THE SOLUTION TO THE KASHMIR ISSUE

 

Subramanian Swamy

 

 

I believe that the Kashmir "issue" can no more be solved by dialogue either with the Pakistanis or the Hurriyat. This is because the Pakistan army has now a majority of Captains and Colonels owing allegiance to the Taliban. In another five years, they will reach, by promotions, the Corps Commander level. We know that the Government in Pakistan is controlled by the seven Corps Commanders of the Army. Therefore, a Taliban Government in Pakistan is inevitable; and a Jihadagainst Hindustan the logical consequence. In turn, the Hurriyat is an organization that cannot go against Pakistan.

 

So, Hindustan has about five years to prepare for a decisive and defining War with Pakistan, and we must prepare to win it. We, therefore, have to throw out of office in the coming elections all those Hindustani politicians who crave or preen themselves on being popular in Pakistan by sounding reasonable and Secular, as also equivocating on every issue. For the survival of the ancient civilization of Hindustan, we have to win that inevitable War and recover the whole of Kashmir.

 

I will not blame the Jihadis for the coming War. They are, after all, programmed for that Way by Islamic theology. I will blame ourselves for not understanding the fundamentals of Islam as propounded in the Sira and the Hadith. It teaches that if Muslims are in a majority, they must rule (Darul Islam), and then everyone else is adhimmi and a kafir, who do not have equal rights of worship. Thus, in Saudi Arabia, you cannot even display a picture of a Hindu God inside your own home! When Muslims are in a hopeless minority, then Sira and Hadith urge Muslims to make a deal with the majority and make no demands (Darul Ahad). In the US and Australia, for example, Muslims will, therefore, never ask for separate Shariatpersonal law. If Muslims are not hopelessly in a minority, Islam directs that true Muslims conduct subversions and act against all human values to leverage their position (Darul Harab) to become of defining influence in the polity, and ultimately become rulers. We saw this in Kashmir recently when the Government was made to cave in on the most humane gesture of allotting land to make Hindu pilgrims feel comfortable while on arduous journey to the Amarnath caves. And we have it on the authority of the Chief Minister of the State that the agitation against the allotment was financed by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

 

It is foolish, therefore, in the face of this reality to expound the banal sentiment that “all Muslims are not terrorists or fanatics”. Of course, that is true. Or that Koran is a message of peace. May be it is. However, the Islam of the cutting edge of Muslim thought propounded by leaders such as Osama Bin Laden is in Sira and Hadith, which calls on the faithful to wage war against the infidels who cannot strike back effectively and crush them.

 

The struggle for Kashmir by the Jihadisthus is not just for Independence. They, instead, want a Darul Islam there and for the State to become a part of theCaliphate. Hindus are a special target because despite Iran, Iraq, Egypt and other countries becoming majority Muslim after less than two decades of conquest and brutalization, Hindusthan after a thousand years of massacres, mayhem and rape remained dominantly Hindu. This is a living affront for the fundamentalist Muslim, and in their seminaries andmadrassas in Iran and Saudi Arabia, they even today debate and agonize over it.

 

Contrary to the British imperialist propaganda, the Hindus did not just lie down and be conquered by foreign invaders. The Hindu fighting spirit had never dimmed, even if weakened, by traitors within. Periodically, the Hindus rose in revolt symbolized by the Vijayanagaram Empire (which lasted 300 years), or in Shivaji's bravery, or Guru Gobind Singh's campaigns, or the Marathanational onslaught.

 

Most of us thus remained Hindus, defiant, even if in poverty and misery, singingVande Mataram. This is the true history of Hindusthan which the fundamentalist Muslim and the British imperialist historians cannot bear to acknowledge.

 

Accommodation and compromise with Islamic terrorists is self-defeating and suicidal. We have, instead, to fight back, for which Kashmir is the starting point. Hindu renaissance, long overdue, will be nurtured if we look for an opportunity to seize back the occupied areas of Kashmir, and make the Jihadis feel that in Hindusthan there can only be Darul Ahadfor Muslims. We had opportunities earlier to demonstrate that, for example, in 1948, 1971, 1999, and 2001. But we let it go.

 

So, let there be no more intellectual confusion about the identity of Hindusthan as a Hindu Rashtra (Nation), which means a land of Hindus and those others who acknowledge proudly that their ancestors are Hindus. If Muslims acknowledge this truth, then they are welcome as a part of our family. And those who do not so acknowledge, cannot be equal citizens in Hindusthan. Therefore, we shall not agree to any more truncation of Hindusthani territory.

 

We have to, therefore, disown UN Resolutions and Hindustan-Pakistan Treaties, such as signed in Simla in 1972, as unauthorized Nehruvian policy blunders. The legality of the Instrument of Accession signed in favour of Hindusthan by the then Maharaja of J&K on October 26, 1947 has to prevail. Otherwise, it will create a plethora of legal issues, including what will become the status of the Maharaja if we abrogate this Instrument. Will Dr. Karan Singh, the son of Maharaja Hari Singh, have then a claim to be regarded again as an independent and sovereign King of J&K? In the Junagadh issue, Pakistan had held the Instrument once signed is "final, irrevocable, and not requiring the wishes of the people to be ascertained". That is the correct position. But the Junagadh Nawab after signing the Instrument in favour of Pakistan, invaded the neighbouring princely states, states which had acceded to Hindusthan. So when the Hindusthani Army was moved by Patel to defend these areas, the Nawab ran away to Pakistan. His subjects were mostly Hindu, who then welcomed the Hindusthani army.

 

Furthermore, on what legal basis, can we now seek to ascertain the wishes of the people of J&K when the India Independence Act of 1947, passed by the British Parliament, makes no provision for the same? After all, it was this same Act which created a legal entity called Pakistan, carved out from the united Hindusthan. Hindusthan, under the Act, was a settled and continuing entity, out of which the British Parliament made a new entity called Pakistan. Never in previous history there was ever a country called Pakistan. The concept itself was formulated only in 1947.

 

By what mechanism can then Pakistan today seek to amend, or even de-recognise, the Act, without unwittingly undermining the legal status of Pakistan itself? That is, if the Instrument of Accession is called into question, will not the Partition itself be subject to challenge, as without legal basis on the same consideration? I raise this question also because in the case of Beruberi in Eastern Hindusthan, the transfer of that area to Bangla Desh although agreed to, has been enmeshed in prolonged litigation in the Hindusthani Supreme Court because of Article 1 of the Hindusthani Constitution which bars de-merger of any Hindusthani territory after 1950.

 

Hindusthani Army Jawans created Bangla Desh out of Pakistan. But despite that, and drunk with their Darul Islam status, the Bengali Muslims have not only driven out the Hindus, or butchered them, or forcibly converted them, but millions of Bengali Muslims have sneaked into Hindusthan and are happily working with Hindus in Hindusthan. The Partition was agreed to by Hindus only for those Muslims who could not bear to live under Hindu hegemony. And, after getting their territory, they cannot now say that they are happy to live in Hindusthan with the Hindus.

 

Therefore, a virat Hindu Rashtra (Nation) should tell Bangla Desh to take back their Muslims, or hand over one-third of Bangla Desh territory as compensation. If they do not agree, then we must send two divisions of the Hindustani Army from Sylhet to Khulna, and annex one-third of north Bangla Desh as our due, for bearing the economic and political burden of Bangla Deshis in our country. This will make our access to Assam and the North-East much easier too. But, more strategically, it will send a powerful and salutary signal to Pakistani terrorists that Hindus will no more be passive.

 

These actions are possible if we gear up diplomatically for it. Today, the world is sick of the terrorism and the greed of Muslims nations to make money out of the sale of oil which they have got by sheer accident of geology. Therefore, we must make strong allies. Israel is one such country. We must find ways to make China see our interests. It can be done if we know how to come to an understanding with them. This is essential for isolating Pakistan. At present, China has begun to see the tinder box that Pakistan has become. Uighurs from Xinjiang have been to madrassas of Pakistan for training in subversion in Urumuchi and to sabotage the Beijing Olympics This worries China. It should concern us, too.

 

Therefore, to lay the foundation for the liberation of Kashmir, we must have President's Rule for some time. Hindustan should refuse to engage in any dialogue on Kashmir in which the other side does not accept the whole of Kashmir as an integral and inalienable part of Hindustan. The people of Kashmir should be left in no doubt in their minds where the citizens ofHindu Rashtra stand on the future of the state: that it lies with us. Every Hindu has a claim on Kashmir. I, for one, claim it because my Gotra (lineage, clan) isKashyapa. It was Rishi Kashyapa who invented Kashmir out of the Dal Lake. Hence, my claim.

 

We should undo the "cleansing" of the state of Kashmiri Hindu Pandits by sending 1 million ex-servicemen and families into the Kashmir Valley for re-settlement. Article 370 of the Constitution will have to be removed for that purpose; but according to the Constitution itself, it is supposed to be a "temporary provision" not requiring a Parliamentary two-thirds majority for amendment. It can be erased by a Presidential Notification on the recommendation of the Union Cabinet.

 

Then, we await a War. We do not have to go to War with Pakistan on Kashmir because a Talibanised Pakistan will provide us with the opportunity. What I am advocating here is that we prepare mentally and militarily for that eventuality, and having been provided that opportunity, go for the jackpot -- to use an American slang.

 

 

-         Subramanian Swamy

__._,_.___

Strategic effects of Increase in US Oil Production and its decreasing dependence on Gulf Oil

C. Raja Mohan

Wed Mar 06 2013

In what could turn out to be a tectonic shift in global energy markets, China has overtaken the United States as the world's largest importer of oil. 

According to preliminary data on world petroleum trade in December 2012, China's net oil imports surged to 6.12 million barrels per day (Mbd) while America's net imports declined to 5.98 Mbd, the lowest figure since 1992. 

Although these numbers could flip back in favour of the US during the winter months, there is no mistaking the trend line. China is all set to replace the US as the world's largest importer of oil either this year or the next. 

As America's domestic oil production grows amidst the shale-gas boom, the US is closer than ever before to reducing its massive dependence on energy imports from the OPEC countries. 

The use of new technologies — most notably hydraulic fracturing or fracking, and horizontal drilling — have opened up massive hydrocarbon resources in America. 

The US oil production has surged by more than 8,00,000 barrels per day in 2012. It is said to be the biggest annual increase in oil production since the hydrocarbon era began in the US in the late 19th century. 

According to the International Energy Agency's latest report, America will overtake Saudi Arabia as the leading oil producer by about 2017 and will become a net oil exporter by 2030.

Energy independence is a popular political goal in the US and the White House recently claimed that America's dependence on foreign oil has gone down every single year since President Obama took office. As part of his strategy to increase safe, responsible oil production in the US, Obama has freed millions of new acres for oil and gas exploration.

TRADING PLACES 

As China replaces the US as the largest importer of oil, might Beijing step into American shoes as the principal security guarantor of the oil-rich Persian Gulf? 

Beijing is unlikely to become the gendarme of the Gulf in the near future. But the logic of its growing dependence on the region's resources is bound to compel China to seek a more decisive role in shaping Persian Gulf security. 

Meanwhile, Washington might want to reconsider its longstanding role as the guarantor of regional security. If greater oil production at home and more imports from the Western hemisphere reduce the incentive for a strong American role in the Gulf, the pressures on the US defence budget have begun to constrain its military presence in the region. 

The Pentagon has been operating two aircraft carriers for many years in the Persian Gulf for many years. The current squeeze on spending in Washington has meant cuts of nearly $85 billion in the US defence budget. This has forced the Pentagon to cancel the deployment of one carrier to the region this year. 

EAST OF SUEZ 

The British Raj policed the Gulf for nearly two centuries, thanks to the massive resource base of the undivided subcontinent and its unrivalled naval primacy in the Indian Ocean. 

With its power ebbing rapidly after World War II, Great Britain announced in 1968 the withdrawal of its military presence "East of Suez". Since then, it has been the burden of the US to police the waters of the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Is the US on the verge of an East of Suez moment of its own? Not really; for it is rather easy to overstate the nature of America's relative decline. 

Yet, at a time of fiscal austerity, there will be much political questioning in Washington of the logic of a significant American military presence in the Gulf.

There are many in Washington who are asking why China, Japan, India and other big oil importers should have a free ride at the expense of America, which pays for the securing of the critical sea lines of communication between the Persian Gulf and the rest of Asia. 

This US domestic debate will take a while to sort itself out. It might be sensible, however, for New Delhi to focus its attention on the potential consequences of a reduced American military presence in the Arabian Sea and a Chinese pivot to the Persian Gulf. 

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/china-oil/1083527/0

NAVIGATING US CHINA RELATIONS: COMPLICATED BY CHINA’S “UNRELENTING STRATEGY” by Jenny Lin Pacific Forum CSIS Honolulu, Hawaii Number 15 March 5, 2013 Jenny Lin (Jenny@pacforum.org) is a Sasakawa Peace Foundation resident fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS. She previously worked at Project 2049 Institute, and the C enter for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies. Wonder why the Chinese government, especially the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has appeared more aggressive, self -confident, and assertive in dealing with the US and its allies? The answer could lie in an ancient Chinese strategy cal led the “unrelenting strategy”– a part of the “thirty -six political military strategies” derived from the I Ching. Mao Zedong incorporated this ancient teaching into his strategic thinking, and it was recently discussed in Chinese media as having made the Japanese mise rable over the Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute. Use of this strategy suggests that Beijing has taken the US-China relationship onto an adversarial path, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) systematically seeks to reduce Washington’s influence in Asia. This “unrelenting strategy” first calls for China to confuse its opponent’s judgments; second, create and induce internal political conflicts within its opponent; and third, deepen the opponent’s existing internal conflicts before launching an offensive attack . However, the goal of “offensive attack” does not necessarily mean the CCP/PLA is ready to use military force against the US in the short-run; rather Beijing is pressing every advantage against the US to transform the balance of forces between them.  That said, evidence of all three is visible in Chinese behavior. Beijing believes that the US is both the greatest threat to China’s national security and a declining power. According to PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Gen. Zhang Qinsheng, the main challenges to China are threats to the country’s sovereignty and legitimacy, as well as separatism. Hu Jintao has warned of a hegemonic power’s efforts to induce separatist movements and violate China’s sovereignty. Meanwhile, Xi Jinping is dedicated to lead China toward “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” with Mao’s strategic thinking at its core –which is a struggle against hegemonic power by unifying third world countries. The perception that the US is in decline began as early as 2001. According to Chinese media such as Xinhua and People’s Daily , “US decline is no longer an unwarranted fear.” They report that US power will “continue to decline” and the US “will unlikely hang on to its hegemony.” Chinese media have examined the causes of US decline, speculated on the possibility of breaking US hegemony, and explored how China can achieve superpower status. To effectively implement the “unrelenting strategy,” China must fulfill certain preconditions – achieve internal stability, along with economic, political, and military strength –before it can contend with other powers. Since Deng Xiaoping opened China, the CCP has made great strides in building national strength with economic growth and military modernization. By the end of 2015, China will have fulfilled its 12th Five-Year Plan. Utilizing an average annual economic growth of 11 percent during 2006-2010, the CCP grew national wealth and agricultural production, and financed technological breakthroughs in space, supercomputers, weapon systems, and high-speed rail. This growing economic and military strength underpins Beijing’s perception that China has ascended to great power status and met the preconditions for implementing the “unrelenting strategy.” The perception that China is an emerging superpower began in the early 2000s. Chinese media such as Xinhua linked the ownership of an aircraft carrier as a symbol to superpower status, while others defined superpower status as chieving economic, military, and political power. In September 2012, China launched its first aircraft carrier, and Beijing anticipates breaking “a pillar of US superpower status” by becoming the world’s leading economy. Step one in the “unrelenting strategy” can now be implemented, which is to confuse the opponent’s judgments. Washington has been consistently surprised by the PLA’s rapid evelopment, a phenomenon that is compounded by the tendency of policy makers to take Chinese public statements at face value without fully understanding CCP thinking. According to a 2012 report prepared for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, the US government and most analysts missed the significance of China’s new attack submarines and stealth fighters, its anti-satellite missile system, and aircraft carrier-killing missiles. The geopolitical consequences of not knowing an opponent’s full capabilities could result in miscalculation and a failure in strategic planning. Step two in the “unrelenting strategy” seeks to induce the opponent’s internal political conflicts. This is evident in the divisions between the US business and security communities. Despite regulatory barriers and security concerns, US companies continue their investments in China and remove incentives for Beijing to foster a better business environment for foreign companies. Moreover, the 89 percent of US companies operating in China that made a profit in 2011 press the US to go easy on Beijing to protect those profits. China also profits from US corporate engagement by violating intellectual property law, hacking into US cyber networks, and espionage designed to acquire sensitive information and technologies. The lack of coordination between the US government and private industry is being exploited by Beijing to its economic and strategic advantage.

To Fight India, We Fought Ourselves

By MOHSIN HAMID

Published: February 21, 2013 188 Comments

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/22/opinion/pakistani-militants-the-enemies-of-peace-the-internal-enemies-of-pakistani-peace.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2

 

ON Monday, my mother’s and sister’s eye doctor was assassinated. He was a Shiite. He was shot six times while driving to drop his son off at school. His son, age 12, was executed with a single shot to the head.

 

Tuesday, I attended a protest in front of the Governor’s House in Lahore demanding that more be done to protect Pakistan’s Shiites from sectarian extremists. These extremists are responsible for increasingly frequent attacks, including bombings this year that killed more than 200 people, most of them Hazara Shiites, in the city of Quetta.

 

As I stood in the anguished crowd in Lahore, similar protests were being held throughout Pakistan. Roads were shut. Demonstrators blocked access to airports. My father was trapped in one for the evening, yet he said most of his fellow travelers bore the delay without anger. They sympathized with the protesters’ objectives.

 

Minority persecution is a common notion around the world, bringing to mind the treatment of African-Americans in the United States, for example, or Arab immigrants in Europe. In Pakistan, though, the situation is more unusual: those persecuted as minorities collectively constitute a vast majority.

 

A filmmaker I know who has relatives in the Ahmadi sect told me that her family’s graves in Lahore had been defaced, because Ahmadis are regarded as apostates. A Baluch friend said it was difficult to take Punjabi visitors with him to Baluchistan, because there is so much local anger there at violence toward the Baluch. An acquaintance of mine, a Pakistani Hindu, once got angry when I answered the question “how are things?” with the word “fine” — because things so obviously aren’t. And Pakistani Christians have borne the brunt of arrests under the country’s blasphemy law; a governor of my province was assassinated for trying to repeal it.

 

What then is the status of the country’s majority? In Pakistan, there is no such thing. Punjab is the most populous province, but its roughly 100 million people are divided by language, religious sect, outlook and gender. Sunni Muslims represent Pakistan’s most populous faith, but it’s dangerous to be the wrong kind of Sunni. Sunnis are regularly killed for being open to the new ways of the West, or for adhering to the old traditions of the Indian subcontinent, for being liberal, for being mystical, for being in politics, the army or the police, or for simply being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

 

At the heart of Pakistan’s troubles is the celebration of the militant. Whether fighting in Afghanistan, or Kashmir, or at home, this deadly figure has been elevated to heroic status: willing to make the ultimate sacrifice, able to win the ultimate victory, selfless, noble. Yet as tens of thousands of Pakistanis die at the hands of such heroes, as tens of millions of Pakistanis go about their lives in daily fear of them, a recalibration is being demanded. The need of the hour, of the year, of the generation, is peace.

 

Pakistan is in the grips of militancy because of its fraught relationship with India, with which it has fought three wars and innumerable skirmishes since the countries separated in 1947. Militants were cultivated as an equalizer, to make Pakistan safer against a much larger foe. But they have done the opposite, killing Pakistanis at home and increasing the likelihood of catastrophic conflicts abroad.

 

Normalizing relations with India could help starve Pakistani militancy of oxygen. So it is significant that the prospects for peace between the two nuclear-armed countries look better than they have in some time.

 

India and Pakistan share a lengthy land border, but they might as well be on separate continents, so limited is their trade with each other and the commingling of their people. Visas, traditionally hard to get, restricted to specific cities and burdened with onerous requirements to report to the local police, are becoming more flexible for business travelers and older citizens. Trade is also picking up. A pulp manufacturer in Pakistani Punjab, for example, told me he had identified a paper mill in Indian Punjab that could purchase his factory’s entire output.

These openings could be the first cracks in a dam that holds back a flood of interaction. Whenever I go to New Delhi, many I meet are eager to visit Lahore. Home to roughly a combined 25 million people, the cities are not much more than half an hour apart by plane, and yet they are linked by only two flights a week.

 

Cultural connections are increasing, too. Indian films dominate at Pakistani cinemas, and Indian songs play at Pakistani weddings. Now Pakistanis are making inroads in the opposite direction. Pakistani actors have appeared as Bollywood leads and on Indian reality TV. Pakistani contemporary art is being snapped up by Indian buyers. And New Delhi is the publishing center for the current crop of Pakistani English-language fiction.

 

A major constraint the two countries have faced in normalizing relations has been the power of security hawks on both sides, and especially in Pakistan. But even in this domain we might be seeing an improvement. The new official doctrine of the Pakistani Army for the first time identifies internal militants, rather than India, as the country’s No. 1 threat. And Pakistan has just completed an unprecedented five years under a single elected government. This year, it will be holding elections in which the largest parties all agree that peace with India is essential.

 

Peace with India or, rather, increasingly normal neighborly relations, offers the best chance for Pakistan to succeed in dismantling its cult of militancy. Pakistan’s extremists, of course, understand this, and so we can expect to see, as we have in the past, attempts to scupper progress through cross-border violence. They will try to goad India into retaliating and thereby giving them what serves them best: a state of frozen, impermeable hostility.

 

They may well succeed. For there is a disturbing rise of hyperbolic nationalism among India’s prickly emerging middle class, and the Indian media is quick to stoke the fires. The explosion of popular rage in India after a recent military exchange, in which soldiers on both sides of the border were killed, is an indicator of the danger.

 

So it is important now to prepare the public in both countries for an extremist outrage, which may well originate in Pakistan, and for the self-defeating calls for an extreme response, which are likely to be heard in India. Such confrontations have always derailed peace in the past. They must not be allowed to do so again. In the tricky months ahead, as India and Pakistan reconnect after decades of virtual embargo, those of us who believe in peace should regard extremist provocations not as barriers to our success but, perversely, as signs that we are succeeding.

  

Forging a new horse shoe

Hardeep S. Puri

http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/forging-a-new-horse-shoe/article4477090.ece

In a debate on Security Council reform last year, a Russian representative assertively stated: “We deserve to be there because we won it in our history on the battlefield.” I had then quipped that if ‘to the victor belong the spoils’ is the criteria cast in stone for a seat on the high table, the battlefield now is fundamentally different from 1945. If, on the other hand, a ‘third world war’ is required to reform the horse shoe, this time around the victors will emerge from the size of their economies. The two European permanent members appeared worried then!
I cite this only to illustrate that our quest for seeking reform of the Council must never underestimate the challenges we confront.
The P-5 club
First, the exclusive P-5 (Permanent Five) club. Theirs is an entrenched reluctance to share the high table with others and, from their perspective, understandably so. Presently, at least two of them would be hard put to justify their privileged position. Frequently, the P-5 mouth platitudes to please the aspirants, even whilst their negotiators at the United Nations do whatever it takes to hold back progress. Clearly, whenever we move, we would need to hold them to the public pronouncements of their leaders and try to get at least three of them on board. In the end, whenever the vote eventually takes place they could still be on the opposing side, as in 1963, when the first expansion took place.
Second, the UfC or the Coffee Club countries which at best total 10-11, including our neighbour on the west, along with Italy and a few others. Secure in the knowledge that they would never make it to the expanded setting, they work overtime to create fissures and stall forward movement to keep the house divided.
Before examining how critically close we are today, one needs to address the cynics in our own system, who question both our credentials and the need for permanent membership. Being on the Security Council is no longer an option or a luxury for India. It is an absolute imperative. The vast expanse of issues on the Council’s plate has transcended its traditional mandate of international peace and security to practically all matters of critical importance including climate change, access to mineral resources, illicit flow of arms/drugs, non-proliferation and even HIV/AIDS. Not joining the pool of ‘chefs’ preparing the global menu could result in ending up on the menu itself!
Need for 128 votes
For Security Council reform to take place, a minimum of 128 votes will be required in the General Assembly on a resolution calling for expansion in both the categories. In a subsequent phase, individual countries would have to demonstrate their ability to garner 128 votes for their candidatures. Ratification by legislatures of member states would then make possible the Charter amendment.
Why is the present juncture a make or break scenario?
In March 2009, we succeeded in upgrading to an Intergovernmental Negotiation (IGN) process. In December 2009, led by India, Brazil and others, we organised a letter signed by 140 countries to the Chair of IGN, resulting in text based negotiations. After eight rounds of negotiations in the IGN, we now have the basis for a text and a formal draft resolution from the CARICOM (Caribbean Community) which could be put to vote!
African Group
The biggest and ‘most difficult’ group to get on board was the 53 strong African Group, represented through the C-10 (a group of 10 African countries chaired by Sierra Leone to negotiate UNSC reform on behalf of Africa). Bonded by the ‘Ezulwini Consensus,’ a maximalist position demanding two permanent and two non-permanent seats for Africa with a veto, their claim is based in the rationale that 80 per cent of UNSC’s work is focused on Africa, and yet they do not have permanent membership.
Another critical stakeholder, a group of 40 developing countries, the L69 (known by the Resolution Number-L69 of 2008, it includes India, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria in addition to 14 African members, CARICOM and Small Island Developing States) has also been proactively pushing for early reforms of the Council.
Through a process of painstakingly long and difficult negotiations, a convergence has now been achieved between the African Group (C10) and L69 on a common draft resolution that seeks to expand the Security Council. By end December 2012, we had an agreement on a common text. This awaits formal endorsement through a ministerial meeting scheduled for April 2013.
In the interim, CARICOM heads of states/governments met in Haiti on 18-19 February 2013 and instructed their negotiators to “press forward with urgency.” To everyone's surprise and collective delight, the CARICOM chair issued a draft resolution, broadly along the lines of the L69-C-10 text, and called for consultations.
It is the best possible assimilation of a comprehensive approach, as repeatedly articulated in the IGN. It would take the UNSC membership to 27, with two permanent and two additional non-permanent seats for Africa, two additional permanent and one non-permanent seat for Asia, one permanent seat for Western Europe (WEOG), one non-permanent seat each for Eastern Europe & Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and one permanent and one non-permanent seat for Latin America and Caribbean States.
On the question of veto, it makes no distinction between existing and new permanent members. This provides an excellent basis to begin the negotiations for a final vote. Given the three double vetoes on Syria last year, the mainstream view is that a ‘veto restraint agreement’ is the need of the hour.
Therein lies the convergence with the G4 — the other big player in the UNSC reform process, which would also bring Germany and Japan to join this resolution, hopefully sooner than later.
The time to act, therefore, is now. We have before us, for the first time, a draft resolution on which the largest possible consensus could be achieved. It needs to be put to a vote on the floor of the General Assembly. Governments are risk averse at the best of times and South Block is no exception. A considered call will have to be made.
First expansion
There is only one precedent for such a vote. In 1963, when the first expansion occurred, the voting sheet read: 97- Yes, 11-No and 4-abstentions. The United States and the United Kingdom abstained, USSR and France voted against, and Taiwan voted in favour. History will most likely repeat itself, as it often does.
We need to draw inspiration from the African Asian solidarity prevailing in 1963 that brought about that decisive change, and recall what the Indian delegate, Mr. Mishra had then said in that historic debate: “At the beginning of the session, it was difficult to imagine the way in which things would move, and there were cynics among us who until even a few days ago thought that we were engaged in fruitless discussions. The negotiations have been successful because the African Asian delegations were solid on this question. Their solidarity did not come out of any desire ... to gang up against other delegations in the Assembly. It was born out the belief of the African Asian delegations that their cause was just and the time was ripe...”
(Hardeep S. Puri was the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations in New York)
For the first time, there is a draft resolution with the largest possible consensus on expanding the Security Council. It needs to be put to vote in the General Assembly

More In: OPINION | Today's Paper

Media’s impact on foreign policy ‘short-term,’ ‘episodic,’ ‘symbolic’

The Hindu NEW DELHI, March 8, 2013

Prashant Jha

Research paper asks government to engage with media

While emphasising that the media’s role in shaping Indian foreign policy remains ‘short-term, episodic and symbolic,’ a monograph published by a government-supported think-tank, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), has advised the government to open up and engage with the media instead of being secretive.

It has also asked the electronic media to introspect, invest in expertise on issues related to external affairs, and post foreign correspondents who would bring in quality field reports.

The paper, written by former television journalist, Shruti Pandalai, has investigated the nature of the media’s impact on foreign policy issues by studying key diplomatic and security events in the past few years. These include the nuclear deal, India-Pakistan relations after 26/11, ‘attacks’ on Indian students in Australia, India-China border dispute, and humanitarian crises. It has confined itself to coverage by three private English-language channels — CNN-IBN, NDTV and Times Now.

Pressure group

The paper has highlighted the media’s ‘versatile agency.’ Depending on circumstances, and the clarity or lack thereof in government policy, TV media has variously played the role of a ‘pressure group’ prodding directions of negotiations, a ‘feedback mechanism’ for policy decisions, an ‘aggressive participant’ as a creator of public opinion, a ‘critical observer’ questioning the government’s every move, and an ‘accelerant’ pushing decision-making. But it has had ‘little impact on long-term policy formulation,’ with its perceived image of lacking political maturity acting as baggage.

The paper quotes National Security Adviser Shiv Shanker Menon saying that the relationship between the media and policymaking is a “manipulative one which is unfortunate.” Mr. Menon also said that unlike the U.S., the media was not an integrated part of the ‘foreign policy mechanism’ in India yet. He noted that the ‘breaking news model’ of 24-hour news networks lent itself to the game of highest TRPs, “sacrificing accuracy and credibility in the bargain.”

Improve information management

At a discussion on the issue, participants reflected on the crisis in the media even as there was a convergence in views that the government needed to improve its “information management.”

A practising journalist said TV channels wanted to be an ‘involved participant’ rather than a detached observer, and therefore the line between “news and views” had blurred, and even the mainstream media did not know how to cope with the new ‘ecology’ brought in by the social media.

There was a widely-shared view that the electronic media, in particular, only wanted to confirm ‘preconceived notions’ in its reporting and did not invest in understanding the ‘complexities and nuances’ of an issue. This resulted in a tendency to whip up passions and engage in jingoism. But others suggested that the belligerent posture taken by certain channels, at times, helped strengthen the government’s hand in negotiations with its external interlocutors.

China, the Abnormal Great Power- Yukon Huang

March 5, 2013  

http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/03/05/china-abnormal-great-power/fo53

 

China’s rising economic influence has leaders around the world on the edge of their seats. But Beijing is an abnormal great power. Its international potential is constrained by significant domestic economic vulnerabilities, and the inward-looking Chinese leadership has yet to craft a nimble and constructive international posture. And as the Chinese economy normalizes, its growing pains are laid bare. All this has the effect of elevating risks and aggravating insecurities in China’s neighborhood and beyond.

 

This is not the path many hoped Beijing would follow. As China became a global economic power, expectations were raised that it would act as a responsible stakeholder, as Robert Zoellick put it when he was U.S. deputy secretary of state. Beijing, it was hoped, would help shape the international agenda—consistent with norms largely established by the West—rather than continue to adhere to long-established national interests. And indeed, Beijing seemed headed that way.

 

As far back as April 1974, the Chinese leadership was avowing its peaceful intentions. Deng Xiaoping, in a special address to the UN General Assembly, declared that “China is not a superpower, nor will she ever seek to be one. If one day China should change her color and turn into a superpower, if she too should play the tyrant in the world, and everywhere subject others to her bullying, aggression and exploitation, the people of the world should identify her as social-imperialism, expose it, oppose it and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it.” In 2003, the Communist Party’s theorist Zheng Bijian echoed the sentiment, explaining that China’s economic ascendancy should be seen as a “peaceful development” that posed little threat to its neighbors but offered many benefits to the world at large.

 

But expectations were clearly unrealistic. China’s remarkable economic progress has encouraged Beijing to become more rather than less confrontational. Most observers see a diminished likelihood of China playing a positive role in global affairs. The discussion is now about how rising nationalism and related security interests have hardened China’s foreign policy positions. This has created the impression—arguably unfair at times—that Beijing is more inclined to use its economic clout to advance core interests than to strengthen political relationships.

 

While the country is criticized for becoming more assertive, aggressive, and bullying, in reality it should be seen as being too reactive.

 

China’s position stems in part from the fact that the leadership in Beijing feels the need to get its own house in order before forging its international path. Beijing is an emerging great power trying to escape the middle-income trap—domestic wages have risen so China is no longer the least expensive producer of low-cost goods, but it still cannot compete effectively with technologically more advanced countries. China also faces particular impediments that were not present for other rising states. And in transitioning to a slower but more normal growth trajectory, instability and risks have emerged. Thus, contrary to expectations, its economic successes do not translate necessarily into greater self-confidence at this stage in its development.

 

Traditionally, Beijing has sought to bide its time in dealing with many sensitive geopolitical issues, preferring to build up its capabilities and wait for a favorable shift in the balance of power. But in many cases, events have forced it to act earlier than it would have liked. This reactive posture is often not well thought through and is potentially self-defeating.

 

Many areas of friction have emerged as a result of these tendencies, including emotionally charged claims over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. But these reactive stances emanate from a wider set of issues, including trade and investment flows, intellectual property rights violations, interactions with “rogue” regimes, and other geopolitical concerns.

 

These tensions are manageable. Beijing will soon be forced to take a more nimble and practical outward view—a reactive posture is counterproductive. In the meantime, both China and the United States in particular should focus on building their relationship in the economic realm and on developing more inclusive international policies.

 

Becoming a Normal Economy but Abnormal Great PowerChina’s rapid economic rise has pushed it into the unique position of becoming a superpower earlier than expected or intended. The country has had startling economic success, moving from low- to upper-middle-income status and lifting some 600 million Chinese out of poverty in only three decades. Some see Beijing as being able to exercise considerable influence, but in reality, its ability to do so is limited.

 

In transitioning from central planning, China’s institutional base and experience in dealing with sensitive global issues lag well behind its impressive economic achievements, placing it at a disadvantage in working with other major powers. And part of the cost of becoming a more “normal” economy is slowing growth and increased vulnerability to global economic cycles.

 

Beijing is facing a bumpy road ahead. The country will no longer be able to maintain stability by controlling key economic prices, such as interest and exchange rates, and limiting capital movements. Liberalization in the context of internationalizing the renminbi naturally involves greater exposure and risks.

 

And this prospect has only exacerbated anxieties within the Chinese leadership. Those concerns then spill over into foreign policy decisions aimed at diverting attention away from domestic problems to real or imagined threats abroad.

 

Adding to the pressure on the leadership to bring stability and success to China is the country’s long history. China as a great power will be an “abnormal” great power compared with the United States, Japan, and the major European economies. Unlike the others, whose ascendancy represented a broadly continuous and lengthy process, China is unique in being a returning great power—one that accounted for 30 percent of global production two centuries ago but saw its share fall to less than 5 percent by 1950. Even today, after three decades of double-digit growth, its share at 15 percent is only half of what it once was.

 

Moreover, despite its economic resurgence, China’s ability to escape the middle-income trap is not a foregone conclusion. Only a handful of middle-income countries have made the transition to high-income status in the past quarter century, and none of them had China’s formidable handicaps.

 

Foremost among these challenges is that China will become old before it becomes rich. Its working-age labor force is shrinking, and the needs of the elderly represent a major financial burden. Many observers do not realize how relatively poor China is, with a per capita income ranking only around 90th internationally. Even by 2030, only about 10 percent of China’s population will be seen as relatively well off (defined as within the top decile of global incomes) compared with about 90 percent of the population in the United States.

 

With a legacy to live up to and domestic issues to overcome, China remains inward looking. And that stance has affected its relationships with the outside world. Tensions have arisen in a number of areas as the Chinese leadership attempts to balance its internal struggles with an evolving international order that waits for no one.

 

Trade and Investment Tensions. For much of the last decade, friction with China has been most often reflected in trade issues. Headline criticism focuses on complaints that Beijing manipulates the exchange rate and unfairly subsidizes exporters. Since accession to the WTO in 2001, China has become the number-one target for complaints filed by the United States and Europe. But this situation has to do with China’s approach to development, not aggressive Chinese policies meant to bully the rest of the world.

 

Increased litigiousness against China does not jibe with the country’s decreasing trade surplus, which has fallen sharply to around 2 percent of its GDP from a high of 8 percent five years ago. Nevertheless, trade tensions with the West persist because of China’s unique position in the East Asian production-sharing network. Components produced by its neighbors are shipped to China for assembly and final export largely to the United States and Europe. China actually benefits much less financially but bears the brunt of trade tensions with the West that should in theory be shared with others in Asia.

 

Beijing’s development strategy has been focused on export-oriented investment. Its economic success has been facilitated by its rapid assimilation of foreign technology through direct investments of multinationals and reverse engineering.  This strategy helped propel China from a poor country to middle-income status.

 

But the reality is that such an approach will be less helpful in the future. The country now faces the challenge of producing more sophisticated components that rely on indigenous technology. This structural transition will further raise tensions in the region as China begins to compete with more developed Asian economies as well as the United States and Europe. This is evidenced by recent U.S. and European complaints against China’s production of solar cells and wind turbine equipment.

 

Moreover, China is increasingly under attack for promoting indigenous innovation through forced technology transfers or theft. Here, China’s rise directly influences perceptions about its behavior as an international stakeholder as it grapples with implementing wide-ranging structural and legal transformations that are required to improve the enforcement of intellectual property rights.

 

And the qualitative importance of foreign direct investment to the Chinese economy is falling. Beijing wants instead to tap expertise abroad through direct investment in foreign ventures. But there too, China has problems.

 

Beijing’s efforts are often subject to security restrictions in destination countries. That was demonstrated recently in a congressional report that raised still-to-be-substantiated national security concerns about Huawei Technologies and ZTE, two large Chinese telecommunications companies. These suspicions were based largely on the companies’ presumed connections to the Chinese government.

 

These incidents only accentuate the image that China cannot be trusted, making it all the more difficult to nurture the vision of it becoming a responsible stakeholder.

 

Resource Needs, Rogue States Further complicating matters is a major component of China’s overseas investment strategy: the search for new energy sources and natural resources. China’s overseas investments and aid flows now dwarf the amounts coming from all other multilateral and bilateral donors. That strategy, too, is not without drawbacks.

 

A hostile reception and burdensome regulations in more developed countries have led China to turn to markets portrayed in some cases as “rogue” states to power its growth engine. In doing business with these regimes, Beijing has at times evaded or failed to actively implement sanctions—a policy that has attracted criticism. Its export-financing terms are seen as undercutting OECD guidelines. And because China abides by principles of noninterference and respects the wishes of host governments, an oft-cited complaint is that China does not adhere to established international norms and ignores the sensitivities of affected local communities.

 

But this policy is unlikely to change in the near future, which means the negative effects of China’s approach are likely to persist. Its voracious appetite for securing these resources abroad will not diminish because its industrial structure will remain heavily resource intensive for the rest of this decade. Energy consumption will continue to increase as more Chinese are lifted into the middle class. This pattern will not be mitigated by recent efforts to develop renewable energy sources, and unlike the United States, China is much further behind in being able to exploit its shale-oil deposits.

 

Differing Time Perspectives on Geopolitical Issues. Still, the most visceral global reactions to China’s perceived assertiveness come from interactions that are seen as impacting America’s security and humanitarian interests and that are shared to varying degrees by other Asian countries and the EU. China’s real intentions in supporting the six-party talks on North Korea, for example, are questioned. Taiwan is a continuing point of contention with the United States, and Beijing’s position on Tibet attracts emotionally tinged criticism from many quarters.

 

On these geopolitical issues, China has been firm in supporting its long-standing principle of noninterference shaped by concerns of how the West might one day target China. But the interactions are also influenced by differing concepts of time. In such disputes, China has preferred to put off addressing the issue. This approach reflects its belief that many sensitive issues such as Taiwan will resolve themselves over time without the need for confrontation or that waiting will promote better outcomes.

 

Political differences between China and Western powers only heighten this divergence, as democracies like the United States with frequent election cycles tend to think of policy implications in terms of years while China’s leaders consider policy choices more in generations. In the North Korean example, both China and the West have a shared interest in a stable, non-nuclear state. But China is reluctant to put pressure on Pyongyang now because it hopes North Korea will eventually become a more reasonable country that can still act as a socialist buffer state. Beijing believes this waiting game will better serve its long-term interests.

 

But events have often forced China to react before it really wanted to. The result is that its actions may not be well considered. This stance harms China’s image as a responsible stakeholder if others see it as being deliberately uncooperative.

 

Territorial Disputes and Shifting Asian Alliances. Deng’s admonition that China should avoid getting involved in external issues remains a guiding principle for Beijing. But if the actions of others are seen as jeopardizing China’s longer-term interests, the Chinese leadership may feel that its decades-old posture is no longer tenable and presents risks for both sides. In this context, defending its interests is not seen by China as being more assertive but rather as ensuring that the country can move forward on its “rightful path” at the right time. This becomes very clear in the context of ongoing territorial disputes, such as the conflict over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands that both China and Japan claim as their own, and in China’s response to America’s return to Asia.

 

A decade ago, China presented itself as a source of support for its neighbors that felt the West had abandoned them amid an Asian financial crisis. With reassuring visits by its senior leaders paired with offers of economic assistance both directly and through regional frameworks, China’s top leaders demonstrated a skillful use of soft power in the first half of the last decade. It contrasted favorably with America’s neglect of its traditional interests in Asia. But territorial disputes and more aggressive fishing ventures in the South China Sea and the waters between China and Japan have squandered this goodwill and caused many in the region to welcome an expanded U.S. role in Asia to counterbalance China’s influence.

 

China is also deeply suspicious about America’s intentions in launching its much-heralded “pivot” or rebalancing toward Asia, which Beijing has interpreted as attempted containment of Chinese power. Such a move calls into question Washington’s willingness to provide more space for a rising China. The aggressive way that America has been pushing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with a host of Asian countries is a case in point. There is little logic in a major regional trade and investment agreement that does not include the region’s largest trader and investor. Yet, the conditions of the TPP gave China no choice but to eschew membership.

 

China has also taken a strong stance in territorial disputes. Its response has been seen as a sign of rising nationalism fueling increased assertiveness abroad. But it can also be seen as a knee-jerk reaction to what Beijing sees as the provocative acts of others. Nationalism is on the rise not only in China but also in Japan and elsewhere in the region.

 

Domestic economic development also plays a role in island disputes. Lagging ASEAN countries have pressing energy and other resource needs and often look to these territories and their surrounding waters for oil and seafood.

 

The shifting power balance between Japan and China has also dragged long-standing territorial disputes to the fore. More naval equipment and nonmilitary boats from both sides are being deployed in the region—some acting independently of Beijing—and private fishing operations roam further afield as domestic consumption has soared with rising incomes. Such moves heighten the risk of accidental collisions or other incidents that could ignite conflict in the region.

 

China is not necessarily the aggressor in all of these conflicts. But it can be seen as being guilty of not staking out more clearly in advance what it would tolerate and thus encouraging others to become more aggressive. For example, China viewed Japan’s move in 2012 to purchase some of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands as a provocative attempt to nationalize the territory—even if Tokyo’s intentions were more benign. When pressed in that way, China responded with more forceful measures to establish firmer goalposts. While in the past Beijing may have expressed its unhappiness with a statement or a diplomatic cable, it now has enough weight to act.

 

Engaging an Abnormal Great Power. But China does not see itself as an unstoppable economic juggernaut. Chinese leaders see a country with deeply ingrained national interests and an economy faced with significant challenges and vulnerabilities that constrain its behavior on the international stage.

 

A slowing growth trajectory, weakened ability to tap export surpluses, declining access to technology transfers, qualitatively less significant inflows of foreign direct investment, and sustainable growth demands are all issues China must address as it tries to transition from a middle-income to an advanced economy. China also recognizes the reality that if it ever succumbs to a major economic crisis, adequate financial support from the global community is unlikely to materialize not only because of its sheer size but also because of differences in shared values with the other major powers.

 

But biding time until circumstances become more favorable is not a workable option for China if the actions of others force an earlier-than-desired reaction. Beijing believes that responding aggressively will forestall future disputes, but such behavior has only increased tensions with regional partners and drawn the United States into establishing a greater presence in the region—both unanticipated results of a self-defeating strategy.

 

A stance of engagement, reaching out, and seeking compromise with due consideration of the interests of others in region would serve China better.

 

Of course, China cannot be expected to follow the international consensus when this harms its own interests—that can be expected of no great power, including the United States. And thus far, China has largely been an outsider to an international system built by the West. It does not see itself as part of the system or bound by its rules.

 

In an ideal world, China would not be seen as a threat to be contained but as a strategic competitor that can be brought in as a partner when needed to help reduce tensions and ensure more constructive outcomes on global issues of a particularly sensitive nature. Providing China with more say in dealing with these issues might encourage a more cooperative relationship with the West.

 

This will require greater openness on the part of both China and the United States in particular. And the two powers should concentrate on promoting cooperative commercial relations, which will help them avoid fueling tensions over hot-button issues like sovereignty.

 

Beijing can start by taking the lead in supporting open markets and fighting protectionism. It would help China counter criticisms of its trade practices and put pressure on the United States and other developed countries that are moving in the direction of more protectionism. And supporting an open-trading system for commodities makes sense for China given that it is vulnerable to cuts in food imports during periods of scarcity.

 

As it seeks to increase its outbound investment, China also needs to support a level playing field. More open capital markets and bilateral and multilateral investment agreements can help ensure appropriate treatment and provide more flexibility to address security concerns. China needs to be sensitive to international norms about its use of aid money, but the West can also learn from China’s more efficient use of assistance for infrastructure investments.

 

Efforts to be more inclusive should extend to the U.S. pivot. The TPP should have been made more flexible so that China would see itself as having a stake in constructing a productive outcome rather than seeing little to be gained by being included. That lesson should be learned and applied to future trade deals.

 

Given the charged nature of sovereignty disputes, China and other Asian claimants might be well served by setting aside this question and focusing on narrow confidence-building measures or negotiating less troublesome resource rights, perhaps on the model of Taiwan’s East China Sea Peace Initiative. The United States should avoid making commitments that destabilize the situation and appear to favor one claimant over others.

 

And because the disputes are complex, with multiple claims and overlapping interests, China should recognize that multilateral approaches involving the most concerned regional parties as well as other interests or advisory groups can help achieve fairer and more inclusive solutions—a consistent goal in China’s history of international relations.

 

A reactive China is helping neither itself nor others. The United States and other major powers should take pains to stress the benefits of more active participation in shaping the international agenda as China enters a riskier period of economic transition. Harsh rhetoric and actions that are perceived as attempts to contain China’s development will not be helpful, but reaching out and constructing sensible solutions would be wise policy for Washington. The key is convincing Beijing that its interests are best served by forging solutions now, showing that compromise and cooperation will help China in the long run, and reassuring Beijing that its concerns will be heard.