Thursday, June 16, 2011
Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft- Mother of all Deals
Win – Win Situation For All by Sushil
The much awaited ‘Mother of all Deals’, the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) for the Indian Air Force (IAF) enters the final phase. According to Air Chief Marshal PV Naik, Chief of the Air Staff, the contract for supplying 126 MMRCA fighters to the IAF will be signed soon. All leading global combat aircraft manufacturers await the outcome of the deal with bated breath. For the first time there was an overwhelming global response and the deal has remained the most speculative topic of discussions for nearly a decade, or more. India’s emerging position in the world strongly steered by a consistent nine per cent economic growth, places India at a pedestal where high-end technologies are willingly offered for the asking by hitherto reluctant sources. Several global players are running head over heels to participate in the modernisation plans of India’s defence forces. In the prevailing environment, it is a foregone conclusion that the IAF would settle for nothing less than the top-end technology-intensive multi-role combat aircraft. Undoubtedly, the MMRCA promises to be the mainstay for the ‘future’ IAF and has the potential to emerge as a game changer.
The additional benefit that the deal promises to the indigenous aviation industry is the transfer of top-end frontline technology that would be relevant for at least the next three decades and beyond. Besides the performance and cost, crucial issues like access to technology, technology transfer, life-cycle support through reliable spares and maintenance, product support, etc. will be decisive factors in finalising the deal. Thus, if it is called the ‘mother of all deals’, it is not just for its commercial facet, but for the enriching accompaniments which will benefit the indigenous defence industrial complex, on a long term perspective. Reportedly, the first 18 aircraft will be acquired directly from the manufacturer and the remaining fighters will be built under licence by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Bangaluru under the provision of transfer of technology (TOT).
This multi-billion dollar deal will be the biggest ever since the 1990s, in which global fighters, namely Lockheed Martin's F-16 Super Viper, Eurofighter's Typhoon, Russian United Aircraft Corporation's Mikoyan MiG-35, France's Dassault Aviation's Rafale, Swedish SAAB's Gripen and Boeing's F/A-18 Super Hornet have participated. Out of these contenders, Russia’s Mikoyan and France’s Dassault have been the regular suppliers of aircraft to the IAF. The Dassault Aviation’s Rafale, the Eurofighter’s Typhoon and the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet are all twin-engine fighters and reportedly very expensive. The MiG-35 is also a twin-engine aircraft, however its price not known.
Indian Navy Perspective
How does the MMRCA deal impinge upon the Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC) programme for the Indian Navy (IN)? This is the big question which needs serious consideration of the decision makers at this crucial juncture. According to Admiral ArunPrakash, former CNS, “The easiest option would be to make IAC-2 a replica of IAC-1. This would imply that the second carrier’s air group would consist of the MiG-29K and perhaps LCA (Navy), with an option to operate the F-35(B) Lightning II, at a later date, if it is available.” He further adds, “Interestingly, the on-going competition for selection of the IAF multi-role combat aircraft appears to have thrown up four potential candidates for the IN too. Of these, the Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet and the Dassault Aviation’s Rafale both have naval versions that operate in the catapult assisted take-off but arrested landing mode. If the IAF does select one of these candidates there might be some pressure for the Indian Navy to consider the same aircraft for IAC-2”. If the Fleet Air Arm of the IN was to be given teeth in true sense that it deserves, there would be no gain in adopting a replica of IAC 1 for IAC 2. In fact it may well prove to be a regressive step and the IN would only be chasing technologies.
According to Air Marshal (Retd) Philip Rajkumar, who set up the National Flight Test Centre and was subsequently the Director, Aeronautics Development Authority (ADA), the naval LCA (Navy) programme is a very interesting one because it is for the first time that India was attempting to develop a carrier-borne fighter. He, however, cautions that the challenges in flight testing and introducing the aircraft into service will be many, namely the modification of the fly-by-wire flight control system's Control Law to cater for the ski jump take-off and arrested landing on the deck, setting up the Shore Based Test Facility and its validation before the commencement of the naval LCA's flight tests. The biggest managerial challenge will be the human resource problem because qualified personnel, who provide the all-important continuity to the test programme in the future, are hard to come by.
Besides the above challenges, there will be complex issues confronting the LCA (Navy) project relating to twin-engine, high agility at supersonic speed, multi-role capability, wing folding mechanism of composite material, strengthening of under carriage for deck operations, arrester engine/gear, Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, etc. Indigenous development of all these essential capabilities would take decades of toil and sweat by ADA and HAL, and will be riddled with unacceptable delays and uncertainties at the end. As it is, the Indian Navy is at a cross road to find a way ahead in finalising the design for IAC 2 which impinges upon the concept of operations, whether it should be Short Take Off But Arrested Recovery (STOBAR) or Catapult Assisted Take Off But Arrested Recovery (CATOBAR) for IAC 2 and IAC 3. Without going into much technicality, emerging trends suggest STOBAR offers sound operating concept for the IAC programme for IN. India can learn the right lessons from the formation of a consortium by AleniaAeronautica, BAE Systems and EADS as Eurofighter GmbH to produce state-of-the-art weapon systems and platforms through a joint venture arrangement. While such a joint venture would catalyse induction of new technology into the IAF, it would set back indigenous efforts and the move towards self-reliance. Pundits for induction of new technology may counter this argument by stating that the strategy of relying on home grown technologies is riddled with severe penalties of time and cost overruns. Nonetheless, access to technology, transfer of technology and the life cycle support would be the main attributes of MMRCA deal. So why not gainfully utilise such provisions of the deal for optimising the operating concept and design for future IAC programme?
Choice of aircraft available plays a pre-dominant role in finalisation of an aircraft carrier design. It is also said that the carrier design should be ‘future proof’ to enable operation of future aircraft when the carrier enters the commissioned service. In this context, the competing options in the MMRCA deal are Boeing F/A 18E/F Super Hornet, France’s Dassault Aviation’s Rafale and Eurofighter’s Typhoon, if the long term naval perspective were to be added to the deal. While Boeing F/A 18E/F and Dassault’sRafale are proven carrier borne multi role fighter aircraft, Eurofighter in recent times have offered the naval variant of Typhoon fighter aircraft. During the recently concluded Aero India 2011 at Bangalore, Eurofighter have not only exhibited the potential of naval version of Typhoon but have also reportedly expressed willingness to transfer of technology and joint development with HAL. It is, therefore, only logical that the provisions in the Defence Procurement Procedure of ‘Buy and Make Indian’ are utilised to acquire such a fighter for the IAF that also has a naval variant.
The need therefore is for a holistic view in the selection process of MMRCA which should serve the long term national interests by ensuring commonality of inventory of the multi role combat aircraft and standardisation of its infrastructure and support facilities both for IAF and IN, over a time horizon of at least three to four decades. Selection of MiG 29K for operating from INS Vikramaditya was precisely based on the similar consideration, though there was no other option available at that time of finalising that deal. Another important aspect that needs consideration is that the IAF does not have any known plan for future acquisition of MiG series of aircraft, except the upgrades of MiG 27s and MiG 29s. Hence, over a period of time, the infrastructure and support facilities for this category of aircraft would dwindle. Perhaps as a fall back option IN has already floated a global Request for Information (RFI) for multi-role fighter aircraft to operate from IAC. The mother of all deals thus can be a win-win situation for both IAF and IN, as also the entire nation. Besides the qualitative quantum jump to IAF, this deal has the potential of not just rejuvenating the IAC programme in real terms, but it even offers multiple options for multi role carrier borne fighters for IN. If this linkage is viewed holistically it would substantially facilitate matching the aircraft and the carrier design at the initial stages itself, thus providing much needed impetus and continuity to the prestigious indigenous aircraft carrier construction programme.
Rear Admiral Sushil Ramsay (Retd) is Senior Editorial Adviser, SP Guide Publications, New Delhi
Courtesy: SP's Naval Forces, February 2011
This article may be read in conjunction with the following article:
MMRCA: Indian MoD shortlists two
Acquisition of Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft
The much awaited ‘Mother of all Deals’, the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) for the Indian Air Force (IAF) enters the final phase. According to Air Chief Marshal PV Naik, Chief of the Air Staff, the contract for supplying 126 MMRCA fighters to the IAF will be signed soon. All leading global combat aircraft manufacturers await the outcome of the deal with bated breath. For the first time there was an overwhelming global response and the deal has remained the most speculative topic of discussions for nearly a decade, or more. India’s emerging position in the world strongly steered by a consistent nine per cent economic growth, places India at a pedestal where high-end technologies are willingly offered for the asking by hitherto reluctant sources. Several global players are running head over heels to participate in the modernisation plans of India’s defence forces. In the prevailing environment, it is a foregone conclusion that the IAF would settle for nothing less than the top-end technology-intensive multi-role combat aircraft. Undoubtedly, the MMRCA promises to be the mainstay for the ‘future’ IAF and has the potential to emerge as a game changer.
The additional benefit that the deal promises to the indigenous aviation industry is the transfer of top-end frontline technology that would be relevant for at least the next three decades and beyond. Besides the performance and cost, crucial issues like access to technology, technology transfer, life-cycle support through reliable spares and maintenance, product support, etc. will be decisive factors in finalising the deal. Thus, if it is called the ‘mother of all deals’, it is not just for its commercial facet, but for the enriching accompaniments which will benefit the indigenous defence industrial complex, on a long term perspective. Reportedly, the first 18 aircraft will be acquired directly from the manufacturer and the remaining fighters will be built under licence by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Bangaluru under the provision of transfer of technology (TOT).
This multi-billion dollar deal will be the biggest ever since the 1990s, in which global fighters, namely Lockheed Martin's F-16 Super Viper, Eurofighter's Typhoon, Russian United Aircraft Corporation's Mikoyan MiG-35, France's Dassault Aviation's Rafale, Swedish SAAB's Gripen and Boeing's F/A-18 Super Hornet have participated. Out of these contenders, Russia’s Mikoyan and France’s Dassault have been the regular suppliers of aircraft to the IAF. The Dassault Aviation’s Rafale, the Eurofighter’s Typhoon and the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet are all twin-engine fighters and reportedly very expensive. The MiG-35 is also a twin-engine aircraft, however its price not known.
Indian Navy Perspective
How does the MMRCA deal impinge upon the Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC) programme for the Indian Navy (IN)? This is the big question which needs serious consideration of the decision makers at this crucial juncture. According to Admiral ArunPrakash, former CNS, “The easiest option would be to make IAC-2 a replica of IAC-1. This would imply that the second carrier’s air group would consist of the MiG-29K and perhaps LCA (Navy), with an option to operate the F-35(B) Lightning II, at a later date, if it is available.” He further adds, “Interestingly, the on-going competition for selection of the IAF multi-role combat aircraft appears to have thrown up four potential candidates for the IN too. Of these, the Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet and the Dassault Aviation’s Rafale both have naval versions that operate in the catapult assisted take-off but arrested landing mode. If the IAF does select one of these candidates there might be some pressure for the Indian Navy to consider the same aircraft for IAC-2”. If the Fleet Air Arm of the IN was to be given teeth in true sense that it deserves, there would be no gain in adopting a replica of IAC 1 for IAC 2. In fact it may well prove to be a regressive step and the IN would only be chasing technologies.
According to Air Marshal (Retd) Philip Rajkumar, who set up the National Flight Test Centre and was subsequently the Director, Aeronautics Development Authority (ADA), the naval LCA (Navy) programme is a very interesting one because it is for the first time that India was attempting to develop a carrier-borne fighter. He, however, cautions that the challenges in flight testing and introducing the aircraft into service will be many, namely the modification of the fly-by-wire flight control system's Control Law to cater for the ski jump take-off and arrested landing on the deck, setting up the Shore Based Test Facility and its validation before the commencement of the naval LCA's flight tests. The biggest managerial challenge will be the human resource problem because qualified personnel, who provide the all-important continuity to the test programme in the future, are hard to come by.
Besides the above challenges, there will be complex issues confronting the LCA (Navy) project relating to twin-engine, high agility at supersonic speed, multi-role capability, wing folding mechanism of composite material, strengthening of under carriage for deck operations, arrester engine/gear, Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, etc. Indigenous development of all these essential capabilities would take decades of toil and sweat by ADA and HAL, and will be riddled with unacceptable delays and uncertainties at the end. As it is, the Indian Navy is at a cross road to find a way ahead in finalising the design for IAC 2 which impinges upon the concept of operations, whether it should be Short Take Off But Arrested Recovery (STOBAR) or Catapult Assisted Take Off But Arrested Recovery (CATOBAR) for IAC 2 and IAC 3. Without going into much technicality, emerging trends suggest STOBAR offers sound operating concept for the IAC programme for IN. India can learn the right lessons from the formation of a consortium by AleniaAeronautica, BAE Systems and EADS as Eurofighter GmbH to produce state-of-the-art weapon systems and platforms through a joint venture arrangement. While such a joint venture would catalyse induction of new technology into the IAF, it would set back indigenous efforts and the move towards self-reliance. Pundits for induction of new technology may counter this argument by stating that the strategy of relying on home grown technologies is riddled with severe penalties of time and cost overruns. Nonetheless, access to technology, transfer of technology and the life cycle support would be the main attributes of MMRCA deal. So why not gainfully utilise such provisions of the deal for optimising the operating concept and design for future IAC programme?
Choice of aircraft available plays a pre-dominant role in finalisation of an aircraft carrier design. It is also said that the carrier design should be ‘future proof’ to enable operation of future aircraft when the carrier enters the commissioned service. In this context, the competing options in the MMRCA deal are Boeing F/A 18E/F Super Hornet, France’s Dassault Aviation’s Rafale and Eurofighter’s Typhoon, if the long term naval perspective were to be added to the deal. While Boeing F/A 18E/F and Dassault’sRafale are proven carrier borne multi role fighter aircraft, Eurofighter in recent times have offered the naval variant of Typhoon fighter aircraft. During the recently concluded Aero India 2011 at Bangalore, Eurofighter have not only exhibited the potential of naval version of Typhoon but have also reportedly expressed willingness to transfer of technology and joint development with HAL. It is, therefore, only logical that the provisions in the Defence Procurement Procedure of ‘Buy and Make Indian’ are utilised to acquire such a fighter for the IAF that also has a naval variant.
The need therefore is for a holistic view in the selection process of MMRCA which should serve the long term national interests by ensuring commonality of inventory of the multi role combat aircraft and standardisation of its infrastructure and support facilities both for IAF and IN, over a time horizon of at least three to four decades. Selection of MiG 29K for operating from INS Vikramaditya was precisely based on the similar consideration, though there was no other option available at that time of finalising that deal. Another important aspect that needs consideration is that the IAF does not have any known plan for future acquisition of MiG series of aircraft, except the upgrades of MiG 27s and MiG 29s. Hence, over a period of time, the infrastructure and support facilities for this category of aircraft would dwindle. Perhaps as a fall back option IN has already floated a global Request for Information (RFI) for multi-role fighter aircraft to operate from IAC. The mother of all deals thus can be a win-win situation for both IAF and IN, as also the entire nation. Besides the qualitative quantum jump to IAF, this deal has the potential of not just rejuvenating the IAC programme in real terms, but it even offers multiple options for multi role carrier borne fighters for IN. If this linkage is viewed holistically it would substantially facilitate matching the aircraft and the carrier design at the initial stages itself, thus providing much needed impetus and continuity to the prestigious indigenous aircraft carrier construction programme.
Rear Admiral Sushil Ramsay (Retd) is Senior Editorial Adviser, SP Guide Publications, New Delhi
Courtesy: SP's Naval Forces, February 2011
This article may be read in conjunction with the following article:
MMRCA: Indian MoD shortlists two
Acquisition of Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft
Space and Cyber Warfare: Threat from China
Article No.: 1859 Date: 31/05/2011
Space and Cyber Warfare: Threat from China by Radhakrishna Raoranga
Cyber space and outer space seem to be receiving more than usual attention from Chinese warfare strategists who believe that victory in future conflict will be determined by the supremacy exercised therein. The Chinese anti-satellite test carried out in 2007 was in keeping with this vision. In this test, China deployed a ground based medium range ballistic missile to hit and destroy an aging weather satellite located in the middle earth orbit. This exercise was a clear pointer to Chinese intentions to use space for realisation of its strategic goals.
Following this anti-satellite test, there was a strident clamour in India to set up a full-fledged aerospace command and step up efforts to ensure the security of Indian space assets that are equipped for both military and civilian uses. Reflecting the Indian Defence Ministry’s thinking on the contours of a plan to help India to prepare the ground for a space war, ‘technology perspective and capability road map’ points out to priority areas including space warfare and ballistic missile defence shield. This roadmap identifies in clear terms the development of an anti-satellite capability ‘for electronic or physical destruction of satellites in both the low earth orbit and geostationary orbit’.
The parameters of a space war are well identified involving as they do physical assets like satellites, launch vehicles, missiles and ground stations. But this is not the case with cyber warfare where the enemy remains incognito. Moreover, it is well-nigh impossible to anticipate the timing and scale of cyber-attack. “We need to be extra vigilant about cyber terrorism because this can inflict attacks of an asymmetric nature and is therefore that much more dangerous,” says Sachin Pilot, Minister of state for Information Technology and Telecommunications.
For many years now, the high security computer systems containing sensitive and strategically important data belonging to India and many other countries have fallen prey to cyber-attacks. It is more than a year now since it was revealed that a group of cyber hackers based in mainland China successfully broke through the high security networks of Indian government agencies including defence and security establishments. While the Indian defence establishment was cognisant of such a possibility, it evidently could not prevent its occurrence. Among the institutions targeted by the Chinese hackers were National Security Council Secretariat, 21 Mountain Artillery Brigade based in North East India and Air Force Station in New Delhi. What is more, computer systems being operated by Indian military colleges were also taken over by the Chinese cyber spies. Some of the documents obtained by Chinese hackers are known to have included the secret assessment of the security situation in Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura as well as Maoist insurgency in various parts of the country. Whether this Chinese cyber spy ring enjoyed the support and blessings of Chinese military establishment or the ruling dispensation in Beijing, no one is sure as yet.
Prior to that, way back in 2008, a meticulous research carried out by a team of tech savvy cyber sleuths at Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto in Canada resulted in uncovering the “devious doings” of a spy ring based in Sichuan province of China. The report, ”Shadows in the Cloud: Investigating Cyber Espionage 2.0”, documents “a complex eco system of cyber espionage that systematically compromised government, business, academia and other computer network systems in India and the Offices of the Tibetan Government in Exile led by Dalai Lama”. It was also revealed that the Chinese cyber spy gang based in mainland China had tapped into classified documents from government and private organisations in more than a hundred countries.
Against this backdrop, the recent unveiling of the plan to set up a Special Cyber Warfare unit named “Blue Team” under the command of People’s Liberation Army(PLA) cannot but be a cause of worry for the Indian defence establishment. Though the stated objective of this unit is to safeguard the computer network of Chinese defence forces, there is every chance of this unit being exploited for mounting cyber-attacks on computer systems of the organisations and countries from across the world to secure information which China considers critical to shaping its long term defence strategy. A report appearing in the Hong Kong based influential English language newspaper South China Morning Post said that by 2020, PLA will train and recruit highly skilled personnel to handle advanced weaponry, cyber warfare and to carry out unconventional security tasks.
USA has established its full-fledged cyber command as a subordinate to Strategic Command in 2009. Meanwhile USA and India are negotiating for signing a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for cyber security cooperation. To this end CERT-IN (Indian Computer Emergency Response Team) and its US counterpart US-CERT are working on finalising the final details of the proposed MOU that would focus on sharing of expertise in artefact analysis, network traffic analysis and exchange of information. In fact, the Cyber Security Strategy released by White House in May this year lays emphasis on international cooperation to strengthen cyber security. As stated by Howard Schmidt, White House cyber security coordinator, ‘To achieve our vision, the US will build an international environment that ensures global networks are open to new innovations, interoperable the world over, secure enough to support people’s work and reliable enough to earn their trust’.
In the ultimate analysis, a cyber-warfare strategy could be employed as the easiest and most inexpensive strategy to cripple a targeted country in a ‘highly non-invasive fashion’. But then efforts are on to devise strategies to blunt the edge of cyber invasion by developing techniques to predict, detect and control anomalous behaviour in cyber space.
CLAWS: Space and Cyber Warfare: Threat from China
Space and Cyber Warfare: Threat from China by Radhakrishna Raoranga
Cyber space and outer space seem to be receiving more than usual attention from Chinese warfare strategists who believe that victory in future conflict will be determined by the supremacy exercised therein. The Chinese anti-satellite test carried out in 2007 was in keeping with this vision. In this test, China deployed a ground based medium range ballistic missile to hit and destroy an aging weather satellite located in the middle earth orbit. This exercise was a clear pointer to Chinese intentions to use space for realisation of its strategic goals.
Following this anti-satellite test, there was a strident clamour in India to set up a full-fledged aerospace command and step up efforts to ensure the security of Indian space assets that are equipped for both military and civilian uses. Reflecting the Indian Defence Ministry’s thinking on the contours of a plan to help India to prepare the ground for a space war, ‘technology perspective and capability road map’ points out to priority areas including space warfare and ballistic missile defence shield. This roadmap identifies in clear terms the development of an anti-satellite capability ‘for electronic or physical destruction of satellites in both the low earth orbit and geostationary orbit’.
The parameters of a space war are well identified involving as they do physical assets like satellites, launch vehicles, missiles and ground stations. But this is not the case with cyber warfare where the enemy remains incognito. Moreover, it is well-nigh impossible to anticipate the timing and scale of cyber-attack. “We need to be extra vigilant about cyber terrorism because this can inflict attacks of an asymmetric nature and is therefore that much more dangerous,” says Sachin Pilot, Minister of state for Information Technology and Telecommunications.
For many years now, the high security computer systems containing sensitive and strategically important data belonging to India and many other countries have fallen prey to cyber-attacks. It is more than a year now since it was revealed that a group of cyber hackers based in mainland China successfully broke through the high security networks of Indian government agencies including defence and security establishments. While the Indian defence establishment was cognisant of such a possibility, it evidently could not prevent its occurrence. Among the institutions targeted by the Chinese hackers were National Security Council Secretariat, 21 Mountain Artillery Brigade based in North East India and Air Force Station in New Delhi. What is more, computer systems being operated by Indian military colleges were also taken over by the Chinese cyber spies. Some of the documents obtained by Chinese hackers are known to have included the secret assessment of the security situation in Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura as well as Maoist insurgency in various parts of the country. Whether this Chinese cyber spy ring enjoyed the support and blessings of Chinese military establishment or the ruling dispensation in Beijing, no one is sure as yet.
Prior to that, way back in 2008, a meticulous research carried out by a team of tech savvy cyber sleuths at Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto in Canada resulted in uncovering the “devious doings” of a spy ring based in Sichuan province of China. The report, ”Shadows in the Cloud: Investigating Cyber Espionage 2.0”, documents “a complex eco system of cyber espionage that systematically compromised government, business, academia and other computer network systems in India and the Offices of the Tibetan Government in Exile led by Dalai Lama”. It was also revealed that the Chinese cyber spy gang based in mainland China had tapped into classified documents from government and private organisations in more than a hundred countries.
Against this backdrop, the recent unveiling of the plan to set up a Special Cyber Warfare unit named “Blue Team” under the command of People’s Liberation Army(PLA) cannot but be a cause of worry for the Indian defence establishment. Though the stated objective of this unit is to safeguard the computer network of Chinese defence forces, there is every chance of this unit being exploited for mounting cyber-attacks on computer systems of the organisations and countries from across the world to secure information which China considers critical to shaping its long term defence strategy. A report appearing in the Hong Kong based influential English language newspaper South China Morning Post said that by 2020, PLA will train and recruit highly skilled personnel to handle advanced weaponry, cyber warfare and to carry out unconventional security tasks.
USA has established its full-fledged cyber command as a subordinate to Strategic Command in 2009. Meanwhile USA and India are negotiating for signing a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for cyber security cooperation. To this end CERT-IN (Indian Computer Emergency Response Team) and its US counterpart US-CERT are working on finalising the final details of the proposed MOU that would focus on sharing of expertise in artefact analysis, network traffic analysis and exchange of information. In fact, the Cyber Security Strategy released by White House in May this year lays emphasis on international cooperation to strengthen cyber security. As stated by Howard Schmidt, White House cyber security coordinator, ‘To achieve our vision, the US will build an international environment that ensures global networks are open to new innovations, interoperable the world over, secure enough to support people’s work and reliable enough to earn their trust’.
In the ultimate analysis, a cyber-warfare strategy could be employed as the easiest and most inexpensive strategy to cripple a targeted country in a ‘highly non-invasive fashion’. But then efforts are on to devise strategies to blunt the edge of cyber invasion by developing techniques to predict, detect and control anomalous behaviour in cyber space.
CLAWS: Space and Cyber Warfare: Threat from China
Tuesday, June 14, 2011
Pakistan’s Generals running international jihadi tourist resort
Pakistan’s General Problem
How Pakistan’s Generals turned the country into an international jihadi tourist resort BY Mohammad Hanif
HOW TO AVOID A COURT MARTIAL: Pervez Musharraf (bottom centre) and his colleagues should have been court martialed for inflicting the Kargil mission on Pakistan—a humiliating defeat and a diplomatic disaster. Instead, he elevated himself to become the country’s President (Photo: AFP)"
What is the last thing you say to your best general when ordering him into a do-or-die mission? A prayer maybe, if you are religiously inclined. A short lecture, underlining the importance of the mission, if you want to keep it businesslike. Or maybe you’ll wish him good luck accompanied by a clicking of the heels and a final salute.
On the night of 5 July 1977 as Operation Fair Play, meant to topple Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s elected government, was about to commence, then Army Chief General Zia ul Haq took aside his right-hand man and Corps Commander of 10th Corps Lieutenant General Faiz Ali Chishti and whispered to him: “Murshid, marwa na daina.” (Guru, don’t get us killed.)
General Zia was indulging in two of his favourite pastimes: spreading his paranoia amongst those around him and sucking up to a junior officer he needed to do his dirty work. General Zia had a talent for that; he could make his juniors feel as if they were indispensable to the running of this world. And he could make his seniors feel like proper gods, as Bhutto found out to his cost.
General Faiz Ali Chishti’s troops didn’t face any resistance that night; not a single shot was fired, and like all military coups in Pakistan, this was also dubbed a ‘bloodless coup’. There was a lot of bloodshed, though, in the following years—in military-managed dungeons, as pro-democracy students were butchered at Thori gate in interior Sindh, hundreds of shoppers were blown up in Karachi’s Bohri Bazar, in Rawalpindi people didn’t even have to leave their houses to get killed as the Army’s ammunition depot blew up raining missiles on a whole city, and finally at Basti Laal Kamal near Bahawalpur, where a plane exploded killing General Zia and most of the Pakistan Army’s high command. General Faiz Ali Chishti had nothing to do with this, of course. General Zia had managed to force his murshid into retirement soon after coming to power. Chishti had started to take that term of endearment—murshid—a bit too seriously and dictators can’t stand anyone who thinks of himself as a kingmaker.
Thirty-four years on, Pakistan is a society divided at many levels. There are those who insist on tracing our history to a certain September day in 2001, and there are those who insist that this country came into being the day the first Muslim landed on the Subcontinent. There are laptop jihadis, liberal fascist and fair-weather revolutionaries. There are Balochi freedom fighters up in the mountains and bullet-riddled bodies of young political activists in obscure Baloch towns. And, of course, there are the members of civil society with a permanent glow around their faces from all the candle-light vigils. All these factions may not agree on anything but there is consensus on one point: General Zia’s coup was a bad idea. When was the last time anyone heard Nawaz Sharif or any of Zia’s numerous protégés thump their chest and say, yes, we need another Zia? When did you see a Pakistan military commander who stood on Zia’s grave and vowed to continue his mission?
It might have taken Pakistanis 34 years to reach this consensus but we finally agree that General Zia’s domestic and foreign policies didn’t do us any good. It brought us automatic weapons, heroin and sectarianism; it also made fortunes for those who dealt in these commodities. And it turned Pakistan into an international jihadi tourist resort.
And yet, somehow, without ever publicly owning up to it, the Army has continued Zia’s mission. Successive Army commanders, despite their access to vast libraries and regular strategic reviews, have never actually acknowledged that the multinational, multicultural jihadi project they started during the Zia era was a mistake. Late Dr Eqbal Ahmed, the Pakistani teacher and activist, once said that the Pakistan Army is brilliant at collecting information but its ability to analyse this information is non-existent.
Looking back at the Zia years, the Pakistan Army seems like one of those mythical monsters that chops off its own head but then grows an identical one and continues on the only course it knows.
In 1999, two days after the Pakistan Army embarked on its Kargil misadventure, Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmed gave a ‘crisp and to the point’ briefing to a group of senior Army and Air Force officers. Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail, who attended the meeting, later wrote that they were told that it was nothing more than a defensive manoeuvre and the Indian Air Force will not get involved at any stage. “Come October, we shall walk into Siachen—to mop up the dead bodies of hundreds of Indians left hungry, out in the cold,” General Mahmud told the meeting. “Perhaps it was the incredulousness of the whole thing that led Air Commodore Abid Rao to famously quip, ‘After this operation, it’s going to be either a Court Martial or Martial Law!’ as we walked out of the briefing room,” Air Commodore Tufail recalled in an essay.
If Rao Abid even contemplated a court martial, he probably lacked leadership qualities because there was only one way out of this mess—a humiliating military defeat, a world-class diplomatic disaster, followed by yet another martial law. The man who should have faced court martial for Kargil appointed himself Pakistan’s President for the next decade.
General Mahmud went on to command ISI, Rao Abid retired as air vice marshal, both went on to find lucrative work in the Army’s vast welfare empire, and Kargil was forgotten as if it was a game of dare between two juveniles who were now beyond caring about who had actually started the game. Nobody remembers that a lot of blood was shed on this pointless Kargil mission. The battles were fierce and some of the men and officers fought so valiantly that two were awarded Pakistan’s highest military honour, Nishan-e-Haidar. There were hundreds of others whose names never made it to any awards list, whose families consoled themselves by saying that their loved ones had been martyred while defending our nation’s borders against our enemy. Nobody pointed out the basic fact that there was no enemy on those mountains before some delusional generals decided that they would like to mop up hundreds of Indian soldiers after starving them to death.
The architect of this mission, the daring General Pervez Musharraf, who didn’t bother to consult his colleagues before ordering his soldiers to their slaughter, doesn’t even have the wits to face a sessions court judge in Pakistan, let alone a court martial. The only people he feels comfortable with are his Facebook friends and that too from the safety of his London apartment. During the whole episode, the nation was told that it wasn’t the regular army that was fighting in Kargil; it was the mujahideen. But those who received their loved ones’ flag-draped coffins had sent their sons and brothers to serve in a professional army, not a freelance lashkar.
The Pakistan Army’s biggest folly has been that under Zia it started outsourcing its basic job—soldiering—to these freelance militants. By blurring the line between a professional soldier—who, at least in theory, is always required to obey his officer, who in turn is governed by a set of laws—and a mujahid, who can pick and choose his cause and his commander depending on his mood, the Pakistan Army has caused immense confusion in its own ranks. Our soldiers are taught to shout Allah-o-Akbar when mocking an attack. In real life, they are ambushed by enemies who shout Allah-o-Akbar even louder. Can we blame them if they dither in their response? When the Pakistan Navy’s main aviation base in Karachi, PNS Mehran, was attacked, Navy Chief Admiral Nauman Bashir told us that the attackers were ‘very well trained’. We weren’t sure if he was giving us a lazy excuse or admiring the creation of his institution. When naval officials told journalists that the attackers were ‘as good as our own commandoes’ were they giving themselves a backhanded compliment?
In the wake of the attacks on PNS Mehran in Karachi, some TV channels have pulled out an old war anthem sung by late Madam Noor Jehan and have started to play it in the backdrop of images of young, hopeful faces of slain officers and men. Written by the legendary teacher and poet Sufi Tabassum, the anthem carries a clear and stark warning: Aiay puttar hatantay nahin wickday, na labhdi phir bazaar kuray (You can’t buy these brave sons from shops, don’t go looking for them in bazaars).
While Sindhis and Balochis have mostly composed songs of rebellion, Punjabi popular culture has often lionised its karnails and jarnails and even an odd dholsipahi. The Pakistan Army, throughout its history, has refused to take advice from politicians as well as thinking professionals from its own ranks. It has never listened to historians and sometimes ignored even the esteemed religious scholars it frequently uses to whip up public sentiments for its dirty wars. But the biggest strategic mistake it has made is that it has not even taken advice from the late Madam Noor Jehan, one of the Army’s most ardent fans in Pakistan’s history. You can probably ignore Dr Eqbal Ahmed’s advice and survive in this country but you ignore Madam at your own peril.
Since the Pakistan Army’s high command is dominated by Punjabi-speaking generals, it’s difficult to fathom what it is about this advice that they didn’t understand. Any which way you translate it, the message is loud and clear. And lyrical: soldiers are not to be bought and sold like a commodity. “Na awaian takran maar kuray” (That search is futile, like butting your head against a brick wall), Noor Jehan goes on to rhapsodise.
For decades, the Army has not only shopped for these private puttars in the bazaars, it also set up factories to manufacture them. It raised whole armies of them. When you raise Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish Mohammed, Sipahe Sahaba, Sipahe Mohammed, Lashker Jhangvi, Al- Badar Mujahideen, others encouraged by the thriving market place will go ahead and start outfits like Anjuman Tahuffuze Khatame Nabuwat and Anjuman Tahuffuze Namoos-e-Aiyasha. It’s not just Kashmir and Afghanistan and Chechnya they will want to liberate, they will also go back in time and seek revenge for a perceived slur that may or may not have been cast by someone more than 1,300 years ago in a country far far away.
As if the Army’s sprawling shopping mall of private puttars in Pakistan wasn’t enough, it actively encouraged import and export of these commodities, even branched out into providing rest and recreation facilities for the ones who wanted a break. The outsourcing of Pakistan’s military strategy has reached a point where mujahids have their own mujahids to do their job, and inevitably at the end of the supply chain are those faceless and poor teenagers with explosives strapped to their torsos regularly marched out to blow up other poor kids.
Two days before the Americans killed Osama bin Laden and took away his bullet-riddled body, General Kiyani addressed Army cadets at Kakul. After declaring a victory of sorts over the militants, he gave our nation a stark choice. And before the nation could even begin to weigh its pros and cons, he went ahead and decided for them: we shall never bargain our honour for prosperity. As things stand, most people in Pakistan have neither honour nor prosperity and will easily settle for their little world not blowing up every day.
The question people really want to ask General Kiyani is that if he and his Army officer colleagues can have both honour and prosperity, why can’t we the people have a tiny bit of both?
The Army and its advocates in the media often worry about Pakistan’s image, as if we are not suffering from a long-term serious illness but a seasonal bout of acne that just needs better skin care. The Pakistan Army, over the years, has cultivated this image of 180 million people with nuclear devices strapped to their collective body threatening to take the world down with it. We may not be able to take the world down with us; the world might defang us or try to calm us down by appealing to our imagined Sufi side. But the fact remains that Pakistan as a nation is paying the price for our generals’ insistence on acting, in Asma Jahangir’s frank but accurate description, like duffers.
And demanding medals and golf resorts for being such duffers consistently for such a long time.
What people really want to do at this point is put an arm around our military commanders’ shoulders, take them aside and whisper in their ears: “Murshid, marwa na daina.” +++
Mohammed Hanif is the author of A Case of Exploding Mangoes (2008), his first novel, a satire on the death of General Zia ul Haq Pakistan’s General Problem
How Pakistan’s Generals turned the country into an international jihadi tourist resort BY Mohammad Hanif
What is the last thing you say to your best general when ordering him into a do-or-die mission? A prayer maybe, if you are religiously inclined. A short lecture, underlining the importance of the mission, if you want to keep it businesslike. Or maybe you’ll wish him good luck accompanied by a clicking of the heels and a final salute.
On the night of 5 July 1977 as Operation Fair Play, meant to topple Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s elected government, was about to commence, then Army Chief General Zia ul Haq took aside his right-hand man and Corps Commander of 10th Corps Lieutenant General Faiz Ali Chishti and whispered to him: “Murshid, marwa na daina.” (Guru, don’t get us killed.)
General Zia was indulging in two of his favourite pastimes: spreading his paranoia amongst those around him and sucking up to a junior officer he needed to do his dirty work. General Zia had a talent for that; he could make his juniors feel as if they were indispensable to the running of this world. And he could make his seniors feel like proper gods, as Bhutto found out to his cost.
General Faiz Ali Chishti’s troops didn’t face any resistance that night; not a single shot was fired, and like all military coups in Pakistan, this was also dubbed a ‘bloodless coup’. There was a lot of bloodshed, though, in the following years—in military-managed dungeons, as pro-democracy students were butchered at Thori gate in interior Sindh, hundreds of shoppers were blown up in Karachi’s Bohri Bazar, in Rawalpindi people didn’t even have to leave their houses to get killed as the Army’s ammunition depot blew up raining missiles on a whole city, and finally at Basti Laal Kamal near Bahawalpur, where a plane exploded killing General Zia and most of the Pakistan Army’s high command. General Faiz Ali Chishti had nothing to do with this, of course. General Zia had managed to force his murshid into retirement soon after coming to power. Chishti had started to take that term of endearment—murshid—a bit too seriously and dictators can’t stand anyone who thinks of himself as a kingmaker.
Thirty-four years on, Pakistan is a society divided at many levels. There are those who insist on tracing our history to a certain September day in 2001, and there are those who insist that this country came into being the day the first Muslim landed on the Subcontinent. There are laptop jihadis, liberal fascist and fair-weather revolutionaries. There are Balochi freedom fighters up in the mountains and bullet-riddled bodies of young political activists in obscure Baloch towns. And, of course, there are the members of civil society with a permanent glow around their faces from all the candle-light vigils. All these factions may not agree on anything but there is consensus on one point: General Zia’s coup was a bad idea. When was the last time anyone heard Nawaz Sharif or any of Zia’s numerous protégés thump their chest and say, yes, we need another Zia? When did you see a Pakistan military commander who stood on Zia’s grave and vowed to continue his mission?
It might have taken Pakistanis 34 years to reach this consensus but we finally agree that General Zia’s domestic and foreign policies didn’t do us any good. It brought us automatic weapons, heroin and sectarianism; it also made fortunes for those who dealt in these commodities. And it turned Pakistan into an international jihadi tourist resort.
And yet, somehow, without ever publicly owning up to it, the Army has continued Zia’s mission. Successive Army commanders, despite their access to vast libraries and regular strategic reviews, have never actually acknowledged that the multinational, multicultural jihadi project they started during the Zia era was a mistake. Late Dr Eqbal Ahmed, the Pakistani teacher and activist, once said that the Pakistan Army is brilliant at collecting information but its ability to analyse this information is non-existent.
Looking back at the Zia years, the Pakistan Army seems like one of those mythical monsters that chops off its own head but then grows an identical one and continues on the only course it knows.
In 1999, two days after the Pakistan Army embarked on its Kargil misadventure, Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmed gave a ‘crisp and to the point’ briefing to a group of senior Army and Air Force officers. Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail, who attended the meeting, later wrote that they were told that it was nothing more than a defensive manoeuvre and the Indian Air Force will not get involved at any stage. “Come October, we shall walk into Siachen—to mop up the dead bodies of hundreds of Indians left hungry, out in the cold,” General Mahmud told the meeting. “Perhaps it was the incredulousness of the whole thing that led Air Commodore Abid Rao to famously quip, ‘After this operation, it’s going to be either a Court Martial or Martial Law!’ as we walked out of the briefing room,” Air Commodore Tufail recalled in an essay.
If Rao Abid even contemplated a court martial, he probably lacked leadership qualities because there was only one way out of this mess—a humiliating military defeat, a world-class diplomatic disaster, followed by yet another martial law. The man who should have faced court martial for Kargil appointed himself Pakistan’s President for the next decade.
General Mahmud went on to command ISI, Rao Abid retired as air vice marshal, both went on to find lucrative work in the Army’s vast welfare empire, and Kargil was forgotten as if it was a game of dare between two juveniles who were now beyond caring about who had actually started the game. Nobody remembers that a lot of blood was shed on this pointless Kargil mission. The battles were fierce and some of the men and officers fought so valiantly that two were awarded Pakistan’s highest military honour, Nishan-e-Haidar. There were hundreds of others whose names never made it to any awards list, whose families consoled themselves by saying that their loved ones had been martyred while defending our nation’s borders against our enemy. Nobody pointed out the basic fact that there was no enemy on those mountains before some delusional generals decided that they would like to mop up hundreds of Indian soldiers after starving them to death.
The architect of this mission, the daring General Pervez Musharraf, who didn’t bother to consult his colleagues before ordering his soldiers to their slaughter, doesn’t even have the wits to face a sessions court judge in Pakistan, let alone a court martial. The only people he feels comfortable with are his Facebook friends and that too from the safety of his London apartment. During the whole episode, the nation was told that it wasn’t the regular army that was fighting in Kargil; it was the mujahideen. But those who received their loved ones’ flag-draped coffins had sent their sons and brothers to serve in a professional army, not a freelance lashkar.
The Pakistan Army’s biggest folly has been that under Zia it started outsourcing its basic job—soldiering—to these freelance militants. By blurring the line between a professional soldier—who, at least in theory, is always required to obey his officer, who in turn is governed by a set of laws—and a mujahid, who can pick and choose his cause and his commander depending on his mood, the Pakistan Army has caused immense confusion in its own ranks. Our soldiers are taught to shout Allah-o-Akbar when mocking an attack. In real life, they are ambushed by enemies who shout Allah-o-Akbar even louder. Can we blame them if they dither in their response? When the Pakistan Navy’s main aviation base in Karachi, PNS Mehran, was attacked, Navy Chief Admiral Nauman Bashir told us that the attackers were ‘very well trained’. We weren’t sure if he was giving us a lazy excuse or admiring the creation of his institution. When naval officials told journalists that the attackers were ‘as good as our own commandoes’ were they giving themselves a backhanded compliment?
In the wake of the attacks on PNS Mehran in Karachi, some TV channels have pulled out an old war anthem sung by late Madam Noor Jehan and have started to play it in the backdrop of images of young, hopeful faces of slain officers and men. Written by the legendary teacher and poet Sufi Tabassum, the anthem carries a clear and stark warning: Aiay puttar hatantay nahin wickday, na labhdi phir bazaar kuray (You can’t buy these brave sons from shops, don’t go looking for them in bazaars).
While Sindhis and Balochis have mostly composed songs of rebellion, Punjabi popular culture has often lionised its karnails and jarnails and even an odd dholsipahi. The Pakistan Army, throughout its history, has refused to take advice from politicians as well as thinking professionals from its own ranks. It has never listened to historians and sometimes ignored even the esteemed religious scholars it frequently uses to whip up public sentiments for its dirty wars. But the biggest strategic mistake it has made is that it has not even taken advice from the late Madam Noor Jehan, one of the Army’s most ardent fans in Pakistan’s history. You can probably ignore Dr Eqbal Ahmed’s advice and survive in this country but you ignore Madam at your own peril.
Since the Pakistan Army’s high command is dominated by Punjabi-speaking generals, it’s difficult to fathom what it is about this advice that they didn’t understand. Any which way you translate it, the message is loud and clear. And lyrical: soldiers are not to be bought and sold like a commodity. “Na awaian takran maar kuray” (That search is futile, like butting your head against a brick wall), Noor Jehan goes on to rhapsodise.
For decades, the Army has not only shopped for these private puttars in the bazaars, it also set up factories to manufacture them. It raised whole armies of them. When you raise Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish Mohammed, Sipahe Sahaba, Sipahe Mohammed, Lashker Jhangvi, Al- Badar Mujahideen, others encouraged by the thriving market place will go ahead and start outfits like Anjuman Tahuffuze Khatame Nabuwat and Anjuman Tahuffuze Namoos-e-Aiyasha. It’s not just Kashmir and Afghanistan and Chechnya they will want to liberate, they will also go back in time and seek revenge for a perceived slur that may or may not have been cast by someone more than 1,300 years ago in a country far far away.
As if the Army’s sprawling shopping mall of private puttars in Pakistan wasn’t enough, it actively encouraged import and export of these commodities, even branched out into providing rest and recreation facilities for the ones who wanted a break. The outsourcing of Pakistan’s military strategy has reached a point where mujahids have their own mujahids to do their job, and inevitably at the end of the supply chain are those faceless and poor teenagers with explosives strapped to their torsos regularly marched out to blow up other poor kids.
Two days before the Americans killed Osama bin Laden and took away his bullet-riddled body, General Kiyani addressed Army cadets at Kakul. After declaring a victory of sorts over the militants, he gave our nation a stark choice. And before the nation could even begin to weigh its pros and cons, he went ahead and decided for them: we shall never bargain our honour for prosperity. As things stand, most people in Pakistan have neither honour nor prosperity and will easily settle for their little world not blowing up every day.
The question people really want to ask General Kiyani is that if he and his Army officer colleagues can have both honour and prosperity, why can’t we the people have a tiny bit of both?
The Army and its advocates in the media often worry about Pakistan’s image, as if we are not suffering from a long-term serious illness but a seasonal bout of acne that just needs better skin care. The Pakistan Army, over the years, has cultivated this image of 180 million people with nuclear devices strapped to their collective body threatening to take the world down with it. We may not be able to take the world down with us; the world might defang us or try to calm us down by appealing to our imagined Sufi side. But the fact remains that Pakistan as a nation is paying the price for our generals’ insistence on acting, in Asma Jahangir’s frank but accurate description, like duffers.
And demanding medals and golf resorts for being such duffers consistently for such a long time.
What people really want to do at this point is put an arm around our military commanders’ shoulders, take them aside and whisper in their ears: “Murshid, marwa na daina.” +++
Mohammed Hanif is the author of A Case of Exploding Mangoes (2008), his first novel, a satire on the death of General Zia ul Haq Pakistan’s General Problem
Lessons from Chicago Terror Trial
26/11 case: Three lessons from Chicago trial of Tahawur Rana
by Brahma Chellaney Jun 13, 2011, 08.28am IST
The verdict in the Chicago trial, which coincided with CIA Director Leon Panetta's unannounced departure for Pakistan, holds three important lessons for India. The first lesson is that it was wrong on New Delhi's part to expect the US to try and legally corner the ISI for its role in 26/11 or to help bring to justice the perpetrators of those grisly attacks. The US has its own foreign-policy interests and compulsions. Since its daring raid that killed Osama bin Laden, it has sent four high-level delegations to Islamabad , including one led by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
The flurry of visits has been intended to repair its relationship with — not discipline — Pakistan. In fact, Panetta, who is due to replace Robert Gates as defence secretary on July 1, delivered a positive message to Islamabad that the US wants to rebuild a trusting, constructive relationship. Washington may be unhappy with Pakistan's counterterrorism efforts. But the last thing it wants to do is to spotlight the ISI's terror role in a third country, India, when the CIA needs the ISI more than ever to cut a peace deal with the Afghan Taliban, whose top leadership is ensconced in Pakistan.
The second lesson is about the Chicago trial itself. The prosecution — the Federal Bureau of Investigation — had a subtle political focus. It was more interested in securing Tahawwur Hussain Rana's conviction on the Denmark-related charge than on the more-serious 26/11 charge. Furthermore, the prosecution directly and through its star witness David Headley sought to shield the ISI brass from getting linked with 26/11. A junior ISI functionary, one Major Iqbal who served as Headley's handler, was indicted and made the fall guy, without any effort by the prosecutors to delve into the issue whether the ISI's leadership was in the loop on the 26/11 operation . Headley actually contradicted himself in his testimony, claiming the ISI brass was not aware of the operation, yet admitting that Iqbal's commanding officer and the wing of the ISI they worked for knew about the 26/11 planning.
Although the case helped highlight the impunity with which serving and retired Pakistani military officers have been aiding Lashkare-Taiba , the prosecution was reluctant to go beyond the role played by Iqbal. The prosecution also declined to examine the military antecedents of a Lashkar leader, Sajid Mir, who was caught on tape directing the killings in Mumbai by phone during the terrorist strikes. The prosecution, of course, did not examine the key question — whether 26/11 could have been prevented had the FBI stopped Headley's terrorist activities in time? Despite having received six warnings over seven years about Headley's Lashkar connections, the FBI did not arrest him because he was working as an US agent.
Headley, a former drug trafficker with a history of previous arrests in the 1980s and 1990s, reportedly continued to work as a paid US informant even beyond 26/11 until evidence surfaced in October 2009 of his involvement in a plot to target a Danish newspaper that had published cartoons of Prophet Muhammad. It was thus no accident that the prosecution buried material evidence about Headley's ties with US law-enforcement agencies. This has left the key issue hanging: Was 26/11 preventable? The verdict may reopen old wounds between India and the US over Headley, including the failure to arrest him in time or share with India sooner the intelligence the US had on him. And even after he was arrested in Chicago in 2009, it took months before America granted Indian investigators limited access to question him. Headley's plea bargain has saved him the death penalty and extradition to India.
The 26/11 acquittal sets back the plaintiffs' case against ISI in the New York civil suit — in which the ISI chief has been named as a defendant — and facilitates Islamabad's bid to strike a deal with Washington in that matter. The third lesson is about India's own lack of response to 26/11. India did not take the smallest of small steps after 26/11. Instead it responded by fashioning a new counterterrorism tool — dossier bombing. It also delivered lists of Pakistan-based terrorists. Can such bureaucratic exercises make Pakistan reassess its strategic calculus and abandon a foreign policy that relies on jihadist adventurism ?
The answer came recently from the Pakistani foreign secretary , who publicly mocked the dossiers as interesting "literature" but not evidence. In fact, after bin Laden's killing, he heaped scorn on India's demand that Islamabad arrest and prosecute all the 26/11 perpetrators, calling the demand "a familiar line" , "outdated" , and a line of thinking "mired in a mindset that is neither realistic nor productive" . Islamabad indeed has had the last laugh: The Pakistan-based masterminds of 26/11 remain untouched and the terrorist-training camps near the border with India continue to operate, yet New Delhi has returned to square one by resuming political dialogue at all levels.
US Assistant Secretary Robert Blake recently thanked India for resuming "full comprehensive dialogue" with Pakistan by dropping both its conditions — "that those who had been responsible for the Mumbai bombings had to be brought to justice and the trials had to be completed ; and then that there had to be visible progress by the Pakistanis to stop cross-border infiltration" . The role of the Pak state agencies, including the ISI and navy, in scripting 26/11 is clear. It is time the culpability of Indian decision-makers in letting Pak off the hook over 26/11 came under public spotlight.
26/11 case: Three lessons from Chicago trial of Tahawur Rana
by Brahma Chellaney Jun 13, 2011, 08.28am IST
The verdict in the Chicago trial, which coincided with CIA Director Leon Panetta's unannounced departure for Pakistan, holds three important lessons for India. The first lesson is that it was wrong on New Delhi's part to expect the US to try and legally corner the ISI for its role in 26/11 or to help bring to justice the perpetrators of those grisly attacks. The US has its own foreign-policy interests and compulsions. Since its daring raid that killed Osama bin Laden, it has sent four high-level delegations to Islamabad , including one led by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
The flurry of visits has been intended to repair its relationship with — not discipline — Pakistan. In fact, Panetta, who is due to replace Robert Gates as defence secretary on July 1, delivered a positive message to Islamabad that the US wants to rebuild a trusting, constructive relationship. Washington may be unhappy with Pakistan's counterterrorism efforts. But the last thing it wants to do is to spotlight the ISI's terror role in a third country, India, when the CIA needs the ISI more than ever to cut a peace deal with the Afghan Taliban, whose top leadership is ensconced in Pakistan.
The second lesson is about the Chicago trial itself. The prosecution — the Federal Bureau of Investigation — had a subtle political focus. It was more interested in securing Tahawwur Hussain Rana's conviction on the Denmark-related charge than on the more-serious 26/11 charge. Furthermore, the prosecution directly and through its star witness David Headley sought to shield the ISI brass from getting linked with 26/11. A junior ISI functionary, one Major Iqbal who served as Headley's handler, was indicted and made the fall guy, without any effort by the prosecutors to delve into the issue whether the ISI's leadership was in the loop on the 26/11 operation . Headley actually contradicted himself in his testimony, claiming the ISI brass was not aware of the operation, yet admitting that Iqbal's commanding officer and the wing of the ISI they worked for knew about the 26/11 planning.
Although the case helped highlight the impunity with which serving and retired Pakistani military officers have been aiding Lashkare-Taiba , the prosecution was reluctant to go beyond the role played by Iqbal. The prosecution also declined to examine the military antecedents of a Lashkar leader, Sajid Mir, who was caught on tape directing the killings in Mumbai by phone during the terrorist strikes. The prosecution, of course, did not examine the key question — whether 26/11 could have been prevented had the FBI stopped Headley's terrorist activities in time? Despite having received six warnings over seven years about Headley's Lashkar connections, the FBI did not arrest him because he was working as an US agent.
Headley, a former drug trafficker with a history of previous arrests in the 1980s and 1990s, reportedly continued to work as a paid US informant even beyond 26/11 until evidence surfaced in October 2009 of his involvement in a plot to target a Danish newspaper that had published cartoons of Prophet Muhammad. It was thus no accident that the prosecution buried material evidence about Headley's ties with US law-enforcement agencies. This has left the key issue hanging: Was 26/11 preventable? The verdict may reopen old wounds between India and the US over Headley, including the failure to arrest him in time or share with India sooner the intelligence the US had on him. And even after he was arrested in Chicago in 2009, it took months before America granted Indian investigators limited access to question him. Headley's plea bargain has saved him the death penalty and extradition to India.
The 26/11 acquittal sets back the plaintiffs' case against ISI in the New York civil suit — in which the ISI chief has been named as a defendant — and facilitates Islamabad's bid to strike a deal with Washington in that matter. The third lesson is about India's own lack of response to 26/11. India did not take the smallest of small steps after 26/11. Instead it responded by fashioning a new counterterrorism tool — dossier bombing. It also delivered lists of Pakistan-based terrorists. Can such bureaucratic exercises make Pakistan reassess its strategic calculus and abandon a foreign policy that relies on jihadist adventurism ?
The answer came recently from the Pakistani foreign secretary , who publicly mocked the dossiers as interesting "literature" but not evidence. In fact, after bin Laden's killing, he heaped scorn on India's demand that Islamabad arrest and prosecute all the 26/11 perpetrators, calling the demand "a familiar line" , "outdated" , and a line of thinking "mired in a mindset that is neither realistic nor productive" . Islamabad indeed has had the last laugh: The Pakistan-based masterminds of 26/11 remain untouched and the terrorist-training camps near the border with India continue to operate, yet New Delhi has returned to square one by resuming political dialogue at all levels.
US Assistant Secretary Robert Blake recently thanked India for resuming "full comprehensive dialogue" with Pakistan by dropping both its conditions — "that those who had been responsible for the Mumbai bombings had to be brought to justice and the trials had to be completed ; and then that there had to be visible progress by the Pakistanis to stop cross-border infiltration" . The role of the Pak state agencies, including the ISI and navy, in scripting 26/11 is clear. It is time the culpability of Indian decision-makers in letting Pak off the hook over 26/11 came under public spotlight.
26/11 case: Three lessons from Chicago trial of Tahawur Rana
Monday, June 13, 2011
Pakistan: Accountability of Military Inc?
Posted on Sunday, June 12, 2011 in The Friday Times (Editorial)
Najam Sethi E d i t o r i a l
The terrorist attacks on GHQ last year and the Mehran Naval Base last month were outrageous examples of terrorist efficiency and motivation as opposed to ISI incompetence and military ill-preparedness. The US Navy Seal raid to extract Osama bin Laden from a compound in Abbottabad was deeply humiliating as well. Heads should have rolled. But the military will not even consider an independent commission of inquiry to unearth the facts. No wonder its credibility and sacred-cow status have taken a mighty hit. Within the armed forces, officers are standing up to question and confront their superiors. Outside, an angry public wants to know why we are spending half our tax resources on equipping the military with F-16s and BMWs when it can’t even protect itself, let alone defend the nation. This questioning of Military Incorporated is unprecedented.
More significantly, the civilian opposition is up in arms. It is demanding an informed debate over the military’s national security doctrines – particularly with reference to the obsession with, and fear of, “arch-enemy India” – that have spawned such self-serving budgetary outlays and an arms race at the expense of the social welfare of Pakistanis for six decades. The indignant argument that criticism of the military is “unpatriotic” or serves the interests of the “enemy” doesn’t wash any more. Indeed, the term “establishment”, used hitherto to refer obliquely to the military so as not to offend it, is rapidly going out of fashion. People are not afraid to call a spade a spade.
Ominously, the ISI’s mythology of power is now being deconstructed and exposed as being undeserved. The “agencies” are out of fashion, the ISI is squarely in the spotlight. The premeditated abduction and torture of journalist Saleem Shehzad, which led to his death, has been bravely laid by the media and opposition at the door of the ISI and not some invisible “agency”. The government’s silence – in not establishing a credible commission of inquiry – has also compromised the ISI’s position. This is remarkable, not because of the pathetic response in self-defense elicited from unnamed spokesmen of the ISI but because a conviction has now taken root in the public imagination that the ISI should not be beyond the pale of the law and accountability. The opposition has gone so far in parliament as to demand an oversight of its functions, duties, responsibilities and budgets. This is a far cry from a demand by the media and opposition not so long ago to shield and protect the ISI and its DG from the “conspiratorial” tentacles of the PPP government and its ubiquitous interior minister, Rehman Malik, who sought to bring the ISI’s internal political wing dedicated to political machinations under civilian control.
All this has happened because of two new factors that are not sufficiently imagined or understood by the military and ISI. One is the rise of a fiercely competitive and free media that is rapidly coming of age and will not allow itself to be manipulated wholesale in the “patriotic national interest”, a term that is constantly being re-evaluated in light of changing realities. The other is the revival of a chief justice and supreme court that are acutely aware of the civil burden imposed by their historic and popular enthronement. Neither will countenance any political or military oversight of their own sense of freedom and function. So if the military cannot rely on the troika of army chief, president and prime minister for political leverage of government – because the president and prime minister are one now – it is even more problematic to try and manipulate the media and SC merely on the yardstick of “patriotism” and “national interest”. The military’s woes are compounded by the fact that, for the first time in history, a popular Punjabi “son of the soil” like Nawaz Sharif, whose PML is a veritable creature of the predominantly Punjabi-origin military itself, has turned around and openly challenged its supremacy, arrogance and lack of accountability. The “Punjabi establishment” – meaning the civil-military power combine that has ruled Pakistan since independence — is therefore openly divided. The irony of history is that it is a Sindhi politician (Asif Zardari) who is opportunistically lending his shoulder to the military as it braces for fresh buffetings at home.
But that is just the beginning of a new story. The international establishment – principally the USA and EU – that has nurtured and molly-coddled the Pakistani military for six decades with money and weapons is also at the end of its tether. The “strategic partnership” mantra is dead. Washington, like Islamabad, doesn’t trust Rawalpindi either as long-term partner or ally. It is only a matter of time before the civilians in Pakistan and those in DC or Brussels make common cause for mutual benefit. Indeed, if the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill were to be floated anew with clauses enjoining civilian supremacy over the military, there would not even be conscientious objectors today.
The Pakistan military should see the writing on the wall. It must hunker down and become subservient to civilian rule and persuasion instead of embarking on new misadventures in the region like the proverbial Pied Piper. The road to hell is always paved with self-serving intentions.
Accountability of Military Inc
Najam Sethi E d i t o r i a l
The terrorist attacks on GHQ last year and the Mehran Naval Base last month were outrageous examples of terrorist efficiency and motivation as opposed to ISI incompetence and military ill-preparedness. The US Navy Seal raid to extract Osama bin Laden from a compound in Abbottabad was deeply humiliating as well. Heads should have rolled. But the military will not even consider an independent commission of inquiry to unearth the facts. No wonder its credibility and sacred-cow status have taken a mighty hit. Within the armed forces, officers are standing up to question and confront their superiors. Outside, an angry public wants to know why we are spending half our tax resources on equipping the military with F-16s and BMWs when it can’t even protect itself, let alone defend the nation. This questioning of Military Incorporated is unprecedented.
More significantly, the civilian opposition is up in arms. It is demanding an informed debate over the military’s national security doctrines – particularly with reference to the obsession with, and fear of, “arch-enemy India” – that have spawned such self-serving budgetary outlays and an arms race at the expense of the social welfare of Pakistanis for six decades. The indignant argument that criticism of the military is “unpatriotic” or serves the interests of the “enemy” doesn’t wash any more. Indeed, the term “establishment”, used hitherto to refer obliquely to the military so as not to offend it, is rapidly going out of fashion. People are not afraid to call a spade a spade.
Ominously, the ISI’s mythology of power is now being deconstructed and exposed as being undeserved. The “agencies” are out of fashion, the ISI is squarely in the spotlight. The premeditated abduction and torture of journalist Saleem Shehzad, which led to his death, has been bravely laid by the media and opposition at the door of the ISI and not some invisible “agency”. The government’s silence – in not establishing a credible commission of inquiry – has also compromised the ISI’s position. This is remarkable, not because of the pathetic response in self-defense elicited from unnamed spokesmen of the ISI but because a conviction has now taken root in the public imagination that the ISI should not be beyond the pale of the law and accountability. The opposition has gone so far in parliament as to demand an oversight of its functions, duties, responsibilities and budgets. This is a far cry from a demand by the media and opposition not so long ago to shield and protect the ISI and its DG from the “conspiratorial” tentacles of the PPP government and its ubiquitous interior minister, Rehman Malik, who sought to bring the ISI’s internal political wing dedicated to political machinations under civilian control.
All this has happened because of two new factors that are not sufficiently imagined or understood by the military and ISI. One is the rise of a fiercely competitive and free media that is rapidly coming of age and will not allow itself to be manipulated wholesale in the “patriotic national interest”, a term that is constantly being re-evaluated in light of changing realities. The other is the revival of a chief justice and supreme court that are acutely aware of the civil burden imposed by their historic and popular enthronement. Neither will countenance any political or military oversight of their own sense of freedom and function. So if the military cannot rely on the troika of army chief, president and prime minister for political leverage of government – because the president and prime minister are one now – it is even more problematic to try and manipulate the media and SC merely on the yardstick of “patriotism” and “national interest”. The military’s woes are compounded by the fact that, for the first time in history, a popular Punjabi “son of the soil” like Nawaz Sharif, whose PML is a veritable creature of the predominantly Punjabi-origin military itself, has turned around and openly challenged its supremacy, arrogance and lack of accountability. The “Punjabi establishment” – meaning the civil-military power combine that has ruled Pakistan since independence — is therefore openly divided. The irony of history is that it is a Sindhi politician (Asif Zardari) who is opportunistically lending his shoulder to the military as it braces for fresh buffetings at home.
But that is just the beginning of a new story. The international establishment – principally the USA and EU – that has nurtured and molly-coddled the Pakistani military for six decades with money and weapons is also at the end of its tether. The “strategic partnership” mantra is dead. Washington, like Islamabad, doesn’t trust Rawalpindi either as long-term partner or ally. It is only a matter of time before the civilians in Pakistan and those in DC or Brussels make common cause for mutual benefit. Indeed, if the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill were to be floated anew with clauses enjoining civilian supremacy over the military, there would not even be conscientious objectors today.
The Pakistan military should see the writing on the wall. It must hunker down and become subservient to civilian rule and persuasion instead of embarking on new misadventures in the region like the proverbial Pied Piper. The road to hell is always paved with self-serving intentions.
Accountability of Military Inc
Sunday, June 12, 2011
How India Deals with Pakistan and China
How India Deals with Pakistan and China by Kanwal Sibal, Member Advisory Board, VIF
It might be interesting to analyse our diplomatic handling of China and Pakistan on a comparative basis. These two countries pose the most difficult and complex foreign policy challenges to us. Is our approach to both countries similar, or there are differences in the way we engage them? Are the weaknesses of our policy making towards Pakistan reflected in our dealings with China too? Does public opinion have greater influence on policy making towards one country or the other? Does our shared history, culture and language with the people of what is now Pakistan constitute a dimension of our relationship that makes hard, unsentimental pursuit of national interest with that country more difficult than in the case of China, or is it that in the latter case too some romanticism about the two biggest countries of Asia, with no historical enmity, coming together to shape the future history of the continent and the world at large play a softening role, quite apart from the pro-China ideological tilt of a section of our political class? Are we diplomatically handling one country better than the other?
Any sensible policy towards a country has to be based not on some a priori principles but on objective factors, the history of the relationship, the place the other country has in the larger strategic context, the role of other powers and, most importantly, the specific nature of the issues on the table. Yes, policy makers can always bear in mind some Kautilya like general principles of state conduct, which in a broad sense can provide guidance, but these have been already been long internalized in policy making and do not provide much help in addressing concrete contentious issues in negotiations. With China we have the Panch Sheel principles, but these have hardly governed China’s actual conduct towards us. With Pakistan we have no over-arching principles supposedly governing our relationship, with no better or worse results for our bilateral ties.
Our policy options in dealing with Pakistan or China have to be guided by several underlying considerations. Our core objective has to be to build a peaceful and friendly relationship with both countries. But this cannot be a unilateral exercise. If the other side is unwilling to meet us half way or lays down unacceptable conditions for resolving differences, we cannot move forward towards our desired goal. If conditions of conflict remain, what do we do when faced with grave provocations? Do we retaliate or hold our hand? At what level do we keep the threshold of our tolerance? To decide this we have to evaluate the costs to us of a military conflict.
India has today reached for the first time in its modern history a point when it is veritably set to become a major power internationally. Our economy is growing at the rate of almost 9%, our corporate sector has given competitive depth to our economy and is now investing all over the globe, our huge economy with tremendous backlogs in infrastructure development that must be bridged provides great scope for India to rise economically further with domestic effort and foreign investment. Our massive manpower resources, adequately trained to meet internal development needs are also an international resource as they can meet the needs of the ageing economies of the West and Japan. Our aspiration to become a permanent member of the Security Council reflects our confidence in our growing international stature.
In this background should India risk entering into a military conflict with either power even if our interests are strongly challenged? The cost of a conflict will impose severer penalties on India as its steady rise at a critical juncture will be arrested, whereas a failing Pakistan will merely slide from bad to worse. Our relations with the Muslim world, from where we get most of our energy, will come under strain. Pakistan’s traditional friends in the West, however frustrated they may be currently with its duplicitous conduct on the issue of combatting extremist groups active in Afghanistan from inside Pakistan, will become active on Pakistan’s behalf to our discomfiture. The threat of a nuclear conflict in South Asia will be played up, reviving international concerns and adversely affecting investment flows into India. With Pakistan the potential of conflict escalation cannot be discounted given its irrational hostility towards us, aggravated by growing extremism within society there.
The economic arguments against any conflict apply to China too, as we need to project stability in our region, not instability and uncertainty that an atmosphere of military tensions creates. Apart from that, the India-China trade relationship at $60 billion has grown phenomenally, making China India’s biggest trade partner. A pro-China corporate lobby has risen in India for the first time, including in key sectors such as power and telecommunications. While this gives China a platform to influence Indian policies in its favour, its own stakes in the economic relationship have grown, though the manner in which China can separate political hostility from intensive economic engagement is instructive, as its treatment of Japan shows.
In China’s case the cost of a conflict with India will weigh heavily on it too in diverse ways, particularly as the fiction of its peaceful rise, already exposed by its assertiveness in the South China Sea on territorial issues, will get punctured further. A conflict with India will go contrary to China’s desire for a peaceful periphery for its economic modernization. It will also compromise the mutually beneficial cooperation with India on global issues such as Climate Change or the Doha Round, or in forums like the BRICS or the trilateral Russia-India-China dialogue that work outside the orbit of western powers and contribute to building China’s global stature. The Tibet question and the Dalai Lama issue can become more problematic for China if restraints on India, willingly accepted in the interest of a better India-China relationship, lose salience.
China’s inroads into POK and connectivity projects in the region are currently advancing under cover of an improving relationship with India. Given the dual track Chinese approach to India we are unable to seriously object to these developments. Tensions will open room for us to raise these issues more frontally. China, already worried about the strategic relationship developing between India and the US- with open US calls to India to “engage east” more firmly- will be pushing India more into the US camp if it became more assertive on the India-Tibet border. Already India, the US and Japan have held a trilateral naval exercise off Okinawa recently, and a decision to set-up a trilateral political dialogue has been announced. At the same time, India does not want to get trapped into US-China rivalry in East Asia and the Pacific, and be used as a pawn in a US hedging strategy against China to be discarded as and when the two, tied by an unhealthy economic and financial interdependence, manage to bridge their differences.
India’s foreign policy options both vis a vis Pakistan and China also depend on the state of preparednes of our armed forces. In the case of China we have allowed the military gap to grow too big, making any catching up most diffficult. If India has access to more technologically advanced weapons and platforms, our external dependence is a major weakness. China has an indigenous defence manufacturing base that far surpasses ours. Its military infrastructure across the border with us is incomparably superior, and is improving. We need to put our minimum nuclear deterrent in place on an accelerated basis in order to give ourselves space to counter China’s bullying tactics on issues of our territorial sovereignty.
As regards Pakistan we are better prepared to cope with it militarily, though Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear capability has neutralized our advantage in conventional strength. Pakistan has allies in China and the US, and both are arming it. One provides nuclear and missile capabilities to Pakistan, and the other overlooks these transfers. Pakistan uses terrorism as an instrument of state policy under cover of its nuclear capability that, in turn, shields it from penalties. India has been a victim of this rogue behaviour by Pakistan, but the US is also not being spared in Afghanistan, such is now Pakistan’s confidence and sense of impunity.
India has not been able to isolate Pakistan diplomatically for its emergence as the epicentre of global terrorism. The US is not only hesitant to use its many leverages to force Pakistan to break its nexus with terrorists, it presses India too not to react to Pakistan’s terrorist acts directed at India to prevent its own operations in Afghanistan being disrupted. China, not surprisingly, gives Pakistan political cover by lauding its contribution to the combat against international terrorism. It is remarkable how a failing, nuclear armed, extremism riven state is being bolstered by the two most powerful countries in the world, one democratic and the other authoritarian.
Adding to this genuine dilemma of India that the perpetrator of terrorism has more supporters than the victim, the Indian political leadership and society have confused attitudes towards Pakistan. If India can settle its differences with Pakistan, a heavy weight will no doubt be lifted off the back of Indian diplomacy. Pakistan ties down India to South Asia. At one level, we regard Pakistan as India’s inveterate enemy, while at another there is a belief that this hostility is not fundamental and can be overcome with patience and show of goodwill by us. Sections of the political class believe that India as a bigger country should show generosity towards Pakistan, which explains our statements that we are willing to meet them more than half way if they walked the high road of peace with us, and that a stable and prosperous Pakistan is good for us. The same sections are willing to overlook Pakistan’s terrorist activity against us, and even accept the fiction that Pakistan is as much a victim of terrorism as us, for the sake of maintaining a dialogue. How to explain the resounding cheers that the Pakistani contingent to the Commonwealth Games receives from the spectators from a city that has been bled by Pakistani terrorism? It is this public mood that explains the invitation to the Pakistan Prime Minister to visit Mohali to celebrate cricket dreams together, forgettting the nightmare of Mumbai. When the actual actors of the Mumbai carnage accuse Pakistan of official complicity before US courts, we remain silent, such is our anxiety to conserve the dialogue option.
Electoral considerations influence our policy towards Pakistan too. The principal parties in the country calculate that reaching out to Pakistan and a show of softness towards it is paying with the muslim electorate in India. Domestic politics also enters by way of divided muslim families seeking travel links with Pakistan. This aspect has been important in creating more cross-border transportation links between J&K and POK. The civil society in India constantly pushes for more people to people contacts. The angst over J&K in many sections of society, especially the secular lobby, builds pressure for greater engagement with Pakistan. Reinforcing all this is the Prime Minister’s own personal commitment to normalisation of relations with Pakistan, for which dialogue is considered essential. Purely as diplomatic tactics, this show of over-eagerness to talk to Pakistan without obtaining any tangible quid pro quo is not productive. Pakistan can hardly be shamed into responding by “sincere” Indian moves for peace, inasmuch as it would construe such overtures as reflecting India’s weak hand and lack of other options.
With China many of these considerations don’t enter policy making. The dialectic between dialogue and terrorism does not exist in China’s case. There are no wounds of partition to be healed, no sense of brotherhood, sundered by an unfortunate course history took, to be restored, though the trauma of 1962 remains to be overcome. The desire to preserve the cultural bond, the pressure for people to people ties are not a factor in India-China relations.
Some of the issues bedevilling our relations with China exist in the case of Pakistan too. We have an outstanding border issue with both, with both countries occupying parts of our territory and laying claim to more. A line of control separates the armed forces in contested areas; a cease-fire along with confidence building measures have been put in place that include contacts between local commanders to prevent unwanted escalation. In the case of China, unlike in the case of Pakistan, defence contacts exist, although currently interrupted because of Chinese refusal to give a non-stapled visa to the Northern Army Commander for an official visit to China, but they are likely to resume. The armed forces chiefs of the two countries visit each other. Our President and Prime Minister have visited China periodically, with reciprocal visits from the Chinese side. Some limited exercises have taken place betwen the army and navy of the two countries. We have a strategic dialogue with China. Unlike Pakistan, China does not attack India in international forums. On the trade front, while Pakistan refuses to give MFN treatment to India and baulks at opening trade ties, China is active in the Indian market. With China, more pragmatism is at play on both sides.
If India was equated with Pakistan in the past, it is now being equated with China. India and China are set to engage and compete with each other at the regional and global levels, while Pakistan’s role in India’s external equations has declined steeply. India’s rising profile obliges it to play a constructive and stabilizing role, creating opportunities for it to exert its weight on different issues in pursuit of its national interest with different partners depending on shared objectives. India can cooperate with China on specific issues where their interests are tied, and with the US where there is shared interest. Where India is failing in its diplomacy vis a vis China is that we allow China to engage as well as confront us to its advantage, whereas we fail to carve out political space for us to impose costs on China in return for its injurious actions against our interests.
In sum, our policy towards both China and Pakistan tends to be conciliatory. We want to avoid confrontation as far as possible and reduce the level of tensions. Our over-riding concern is our economic growth and poverty alleviation. Our policies are defensive, as we seek only to preserve what we have and not claim what others have, even if it has been taken away from us through aggression. In the process we are willing to overlook serious provocations against our security interests by China and Pakistan, separately and together. We still try to find common ground to work on, without insisting on receiving satisfaction on our basic concerns, whether relating to terrorism in the case of Pakistan or China’s actions undermining our territorial sovereignty. Consequently, we come across as weak and diffident.
Our democracy generates internal pressures on our policy makers, which places us in an unequal position vis a vis China and Pakistan as they can control their public opinion towards India better than we can in the reverse. The media is problematic for the government for our China policy, as it exposes the gap between public perceptions about the threat from China and the positive projection of the relationship at the governmental level. No wonder the Chinese leadership seeks greater Indian governmental control over the media.
Our democratic leaders have to show success in foreign policy initiatives for consolidating their image, and this leads them to look for solutions they can sell as “success”, which often entail concessions to the other side. This syndrome is apparent in our dealings with both Pakistan and China. We let Pakistan off the hook on terrorism and China on the issue of our sovereignty over J&K. We hesitate to retaliate in both cases, unsure of the consequences. Currently perhaps economic arguments are over-riding all other considerations in fashioning optimal policies. We find it easy to smile than snarl, to placate than to confront. We have a particular mind set conditioned by a sense of our own vulnerability, and this dictates our approach to our adversaries.
China, with all our differences, is more willing to deal with us if it is to their advantage, without any visceral feelings of animosity coming in the way. With it we have a more practical relationship which Pakistan rejects in its dealings with India. Sentimentalism distorts our perception of Pakistan and affects our policy much more than in the case of China where the Hindi-Chini Bhai- Bhai is a long forgotten slogan.
However, when all is said and done, even if we have been worsted in our diplomacy in major ways on issues with Pakistan and China and have remained on the defensive, we have not given up Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh!
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Published in Force Magazine Dated: 3rd June, 2011
How India Deals with Pakistan and China
It might be interesting to analyse our diplomatic handling of China and Pakistan on a comparative basis. These two countries pose the most difficult and complex foreign policy challenges to us. Is our approach to both countries similar, or there are differences in the way we engage them? Are the weaknesses of our policy making towards Pakistan reflected in our dealings with China too? Does public opinion have greater influence on policy making towards one country or the other? Does our shared history, culture and language with the people of what is now Pakistan constitute a dimension of our relationship that makes hard, unsentimental pursuit of national interest with that country more difficult than in the case of China, or is it that in the latter case too some romanticism about the two biggest countries of Asia, with no historical enmity, coming together to shape the future history of the continent and the world at large play a softening role, quite apart from the pro-China ideological tilt of a section of our political class? Are we diplomatically handling one country better than the other?
Any sensible policy towards a country has to be based not on some a priori principles but on objective factors, the history of the relationship, the place the other country has in the larger strategic context, the role of other powers and, most importantly, the specific nature of the issues on the table. Yes, policy makers can always bear in mind some Kautilya like general principles of state conduct, which in a broad sense can provide guidance, but these have been already been long internalized in policy making and do not provide much help in addressing concrete contentious issues in negotiations. With China we have the Panch Sheel principles, but these have hardly governed China’s actual conduct towards us. With Pakistan we have no over-arching principles supposedly governing our relationship, with no better or worse results for our bilateral ties.
Our policy options in dealing with Pakistan or China have to be guided by several underlying considerations. Our core objective has to be to build a peaceful and friendly relationship with both countries. But this cannot be a unilateral exercise. If the other side is unwilling to meet us half way or lays down unacceptable conditions for resolving differences, we cannot move forward towards our desired goal. If conditions of conflict remain, what do we do when faced with grave provocations? Do we retaliate or hold our hand? At what level do we keep the threshold of our tolerance? To decide this we have to evaluate the costs to us of a military conflict.
India has today reached for the first time in its modern history a point when it is veritably set to become a major power internationally. Our economy is growing at the rate of almost 9%, our corporate sector has given competitive depth to our economy and is now investing all over the globe, our huge economy with tremendous backlogs in infrastructure development that must be bridged provides great scope for India to rise economically further with domestic effort and foreign investment. Our massive manpower resources, adequately trained to meet internal development needs are also an international resource as they can meet the needs of the ageing economies of the West and Japan. Our aspiration to become a permanent member of the Security Council reflects our confidence in our growing international stature.
In this background should India risk entering into a military conflict with either power even if our interests are strongly challenged? The cost of a conflict will impose severer penalties on India as its steady rise at a critical juncture will be arrested, whereas a failing Pakistan will merely slide from bad to worse. Our relations with the Muslim world, from where we get most of our energy, will come under strain. Pakistan’s traditional friends in the West, however frustrated they may be currently with its duplicitous conduct on the issue of combatting extremist groups active in Afghanistan from inside Pakistan, will become active on Pakistan’s behalf to our discomfiture. The threat of a nuclear conflict in South Asia will be played up, reviving international concerns and adversely affecting investment flows into India. With Pakistan the potential of conflict escalation cannot be discounted given its irrational hostility towards us, aggravated by growing extremism within society there.
The economic arguments against any conflict apply to China too, as we need to project stability in our region, not instability and uncertainty that an atmosphere of military tensions creates. Apart from that, the India-China trade relationship at $60 billion has grown phenomenally, making China India’s biggest trade partner. A pro-China corporate lobby has risen in India for the first time, including in key sectors such as power and telecommunications. While this gives China a platform to influence Indian policies in its favour, its own stakes in the economic relationship have grown, though the manner in which China can separate political hostility from intensive economic engagement is instructive, as its treatment of Japan shows.
In China’s case the cost of a conflict with India will weigh heavily on it too in diverse ways, particularly as the fiction of its peaceful rise, already exposed by its assertiveness in the South China Sea on territorial issues, will get punctured further. A conflict with India will go contrary to China’s desire for a peaceful periphery for its economic modernization. It will also compromise the mutually beneficial cooperation with India on global issues such as Climate Change or the Doha Round, or in forums like the BRICS or the trilateral Russia-India-China dialogue that work outside the orbit of western powers and contribute to building China’s global stature. The Tibet question and the Dalai Lama issue can become more problematic for China if restraints on India, willingly accepted in the interest of a better India-China relationship, lose salience.
China’s inroads into POK and connectivity projects in the region are currently advancing under cover of an improving relationship with India. Given the dual track Chinese approach to India we are unable to seriously object to these developments. Tensions will open room for us to raise these issues more frontally. China, already worried about the strategic relationship developing between India and the US- with open US calls to India to “engage east” more firmly- will be pushing India more into the US camp if it became more assertive on the India-Tibet border. Already India, the US and Japan have held a trilateral naval exercise off Okinawa recently, and a decision to set-up a trilateral political dialogue has been announced. At the same time, India does not want to get trapped into US-China rivalry in East Asia and the Pacific, and be used as a pawn in a US hedging strategy against China to be discarded as and when the two, tied by an unhealthy economic and financial interdependence, manage to bridge their differences.
India’s foreign policy options both vis a vis Pakistan and China also depend on the state of preparednes of our armed forces. In the case of China we have allowed the military gap to grow too big, making any catching up most diffficult. If India has access to more technologically advanced weapons and platforms, our external dependence is a major weakness. China has an indigenous defence manufacturing base that far surpasses ours. Its military infrastructure across the border with us is incomparably superior, and is improving. We need to put our minimum nuclear deterrent in place on an accelerated basis in order to give ourselves space to counter China’s bullying tactics on issues of our territorial sovereignty.
As regards Pakistan we are better prepared to cope with it militarily, though Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear capability has neutralized our advantage in conventional strength. Pakistan has allies in China and the US, and both are arming it. One provides nuclear and missile capabilities to Pakistan, and the other overlooks these transfers. Pakistan uses terrorism as an instrument of state policy under cover of its nuclear capability that, in turn, shields it from penalties. India has been a victim of this rogue behaviour by Pakistan, but the US is also not being spared in Afghanistan, such is now Pakistan’s confidence and sense of impunity.
India has not been able to isolate Pakistan diplomatically for its emergence as the epicentre of global terrorism. The US is not only hesitant to use its many leverages to force Pakistan to break its nexus with terrorists, it presses India too not to react to Pakistan’s terrorist acts directed at India to prevent its own operations in Afghanistan being disrupted. China, not surprisingly, gives Pakistan political cover by lauding its contribution to the combat against international terrorism. It is remarkable how a failing, nuclear armed, extremism riven state is being bolstered by the two most powerful countries in the world, one democratic and the other authoritarian.
Adding to this genuine dilemma of India that the perpetrator of terrorism has more supporters than the victim, the Indian political leadership and society have confused attitudes towards Pakistan. If India can settle its differences with Pakistan, a heavy weight will no doubt be lifted off the back of Indian diplomacy. Pakistan ties down India to South Asia. At one level, we regard Pakistan as India’s inveterate enemy, while at another there is a belief that this hostility is not fundamental and can be overcome with patience and show of goodwill by us. Sections of the political class believe that India as a bigger country should show generosity towards Pakistan, which explains our statements that we are willing to meet them more than half way if they walked the high road of peace with us, and that a stable and prosperous Pakistan is good for us. The same sections are willing to overlook Pakistan’s terrorist activity against us, and even accept the fiction that Pakistan is as much a victim of terrorism as us, for the sake of maintaining a dialogue. How to explain the resounding cheers that the Pakistani contingent to the Commonwealth Games receives from the spectators from a city that has been bled by Pakistani terrorism? It is this public mood that explains the invitation to the Pakistan Prime Minister to visit Mohali to celebrate cricket dreams together, forgettting the nightmare of Mumbai. When the actual actors of the Mumbai carnage accuse Pakistan of official complicity before US courts, we remain silent, such is our anxiety to conserve the dialogue option.
Electoral considerations influence our policy towards Pakistan too. The principal parties in the country calculate that reaching out to Pakistan and a show of softness towards it is paying with the muslim electorate in India. Domestic politics also enters by way of divided muslim families seeking travel links with Pakistan. This aspect has been important in creating more cross-border transportation links between J&K and POK. The civil society in India constantly pushes for more people to people contacts. The angst over J&K in many sections of society, especially the secular lobby, builds pressure for greater engagement with Pakistan. Reinforcing all this is the Prime Minister’s own personal commitment to normalisation of relations with Pakistan, for which dialogue is considered essential. Purely as diplomatic tactics, this show of over-eagerness to talk to Pakistan without obtaining any tangible quid pro quo is not productive. Pakistan can hardly be shamed into responding by “sincere” Indian moves for peace, inasmuch as it would construe such overtures as reflecting India’s weak hand and lack of other options.
With China many of these considerations don’t enter policy making. The dialectic between dialogue and terrorism does not exist in China’s case. There are no wounds of partition to be healed, no sense of brotherhood, sundered by an unfortunate course history took, to be restored, though the trauma of 1962 remains to be overcome. The desire to preserve the cultural bond, the pressure for people to people ties are not a factor in India-China relations.
Some of the issues bedevilling our relations with China exist in the case of Pakistan too. We have an outstanding border issue with both, with both countries occupying parts of our territory and laying claim to more. A line of control separates the armed forces in contested areas; a cease-fire along with confidence building measures have been put in place that include contacts between local commanders to prevent unwanted escalation. In the case of China, unlike in the case of Pakistan, defence contacts exist, although currently interrupted because of Chinese refusal to give a non-stapled visa to the Northern Army Commander for an official visit to China, but they are likely to resume. The armed forces chiefs of the two countries visit each other. Our President and Prime Minister have visited China periodically, with reciprocal visits from the Chinese side. Some limited exercises have taken place betwen the army and navy of the two countries. We have a strategic dialogue with China. Unlike Pakistan, China does not attack India in international forums. On the trade front, while Pakistan refuses to give MFN treatment to India and baulks at opening trade ties, China is active in the Indian market. With China, more pragmatism is at play on both sides.
If India was equated with Pakistan in the past, it is now being equated with China. India and China are set to engage and compete with each other at the regional and global levels, while Pakistan’s role in India’s external equations has declined steeply. India’s rising profile obliges it to play a constructive and stabilizing role, creating opportunities for it to exert its weight on different issues in pursuit of its national interest with different partners depending on shared objectives. India can cooperate with China on specific issues where their interests are tied, and with the US where there is shared interest. Where India is failing in its diplomacy vis a vis China is that we allow China to engage as well as confront us to its advantage, whereas we fail to carve out political space for us to impose costs on China in return for its injurious actions against our interests.
In sum, our policy towards both China and Pakistan tends to be conciliatory. We want to avoid confrontation as far as possible and reduce the level of tensions. Our over-riding concern is our economic growth and poverty alleviation. Our policies are defensive, as we seek only to preserve what we have and not claim what others have, even if it has been taken away from us through aggression. In the process we are willing to overlook serious provocations against our security interests by China and Pakistan, separately and together. We still try to find common ground to work on, without insisting on receiving satisfaction on our basic concerns, whether relating to terrorism in the case of Pakistan or China’s actions undermining our territorial sovereignty. Consequently, we come across as weak and diffident.
Our democracy generates internal pressures on our policy makers, which places us in an unequal position vis a vis China and Pakistan as they can control their public opinion towards India better than we can in the reverse. The media is problematic for the government for our China policy, as it exposes the gap between public perceptions about the threat from China and the positive projection of the relationship at the governmental level. No wonder the Chinese leadership seeks greater Indian governmental control over the media.
Our democratic leaders have to show success in foreign policy initiatives for consolidating their image, and this leads them to look for solutions they can sell as “success”, which often entail concessions to the other side. This syndrome is apparent in our dealings with both Pakistan and China. We let Pakistan off the hook on terrorism and China on the issue of our sovereignty over J&K. We hesitate to retaliate in both cases, unsure of the consequences. Currently perhaps economic arguments are over-riding all other considerations in fashioning optimal policies. We find it easy to smile than snarl, to placate than to confront. We have a particular mind set conditioned by a sense of our own vulnerability, and this dictates our approach to our adversaries.
China, with all our differences, is more willing to deal with us if it is to their advantage, without any visceral feelings of animosity coming in the way. With it we have a more practical relationship which Pakistan rejects in its dealings with India. Sentimentalism distorts our perception of Pakistan and affects our policy much more than in the case of China where the Hindi-Chini Bhai- Bhai is a long forgotten slogan.
However, when all is said and done, even if we have been worsted in our diplomacy in major ways on issues with Pakistan and China and have remained on the defensive, we have not given up Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh!
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Published in Force Magazine Dated: 3rd June, 2011
How India Deals with Pakistan and China
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