Sympathy for Pakistan? May 16, 2011 16:32 IST
By a mix of deception, subterfuge, ingratitude and crocodile tears, Pakistan has begun to get sympathy rather than condemnation when it stands exposed as the haven for the most wanted terrorist in the world, says T P Sreenivasan.
Pakistan has done it again. By a mix of deception, subterfuge, ingratitude and crocodile tears, it has begun to get sympathy rather than condemnation at a time when it stands exposed as the haven for the most wanted terrorist in the world, apart from being the epicentre of international terrorism.
The Government of India [Images] itself, after the initial expression of satisfaction over reaching a milestone in the fight against terror and confirmation of Pakistan's trust deficit, is bending over backwards not to appear to exploit Pakistan's discomfiture. At a time when Pakistan appears to be confused and groping for a face saving, we are even ready to pursue the dialogue with Pakistan. At the height of trust deficit, we wish to chase the mirage of trust.
Our army chief's assertion that India has the capability to have our own Abbottabad provided a perfect handle for General Kayani to turn his embarrassment into bravado. His sovereignty, which he had surrendered to the Americans long ago, suddenly became sacrosanct against perceived Indian adventurism.
Click here to read more
Why we will never see dead Osama bin Laden? What really happened Posted on May 2, 2011 by Raqib By Raqib Shah
We need to look at the facts, use common sense and everything becomes crystal clear. For example, to prove that Osama bin Laden was killed at the compound in Abbottabad, the easiest way is to take the DNA test of the blood on the floor of the compound.
What we all know
August 2010: Pakistan shares with US some details about the compound in Abbottabad. US gathers intelligence that the compound is occupied by Osama’s children.
Jan 27: Raymond Davis, the CIA Station Chief in Pakistan gets an audio file and some pictures of Pak military installations at Tarbela from an informer in Lahore. On the way back he is pursued by two ISI contractors. He realizes that he is being followed and shots both followers in the back. He is arrested by Pakistani police.
March 16: Raymond Davis is released and he shares the information he had gathered with the CIA.
March 17: General Kayani starts criticizing drone attacks in public statements
First Week of April: News started circling that General Petraeus is being transferred to CIA.
Read more click here
Asian power play, post-Osama
Nayan Chanda, May 14, 2011, 01.08am IST
The early morning American raid on Abbottabad on May 2 that killed Osama bin Laden may also herald the rise of China as a South-West Asian power. With US-Pakistan relations on a knife's edge and Afghanistan facing the impending withdrawal of US forces, doors have opened for a rich and powerful China to step up its presence as a regional hegemon. The latest developments follow a historical pattern in Asia, in which rising tensions between the West and an Asian nation offer China new opportunities to advance its influence.
While some angry voices in the West are calling for a suspension of US aid to Pakistan, the first - and so far only - public support for Islamabad has come from Beijing. After first expressing satisfaction at bin Laden's demise, China pivoted swiftly to laud Pakistan for its "vigorous" efforts to fight terrorism - as if Osama's seven years' presence just outside Islamabad was inconsequential.
Read more click here
Opposing National Democrats, Supporting Foreign Terrorists
By Mohammad Nafees 14 May 2011
Small signs of support: Protest rallies were held across Pakistan in various cities to protest the US raid in Abbottabad and the death of Osama bin Laden, but the crowds at most were small.
Over the last decade, our nation has gone through a significant ideological transformation on key political issues. If this wasn’t clear enough in recent years, the death of Osama bin Laden at the hands of US Navy SEALs on Pakistani soil has made it crystal clear now.
Never before has the US been so overwhelmingly detested in Pakistan as they are now. Just try to quote one example from the past when our religious political parties ever had the desire, or guts, to criticise any military operation carried out against the nationalist movements in Balochistan and East Pakistan, or the democratic movements in Sindh and Punjab. Not easy, right?
But now these religious parties waste no opportunity to curse military operations against terrorists in the country. What has changed their mindset so radically? Why has an act that they once considered legal and unavoidable for the integrity of the country now become illegal and unacceptable to them? The rift between the government and the religious parties has now become very wide and deep. Now, these two sides disagree with each other on most of the fundamental national issues.
Read more click here
Wednesday, May 18, 2011
Monday, May 16, 2011
National Security and Defence
By Lt Gen (retd) SRR Aiyengar, PVSM, AVSM, VSM
An overview
“National Security is a ‘National Priority'... Indeed, making India strong and self reliant... economically, socially and militarily is our foremost duty to our motherland, to ourselves and to our future generations …. ‘thinking’ is the key to progress and ‘non thinking’ is distraction from vision. When a Nation does not think, smaller minds over- power it”. ... Dr A P J Abdul Kalam, Former President of India
Introduction
1. The security and defence policies of any state are rooted in the perceptions of its interests and how best these may be protected and promoted. The most important duty of any government is maintaining the freedom and integrity of its territory and its people. Most states will also seek to secure a range of broader interests-political, economic, trading and social. Hence, security policy reflects the broader foreign policy and economic interests of the nation; it is designed to protect and, if necessary, defend them. Thus Security is abroad and enduring concept. It encompasses maintaining internal order within the state and the measures necessary to promote national interests and to prevent challenges to them arising. Where necessary, it includes deterring or defending against external aggression and coercion.
2. The traditional concept of national security has undergone fundamental changes over the last few decades. In today's world, military might alone does not guarantee either sovereignty or security. The more realistic and comprehensive approach to national security also includes economic strength, internal cohesion and technological prowess. The fundamental security of the individual citizen includes security of life and property, food security, energy security, clean environment, education and health. A strong sense of nationalism and good governance also form an integral part of national security. Security implies the ability to retain political and economic sovereignty and autonomy of decision making in an era of globalization and increasing economic interdependence. Although the threat from nation-states as entities has declined, international and state-sponsored terrorism, often motivated by fundamentalist ideologies, has emerged as a major threat to international stability. Regardless of the decreasing control of governments on the citizens' lives, people still look towards the leadership to provide security, stability and an environment conducive to personal growth.
Concept of National Security
3. Defining the concept of security has been a major preoccupation for all analysts. Security and insecurity are the two faces of the same coin. Despite its importance, the concept of security has never been fully defined. Historically, the concept of security used to rest on a simple construct with a narrow focus. The old concept of security was locked in the ideological struggle between the two super powers. The developing countries, having won their independence only recently, were extra sensitive to any real or perceived threats to their national identities. The purpose of ensuring security was to protect the state and thereby its citizens. In the post cold war era, there is widespread recognition that neither security nor its provisions can any longer be understood in these simplistic terms alone. As economic compulsions and the global environment reduce the threat of an all out wars between nations, a new kind of ‘Fourth Generation’ warfare involving terrorism, internal destabilization, economic blackmail etc designed to undermine the sovereignty of a nation has arisen. In addition, sociological factors like increasing population, environmental degradation, depletion of resources, fundamentalism etc are escalating tensions that threaten the security fabric of a nation. These non- military threats are of considerable importance in the security scheme of nations. Thus, Dr Henry Kissinger’s definition is very apt: "National Security Policy ... In its widest sense, comprises every action by which a society seeks to assure its survival or to realize its aspirations internationally”. Basically a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged to maintain them by war.
4. In recent analysis on economic development, economists have been stressing the central importance of, what is called “human security”, that is, economic well being conjoined with social and cultural development. In this arena, the vital economic determinant of national security is economic sufficiency. In this regard, the three key determinants of national security for any developing country like India will be food security, energy security and access to new technologies. Today it is not sufficient for security to be viewed in purely military terms alone. Non – military threats have assumed greater significance as part of and a consequence of globalisation.
5. Thus it can be appreciated that national security signifies a harmonized status when external and internal interests are ensued to achieve national aims and objectives and to secure its core values. It is a very complex and intricate synthesis of geo–political, social, economic, cultural, educational, scientific, environmental, industrial, defence, and nuclear policies paradigm of a country. A very simplistic definition of National Security could be:
“National Security is concerned with the protection, preservation and furtherance of the Core values of a nation against both internal and external threats.”
What are Core Values?
6. Definition. Values are those characteristics of human society which set norms, exert control and influence the thinking, willing, feeling and actions of individuals. Values are enduring beliefs which give an overall direction to a nation's policies. These are the ideals of society based on social, religious, moral and ideological principles and practices prevalent in a nation. As values form the very basis of a nation state, they are most important and they cannot be violated with prejudice to the very existence of the state. The inculcation of values has been cherished as a noble goal of all societies of all times and India has been no exception to this. Our culture, heritage and traditions over a period of time have invoked some uniquely Indian values. These values have been enshrined in the preamble of the Constitution of India which lays the firm foundation of a sovereign, socialist, secular and democratic republic. It secures for all her citizens: social, economic and political justice, liberty of thought, expression, faith, belief and worship, equality of status and of opportunity; fraternity, assuring the dignity of the individual; and the unity and integrity of the nation. And it is these core values that India upholds in the international system. All these provisions along with the independence of the judiciary are the cornerstones of Indian value system.
National Interests
7. National interests are some of the values translated into concrete goals which comprise of intermediate and long-term policy objectives. They depend on history, geography, national character and values, economic and military capability, all of which collectively determine the national interest at any point of time, thus making them both specific and dynamic in nature. They are constantly reviewed taking into consideration changes taking place in those factors which have a bearing on their evolution and identification. It is this specificity and dynamism of national interest that makes it an extremely complex phenomenon defying a simple and valid definition, and which must be understood in all its implications. An element of subjectivity is thus inevitable in any attempt at defining national interest in general. Today, the concept of the national interest is an important consideration in international relations where pursuit of the national interest is the foundation of the realist school. These political realists wish to differentiate their policies from "idealistic" policies that seek either to inject morality into foreign policy or promote solutions that rely on multilateral institutions which might weaken the independence of the state.
8. Components. The national interest of a state is multi faceted. Primary concern is the state's survival and security. In the wider sense it implies ensuring national security, safeguarding territorial integrity, political independence, pursuing national development and economic prosperity and maintaining or enhancing national prestige and reputation or pride and self- respect or national honor. It comprises of the following sub-sets:-
(a) Security. Security is fundamental need of a nation and covers a wide canvas. However, the meaning and significance of security as a component of the national interest of a state in contemporary international relations could be summarized as follows:-
(i) Preservation of territorial integrity, sovereignty and life and property of the people. The order of priority of these elements would depend on the circumstances at any particular time.
(ii) Internal security as it is relates to the very existence of the state or which would weaken or strengthen external security.
(iii) Long term and durable security which results from economic development, nation building and a non-belligerent foreign policy.
(iv) Military security within the frontiers and security through development of international law and world bodies like United Nations (UN), to ensure collective security.
(b) Political Independence. Freedom to identify the needs of the people, harnessing all the resources available, deciding on the best course of action for the betterment of the people without influence or coercion or blackmail is an important attribute of any state’s national interests. Sovereignty cannot be subjugated if the country has to progress
socially or economically.
(c) National Development. Security is only a minimum guarantee that is necessary for the ultimate realization of all political, economic and social potentialities which is the main responsibility of a modern state. The correlation of foreign policy and national development is a function of type of state – developed, developing or under-developed.
Developing countries like India, who are in a position of making maximum use of foreign policy for purposes of national development be it be field of defence, technical collaboration, export promotion, foreign trade, foreign aid or grants or loans, etc, can initiate diplomacy of economic development and state building. Economic prosperity is fundamental to national development and hence any activity that ensures continuous growth and prosperity has become a critical part in determination of national interest.
(d) National Prestige. No foreign policy can be pursued in isolation as it is to be followed in the worldly arena where there are other players promoting their own national interests. Seldom do national interests converge and hence it is a competing game. Nation’s position in the world order is dependent on its ability to influence others through various means available at its disposal, economic, technology, military and control of international organizations. Position in turn permits a nation to steer global debate towards securing its national interest.. Hence retaining or improving one’s power and prestige in the world order is part of the national interest.
9. Interpreting National Interests. What is in national interest and what is not, is quite often at variance depending upon the analyst. However in India it is the government of the day that decides by mainly analyzing the issue of concern in the light of above mentioned components. We have to be clear or select reasonable ends to be pursued abroad and also efficiently organize resources needed i.e. intellectual, material and emotional to accomplish those ends. Here is where the management of national security concerns becomes all the more important. The need for institutionalized arrangement, which can be entrusted with the task of evolution, formulation, execution and not forgetting monitoring of national security strategy, has hardly been contested.
National Security Architecture
10. At the Grand Strategic level, in a democratic set-up, the Cabinet controls al the various means at the government’s disposal to resolve the crisis: diplomatic, economic and other instruments, of which military action tends to be the final resort. As it would be obvious, decision making is at the core of all planned activities, a process of choosing better alternatives, to achieve a goal. The architecture must be so designed to provide the conceptual base for the intellectual material needed for decision making. Political direction is paramount, expressed within national and international laws as it provides the legal basis for the use of military force. Effective leadership at the national level is essential to provide clarity of direction and to inspire the effort and self-sacrifice demanded in a conflict. Many countries have designed/created their own organizational set-up to suit their ethos, history, tradition and inputs from the academia and industry. In our country, the setting up of ‘National Security Council (NSC)’ was a landmark event. It was formed in 1998 and its purpose was to undertake the country’s first strategic defence review and formulate a doctrine while keeping in mind the long term security options. A standing panel composed of the Prime Minister, External Affairs Minister, Finance Minister and Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission oversees the functioning of NSC.India’s National Security Adviser (NSA) serves as the link between the NSC and other support structures. The Kargil Conflict and the aftermath the “Kargil Review Committee” gave the country yet another chance to have a re-look at the security apparatus and Higher Defence Management. The Government also appointed a “Group of Ministers (GOM)” to examine the recommendations of the four task forces and put up their considered views for placing before the Cabinet. This, it is believed to be the country’s most comprehensive National Security document. Many of the recommendations have already been implemented except one vital recommendation regarding the appointment of ‘Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)’ is yet to be implemented. Few countries in the world have evolved the institution of CDS, who is the ultimate source of military advice to Ministers. The Service Chiefs, Army, Navy and Air Force, as the professional head of their Services, offer expert advice to the CDS on the employment of their forces and the strategic direction of operations.
Nature of Defence
11. Defence is the military contribution to National security and is a major element of a government’s wider security policy. Defence policy specifies the structure and capabilities of the armed forces and guides the contribution they make to the achievement of country’s defence and economic policies. The principal purpose of a democratic state’s armed forces is to provide the potential for the application of force to ensure the security of the nation, the freedom of its people and the promotion of its interests. The armed forces can be used for a variety of other tasks, short of conflict, to promote and protect national interests. The possession of credible military capability confers influence and, allied to manifest intent, provides a deterrent against aggression and coercion. Military capability underpins diplomacy and, used judiciously, can encourage stability within which broader national interests can be pursued.
The Components of Defence
12. The principal components of define are its armed forces, an organization to make decisions and a means of implementing them These components need to draw on a wide range of conceptual, moral and material resources throughout the country and abroad. In addition, the armed forces require a substantial supporting infrastructure, both civilian and military, assured budgetary support and a vibrant research and development base. A brief explanation of each of these components follows.
13. Decision Making. This is the central component, which remains under political control and draws upon both the conceptual and the moral base. It must provide sound policy and strategy, efficient allocation of resources, an effective crisis management capable of providing a balanced response to any situation, and clear strategic direction of operations. The formulation of policy must take into account of national aims and obligations, the geo-strategic context, potential threats to security, politics, economics, doctrine and capabilities and intentions of likely allies. Policy formulation is evolutionary and continuous anticipating long-term developments in the nature of conflict, including technology. It is backed by scientific research and analysis and realistic assessment of current military effectiveness of the armed forces. Moral base underpins the motivation of the armed forces. It is founded on public support and the political will of the government to maintain and, when necessary, use effective armed forces. The moral base also embraces the national will to ensure the welfare of military personnel including the retired fraternity and the efficient management to provide it.
14. Implementation. Associated with the decision making process is the equally vital ‘implementation’ process. Implementation requires an established and effective command and control structures with each organs of the Government including its armed forces and with it a swift and reliable communications and information systems. Planning for all contingencies should be based on organizations founded in peace that can be progressively developed, if necessary, as the threat increases. There is also the need for the military to render professional advice, command, control, strategic leadership and the vision and war fighting expertise required for effective and strategically relevant capability development.
15. The Armed Forces. The armed forces provide an important and distinctive strand in the fabric of the Nation. They take pride in the fact in that, as they provide the ideals of integrity, discipline, discipline, professionalism, service and excellence, they contribute immensely to national stability and cohesion. The size, shape and the capabilities of the armed forces should be matched to the security needs and economic circumstances of the state. There is close interaction between the conflicts in the sea; land and air environments and the armed forces must be able to operate in all the three environments as also be able operate together in joint operations. The overall defence making component must be able to apply military force in a coordinated way in each of the environments. Coherent joint warfare emerges as the “silver bullet” for victory in war symbolizing the highest level of force integration. The armed forces comprise, the people, the stores and command organizations, which together with doctrine and training, provide operationally ready military capability. These elements need to be harmonized to stay well trained and equipped professional forces. Only the highest quality, dedicated and well trained personnel with class leaders will be able to succeed in the complex and fast paced environment of future military operations.
16. Material Base. All armed forces require an assured industrial source of equipment and stores. Effective, affordable equipment, which exploits high technology, is essential to provide battle winning edge in modern combat. Equipment procurement is a key function, closely related to national economic and trading policy. Procurement decisions are highly dependent on a sound conceptual base. Moreover, the long development period of much modern equipment require these decisions to be based on an informed assessment of how military affairs are likely to develop over the next 10 to 20 years. Equipment procurement programmes needs to integrate the timely introduction of replacement items, funded and managed on a whole life cycle basis with allowance where appropriate, for planned capability updates during their lifetimes. Where indigenous capability is not able to match the essential requirement, these may have to be obtained through competitive procurement or through collaboration with other countries. Support of equipment and essential services during crisis must be ensured and robustness of some aspects of domestic defence industry may be critical to this.
17. Supporting Infrastructure. Armed forces require an infrastructure of bases, ports, airfields and communications. They also need an organization to store, supply, repair and dispose of equipment and stores. Support is required in other areas, such as medicine and meteorology. Some elements of the infrastructure must be designed specifically for military purposes and owned by the Government. However, in other cases it may be cost effective for facilities and services to be provided by private sector. The essential requirement is the ability of the government to control those assets essential to defence capability. We need to fully comprehend the vital nature of integrated logistic support as it is well established fact that military effectiveness of modern armed forces depends more than ever, on the quality of their logistic support. To meet the requirements of most demanding crises and of general war, it may be necessary for the industry to have the capability for surge capacity and reconstitution. The national communications networks and transport infrastructure provide essential support to routine defence business and in time of crisis to the generation, deployment and recovery of forces on operations. The merchant marine and civilian airlines provide essential strategic lift support when necessary.
18. Research and Development Base. It is recognized the world over that long term technological competence and international competitiveness can only come from a strong foundation of high quality research. Successful Research and Development (R&D) should comprise of a clear focus, excellent management practices, efficient production, adequate funding, and appropriate technology to include imported and indigenous. It also needs a cadre of keen, dedicated and well paid researchers. The presence of competition to ensure quality research is important. Bench marking for facilities, products and processes compatible with prevailing world standards must be ensured. R&D should become a part of an integrated approach to planning, management and financing and sustainable development. Measure must be made to shorten cycle times, particularly for the procurement of strategic systems, enhance program stability, and assured focus on core competencies, while freeing resources for investment in high priority areas. Technology insertion and acquisition agility must ensure that wherewithals needed are able to sustain the armed forces throughout the deployment sequence, from the short-fused start to decisive finish regardless of mission type or duration
19. Budgetary Support/ Allocation. Defence is an economic activity, which involves the commitment of resources to the fulfillment of a purpose. Resources enter the process as inputs of manpower, materials and technical competence. The outputs, which the application yields-military capabilities embodied in warships, field formations, aircrafts, missile squadrons, supported by logistic administration and training elements– serve the purpose. The purpose of defence expenditure depends on circumstances. In war time, the operational aim is easy to define: the attainment of victory or, at least avoidance of defeat. In peacetime however, the objective is more illusive: to attain sense of security. Budget allocations for defence must be related to Threat assessment, Grand Strategy, Technology orientation or roles and missions. The much talked about Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) must parallel the work being done in another revolution namely ‘Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA).
Media Support
20. Modern conflict will be fought in the spotlight of massive attention by news media. The immediacy of media transmissions can magnify the importance of relatively minor incidents and influence public opinion before the political authority can fully analyze facts, putting additional pressure on political and military leaders. Equally, however, the media can also act as a powerful conduit for positive information to boost morale and to influence public opinion. Media operations also need to persuade third parties that action being taken is right and justifiable and to counter malicious or ill-informed reporting in the theatre of operations. Public support for any military operation must be rooted in an accurate understanding of events and their background. Reports of events can be broadcast virtually as they happen and hence the media operations maxim is to release as much accurate information as possible, as quickly as feasible , subject to only to operational security and safety of own troops.
Conclusion
21. With the phenomenon of globalization and under the label of inter-dependence, academics and practioners began to explore alternative ways of looking at security, challenging the somewhat militarized, balance of power perceptions. The notions of Common security (achieving security with others, not against them) and later Comprehensive security (giving primacy to the requirements of internal stability, national development and social harmony, vulnerability to internal threats and external intervention) marked a significant departure in thinking about security. The import of emerging security issues certainly stretches the traditional thinking about security. The issues tend to be complex, multi-dimensions and trans-national in form and impact.
22. Defence policies specify the structure and capabilities of the Armed Forces and guide the contribution they make to the achievement of country’s defence and security goals. The principal purpose of a democratic state’s armed forces is to provide the potential for the application of force to ensure the security of the nation, freedom of its people and promotion of national interests. The place of the armed forces in the fabric of the nation is indeed unique. On the road to prosperity and development, however lay, a host of challenges which has to be factored in. Peace and security, internal as well as external, is the first and most essential foundation for the nation’s future progress. Fearlessness, can be only attained when security extends to cover, over and above our physical security, our social rights and economic well being to eliminate all forms of vulnerability and discrimination.
Bibliography
1. Constitution of India.
2. Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Annual Reports 2008, 2009.
3. Subhash Kapila, ‘India’s Defence Policies and Strategic Thought-A Comparative Analysis’, Simsid Book, Noida, 2003.
4. National Security-Military Aspects –A Compilation by Rupa &Co , New Delhi-2003.
5. India’s National Security-Annual Review –Edited by Shri Satish Kumar, Routledge, New Delhi-2010.
6. Subrahmanyam. K. , “Shedding Shibboleths—India’s Evolving Strategic Outlook”, New Delhi, 2005.
7. General Sunderji.K. “Vision -2100-a Strategy for the Twenty-First Century”-Delhi, 2003
An overview
“National Security is a ‘National Priority'... Indeed, making India strong and self reliant... economically, socially and militarily is our foremost duty to our motherland, to ourselves and to our future generations …. ‘thinking’ is the key to progress and ‘non thinking’ is distraction from vision. When a Nation does not think, smaller minds over- power it”. ... Dr A P J Abdul Kalam, Former President of India
Introduction
1. The security and defence policies of any state are rooted in the perceptions of its interests and how best these may be protected and promoted. The most important duty of any government is maintaining the freedom and integrity of its territory and its people. Most states will also seek to secure a range of broader interests-political, economic, trading and social. Hence, security policy reflects the broader foreign policy and economic interests of the nation; it is designed to protect and, if necessary, defend them. Thus Security is abroad and enduring concept. It encompasses maintaining internal order within the state and the measures necessary to promote national interests and to prevent challenges to them arising. Where necessary, it includes deterring or defending against external aggression and coercion.
2. The traditional concept of national security has undergone fundamental changes over the last few decades. In today's world, military might alone does not guarantee either sovereignty or security. The more realistic and comprehensive approach to national security also includes economic strength, internal cohesion and technological prowess. The fundamental security of the individual citizen includes security of life and property, food security, energy security, clean environment, education and health. A strong sense of nationalism and good governance also form an integral part of national security. Security implies the ability to retain political and economic sovereignty and autonomy of decision making in an era of globalization and increasing economic interdependence. Although the threat from nation-states as entities has declined, international and state-sponsored terrorism, often motivated by fundamentalist ideologies, has emerged as a major threat to international stability. Regardless of the decreasing control of governments on the citizens' lives, people still look towards the leadership to provide security, stability and an environment conducive to personal growth.
Concept of National Security
3. Defining the concept of security has been a major preoccupation for all analysts. Security and insecurity are the two faces of the same coin. Despite its importance, the concept of security has never been fully defined. Historically, the concept of security used to rest on a simple construct with a narrow focus. The old concept of security was locked in the ideological struggle between the two super powers. The developing countries, having won their independence only recently, were extra sensitive to any real or perceived threats to their national identities. The purpose of ensuring security was to protect the state and thereby its citizens. In the post cold war era, there is widespread recognition that neither security nor its provisions can any longer be understood in these simplistic terms alone. As economic compulsions and the global environment reduce the threat of an all out wars between nations, a new kind of ‘Fourth Generation’ warfare involving terrorism, internal destabilization, economic blackmail etc designed to undermine the sovereignty of a nation has arisen. In addition, sociological factors like increasing population, environmental degradation, depletion of resources, fundamentalism etc are escalating tensions that threaten the security fabric of a nation. These non- military threats are of considerable importance in the security scheme of nations. Thus, Dr Henry Kissinger’s definition is very apt: "National Security Policy ... In its widest sense, comprises every action by which a society seeks to assure its survival or to realize its aspirations internationally”. Basically a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged to maintain them by war.
4. In recent analysis on economic development, economists have been stressing the central importance of, what is called “human security”, that is, economic well being conjoined with social and cultural development. In this arena, the vital economic determinant of national security is economic sufficiency. In this regard, the three key determinants of national security for any developing country like India will be food security, energy security and access to new technologies. Today it is not sufficient for security to be viewed in purely military terms alone. Non – military threats have assumed greater significance as part of and a consequence of globalisation.
5. Thus it can be appreciated that national security signifies a harmonized status when external and internal interests are ensued to achieve national aims and objectives and to secure its core values. It is a very complex and intricate synthesis of geo–political, social, economic, cultural, educational, scientific, environmental, industrial, defence, and nuclear policies paradigm of a country. A very simplistic definition of National Security could be:
“National Security is concerned with the protection, preservation and furtherance of the Core values of a nation against both internal and external threats.”
What are Core Values?
6. Definition. Values are those characteristics of human society which set norms, exert control and influence the thinking, willing, feeling and actions of individuals. Values are enduring beliefs which give an overall direction to a nation's policies. These are the ideals of society based on social, religious, moral and ideological principles and practices prevalent in a nation. As values form the very basis of a nation state, they are most important and they cannot be violated with prejudice to the very existence of the state. The inculcation of values has been cherished as a noble goal of all societies of all times and India has been no exception to this. Our culture, heritage and traditions over a period of time have invoked some uniquely Indian values. These values have been enshrined in the preamble of the Constitution of India which lays the firm foundation of a sovereign, socialist, secular and democratic republic. It secures for all her citizens: social, economic and political justice, liberty of thought, expression, faith, belief and worship, equality of status and of opportunity; fraternity, assuring the dignity of the individual; and the unity and integrity of the nation. And it is these core values that India upholds in the international system. All these provisions along with the independence of the judiciary are the cornerstones of Indian value system.
National Interests
7. National interests are some of the values translated into concrete goals which comprise of intermediate and long-term policy objectives. They depend on history, geography, national character and values, economic and military capability, all of which collectively determine the national interest at any point of time, thus making them both specific and dynamic in nature. They are constantly reviewed taking into consideration changes taking place in those factors which have a bearing on their evolution and identification. It is this specificity and dynamism of national interest that makes it an extremely complex phenomenon defying a simple and valid definition, and which must be understood in all its implications. An element of subjectivity is thus inevitable in any attempt at defining national interest in general. Today, the concept of the national interest is an important consideration in international relations where pursuit of the national interest is the foundation of the realist school. These political realists wish to differentiate their policies from "idealistic" policies that seek either to inject morality into foreign policy or promote solutions that rely on multilateral institutions which might weaken the independence of the state.
8. Components. The national interest of a state is multi faceted. Primary concern is the state's survival and security. In the wider sense it implies ensuring national security, safeguarding territorial integrity, political independence, pursuing national development and economic prosperity and maintaining or enhancing national prestige and reputation or pride and self- respect or national honor. It comprises of the following sub-sets:-
(a) Security. Security is fundamental need of a nation and covers a wide canvas. However, the meaning and significance of security as a component of the national interest of a state in contemporary international relations could be summarized as follows:-
(i) Preservation of territorial integrity, sovereignty and life and property of the people. The order of priority of these elements would depend on the circumstances at any particular time.
(ii) Internal security as it is relates to the very existence of the state or which would weaken or strengthen external security.
(iii) Long term and durable security which results from economic development, nation building and a non-belligerent foreign policy.
(iv) Military security within the frontiers and security through development of international law and world bodies like United Nations (UN), to ensure collective security.
(b) Political Independence. Freedom to identify the needs of the people, harnessing all the resources available, deciding on the best course of action for the betterment of the people without influence or coercion or blackmail is an important attribute of any state’s national interests. Sovereignty cannot be subjugated if the country has to progress
socially or economically.
(c) National Development. Security is only a minimum guarantee that is necessary for the ultimate realization of all political, economic and social potentialities which is the main responsibility of a modern state. The correlation of foreign policy and national development is a function of type of state – developed, developing or under-developed.
Developing countries like India, who are in a position of making maximum use of foreign policy for purposes of national development be it be field of defence, technical collaboration, export promotion, foreign trade, foreign aid or grants or loans, etc, can initiate diplomacy of economic development and state building. Economic prosperity is fundamental to national development and hence any activity that ensures continuous growth and prosperity has become a critical part in determination of national interest.
(d) National Prestige. No foreign policy can be pursued in isolation as it is to be followed in the worldly arena where there are other players promoting their own national interests. Seldom do national interests converge and hence it is a competing game. Nation’s position in the world order is dependent on its ability to influence others through various means available at its disposal, economic, technology, military and control of international organizations. Position in turn permits a nation to steer global debate towards securing its national interest.. Hence retaining or improving one’s power and prestige in the world order is part of the national interest.
9. Interpreting National Interests. What is in national interest and what is not, is quite often at variance depending upon the analyst. However in India it is the government of the day that decides by mainly analyzing the issue of concern in the light of above mentioned components. We have to be clear or select reasonable ends to be pursued abroad and also efficiently organize resources needed i.e. intellectual, material and emotional to accomplish those ends. Here is where the management of national security concerns becomes all the more important. The need for institutionalized arrangement, which can be entrusted with the task of evolution, formulation, execution and not forgetting monitoring of national security strategy, has hardly been contested.
National Security Architecture
10. At the Grand Strategic level, in a democratic set-up, the Cabinet controls al the various means at the government’s disposal to resolve the crisis: diplomatic, economic and other instruments, of which military action tends to be the final resort. As it would be obvious, decision making is at the core of all planned activities, a process of choosing better alternatives, to achieve a goal. The architecture must be so designed to provide the conceptual base for the intellectual material needed for decision making. Political direction is paramount, expressed within national and international laws as it provides the legal basis for the use of military force. Effective leadership at the national level is essential to provide clarity of direction and to inspire the effort and self-sacrifice demanded in a conflict. Many countries have designed/created their own organizational set-up to suit their ethos, history, tradition and inputs from the academia and industry. In our country, the setting up of ‘National Security Council (NSC)’ was a landmark event. It was formed in 1998 and its purpose was to undertake the country’s first strategic defence review and formulate a doctrine while keeping in mind the long term security options. A standing panel composed of the Prime Minister, External Affairs Minister, Finance Minister and Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission oversees the functioning of NSC.India’s National Security Adviser (NSA) serves as the link between the NSC and other support structures. The Kargil Conflict and the aftermath the “Kargil Review Committee” gave the country yet another chance to have a re-look at the security apparatus and Higher Defence Management. The Government also appointed a “Group of Ministers (GOM)” to examine the recommendations of the four task forces and put up their considered views for placing before the Cabinet. This, it is believed to be the country’s most comprehensive National Security document. Many of the recommendations have already been implemented except one vital recommendation regarding the appointment of ‘Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)’ is yet to be implemented. Few countries in the world have evolved the institution of CDS, who is the ultimate source of military advice to Ministers. The Service Chiefs, Army, Navy and Air Force, as the professional head of their Services, offer expert advice to the CDS on the employment of their forces and the strategic direction of operations.
Nature of Defence
11. Defence is the military contribution to National security and is a major element of a government’s wider security policy. Defence policy specifies the structure and capabilities of the armed forces and guides the contribution they make to the achievement of country’s defence and economic policies. The principal purpose of a democratic state’s armed forces is to provide the potential for the application of force to ensure the security of the nation, the freedom of its people and the promotion of its interests. The armed forces can be used for a variety of other tasks, short of conflict, to promote and protect national interests. The possession of credible military capability confers influence and, allied to manifest intent, provides a deterrent against aggression and coercion. Military capability underpins diplomacy and, used judiciously, can encourage stability within which broader national interests can be pursued.
The Components of Defence
12. The principal components of define are its armed forces, an organization to make decisions and a means of implementing them These components need to draw on a wide range of conceptual, moral and material resources throughout the country and abroad. In addition, the armed forces require a substantial supporting infrastructure, both civilian and military, assured budgetary support and a vibrant research and development base. A brief explanation of each of these components follows.
13. Decision Making. This is the central component, which remains under political control and draws upon both the conceptual and the moral base. It must provide sound policy and strategy, efficient allocation of resources, an effective crisis management capable of providing a balanced response to any situation, and clear strategic direction of operations. The formulation of policy must take into account of national aims and obligations, the geo-strategic context, potential threats to security, politics, economics, doctrine and capabilities and intentions of likely allies. Policy formulation is evolutionary and continuous anticipating long-term developments in the nature of conflict, including technology. It is backed by scientific research and analysis and realistic assessment of current military effectiveness of the armed forces. Moral base underpins the motivation of the armed forces. It is founded on public support and the political will of the government to maintain and, when necessary, use effective armed forces. The moral base also embraces the national will to ensure the welfare of military personnel including the retired fraternity and the efficient management to provide it.
14. Implementation. Associated with the decision making process is the equally vital ‘implementation’ process. Implementation requires an established and effective command and control structures with each organs of the Government including its armed forces and with it a swift and reliable communications and information systems. Planning for all contingencies should be based on organizations founded in peace that can be progressively developed, if necessary, as the threat increases. There is also the need for the military to render professional advice, command, control, strategic leadership and the vision and war fighting expertise required for effective and strategically relevant capability development.
15. The Armed Forces. The armed forces provide an important and distinctive strand in the fabric of the Nation. They take pride in the fact in that, as they provide the ideals of integrity, discipline, discipline, professionalism, service and excellence, they contribute immensely to national stability and cohesion. The size, shape and the capabilities of the armed forces should be matched to the security needs and economic circumstances of the state. There is close interaction between the conflicts in the sea; land and air environments and the armed forces must be able to operate in all the three environments as also be able operate together in joint operations. The overall defence making component must be able to apply military force in a coordinated way in each of the environments. Coherent joint warfare emerges as the “silver bullet” for victory in war symbolizing the highest level of force integration. The armed forces comprise, the people, the stores and command organizations, which together with doctrine and training, provide operationally ready military capability. These elements need to be harmonized to stay well trained and equipped professional forces. Only the highest quality, dedicated and well trained personnel with class leaders will be able to succeed in the complex and fast paced environment of future military operations.
16. Material Base. All armed forces require an assured industrial source of equipment and stores. Effective, affordable equipment, which exploits high technology, is essential to provide battle winning edge in modern combat. Equipment procurement is a key function, closely related to national economic and trading policy. Procurement decisions are highly dependent on a sound conceptual base. Moreover, the long development period of much modern equipment require these decisions to be based on an informed assessment of how military affairs are likely to develop over the next 10 to 20 years. Equipment procurement programmes needs to integrate the timely introduction of replacement items, funded and managed on a whole life cycle basis with allowance where appropriate, for planned capability updates during their lifetimes. Where indigenous capability is not able to match the essential requirement, these may have to be obtained through competitive procurement or through collaboration with other countries. Support of equipment and essential services during crisis must be ensured and robustness of some aspects of domestic defence industry may be critical to this.
17. Supporting Infrastructure. Armed forces require an infrastructure of bases, ports, airfields and communications. They also need an organization to store, supply, repair and dispose of equipment and stores. Support is required in other areas, such as medicine and meteorology. Some elements of the infrastructure must be designed specifically for military purposes and owned by the Government. However, in other cases it may be cost effective for facilities and services to be provided by private sector. The essential requirement is the ability of the government to control those assets essential to defence capability. We need to fully comprehend the vital nature of integrated logistic support as it is well established fact that military effectiveness of modern armed forces depends more than ever, on the quality of their logistic support. To meet the requirements of most demanding crises and of general war, it may be necessary for the industry to have the capability for surge capacity and reconstitution. The national communications networks and transport infrastructure provide essential support to routine defence business and in time of crisis to the generation, deployment and recovery of forces on operations. The merchant marine and civilian airlines provide essential strategic lift support when necessary.
18. Research and Development Base. It is recognized the world over that long term technological competence and international competitiveness can only come from a strong foundation of high quality research. Successful Research and Development (R&D) should comprise of a clear focus, excellent management practices, efficient production, adequate funding, and appropriate technology to include imported and indigenous. It also needs a cadre of keen, dedicated and well paid researchers. The presence of competition to ensure quality research is important. Bench marking for facilities, products and processes compatible with prevailing world standards must be ensured. R&D should become a part of an integrated approach to planning, management and financing and sustainable development. Measure must be made to shorten cycle times, particularly for the procurement of strategic systems, enhance program stability, and assured focus on core competencies, while freeing resources for investment in high priority areas. Technology insertion and acquisition agility must ensure that wherewithals needed are able to sustain the armed forces throughout the deployment sequence, from the short-fused start to decisive finish regardless of mission type or duration
19. Budgetary Support/ Allocation. Defence is an economic activity, which involves the commitment of resources to the fulfillment of a purpose. Resources enter the process as inputs of manpower, materials and technical competence. The outputs, which the application yields-military capabilities embodied in warships, field formations, aircrafts, missile squadrons, supported by logistic administration and training elements– serve the purpose. The purpose of defence expenditure depends on circumstances. In war time, the operational aim is easy to define: the attainment of victory or, at least avoidance of defeat. In peacetime however, the objective is more illusive: to attain sense of security. Budget allocations for defence must be related to Threat assessment, Grand Strategy, Technology orientation or roles and missions. The much talked about Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) must parallel the work being done in another revolution namely ‘Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA).
Media Support
20. Modern conflict will be fought in the spotlight of massive attention by news media. The immediacy of media transmissions can magnify the importance of relatively minor incidents and influence public opinion before the political authority can fully analyze facts, putting additional pressure on political and military leaders. Equally, however, the media can also act as a powerful conduit for positive information to boost morale and to influence public opinion. Media operations also need to persuade third parties that action being taken is right and justifiable and to counter malicious or ill-informed reporting in the theatre of operations. Public support for any military operation must be rooted in an accurate understanding of events and their background. Reports of events can be broadcast virtually as they happen and hence the media operations maxim is to release as much accurate information as possible, as quickly as feasible , subject to only to operational security and safety of own troops.
Conclusion
21. With the phenomenon of globalization and under the label of inter-dependence, academics and practioners began to explore alternative ways of looking at security, challenging the somewhat militarized, balance of power perceptions. The notions of Common security (achieving security with others, not against them) and later Comprehensive security (giving primacy to the requirements of internal stability, national development and social harmony, vulnerability to internal threats and external intervention) marked a significant departure in thinking about security. The import of emerging security issues certainly stretches the traditional thinking about security. The issues tend to be complex, multi-dimensions and trans-national in form and impact.
22. Defence policies specify the structure and capabilities of the Armed Forces and guide the contribution they make to the achievement of country’s defence and security goals. The principal purpose of a democratic state’s armed forces is to provide the potential for the application of force to ensure the security of the nation, freedom of its people and promotion of national interests. The place of the armed forces in the fabric of the nation is indeed unique. On the road to prosperity and development, however lay, a host of challenges which has to be factored in. Peace and security, internal as well as external, is the first and most essential foundation for the nation’s future progress. Fearlessness, can be only attained when security extends to cover, over and above our physical security, our social rights and economic well being to eliminate all forms of vulnerability and discrimination.
Bibliography
1. Constitution of India.
2. Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Annual Reports 2008, 2009.
3. Subhash Kapila, ‘India’s Defence Policies and Strategic Thought-A Comparative Analysis’, Simsid Book, Noida, 2003.
4. National Security-Military Aspects –A Compilation by Rupa &Co , New Delhi-2003.
5. India’s National Security-Annual Review –Edited by Shri Satish Kumar, Routledge, New Delhi-2010.
6. Subrahmanyam. K. , “Shedding Shibboleths—India’s Evolving Strategic Outlook”, New Delhi, 2005.
7. General Sunderji.K. “Vision -2100-a Strategy for the Twenty-First Century”-Delhi, 2003
Saturday, May 14, 2011
Need to restructure Special Forces
HT CHANDIGARH - 12-05-2011
My article titled " Need to Restucture Special Forces" is placed below.
Regards,
Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi
Defence Matters: Need to restructure Special Forces HINDUSTAN TIMES, CHANDIGARH THURSDAY, MAY 12, 2011 by Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi
A US SEALS-LIKE STRIKE MUST MEET AT LEAST 3 PARAMETERS: POLITICAL WILL,
KNOWLEDGE OF TARGET AREA & TARGET, AND FORCE’S CAPABILITY TO ACHIEVE END RESULT
Once again, Pakistan’s nefarious activities relating to terrorism have been exposed. It is now trying to somehow wriggle out of the monumental expose’ that has followed the shooting down of Osama bin Laden by SEALS of the US Special Forces Command under virtually the nose of the all powerful Pakistani Army. That Pakistan was the epicentre of global as well as regional terrorism was well known to the entire world, especially to India and the United States, but opprobrium for Pakistan is now universal. Pakistan started with its usual ‘denial’ policy but in the face of new revelations, this gave way to threats and brandishing its nuclear sabre, something it always does when it is caught with its hands in the till! It is now in the third stage, as a defiant Prime Minister Gilani has absolved the army and the ISI of any wrongs and instead blamed the Americans and everyone else. Its all-weather friend-China has also given it the thumbs-up signal. It is unfortunate that once again Pakistan will get away because neither India nor USA, the two countries with the maximum stake in rooting out terrorism would take any precipitate action, but for entirely different reasons. The US still needs Pakistan to extricate itself with a modicum of pride from Afghanistan, and the DNA of the Indian political leadership is sans ‘pride or prejudice’. This is despite the anger of our populace towards all that the Pakistani’s have done to destabilise India, wantonly killing, destroying and creating panic. The reaction of our ‘soft’ leadership was predictable; Pakistan has been given yet another reprieve despite its exposure as the perpetrator of terrorism encompassing India as well as other countries. In this milieu, the media and many analysts do not seem to tire of discussing the pros and cons of launching a similar strike by our Special Force (SF’s). Before such analyses get completely out of hand, let me point out a few facts. A strike like the one conducted by the US SEAL’s must meet at least three essential parameters. The first is ‘political will’, which we neither have nor apparently want to cultivate! The second is detailed knowledge of the target area as well as the target, which our intelligence agencies have never been able to give; and the third is the capability of the force needed to achieve the desired end state. Our SF comes in at the third level. Hypothetically, even if our political leadership somehow is able to find the necessary ‘will’ and by some miracle the intelligence agencies are able to give ‘actionable’ intelligence, which they have never given in the past, do the defence forces have the kind of forces the US SF employed in taking out Osama?
The Indian Military does have units that are known as SF, but we would be deluding ourselves if we think that they are in the same league as the elite SF of the world, like the Delta Force and the SEAL’s of USA; the SAS and SBS of UK; or the Spetsnaz of Russia. Notwithstanding this, our SF units are manned by specially selected brave men, who are well trained and have better equipment than other units. Although their equipment may not be as sophisticated as other elite SF’s, they have the ability and capability to carry out raids of the type that eliminated Osama. Their major weaknesses relate to having no integral helicopters to train for the wide variety of missions they are designed to perform and lack of network centricity that is essential in such missions today. Unfortunately, many overtures for setting up a state of art elite SF unit, mooted by me a number of times did not fructify on account of three reasons - refusal of the Air Force to part with helicopters; emotional attachment of senior officers to their regiments; and the comfort of the status quo! My detailed recommendation made on combining all SF under a joint Special Forces Command was also scuttled by the Chiefs, as they did not want to lose their SF resources to a joint entity! I do hope the Chiefs and other stake holders revisit our SF capability and make our SF as capable and elitist as those of other countries. Today, it has become a dire necessity that can no longer be sacrificed at the alter of expediency and turf considerations.
My article titled " Need to Restucture Special Forces" is placed below.
Regards,
Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi
Defence Matters: Need to restructure Special Forces HINDUSTAN TIMES, CHANDIGARH THURSDAY, MAY 12, 2011 by Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi
A US SEALS-LIKE STRIKE MUST MEET AT LEAST 3 PARAMETERS: POLITICAL WILL,
KNOWLEDGE OF TARGET AREA & TARGET, AND FORCE’S CAPABILITY TO ACHIEVE END RESULT
Once again, Pakistan’s nefarious activities relating to terrorism have been exposed. It is now trying to somehow wriggle out of the monumental expose’ that has followed the shooting down of Osama bin Laden by SEALS of the US Special Forces Command under virtually the nose of the all powerful Pakistani Army. That Pakistan was the epicentre of global as well as regional terrorism was well known to the entire world, especially to India and the United States, but opprobrium for Pakistan is now universal. Pakistan started with its usual ‘denial’ policy but in the face of new revelations, this gave way to threats and brandishing its nuclear sabre, something it always does when it is caught with its hands in the till! It is now in the third stage, as a defiant Prime Minister Gilani has absolved the army and the ISI of any wrongs and instead blamed the Americans and everyone else. Its all-weather friend-China has also given it the thumbs-up signal. It is unfortunate that once again Pakistan will get away because neither India nor USA, the two countries with the maximum stake in rooting out terrorism would take any precipitate action, but for entirely different reasons. The US still needs Pakistan to extricate itself with a modicum of pride from Afghanistan, and the DNA of the Indian political leadership is sans ‘pride or prejudice’. This is despite the anger of our populace towards all that the Pakistani’s have done to destabilise India, wantonly killing, destroying and creating panic. The reaction of our ‘soft’ leadership was predictable; Pakistan has been given yet another reprieve despite its exposure as the perpetrator of terrorism encompassing India as well as other countries. In this milieu, the media and many analysts do not seem to tire of discussing the pros and cons of launching a similar strike by our Special Force (SF’s). Before such analyses get completely out of hand, let me point out a few facts. A strike like the one conducted by the US SEAL’s must meet at least three essential parameters. The first is ‘political will’, which we neither have nor apparently want to cultivate! The second is detailed knowledge of the target area as well as the target, which our intelligence agencies have never been able to give; and the third is the capability of the force needed to achieve the desired end state. Our SF comes in at the third level. Hypothetically, even if our political leadership somehow is able to find the necessary ‘will’ and by some miracle the intelligence agencies are able to give ‘actionable’ intelligence, which they have never given in the past, do the defence forces have the kind of forces the US SF employed in taking out Osama?
The Indian Military does have units that are known as SF, but we would be deluding ourselves if we think that they are in the same league as the elite SF of the world, like the Delta Force and the SEAL’s of USA; the SAS and SBS of UK; or the Spetsnaz of Russia. Notwithstanding this, our SF units are manned by specially selected brave men, who are well trained and have better equipment than other units. Although their equipment may not be as sophisticated as other elite SF’s, they have the ability and capability to carry out raids of the type that eliminated Osama. Their major weaknesses relate to having no integral helicopters to train for the wide variety of missions they are designed to perform and lack of network centricity that is essential in such missions today. Unfortunately, many overtures for setting up a state of art elite SF unit, mooted by me a number of times did not fructify on account of three reasons - refusal of the Air Force to part with helicopters; emotional attachment of senior officers to their regiments; and the comfort of the status quo! My detailed recommendation made on combining all SF under a joint Special Forces Command was also scuttled by the Chiefs, as they did not want to lose their SF resources to a joint entity! I do hope the Chiefs and other stake holders revisit our SF capability and make our SF as capable and elitist as those of other countries. Today, it has become a dire necessity that can no longer be sacrificed at the alter of expediency and turf considerations.
Sunday, May 8, 2011
Covert Raids- India Can and yet, it Cannot
The success of the covert US operation resulting in killing of the world’s most wanted terrorist, Osama bin Laden has evoked interesting questions that seem to echo a popular eagerness in India to be more decisive in our response to terrorist attacks. If the US can launch such an audacious raid deep inside Pakistan, can’t India do so to deal with the likes of Daud and others accused for crimes against India? The Indian Army and Air Force Chiefs, General VK Singh and Air Chief Marshal PV Naik had to confirm in reply to questions from the media that Indian Defence Forces do have the capabilities to conduct similar operations. The dithering attitude of the Indian government, however, contradicts this martial confidence for reasons never fully explained as has been witnessed by the world so far.
The history of our responses to terror attacks has been peculiar. When it became clear that the terror attack on the Parliament House in New Delhi had its origin in Pakistan, the government ordered the Indian Army, second largest in the world, to rise to the occasion. The whole Indo-Pak border from Siachen (J&K) to Kutch (Gujarat) became active and hot with opposing armies deployed and fuming at each other. A lot of polemics and flexing of military muscle from India but little else. After a year long deployment, the Indian Army was ordered back to barracks even as Pakistan remained unmoved on all counts. Subsequent to the Mumbai terror attack (fashionably called ‘26/11’ to liken it to the 9/11 WTC devastation in New York), investigations in India and the US confirmed that it was an operation planned and executed under ISI supervision by an all-Pakistani team. We immediately snapped peace talks with Pakistan and issued ultimatum to that country: 'arrest and hand over to India the originators of the crime or else…uh…'! Nothing shook Pakistan. The Samjhauta Express train was suspended and resumed without much change in commitments from the other side. Such blow-hot blow-cold behaviour has only exposed India’s inability to retaliate.
A sovereign nation must possess a credible deterrence to pursue and protect its vital national interests, which essentially means its power to discourage another power from acting against its interests and, if necessary, to coerce a potential enemy to abandon hostile options and cooperate. India’s position in this aspect has been curiously strange. In spite of having dismembered and defeated Pakistan repeatedly in four wars since 1947, India has proved its military superiority beyond doubt. Sadly yet, it has unwittingly compromised its credibility to retaliate by failing to deliver a decisive retaliatory blow in response to some most damaging terrorist attacks. Further, its self-proclaimed nuclear doctrine of ‘no first use policy’ has much to soothe rather than deter Pakistan, which gives no such undertaking and has kept its nuclear options open – a credible deterrence that has not only restrained India but has often brought in pressure from the international community to persuade India against escalating military tensions with Pakistan. A curious feature of this scenario in South Asia is that while everybody in the world trusts India will behave with due responsibility and restraint, few would trust Pakistan to abide by such norms of self-restraint in times of severe threat or adversity. Obviously, this has betrayed the meaninglessness of our noises and emboldened the terror nurseries in Pakistan to roll out more proxies to bleed India. A case of deterrence working in reverse order!
Countries have built in deterrence in their military options and made it abundantly credible through their prompt punitive actions. Having risen as a power in the midst of hostile nations, Israel spells awe because of its devastating response to any hostile activity. ‘Operation Thunderbolt’ (4 July 1976), a daring raid on Entebbe airport to rescue 103 Israeli hostages kept at the Ugandan airport by Palestinian militants was launched without awaiting approval of the UN or US even though the hijacked Boeing 737 belonged to Air France. What a resounding success it was! Al Wazir, a high-ranking Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) leader, who was suspected for his role in the Black September massacre of Israeli sportsmen, was killed in his safe house in Tunis in April 1988 in a covertly executed Israeli raid. Special forces like the German GSG-9 and the British SAS Regiment have also carried out a number of successful covert raids across borders with astounding results. India’s own Elite forces like Special Action Groups of the National Security Guard, Army Special Forces commandos and Special Group have carried out a number of successful anti-hijack missions, hostage rescue missions including an overseas ‘Operation Cactus’ that thwarted a coup attempt by Tamil militants and restored Maumoon Abdul Gayoom’s government in Maldives in November 1988. There is enough for every Indian to feel proud and confident of India’s military capabilities.
The world saw President Barrak Obama closeted with the military officers in their Operations Room watching the operation live and giving on the spot decisions during the raid against Osama bin Laden. Involvement of political decision makers with their military commanders is a state necessity and a boon to the functionaries. But our leaders and the South Block mandarins have been somewhat shy to get closer to the military. We know how an ostrich digs and buries its head in the sand to avoid danger; but is that the way to avoid danger? Unlike the US Pentagon staff, the Indian Defence Ministry officials are all non-military babus who rarely, if ever, interact with Army/Navy/Air Force officers. Little wonder that in their view guerrilla is the same as gorilla; mortar may be a masonry substance and ‘Wilco’ may be just another name in the MNCs list like Telco, Nelco, Tisco etc. A minister was invited to an artillery unit’s raising day function in Delhi Cantt. At the equipment display, as the minister seemed curious about the equipment before him, an officer offered to acquaint him with the equipment and weapon systems. “It’s Howitzer”, the officer said. Prompt came the minister’s appreciation, “Nice, but what’s it called?” “Howitzer”, the officer repeated, a little louder this time. “I said it’s fine, but what is the damn thing called.” Having never seen or heard a howitzer, the minister got it the best he could – ‘How’s-it-Sir’! It is through military power that a nation asserts its political will and gives meaning to diplomacy. Indian leaders and bureaucrats need to know more about their military and do everything to keep it best maintained at all times to lend credence to India’s global aspirations.
Whether India will ever carry out covert operations to capture or kill and destroy individuals and establishments hostile to India kept in safe havens in Pakistan is a different matter. What is most essential is that India must revive and re-establish its credibility as a power that can resort to swift offensive actions to safeguard its vital interests and to punish its offenders irrespective of their location. The minimum that India must do is to act in a manner that shall convince Pakistan that India can retaliate with ferocity and inflict unacceptable damage if peaceful overtures do not pay up within a stated period.
What should be noted, however, is that secret commando missions can also end up in fiascos even if it is a US mission like ‘Operation Eagle Claw’ – a covert mission launched to rescue its Embassy staff held hostage in Tehran in April 1980. The entire operation ended up in a disaster and had to be aborted. President Jimmy Carter paid the price for this failure as he was defeated in his bid for a second term. Indian leaders are wiser, though!
Col Karan Kharb (Retd)
The writer is a defence veteran and a social activist having authored two bestselling books on leadership development.
The history of our responses to terror attacks has been peculiar. When it became clear that the terror attack on the Parliament House in New Delhi had its origin in Pakistan, the government ordered the Indian Army, second largest in the world, to rise to the occasion. The whole Indo-Pak border from Siachen (J&K) to Kutch (Gujarat) became active and hot with opposing armies deployed and fuming at each other. A lot of polemics and flexing of military muscle from India but little else. After a year long deployment, the Indian Army was ordered back to barracks even as Pakistan remained unmoved on all counts. Subsequent to the Mumbai terror attack (fashionably called ‘26/11’ to liken it to the 9/11 WTC devastation in New York), investigations in India and the US confirmed that it was an operation planned and executed under ISI supervision by an all-Pakistani team. We immediately snapped peace talks with Pakistan and issued ultimatum to that country: 'arrest and hand over to India the originators of the crime or else…uh…'! Nothing shook Pakistan. The Samjhauta Express train was suspended and resumed without much change in commitments from the other side. Such blow-hot blow-cold behaviour has only exposed India’s inability to retaliate.
A sovereign nation must possess a credible deterrence to pursue and protect its vital national interests, which essentially means its power to discourage another power from acting against its interests and, if necessary, to coerce a potential enemy to abandon hostile options and cooperate. India’s position in this aspect has been curiously strange. In spite of having dismembered and defeated Pakistan repeatedly in four wars since 1947, India has proved its military superiority beyond doubt. Sadly yet, it has unwittingly compromised its credibility to retaliate by failing to deliver a decisive retaliatory blow in response to some most damaging terrorist attacks. Further, its self-proclaimed nuclear doctrine of ‘no first use policy’ has much to soothe rather than deter Pakistan, which gives no such undertaking and has kept its nuclear options open – a credible deterrence that has not only restrained India but has often brought in pressure from the international community to persuade India against escalating military tensions with Pakistan. A curious feature of this scenario in South Asia is that while everybody in the world trusts India will behave with due responsibility and restraint, few would trust Pakistan to abide by such norms of self-restraint in times of severe threat or adversity. Obviously, this has betrayed the meaninglessness of our noises and emboldened the terror nurseries in Pakistan to roll out more proxies to bleed India. A case of deterrence working in reverse order!
Countries have built in deterrence in their military options and made it abundantly credible through their prompt punitive actions. Having risen as a power in the midst of hostile nations, Israel spells awe because of its devastating response to any hostile activity. ‘Operation Thunderbolt’ (4 July 1976), a daring raid on Entebbe airport to rescue 103 Israeli hostages kept at the Ugandan airport by Palestinian militants was launched without awaiting approval of the UN or US even though the hijacked Boeing 737 belonged to Air France. What a resounding success it was! Al Wazir, a high-ranking Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) leader, who was suspected for his role in the Black September massacre of Israeli sportsmen, was killed in his safe house in Tunis in April 1988 in a covertly executed Israeli raid. Special forces like the German GSG-9 and the British SAS Regiment have also carried out a number of successful covert raids across borders with astounding results. India’s own Elite forces like Special Action Groups of the National Security Guard, Army Special Forces commandos and Special Group have carried out a number of successful anti-hijack missions, hostage rescue missions including an overseas ‘Operation Cactus’ that thwarted a coup attempt by Tamil militants and restored Maumoon Abdul Gayoom’s government in Maldives in November 1988. There is enough for every Indian to feel proud and confident of India’s military capabilities.
The world saw President Barrak Obama closeted with the military officers in their Operations Room watching the operation live and giving on the spot decisions during the raid against Osama bin Laden. Involvement of political decision makers with their military commanders is a state necessity and a boon to the functionaries. But our leaders and the South Block mandarins have been somewhat shy to get closer to the military. We know how an ostrich digs and buries its head in the sand to avoid danger; but is that the way to avoid danger? Unlike the US Pentagon staff, the Indian Defence Ministry officials are all non-military babus who rarely, if ever, interact with Army/Navy/Air Force officers. Little wonder that in their view guerrilla is the same as gorilla; mortar may be a masonry substance and ‘Wilco’ may be just another name in the MNCs list like Telco, Nelco, Tisco etc. A minister was invited to an artillery unit’s raising day function in Delhi Cantt. At the equipment display, as the minister seemed curious about the equipment before him, an officer offered to acquaint him with the equipment and weapon systems. “It’s Howitzer”, the officer said. Prompt came the minister’s appreciation, “Nice, but what’s it called?” “Howitzer”, the officer repeated, a little louder this time. “I said it’s fine, but what is the damn thing called.” Having never seen or heard a howitzer, the minister got it the best he could – ‘How’s-it-Sir’! It is through military power that a nation asserts its political will and gives meaning to diplomacy. Indian leaders and bureaucrats need to know more about their military and do everything to keep it best maintained at all times to lend credence to India’s global aspirations.
Whether India will ever carry out covert operations to capture or kill and destroy individuals and establishments hostile to India kept in safe havens in Pakistan is a different matter. What is most essential is that India must revive and re-establish its credibility as a power that can resort to swift offensive actions to safeguard its vital interests and to punish its offenders irrespective of their location. The minimum that India must do is to act in a manner that shall convince Pakistan that India can retaliate with ferocity and inflict unacceptable damage if peaceful overtures do not pay up within a stated period.
What should be noted, however, is that secret commando missions can also end up in fiascos even if it is a US mission like ‘Operation Eagle Claw’ – a covert mission launched to rescue its Embassy staff held hostage in Tehran in April 1980. The entire operation ended up in a disaster and had to be aborted. President Jimmy Carter paid the price for this failure as he was defeated in his bid for a second term. Indian leaders are wiser, though!
Col Karan Kharb (Retd)
The writer is a defence veteran and a social activist having authored two bestselling books on leadership development.
Pakistan Officer linked to Mumbai Attacks
Trial in Mumbai attacks could strain U.S.-Pakistan relations: David Guttenfelder/ ASSOCIATED PRESS
In 2008, 166 people were killed in a terrorist attack in Mumbai. A Pakistani intelligence officer is alleged to have been involved.
It could be years, if ever, before the world learns whether Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) helped hide Osama bin Laden.
But detailed allegations of ISI involvement in terrorism will soon be made public in a federal courtroom in Chicago, where prosecutors late last month charged a suspected ISI major with helping to plot the deaths of six Americans in the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
The indictment has explosive implications because Washington and Islamabad are struggling to preserve their fragile relationship. The ISI has long been suspected of secretly aiding terrorist groups while serving as a U.S. ally in the terrorism fight. The discovery that bin Laden spent years in a fortress like compound surrounded by military facilities in Abbottabad has heightened those suspicions and reinforced the accusations that the ISI was involved in the attacks that killed 166 people in Mumbai.
“It’s very, very troubling,” said Rep. Frank R. Wolf (R-Va.), chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee that oversees funding of the Justice Department. Wolf has closely followed the Mumbai case and wants an independent study group to review South Asia policy top to bottom.
“Keep in mind that we’ve given billions of dollars to the Pakistani government,” he said. “In light of what’s taken place with bin Laden, the whole issue raises serious problems and questions.”
Three chiefs of Lashkar-i-Taiba, the Pakistani terrorist group, were also indicted in Chicago. They include Sajid Mir, a suspected Mumbai mastermind whose voice was caught on tape directing the three-day slaughter by phone from Pakistan. Mir, too, has ISI links. He remains at large along with the suspected ISI major and half a dozen other top suspects.
Despite the unprecedented terrorism charges implicating a Pakistani officer, the Justice Department and other agencies did not issue news releases, hold a news conference or make any comments when the indictment was issued. The 33-page document names the suspect only as “Major Iqbal.” It does not mention the ISI, although Iqbal’s affiliation to the spy agency has been detailed in U.S. and Indian case files and by anti-terrorism officials in interviews with ProPublica over the past year.
“Obviously there has been a push to be low-key,” said an Obama administration official who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the pending trial.
The first public airing of the ISI’s alleged involvement in the Mumbai attack will begin May 16 with the trial of Tahawwur Rana, owner of a Chicago immigration consulting firm. Rana was arrested in 2009 and charged with material support of terrorism in the same case in which the four suspects were indicted. The star witness will be David Coleman Headley, a Pakistani American businessman-turned-militant who has pleaded guilty to scouting targets in India and Denmark. Rana allegedly helped Headley use his firm as a cover for reconnaissance.
Rana’s attorney, Charles Swift, contends that Rana is not a terrorist because he thought he was assisting the ISI with an espionage operation. Swift said the U.S. indictment omits the ISI in hopes of mitigating tensions.
Trial in Mumbai attacks could strain U.S.-Pakistan relations
Pakistan Exposed- Mother of all embrassments by Ayaz Amir
The accused Major Basha
Abdur Rehman retired in 2007 from the Pakistan army as a Major. He worked closely with Lashkar-e-Taiba and coordinated the activities of a Chicago man, David Headley. He was arrested in 2009 in Pakistan on unspecified charges and later released. An Associated Press story on 24 November 2009 said that five Pakistan army officers, including a retired brigadier and two active lieutenant colonels, had been detained for questioning in Pakistan. They had all been in telephone contact with Headley. But the next day, Pakistan military spokesman Athar Abbas said that "security agencies" had only detained a single former army major in connection with the FBI case
click here to read more
It could be years, if ever, before the world learns whether Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) helped hide Osama bin Laden.
But detailed allegations of ISI involvement in terrorism will soon be made public in a federal courtroom in Chicago, where prosecutors late last month charged a suspected ISI major with helping to plot the deaths of six Americans in the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
The indictment has explosive implications because Washington and Islamabad are struggling to preserve their fragile relationship. The ISI has long been suspected of secretly aiding terrorist groups while serving as a U.S. ally in the terrorism fight. The discovery that bin Laden spent years in a fortress like compound surrounded by military facilities in Abbottabad has heightened those suspicions and reinforced the accusations that the ISI was involved in the attacks that killed 166 people in Mumbai.
“It’s very, very troubling,” said Rep. Frank R. Wolf (R-Va.), chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee that oversees funding of the Justice Department. Wolf has closely followed the Mumbai case and wants an independent study group to review South Asia policy top to bottom.
“Keep in mind that we’ve given billions of dollars to the Pakistani government,” he said. “In light of what’s taken place with bin Laden, the whole issue raises serious problems and questions.”
Three chiefs of Lashkar-i-Taiba, the Pakistani terrorist group, were also indicted in Chicago. They include Sajid Mir, a suspected Mumbai mastermind whose voice was caught on tape directing the three-day slaughter by phone from Pakistan. Mir, too, has ISI links. He remains at large along with the suspected ISI major and half a dozen other top suspects.
Despite the unprecedented terrorism charges implicating a Pakistani officer, the Justice Department and other agencies did not issue news releases, hold a news conference or make any comments when the indictment was issued. The 33-page document names the suspect only as “Major Iqbal.” It does not mention the ISI, although Iqbal’s affiliation to the spy agency has been detailed in U.S. and Indian case files and by anti-terrorism officials in interviews with ProPublica over the past year.
“Obviously there has been a push to be low-key,” said an Obama administration official who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the pending trial.
The first public airing of the ISI’s alleged involvement in the Mumbai attack will begin May 16 with the trial of Tahawwur Rana, owner of a Chicago immigration consulting firm. Rana was arrested in 2009 and charged with material support of terrorism in the same case in which the four suspects were indicted. The star witness will be David Coleman Headley, a Pakistani American businessman-turned-militant who has pleaded guilty to scouting targets in India and Denmark. Rana allegedly helped Headley use his firm as a cover for reconnaissance.
Rana’s attorney, Charles Swift, contends that Rana is not a terrorist because he thought he was assisting the ISI with an espionage operation. Swift said the U.S. indictment omits the ISI in hopes of mitigating tensions.
Trial in Mumbai attacks could strain U.S.-Pakistan relations
Pakistan Exposed- Mother of all embrassments by Ayaz Amir
The accused Major Basha
Abdur Rehman retired in 2007 from the Pakistan army as a Major. He worked closely with Lashkar-e-Taiba and coordinated the activities of a Chicago man, David Headley. He was arrested in 2009 in Pakistan on unspecified charges and later released. An Associated Press story on 24 November 2009 said that five Pakistan army officers, including a retired brigadier and two active lieutenant colonels, had been detained for questioning in Pakistan. They had all been in telephone contact with Headley. But the next day, Pakistan military spokesman Athar Abbas said that "security agencies" had only detained a single former army major in connection with the FBI case
click here to read more
Thursday, May 5, 2011
Who Dares Wins
Special Forces Who Dares Wins
Almost 24 years ago, two Indian naval officers were quietly sent off to the United States to attend a training course that few really knew much about. Since then it has been a tragedy of monumental neglect...Saikat Datta
Almost 24 years ago, two Indian naval officers were quietly sent off to the United States to attend a training course that few really knew much about. These two officers, Lt. Arvind Singh and Lt Shamsher Singh Deopa, were young naval officers who had never done anything like the course they were about to attend.
The same course they attended would eventually produce the men who slipped into Abbottabad, Pakistan in the early hours of May 2 to neutralise Osama bin Laden. Both Singh and Deopa were the first ever Indian officers to attend the Navy S.E.A.L.S course, the toughest few weeks of physical and psychological torture created to produce some of the best Special Forces in the world.
In the weeks that followed, both naval officers did India proud and Singh emerged on the top of his course. On their return to India, Singh and Deopa became part of a top secret project that had been envisaged by a few naval officers. Both men were to be the nucleus around which the Indian Marine Special Forces (IMSF) would be built and give India’s navy the same edge that the Navy S.E.A.L.S had.
In the next few years the IMSF would see action all over the Jaffna peninsula as the IPKF battled the LTTE in Sri Lanka. The first time the IMSF would see action would be a hazardous operation to blow up the Jaffna jetty. This was a crucial link to the LTTE’s suicide boats that was threatening the IPKF’s naval supply ships as well as the Sri Lankan navy. India’s naval operations decided to use the first batch of the IMSF to put together a team that would take out the jetty.
Naturally, the man they chose to lead the operation was Lt Arvind Singh. In the late hours of a summer night, Singh and his men slipped off an Indian naval ship and began to swim towards their objective a good 10-12 km away. Carrying their weapons and demolitions, the team slipped into the Jaffna harbour and laid their charges. As soon as the jetty blew up, the LTTE immediately detected the IMSF team and began to harass them with withering fire. Singh and his men returned the fire and began their long swim back to their ship. They returned without any casualties and, a year later, Singh would walk up the steps of Rashtrapati Bhawan to receive his Maha Vir Chakra.
Singh would participate in many more operations including a major rescue of Sri Lankan and IPKF forces held hostage in the Jaffna fort by the LTTE. Singh and his Sri Lankan counterparts parachuted into the fort and brought out the troops who had been held hostage for weeks. Years after the IPKF withdrew from the Sri Lanka, the IMSF would return to the Island nation for a few more operations that will always remain under wraps. Renamed as the MARCOS (Marine Commandos) they would continue to play a stellar role in the anti-piracy operations undertaken by the Indian Navy in recent months.
Unfortunately, while the men who served in these elite units were some of the finest, they continued to remain neglected by a poor military and political leadership that had little appreciation for their strategic reach.
The operation to capture Osama has amplified the strategic reach that Special Forces (SF) can give to a state facing myriad challenges. Sadly, while India’s SF, was patterned on the best in the world, have withered away since then. Take the Indian Army’s SF battalions. Created in 1968, the 9th and the 19th battalions of the Parachute Regiment underwent training designed by a young army captain from Pune who had been sent to the U.S Special Forces training school. Both battalions would cover themselves with glory in the 1971 war.
A team from 9 Para (SF) would cross the line of control to raid a major Pakistani artillery gun position in Mandhol. The team returned after destroying all the guns and with just two minor casualties. In the scorching deserts of Rajathsan, a young prince from Jaipur led a team of 10 Para (SF) to raid the Pakistani town of Chachro in Sind. Legend has it that when Bhawani Singh was returning with his raiders, the Indian BSF opened fire on them thinking they were Pakistanis! No one could believe that an Indian army team could slip across the international border, hit a major town and return back to base successfully.
Since then, the Indian SF has seen monumental neglect at the hands of hostile military leaders and ignorant political masters. While the U.S saw the consolidation of all its Special Forces under one command, India went in the opposite direction. In 1987-88 a young Colonel R K Nanavatty was part of a study that would make an attempt to upgrade the strategic capabilities of our SF. A comprehensive study recommended that the SF be separated from the Parachute regiment and have a home and hearth of its own.
In 1994 this was done and a new Special Forces Regiment, headquartered in the hilly town of Nahan, Himachal Pradesh was created. Unfortunately for the youngest regiment of the Indian Army, the death of the then army chief, Gen B C Joshi proved to be a death blow. Gen Shankar Roychowdhury took over and under pressure from retired generals of the Parachute Regiment, he promptly disbanded the Special Forces regiment.
Since then, the Indian SF has been put through a series of blunders. At one point, while there was a severe lack of resources to modernise the SF, army headquarters began an ill-advised expansion. More battalions were converted into an SF role, but in reality they had no equipment, training and therefore, no special capabilities. Many within the SF community opposed this tooth and nail but failed to anticipate the political machinations of a vested few. In the end, the expansion took place and we continue to pay for this mammoth blunder even today.
If that was not bad enough, India’s military and political masters have steadfastly refused to create a Special Operations Command. So while the army has its SF component, the IAF, Navy, Cabinet Secretariat and the home ministry have their own. No one speaks to the other, everyone buys equipment in complete isolation, and there are no joint doctrines, trainings or exercises. As a result India’s strategic use of SF remains an incoherent mess.
So if we need to go after our enemies, or protect our growing energy needs, or address an out-of-area contingency far away from our territorial boundaries, we simply don’t have the wherewithal. If the U.S could fly several thousand miles into Abbottabad to capture and neutralise a declared enemy of the state, it is because they began work over 30 years ago. Similar successes have been notched up by the British Special Air Services (SAS), as they became a major tool for British foreign policy. During every major crisis that the U.K faces, one lowly Brigadier gets to sit next to the British Prime Minister as he consults his crisis management group. A badge worn by the Brigadier on his uniform with the words “Who Dares Wins” is the only indication that he belongs to the legendary SAS.
In India, only powerful IAS bureaucrats and politicians get to sit in the crisis management group. They are supposed to mull and decide over the options that can be exercised when an enemy of the state shows hostile intent. Therein hangs a tragic tale of a strategic blunder.
Who Dares Wins
Almost 24 years ago, two Indian naval officers were quietly sent off to the United States to attend a training course that few really knew much about. Since then it has been a tragedy of monumental neglect...Saikat Datta
Almost 24 years ago, two Indian naval officers were quietly sent off to the United States to attend a training course that few really knew much about. These two officers, Lt. Arvind Singh and Lt Shamsher Singh Deopa, were young naval officers who had never done anything like the course they were about to attend.
The same course they attended would eventually produce the men who slipped into Abbottabad, Pakistan in the early hours of May 2 to neutralise Osama bin Laden. Both Singh and Deopa were the first ever Indian officers to attend the Navy S.E.A.L.S course, the toughest few weeks of physical and psychological torture created to produce some of the best Special Forces in the world.
In the weeks that followed, both naval officers did India proud and Singh emerged on the top of his course. On their return to India, Singh and Deopa became part of a top secret project that had been envisaged by a few naval officers. Both men were to be the nucleus around which the Indian Marine Special Forces (IMSF) would be built and give India’s navy the same edge that the Navy S.E.A.L.S had.
In the next few years the IMSF would see action all over the Jaffna peninsula as the IPKF battled the LTTE in Sri Lanka. The first time the IMSF would see action would be a hazardous operation to blow up the Jaffna jetty. This was a crucial link to the LTTE’s suicide boats that was threatening the IPKF’s naval supply ships as well as the Sri Lankan navy. India’s naval operations decided to use the first batch of the IMSF to put together a team that would take out the jetty.
Naturally, the man they chose to lead the operation was Lt Arvind Singh. In the late hours of a summer night, Singh and his men slipped off an Indian naval ship and began to swim towards their objective a good 10-12 km away. Carrying their weapons and demolitions, the team slipped into the Jaffna harbour and laid their charges. As soon as the jetty blew up, the LTTE immediately detected the IMSF team and began to harass them with withering fire. Singh and his men returned the fire and began their long swim back to their ship. They returned without any casualties and, a year later, Singh would walk up the steps of Rashtrapati Bhawan to receive his Maha Vir Chakra.
Singh would participate in many more operations including a major rescue of Sri Lankan and IPKF forces held hostage in the Jaffna fort by the LTTE. Singh and his Sri Lankan counterparts parachuted into the fort and brought out the troops who had been held hostage for weeks. Years after the IPKF withdrew from the Sri Lanka, the IMSF would return to the Island nation for a few more operations that will always remain under wraps. Renamed as the MARCOS (Marine Commandos) they would continue to play a stellar role in the anti-piracy operations undertaken by the Indian Navy in recent months.
Unfortunately, while the men who served in these elite units were some of the finest, they continued to remain neglected by a poor military and political leadership that had little appreciation for their strategic reach.
The operation to capture Osama has amplified the strategic reach that Special Forces (SF) can give to a state facing myriad challenges. Sadly, while India’s SF, was patterned on the best in the world, have withered away since then. Take the Indian Army’s SF battalions. Created in 1968, the 9th and the 19th battalions of the Parachute Regiment underwent training designed by a young army captain from Pune who had been sent to the U.S Special Forces training school. Both battalions would cover themselves with glory in the 1971 war.
A team from 9 Para (SF) would cross the line of control to raid a major Pakistani artillery gun position in Mandhol. The team returned after destroying all the guns and with just two minor casualties. In the scorching deserts of Rajathsan, a young prince from Jaipur led a team of 10 Para (SF) to raid the Pakistani town of Chachro in Sind. Legend has it that when Bhawani Singh was returning with his raiders, the Indian BSF opened fire on them thinking they were Pakistanis! No one could believe that an Indian army team could slip across the international border, hit a major town and return back to base successfully.
Since then, the Indian SF has seen monumental neglect at the hands of hostile military leaders and ignorant political masters. While the U.S saw the consolidation of all its Special Forces under one command, India went in the opposite direction. In 1987-88 a young Colonel R K Nanavatty was part of a study that would make an attempt to upgrade the strategic capabilities of our SF. A comprehensive study recommended that the SF be separated from the Parachute regiment and have a home and hearth of its own.
In 1994 this was done and a new Special Forces Regiment, headquartered in the hilly town of Nahan, Himachal Pradesh was created. Unfortunately for the youngest regiment of the Indian Army, the death of the then army chief, Gen B C Joshi proved to be a death blow. Gen Shankar Roychowdhury took over and under pressure from retired generals of the Parachute Regiment, he promptly disbanded the Special Forces regiment.
Since then, the Indian SF has been put through a series of blunders. At one point, while there was a severe lack of resources to modernise the SF, army headquarters began an ill-advised expansion. More battalions were converted into an SF role, but in reality they had no equipment, training and therefore, no special capabilities. Many within the SF community opposed this tooth and nail but failed to anticipate the political machinations of a vested few. In the end, the expansion took place and we continue to pay for this mammoth blunder even today.
If that was not bad enough, India’s military and political masters have steadfastly refused to create a Special Operations Command. So while the army has its SF component, the IAF, Navy, Cabinet Secretariat and the home ministry have their own. No one speaks to the other, everyone buys equipment in complete isolation, and there are no joint doctrines, trainings or exercises. As a result India’s strategic use of SF remains an incoherent mess.
So if we need to go after our enemies, or protect our growing energy needs, or address an out-of-area contingency far away from our territorial boundaries, we simply don’t have the wherewithal. If the U.S could fly several thousand miles into Abbottabad to capture and neutralise a declared enemy of the state, it is because they began work over 30 years ago. Similar successes have been notched up by the British Special Air Services (SAS), as they became a major tool for British foreign policy. During every major crisis that the U.K faces, one lowly Brigadier gets to sit next to the British Prime Minister as he consults his crisis management group. A badge worn by the Brigadier on his uniform with the words “Who Dares Wins” is the only indication that he belongs to the legendary SAS.
In India, only powerful IAS bureaucrats and politicians get to sit in the crisis management group. They are supposed to mull and decide over the options that can be exercised when an enemy of the state shows hostile intent. Therein hangs a tragic tale of a strategic blunder.
Who Dares Wins
Why They Killed Osama bin Laden Now
By Nitin Pai Tue, May 3, 2011
You might remember a Shekhar Suman gag on Zee TV's Movers and Shakers several years ago: An angry George W Bush announces that the United States will bomb the place where Osama bin Laden is found to be hiding.
Hearing this, Vajpayee looks under his bed, pauses, and with a characteristic flick of his wrist says: "Thank God! He isn't here!"
Over in Rawalpindi, General Musharraf looks under his bed, sighs in relief, and says: "Thank God! He is still here!"
Shekhar Suman, more than most Western analysts, got the plot right. Keeping Osama bin Laden out of Washington's hands was vital in order to prevent having to publicly deal with revelations of how the Pakistani military-jihadi complex not only was connected with al-Qaeda, but might also have been involved in the conspiracy behind the 9/11 attacks.
Moreover, when the Pakistani military leadership was getting paid hundreds of millions of dollars per year to hunt bin Laden down, it made little sense to give him up quickly. As early as October 2001, a month after 9/11, wags in Islamabad coined the phrase "al-Faida" (the profit) in anticipation of the rewards Pakistan would reap for joining the war on terror that it had played a part in creating. Pakistan was in an international doghouse at that time. Its economy was crumbling under the weight of sections imposed by the international community for having carried out nuclear tests in 1998. Its government, then under General Musharraf's military dictatorship, was seen as odious, not least for supporting the original Taliban regime in Kabul. It was barely surviving on Saudi largesse until September 2001, when General Musharraf's ditching of one set of allies for another changed his country's fortunes -- from being nearly toast, Pakistan was the toast.
Just how much was the al-Faida worth? According to data compiled by K Alan Kronstadt, of the US Congressional Research Service, between 2002 and 2010, US direct overt aid and military reimbursements to Pakistan amounted to $19.6 billion, of which $13.3 billion was for security-related heads. Obviously, if there is "direct, overt" aid, there is likely to be "indirect, covert" aid. There is also the money from other countries and loans from the IMF. Because the military-jihadi complex dominates the Pakistani political economy, it is the primary beneficiary of this largesse. Between 2002 and 2008, my estimate suggests that the business of shipping US and NATO containers from Karachi to Kabul alone made $500m per year for the military establishment and $300m per year for the militant groups. Why would they want the gravy train to stop?
They wouldn't, but the Obama administration had other ideas. It made three changes that caused the Pakistani military establishment to redo its sums. First, the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation made it harder for the military to capture the funds. It also came with more strings attached. Second, the Obama administration increased the number of drone strikes against targets in Pakistan, while increasing pressure on the Pakistani army to go after the taliban groups in its tribal areas. Finally, by indicating a timeline for withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, Washington triggered the endgame.
With the Obama adminstration taking a harder line on the Pakistani army, the al-Faida from the war against al-Qaeda began to be less attractive. At the same time, with a US withdrawal in sight, Afghanistan began to look more attractive as a prize. For General Kayani to stand a chance for claiming this prize, it is necessary for President Obama to prevail over other members of his administration and get US troops out earlier.
Playing the bin Laden card is a brilliant way to achieve this outcome. Although US officials claim they did it without Pakistan's knowledge or permission, it is hard to believe he could be found without the Pakistani military establishment permitting it.
Either way, bin Laden's elimination provides the right political cover for President Obama to declare victory and order his troops out of Afghanistan. Once withdrawal starts, President Obama will be politically dependent on General Kayani to ensure that it takes place in a manner that doesn't damage his re-election prospects. Expect the latter to use the leverage to ensure that the military-jihadi complex gets its proxies into the government in Kabul.
As I wrote on my blog yesterday, "the United States is unlikely to punish Pakistan for the decade of duplicity, subterfuge and violence that consumed innumerable lives and astounding amounts of money." President Obama will not ask why Osama bin Laden was living it up in Abbottabad, a bus stop away from the Pakistan Military Academy, and not in a cave somewhere in Waziristan. You won't find Washington too interested in confronting General Kayani on when bin Laden moved in there and why his presence went undetected for so long.
Rather, Washington will seek plausible reassurances that after it leaves, Afghanistan will not play host to terrorists targeting the United States. It will place some anti-Taliban and anti-Pakistan Afghans into positions of power in Kabul to balance Pakistan's proxies. It might retain some troops and drones in Afghanistan just in case it needs to use a stick. That apart, it will accede to Pakistani demands that Kabul be made over to a pro-Pakistani regime.
In time, the Pakistani military-jihadi complex will seek to reconquer Afghanistan (called "gaining strategic depth") with China's support or connivance.
We are staring at a return of the 1990s. This is a bad outcome for Afghans, Pakistanis and Indians. The military-jihadi complex will gain in strength. Pakistan's civilian government will be more powerless. It will only be a facade with which to seek foreign assistance. It will also be the whipping boy, blamed for the worsening state of Pakistan. Hundreds of thousands of triumphant militants will need to be given new targets. Compared to the early 1990s, it is far more difficult today---strategically and operationally---to push them across into India. Yet, the interests of the military-jihadi complex and the absence of a miracle job-machine will pose a serious threat to India's national security. We may be, at best, two summers away from an escalation of the proxy war in Kashmir and elsewhere.
Nitin Pai is founder & fellow for geopolitics at the Takshashila Institution and editor of Pragati - The Indian National Interest Review, a publication on strategic affairs, public policy and governance. He blogs at The Acorn and is active on Twitter too.
Why They Killed Osama bin Laden Now
Could India be source of Al Qaeda Funds?
Continued vigilance seen needed on al Qaeda money flows
2G Scam, Hasan Ali and Dawood are pointers to Hawala, Black Money, Benami Transanctions, Swiss Secret Accounts and Money Laundering are routes to aid/ help finance terrorist organisations world wide!
You might remember a Shekhar Suman gag on Zee TV's Movers and Shakers several years ago: An angry George W Bush announces that the United States will bomb the place where Osama bin Laden is found to be hiding.
Hearing this, Vajpayee looks under his bed, pauses, and with a characteristic flick of his wrist says: "Thank God! He isn't here!"
Over in Rawalpindi, General Musharraf looks under his bed, sighs in relief, and says: "Thank God! He is still here!"
Shekhar Suman, more than most Western analysts, got the plot right. Keeping Osama bin Laden out of Washington's hands was vital in order to prevent having to publicly deal with revelations of how the Pakistani military-jihadi complex not only was connected with al-Qaeda, but might also have been involved in the conspiracy behind the 9/11 attacks.
Moreover, when the Pakistani military leadership was getting paid hundreds of millions of dollars per year to hunt bin Laden down, it made little sense to give him up quickly. As early as October 2001, a month after 9/11, wags in Islamabad coined the phrase "al-Faida" (the profit) in anticipation of the rewards Pakistan would reap for joining the war on terror that it had played a part in creating. Pakistan was in an international doghouse at that time. Its economy was crumbling under the weight of sections imposed by the international community for having carried out nuclear tests in 1998. Its government, then under General Musharraf's military dictatorship, was seen as odious, not least for supporting the original Taliban regime in Kabul. It was barely surviving on Saudi largesse until September 2001, when General Musharraf's ditching of one set of allies for another changed his country's fortunes -- from being nearly toast, Pakistan was the toast.
Just how much was the al-Faida worth? According to data compiled by K Alan Kronstadt, of the US Congressional Research Service, between 2002 and 2010, US direct overt aid and military reimbursements to Pakistan amounted to $19.6 billion, of which $13.3 billion was for security-related heads. Obviously, if there is "direct, overt" aid, there is likely to be "indirect, covert" aid. There is also the money from other countries and loans from the IMF. Because the military-jihadi complex dominates the Pakistani political economy, it is the primary beneficiary of this largesse. Between 2002 and 2008, my estimate suggests that the business of shipping US and NATO containers from Karachi to Kabul alone made $500m per year for the military establishment and $300m per year for the militant groups. Why would they want the gravy train to stop?
They wouldn't, but the Obama administration had other ideas. It made three changes that caused the Pakistani military establishment to redo its sums. First, the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation made it harder for the military to capture the funds. It also came with more strings attached. Second, the Obama administration increased the number of drone strikes against targets in Pakistan, while increasing pressure on the Pakistani army to go after the taliban groups in its tribal areas. Finally, by indicating a timeline for withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, Washington triggered the endgame.
With the Obama adminstration taking a harder line on the Pakistani army, the al-Faida from the war against al-Qaeda began to be less attractive. At the same time, with a US withdrawal in sight, Afghanistan began to look more attractive as a prize. For General Kayani to stand a chance for claiming this prize, it is necessary for President Obama to prevail over other members of his administration and get US troops out earlier.
Playing the bin Laden card is a brilliant way to achieve this outcome. Although US officials claim they did it without Pakistan's knowledge or permission, it is hard to believe he could be found without the Pakistani military establishment permitting it.
Either way, bin Laden's elimination provides the right political cover for President Obama to declare victory and order his troops out of Afghanistan. Once withdrawal starts, President Obama will be politically dependent on General Kayani to ensure that it takes place in a manner that doesn't damage his re-election prospects. Expect the latter to use the leverage to ensure that the military-jihadi complex gets its proxies into the government in Kabul.
As I wrote on my blog yesterday, "the United States is unlikely to punish Pakistan for the decade of duplicity, subterfuge and violence that consumed innumerable lives and astounding amounts of money." President Obama will not ask why Osama bin Laden was living it up in Abbottabad, a bus stop away from the Pakistan Military Academy, and not in a cave somewhere in Waziristan. You won't find Washington too interested in confronting General Kayani on when bin Laden moved in there and why his presence went undetected for so long.
Rather, Washington will seek plausible reassurances that after it leaves, Afghanistan will not play host to terrorists targeting the United States. It will place some anti-Taliban and anti-Pakistan Afghans into positions of power in Kabul to balance Pakistan's proxies. It might retain some troops and drones in Afghanistan just in case it needs to use a stick. That apart, it will accede to Pakistani demands that Kabul be made over to a pro-Pakistani regime.
In time, the Pakistani military-jihadi complex will seek to reconquer Afghanistan (called "gaining strategic depth") with China's support or connivance.
We are staring at a return of the 1990s. This is a bad outcome for Afghans, Pakistanis and Indians. The military-jihadi complex will gain in strength. Pakistan's civilian government will be more powerless. It will only be a facade with which to seek foreign assistance. It will also be the whipping boy, blamed for the worsening state of Pakistan. Hundreds of thousands of triumphant militants will need to be given new targets. Compared to the early 1990s, it is far more difficult today---strategically and operationally---to push them across into India. Yet, the interests of the military-jihadi complex and the absence of a miracle job-machine will pose a serious threat to India's national security. We may be, at best, two summers away from an escalation of the proxy war in Kashmir and elsewhere.
Nitin Pai is founder & fellow for geopolitics at the Takshashila Institution and editor of Pragati - The Indian National Interest Review, a publication on strategic affairs, public policy and governance. He blogs at The Acorn and is active on Twitter too.
Why They Killed Osama bin Laden Now
Could India be source of Al Qaeda Funds?
Continued vigilance seen needed on al Qaeda money flows
2G Scam, Hasan Ali and Dawood are pointers to Hawala, Black Money, Benami Transanctions, Swiss Secret Accounts and Money Laundering are routes to aid/ help finance terrorist organisations world wide!
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)