confuses our thoughts and undermines the Party’s organizations on all levels.” Xi added in his speech that the lesson for China from the disintegration of the Soviet Union is that “we must stand firm on the Party’s leadership over the military”. He pointed out, “In the Soviet Union, the military was depoliticized, separated from the Party and nationalized and the party was disarmed. A few people tried to save the Soviet Union; they seized Gorbachev, but within days it was turned around again, because they didn’t have the instruments to exert power. Yeltsin gave a speech standing on a tank, but the military made no response, keeping so-called ‘neutrality.’ Finally, Gorbachev announced the disbandment of the CPSU. A big Party was gone just like that. Proportionally, the CPSU had more members than the CCP does, but nobody was man enough to stand up and resist”.

Reform was the other prominent theme in Xi Jinping’s ‘Southern Tour” speech. Xi said, “The essence of our reform lies in carrying out all round reform. I do not approve the view that under reform, certain areas will remain backward; in concrete terms, certain areas getting reformed and others not so, is not the issue. Certain areas may remain unaffected by reform, even for a long time, but it does not mean there should be no reform. Some define reform in terms of Western universal values; if Western political system is taken as norm for reform, our reform concept will get distorted. We should conduct reform under the path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. We are in the stage of primary stage of socialism. We should pay attention to both short term and long term goals. Following the important ideologies of Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong thought, Deng Xiaoping theory, “Three Represents” and the Scientific Development outlook, we should realize the greatest dream for renewal of the Chinese nation. “China dream” is indeed our ideal .Of course, all communists must cherish a higher ideal, i.e Communism”.

The available details of the second speech of the CCP General Secretary, delivered at a party Politburo Study session convened on 28 January 2013, look notable in assessing the likely foreign policy directions of Xi Jinping’s leadership. Xi said, “China will unswervingly pursue peaceful development, push forward joint development, maintain the multilateral trade system and participate in global economic governance. The PRC will never pursue its development at the cost of sacrificing interests of other countries. We will never benefit ourselves at others' expense or do harm to any neighbour”. He at the same time emphasized, “We will never give up our legitimate rights and will never sacrifice our national core interests. No country should presume that we will engage in trade involving our core interests or that we will swallow the 'bitter fruit' of harming our sovereignty, security or development interests”. The Chinese leader added, “China is following a road of peaceful development and other countries should do the same. Only when all countries pursue a path of peaceful development, they can jointly develop and enjoy peaceful coexistence. We should spread our country's strategic thinking of sticking to the road of peaceful development and guide the international community to properly understand and approach China's development. Wartime atrocities in the past have made an indelible impression on the Chinese people, leading them to desire and cherish a peaceful and stable life. Turbulence is what the Chinese people are afraid of, stability is what they are after and world peace is what they are looking forward to. China has put forward the five principles of peaceful co-existence, established and carried out a peaceful and independent foreign policy, made a solemn commitment to never seek hegemony and expansion and emphasized that it will always remain a staunch force in safeguarding world peace. China will unswervingly adhere to these principles, policies and commitments”. Declaring that “China will strengthen its strategic thinking and enhance its capacity to make strategies ( Zeng Qiang Zhan Lue Ding Li ), Xi Jinping said that “ China will pursue the two ‘ double hundred’ goals of building a moderately prosperous society by 2021 ( the year marking 100^th anniversary of founding the CCP) and building a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious and modernised socialist country by 2049 “ (the year marking the 100^th anniversary of founding the PRC ).

Xi Jinping’s focus in his “Southern Tour” speech on the need for the CCP to learn lessons from the Soviet collapse, especially on party exercising absolute control over the army, is not a new theme in China; the same has already been noticeable in the regime of his predecessor Hu Jintao and in the past also. A repetition by Xi would only go to imply that the party has still lot more to do in eradicating the ideological confusion prevailing within its ranks. Another point of interest is Xi Jinping’s call for ‘all round’ reform and his ‘non-approval’ of the reform policy of veteran leader Deng Xiaoping which justified certain areas to develop more quickly than others. Is Xi signaling a nuanced shift in China’s reform course directions?

How to interpret Xi Jinping’s second speech of 28 January 2013? To start with, a look at the comments which have appeared in the Western and Chinese media may be useful for analysis. The Western media have viewed the speech as ‘tough’ and connected it to the likely continuation of aggressive postures of the PRC on sovereignty issues under Xi Jinping’s leadership. On the other hand, the Chinese official press (for e.g Xinhua international and ‘The Global Times’ Chinese edition , both of 31 January 2013) have refuted such assessments . In the words of an influential Chinese scholar, Jin Canrong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing, “ Xi only stated basic principles more clearly, appears more willing than his predecessors to show an assertive position on territorial issues, but Xi’s comments were with in the bounds of established Chinese policy”. Very interestingly, some authoritative Chinese assessments have detected signals towards some strategic restructuring on the part of China in Xi’s speech. For e.g as an evidence, an article of Global Times Chinese edition, also carried in the CCP theoretical journal ‘Qiu Shi’ ( 15 February 2013) , referred to the findings of Chinese scholars that Xi has laid dual stress in his speech to ‘ strategic thoughts’ ( Zhan Lue Si Wei) and to ‘ enhancing capacity to make strategies’ ( Zhan Lue Ding Li ).

The pro-Beijing Hongkong paper Wen Wei Po (30 January 2013) has echoed the same opinion. Noting that the dual stress is being seen for the first time, the paper suggested that it could mark efforts of the new leadership to develop the needed ‘correct and restructured strategic thought’, in order to face the worsening the security environment in China’s neighborhood, more and more increasing diplomatic pressure from abroad and the growing global impact on the Chinese economy, all in last two years. This raises the question - Will Xi Jinping’s leadership make some course corrections in China’s present strategic outlook and if so, what will be the impact on the outside world?

For an impartial observer, Xi Jinping’s 28 January 2013 speech definitely has some importance, as the leader, through it, has presented aspects of his foreign policy vision for the first time since he assumed the office of CCP chief. It is at the same time clear that there are no signs in the speech towards any basic shift in China’s foreign policy, followed hitherto. The leader’s stress to ‘ no sacrifice on core interests’ is not new; ever since middle 2008, this principle is dominating the Chinese foreign policy and notably, finds a place in the adopted report at the 18^th CCP congress , though there was no specific mention of ‘core interests’ in it.

Views are appearing in China that Beijing can adopt a ‘really tough approach’ if external forces provoke the PRC, conveying a message in the present day context (Global Times, Chinese language editorial, 31 January 2013). The Hu Jintao regime faced a dilemma in balancing the country’s declared aim to develop diplomatic relations ensuring‘win-win’ international ties and the perceived strategic imperatives to protect the PRC’s ‘core interests’. All indications are that the Xi Jinping leadership will persist with the ‘core interests’- based foreign policy of the previous regime and as a result, the same dilemma is going to confront it.

(The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai, India. Email: director.c3s@gmail.com)

Who is the biggest enemy – China, Pakistan or Babus? by Maj Gen Satbir Singh in IDR 18/2/13

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/who-is-the-biggest-enemy-china-pakistan-or-babus/

The Ministry of Defence had itself accepted through affidavits and submissions before the SC that implementation of the judgement in rank and pay would involve re-fixation of not only the Fourth Pay Commission, but would affect successive pay commissions.

Once again the Ministry of Defence has betrayed its soldiers. The Supreme Court judgement in the rank pay case has not been implemented in letter and spirit, making it largely redundant. The MoD has not only denied pay scale upgradation for officers but also, as a result, left out re-fixation of pensions of those who retired before January 1986 as well as consequential benefits to all officers arising out of the implementation of the fifth and sixth pay commissions. This is another case of bureaucratic manipulation against soldiers. The ministry’s letter of December 27, 2012 is applicable to only about 20,000 officers who were holding the rank of Captain to Brigadier on January 1, 1986, whereas it should have covered all officers who are in receipt of pay or pension or family pension which is about 80,000.

The Apex Court clearly ruled that the rank pay granted by the Fourth Pay Commission (FPC) was wrongly deducted from basic pay and ordered re-fixation of pay “with effect from” and not “as on” January 1, 1986, as mentioned in the letter. The letter states that the judgement has no bearing on fifth and sixth pay commissions, and that there shall be no change in instructions issued thereof except those necessitated due to re-fixation of pay on January 1, 1986.

The deduction of rank pay had resulted in depressed scales and status, and once corrected should have resulted in automatic upgradation of FPC scales as well as successive ones, as was fully argued before the court and contained in the various affidavits filed by both the petitioners and the UOI.

The MoD should be questioned as to how the rank of Captain, which was shown before the Supreme Court as equal to Senior Time Scale (STS) till the Third Pay Commission (TPC), was suddenly degraded in the FPC, making STS equal to Major. There was no order by the FPC or any other authority to degrade the rank and club it with Junior Time Scale (JTS). This shows systematic degradation by the MoD without knowledge of the political executive.

Till TPC, Second Lieutenant and Lieutenant were equated with JTS and Captain with STS. After the rank pay fiasco in the FPC, three ranks, that is Second Lieutenant, Lieutenant and Captain were shown clubbed with a single civilian rank of JTS. How could it be allowed that the first military rank of Second Lieutenant along with two promotional ranks of Lieutenant and Captain were all clubbed with the first civilian rank? All happened because of the strange manipulations in the rank pay saga which have now been corrected by the SC.

Similarly a Major drew pay equal to the Selection Grade/Non-Functional Selection Grade of the civil services, but today an SG/NFSG officer enjoys a status and draws a pay equal to a Colonel. Such manipulations and degradation of status and sheen of the military rank continue where civilian staff put up noting sheets and get approvals without taking into confidence the military staff.

The judgement, which was to have a cascading effect on the fixation of pay scales from January 1986 till date, has fraudulently been made applicable only to those persons who were in receipt of rank pay in January 1986.

Stake-holders be consulted before taking decisions that affect them, but it has always been a one-sided affair. The defence minister should know that elements inimical to the soldier would ensure that he does not get to know the correct situation and there is a huge gap between what is projected to him and what is the reality.

The MoD had itself accepted through affidavits and submissions before the SC that implementation of the judgement would involve re-fixation of not only the FPC, but would affect successive pay commissions. Further, it would alter payment of all consequential and resultant benefits of officers and their families wherever applicable. In an affidavit seeking extension of time for implementation of the judgement, the MoD had stated that the judgement related to three successive pay commissions and also affected the benefits of those who retired prior to 1986.

Then how can the MoD issue instructions contrary to the above submission? The staff concerned has very carefully chosen to stick on to certain words without looking at the spirit of the entire order and court proceedings.

The letter can easily be termed as “rarest of rare fraud, perjury and Injustice to the defence forces”. How does the government expect demoralised and demotivated officers to lead from the front and sacrifice their lives when it is denying them their due respect, status, inter se equation with other services and emoluments? Certainly the government has clearly not been fair to defence personnel. The letter of December 27, 2012 should be withdrawn and a fresh letter incorporating all aspects of the SC judgement correctly needs to be issued immediately.

IMPRESSIONS ON CHINA’S SECOND MISSILE INTERCEPTOR TEST

By A. Vinod Kumar

February 22, 2013

China is reported to have conducted the second test of its missile interceptor system on January 27, 2013 in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.1 Quite symbolic of China’s postural patterns, the reported test comes exactly three years (and 16 days) after the first test of its ballistic missile defence (BMD) system on January 11, 2010. Like in 2010, China has divulged little details on the system or technology used in the latest test, except for terming it as ‘defensive in nature’.2 In all probability, this seems to be another development test of the same system, which, I assume, is a reconfigured version of either the DF-21C or DF-25, referred to in some circles as the KS/SC-19.3 Both these medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) are two-stage systems with around 1500-1700 km range and capable of carrying a 600 kg payload (in this case, an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle). China was presumed to have used a reconfigured variant of the same system for its ASAT test of January 2007, when it hit a weather satellite in low-earth orbit. Another variant – the Kaituozhe 1 (KT-1) – was also known to be the vehicle for its commercial space launches.4 Reconfiguring these missiles to hit a satellite-size target would not be a tough task, though hitting another missile moving at a higher velocity is a challenging endeavour, which China seems to have mastered with its demonstration of an outer-space interception in 2010, confirmed then by the Pentagon.5

However, the element of doubt that is left behind by the latest test is the absence of any reference to exo-atmospheric interception. Though China has an inventory of advanced air defence systems of the Hongqi series (including HQ-9 & -12), it is unlikely that an interception exercise with any of these systems will be projected as a missile defence effort. Nonetheless, there are few indicators to discount the development of another missile interceptor with operational roles for the lower or theatre level.6Assuming that the Chinese effort is to counter US BMD systems, besides responding to the inroads India has made in interception technologies, its pursuit of a multi-layered architecture cannot be ruled out. By divulging very few details, China has again left the world guessing on the contours of what could be an advanced BMD programme with regional and global implications, like its ASAT incarnation.

Challenging the US BMD footprint

With the US theatre (PAC-3) and boost-phase (Aegis SM-3) interception platforms showing up in East Asia, Beijing was invariably expected to respond with a similar capability. Though countering a BMD with another need not be the ideal strategic move, China’s missile defence efforts are seemingly geared towards negating the asymmetry caused by the presence of US BMD systems in its neighbourhood.7 Beijing can consider such deployments as impinging on its deterrence and retaliatory capabilities just as Russia saw a similar challenge from the earlier US plans to deploy the Ground-based Mid-Course Defence (GMD) system in Eastern Europe. It is hence no surprise that both Russia and China are developing exo-atmospheric interceptors that will negate any advantage that the US will seek to gain by the addition of defensive systems to its net offensive capability.

The Chinese pursuits come at a time when the feverish development of missile defence systems raises the potential of altering deterrence equations based on assured destruction. Though mutual vulnerability was at the core of such equations during the Cold War, Washington’s propensity to limit its vulnerabilities through a consolidation of offensive and defensive capabilities has propelled many other nuclear weapon states towards the same path. The pursuit of a multi-layered architecture with boost, mid-course and terminal interception capabilities has thereby emerged as the standard technological goalpost for nations developing missile defence systems. The possibility of a new Chinese interceptor for the lower-tier could be seen within this matrix, even though the actual architectural contours of China’s BMD programme remains speculative.

What’s in it for India?

The other dimension of the latest test is about what it augurs for India. Though India debuted in BMD development before China (originating in the late-1990s and the first development test in 2006), there were few indicators in China’s January 2010 test to assume that it was also meant to counter the Indian missile programme. No such Indian missile system was then considered potent enough to warrant a Chinese exo-atmospheric interceptor (despite being wary of the intermediate-range missiles of the Agni series). Rather, the Chinese were always confident of deterring India with their ability to hit vital assets in northern India through the missile systems deployed in the southern military regions. Even the primary Indian BMD platform – Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) system – with a proclaimed capability to intercept incoming missiles of over 1000 km range at 50-80 km altitude is deemed to be effective only against slower and shorter-range Chinese missiles, thus leaving the scope for China’s faster and longer-range systems to hit the Indian heartland.

The scenario of 2010 though has dramatically changed now. Irrespective of what the Chinese had tested last month, it comes months after India demonstrated the capability to hit Beijing with the Agni-V. The new strategic calculus created by Agni-V could have convinced China on the need to develop capabilities not just against the US (and Russia), but also its southern neighbour. Simply so, the second BMD test has a message for New Delhi: namely, it needs to propel the development of its long-range (implying exo-atmospheric) interception capabilities to mitigate the possibility of further asymmetry with China on strategic forces. In fact, India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) had earlier announced plans for an exo-atmospheric system (PDV/AD-1&2) to target missiles with over 5000 km range and interception capability at around 120 km altitude. This effort, though, is known to be impeded by the absence of long-range tracking systems, as early-warning radars and optical homing systems are at the core of attaining long-range and/or high-velocity interception capability.

As India prepares to address these impediments, another overlooked aspect of the Chinese BMD capability is the likely opportunities that Pakistan stands to garner from its all-weather friend. With its increasing dependence on Chinese military hardware, there remains a strong possibility of Pakistan gaining access to China’s BMD systems as they mature towards deployment. Owing to anxieties of losing its strategic edge to India’s BMD systems, and with no advanced interception capabilities to flaunt for itself, Pakistan may seek an early transfer of Chinese interceptors, even if in nominal terms, in order to project a capability against India’s offensive forces. China could also gain an opportunity to justify such transfers in the event of a US interceptor landing up in India or if New Delhi activates the technology cooperation corridor on missile defence systems as envisaged in the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) of 2004. Though the possibility of US systems like PAC-3, THAAD or even the SM-3 being sought by India is not immediately foreseen (considering DRDO’s propensity to develop these capabilities indigenously), a China-Pakistan channel of cooperation in BMD technology is an eventuality that Indian security planners need to seriously contemplate.

Conclusion

That Washington had been muted on China’s second BMD test indicates its propensity to reconcile with Beijing’s acquisition of this capability.8 However, such complacency may not prove to be long-lasting as China’s pursuit of BMD capability will primarily be intended to counter the US strategic pre-dominance in the region, besides augmenting its own deterrent by adding defensive systems to its net offensive capability. Consequently, China is likely to pursue a multi-pronged deterrence agenda along the following lines: (a) sustain a colossal offensive forces inventory to project massive retaliation and overwhelm US defences; (b) develop a nation-wide BMD shield to protect its population centres and military assets; and (c) continue to deter India through southern deployments, but also project the BMD shield as a means to counter the Agni-V or other Indian systems.

1. The event was reported by Xinhua a day later but with the January 27 dateline. See “China carries out land-based mid-course missile interception test,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-01/28/c_124285293.htm.

2. Xinhua quoted an official from the Information Bureau of China's Defence Ministry as saying: “The test has reached the preset goal. The test is defensive in nature and targets no other country.” Ibid.

3. I had analyzed the first test by using various resources, including the exhibits from China’s 60th anniversary parade, to conclude on the probable system that was used. See A. Vinod Kumar, “The Dragon’s Shield: Intricacies of China’s BMD capability,” IDSA Issue Brief, February 25, 2010,http://www.idsa.in/system/files/IB_ChinasBMDCapability.pdf.

4. See “Kaituozhe 1 (KT-1) Launch Vehicle”,http://www.sinodefence.com/space/launcher/kaituozhe1.asp; accessed on January 20, 2010.

5. “China Says Missile Defence System Test Successful,” The New York Times, January 11, 2010.

6. Some photographs were in circulation online claiming to be images of the latest Chinese BMD test. Even if we assume that the pictures were of this interception, the fact that they were taken with clarity points to the possibility of an interception within the Earth’s atmosphere.

7. While being initially critical of BMD systems, China had sought to overwhelm them with an offensive build-up and through extensive use of counter-measures.

8. Knowledgeable sources have told this author that US officials have indicated to their Chinese counterparts their appreciation of China’s ability and strategic imperative to develop ‘defensive’ technologies.

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/CounteringUrbanTerrorisminIndia_nmanoharan_220213