BEAUTIFUL THOUGHT BY LORD BUDHA Once Buddha was traveling with a few of his followers. While they were passing a lake, Buddha told one of his disciples, "I am thirsty. Do get me some water from the lake." The disciple walked up to the lake. At that moment, a bullock cart started crossing through the lake. As a result, the water became very muddy and turbid. The disciple thought, "How can I give this muddy water to Buddha to drink?" So he came back and told Buddha, "The water in there is very muddy. I don't think it is fit to drink." After about half an hour, again Buddha asked the same disciple to go back to the lake. The disciple went back, and found that the water was still muddy. He returned and informed Buddha about the same. After sometime, again Buddha asked the same disciple to go back. This time, the disciple found the mud had settled down, and the water was clean and clear. So he collected some water in a pot and brought it to Buddha. Buddha looked at the water, and then he looked up at the disciple and said," See what you did to make the water clean. You let it be, and the mud settled down on its own -- and you have clear water. Your mind is like that too ! When it is disturbed, just let it be. Give it a little time. It will settle down on its own. You don't have to put in any effort to calm it down. It will happen. It is effortless." Having 'Peace of Mind' is not a strenuous job; it is an effortless process! TREAT EVERYONE WITH POLITENESS EVEN THOSE WHO ARE RUDE TO YOU NOT BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT NICE BUT BECAUSE YOU ARE NICE.

 

No First Use Nuclear Doctrine with “Chinese Characteristics” Dr. Adityanjee http://www.vifindia.org/article/2013/may/02/no-first-use-nuclear-doctrine-with-chinese-characteristics Introduction Like a chameleon, the dragon, very predictably is changing its colors with regards to its often stated nuclear doctrine of “no first use” (NFU). Since 1964 when China conducted its first nuclear weapon test, China has repeatedly and vociferously insisted that it would not be the first nuclear power to use a tactical or strategic nuclear weapon in pursuit of its strategic objectives. This NFU pledge was explicitly and unconditionally included in each of China’s defense white papers from the first in 1998 through the seventh one in 2011. Recently, there is some international debate about possible changes in China’s NFU doctrine following publication of China’s biannual 2013 Defense White Paper. However, it appears that China may have moved beyond its so-called NFU doctrine and its duplicitous pledges do not hold any sincere meaning. Strategic deception has been an important part of China’s military DNA since the times of Sun Tzu who wrote in his treatise the Art of War: “All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away. Since achieving a great economic success and flush with $ 3.4 trillion foreign exchange reserves, China has increased its list of core national issues and has adopted a more belligerent strategic posture and hegemonic attitude towards international community in general and its neighbors in particular. Disregarding the Deng’s advice of lying low and bidding your time, the current (5th) generation of China’s leaders are adopting aggressive postures militarily though the transformation into visibly hardened strategic claims started really during the reign of the 4th generation leaders (Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and Wu Bangguo). The last time a Chinese paramount leader reaffirmed the so-called NFU pledge was on March 27th 2012 in Seoul Nuclear Conference when Hu Jintao mentioned it in his address. However, in December 2012, the new 5th generation Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping failed to mention about the so-called no first use pledge in a speech given to Second Artillery Force of the PLA which manages China’s land-based nuclear weapons. Apparently, he also stated that nuclear weapons create strategic support for China’s status as a major world power. This is a significant departure from the previously stated public positions citing Mao Zedong’s ideas about the use of nuclear weapons as a taboo and labeling the nuclear weapons essentially as “paper tigers”. Fundamentals of NFU Commitment Out of the nine countries that possess nuclear weapons currently, only two, China and India had explicitly stated “No First Use” as the guiding principle of their strategic nuclear doctrine. An absolute and unconditional NFU commitment would have four following components: Not to use nuclear weapons first against countries that possess nuclear weapons Not to threaten use nuclear weapons first against countries that possess nuclear weapons Not to use nuclear weapons first against countries that do not possess nuclear weapons Not to threaten to use nuclear weapons first against countries that do not possess nuclear weapons NFU policy has been a core feature of the Chinese defense policy having been decided apparently by Chairman Mao himself in 1964. Critics of the Chinese NFU commitment claim that it is completely unverifiable and is mere rhetoric. Self-described “China hawks” in the West have derisively dismissed the Chinese NFU pledge as pure propaganda for the last five decades. Chinese strategists have debated the merits of dropping or altering the NFU policy. This debate was reportedly very intense from mid to late 2000s. There are assertions from Chinese officials that Chinese NFU commitment is not applicable to perceived claims on territories. China has territorial disputes with multiple neighbors including India. Presumably since China continues to claim that Arunachal Pradesh is its own territory, in a hypothetical scenario, it may use tactical nuclear weapons in a war with India in eastern sector because China will consider this use not against any other country but in its own perceived territory. Similarly, China will not be bound by its NFU if the US were to intervene in Taiwan in case of a Sino-Taiwanese war as it considers Taiwan as a renegade province. Chinese NFU is not applicable if it apprehends annihilation of its top leadership by conventional means. Similarly, a conventional attack on strategic target like the Three Gorges Dam would be an exception to the NFU pledge. More recently, Chinese have discussed other possible exceptions from their NFU commitment including a massive precision guided conventional attack on their intercontinental ballistic missile silos or their strategic facilities. As China moves away from minimal credible deterrence to “limited deterrence”, a more sophisticated delivery mechanism and an exponential increase in its nuclear stockpile, it has also moved towards greater flexibility and continued opacity in its nuclear operational doctrine. It is pertinent to say that the so-called Chinese NFU commitment has never been taken seriously by both the US and Russia at any time in their policy matrix. Chinese Nuclear Arsenal China can be considered the largest nuclear power after the US and Russia. China’s nuclear capability is apparently stronger than those of the next six nuclear states combined. According to Russian estimates, since early 1960s China has generated 40 tons of enriched weapons grade uranium and 10 tons of plutonium which would be enough to produce 3,600 nuclear war-heads. It is probable that half of this fissile material is kept in stocks whereas the rest half has been used up to produce 1500-1800 warheads, half of which may be in storage. This would leave 800-900 warheads that could be available for operational deployment on various types of delivery vehicles. Therefore, the real motives for China’s complete secrecy about its nuclear forces lie not in their “weakness” and “small size” but in much larger strength of China’s actual nuclear arsenal that is much higher than the commonly cited number of 300-400 warheads by the western analysts. There is also a great degree of international uncertainty about the hundreds of tunnels being built in China as their purpose has not yet been officially explained. Chinese Nuclear Posture and Track II Interactions Personal interactions with various Chinese academicians and officials during policy conferences suggest that China will continue to add to its nuclear arsenal and will not participate in any nuclear disarmament program till it reaches a certain level. This analyst has interacted with Professor Shen Dingli, Associate Dean of the Institute of International Studies from Fudan University, Shanghai over the last four years with very consistent and candid answers regarding Chinese national nuclear posture. Professor Shen Dingli claims to have independent (but sometimes more hawkish views) from those of the Chinese Government. In 2009 Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference in Washington, DC, he expressed absolute ignorance about Chinese proliferation activities and the fact that Chinese weapons designs were turned in by Libya to the International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA) when Libya folded up their clandestine nuclear program. He was totally unaware of China’s both vertical and horizontal proliferation activities as late as April 2009. During the 2009 Carnegie International Non-proliferation Conference, Washington, DC, he agreed that Chinese government will continue to increase its number of nuclear war-heads. In a more recent Carnegie Endowment meeting on India-China dialogue in Washington DC on January 10th 2013, he again reiterated that China will continue to modernize its nuclear arsenals and the delivery systems till a perceived parity is achieved with the two great powers (US and Russia). China will certainly not agree to cut the number of nuclear arsenals as it wants both the US and Russia to implement further reductions in their respective nuclear arsenals. Interactions with another Chinese academician Dr. Shulong Chu, Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the School of Public Policy and Management and the Deputy Director of the Institute of International Strategic and Development Studies at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China in a session on China-US Strategic Stability on 4/6/2009 during the Carnegie International Non-proliferation Conference, Washington DC revealed very interesting Chinese perspectives. Chu explicitly stated that since China has accepted US supremacy, analogously both India and Japan should accept Chinese supremacy in the Asia-pacific region. China is a bigger country than Japan and India. It has bigger military requirements. Japan, India and other Asian countries should understand that and should be willing to accept China’s ongoing modernization of its military and strategic (read nuclear) assets. Chu further went on saying: “Russia and the US have too many nuclear war-heads. They can afford to have deep cuts. China cannot do that because China has too few. China wants more and its agenda is to have more nuclear weapons”. Major-General Yao Yunzhu, Director of the Center on China-America Defense Relations of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, Beijing in a session on Deterrence, Disarmament and Non-proliferation during the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, held in Washington, DC on April 8-9th 2013, artfully deflected all the questions on China’s growing number of nuclear arsenals with a cute smile, stating again that the onus for nuclear warhead reduction lies on both US and Russia because China has very limited, small number of nuclear weapons. General Yao while doing routine lip-service to the NFU doctrine explicitly admitted that, "A certain amount of opaqueness is an integral part of China's no-first-use policy". She persistently refused to quantify the number of warheads China needed for a credible and effective nuclear deterrence. She officially expressed Chinese Government‘s serious concern at the US shifting its ballistic missiles interceptors in the Pacific island of Guam to deal with DPRK nuclear threat, thereby degrading the quality of the Chinese nuclear deterrent. She enumerated three essential characteristics for the Chinese nuclear deterrent: it has to be survivable against first strike; it has to be credible enough in numbers and in delivery system, and lastly it has to have an effective and punitive second strike retaliatory capability. She was asked about recent BMD tests by China on January 22nd 2013 and she categorically confirmed that China will, from now on, indeed develop its own BMD system as the US is not willing to commit to cease its BMD system. Professor Li Bin from the Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing and also a Senior Associate at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC admits formally in his writings that China’s non-proliferation posture has evolved over a period of time and now is an important and essential part of its nuclear theology. However, in private discussions he passionately justified Chinese horizontal proliferation activities outside the scope of the Nuclear Suppliers Group by providing Chashma-3 and Chashma-4 nuclear plants to Pakistan on grounds that China had helped India also with nuclear fuel supplies for the Tarapore Atomic Reactor when India was under the US nuclear embargo. He assertively implied that China will continue to provide nuclear materials and technology to its all-weather friend Pakistan analogous to US-India civil nuclear deal though the latter deal was approved by the NSG. Interestingly a younger researcher Zhu Jianyu from the Center for Strategic Studies of the China Academy of Engineering Physics during the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, held in Washington, DC on April 8-9th 2013 candidly admitted that Chinese press and academicians usually toe the government line because the government controls their funding and hence independent viewpoints are not possible. In private discussions with Major General Yao, it became quite clear that China will now vigorously pursue development of its national ballistic missile defense system; something which China had vociferously denounced earlier. She also stated that China will continue to develop its ASAT weapons till a legally binding multi-lateral treaty banning weaponization of the space is signed and ratified. Major General Yao attributed to and categorically linked this shift in Chinese strategic thinking to the recent US decision to deploy 14 long-range ballistic missile interceptor batteries in the Pacific Island of Guam ostensibly in response to threats posed by the DPRK thereby potentially degrading the Chinese nuclear deterrent. Changes in the Chinese nuclear posture are also linked to the US development and deployment of advanced precision guided conventional warheads in the Asian theatre capable of destroying Chinese multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) ballistic missile silos thereby degrading the Chinese minimum nuclear deterrent. China is focused on modernizing and its strategic survivability and beefing up its effective second strike capability and therefore will continue to develop more nuclear warheads and will keep its nuclear capabilities fully opaque. China’s 2013 Defence White Paper For the first time, the 2013 edition of China’s defense white paper entitled: “Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces” conspicuously fails to mention re-adherence to and re-affirmation of China’s often-stated “No first use pledge”. This is significant departure from the 2011 version of China’s Defense White Paper. The absolutely deafening silence in the 2013 version on NFU is deliberate and is very significant for its reverberating eloquence. The new white paper introduces ambiguity as it endorses the use of nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack but does not rule out other uses. In the last few years, Chinese analysts and officials have done an excellent job of qualifying the original Chinese “NFU” pledge with myriads of qualitative exceptions so as to render it effectively meaningless. This carefully contrived departure is strategically significant for the international community. Following a vigorous international debate on China’s departure from the NFU policy, Major General Yao floated a trial balloon in an op-ed piece in Asia Times Online on April 24th 2013 when she called for a legally binding multi-lateral NFU agreement. She wrote a point by point rejoinder while still defending the reasons as to why China should depart from the often stated NFU policy and acknowledged that domestic discussions happening in China regarding junking the NFU policy. She has tried to invoke new exceptions to China’s so-called NFU commitment linking it to a new US law (2013 National Defense Authorization Act) that seeks a report from the Commander of the US Strategic Command by August 15th 2013 to describe the Chinese underground tunnel networks and to review the US capability to neutralize such networks with conventional and nuclear forces. Ostensibly, with a view to creating more confusion and more opaqueness about China’s intentions, she explicitly states: “To alleviate China's concerns, a constructive approach would be to assure the policy through nuclear policy dialogues, to establish a multilateral NFU agreement among all the nuclear weapon states, and to consider limiting or even prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in a legally binding international agreement.” Li Bin, in bilateral context, has previously suggested that India and China should begin their nuclear engagement with mutual reassurance of NFU and should work together in advocating NFU in global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. China very well knows such a legally binding international agreement will not be negotiated for several decades owing to US dogmatic postures. The US is already spending $10 billion to upgrade its nuclear weapons despite Obama’s initial call for a global zero goal. This gives a window of opportunity for China to increase its nuclear warheads exponentially while keeping its so-called NFU pledge under suspended animation and even junk it de facto. Interestingly, China refuses to enter into an official government to government nuclear weapons dialogue with India on the grounds that India is non-signatory to the NPT. At the same time, China has shrewdly refused to engage in bilateral dialogue with the US on nuclear arms reductions on grounds of asymmetry of nuclear forces of respective countries. China does complain of discrimination and nuclear asymmetry while discussing US-China relations but fails to address genuine Indian concerns on similar grounds. Implications for India Western debate on the perceptible change in Chinese nuclear posture has focussed only on its narrow impact on the strategic environment of the US and its allies including Japan. India should not behave like an ostrich burying its head in the sand. Perhaps, time has come for India to review her own strategic nuclear doctrine revising the no-first use pledge. Robust evidence has come cumulatively over a period of time from multiple sources reflecting the new nuclear reality in our neighborhood. Totality of the evidence available convinces this analyst that China has indeed changed its nuclear posture from defensive to offensive and is on a large-scale nuclear build-up. China is indeed willing to consider first strike capability to preserve its core national issues though vehemently denying such intentions at the moment. Predictably, China will continue to obfuscate this change in nuclear posture using ambiguous, turgid and opaque language while simultaneously blaming the US for failing to negotiate a legally binding multi-lateral agreement on NFU. Indeed, this gives the dragon a fig-leaf of deniability. Certainly, India should not countenance being the only nuclear weapon state pledging “no first use” while the global nuclear posturing has become indeed hardened. One has to take into factor Pakistan’s accelerated development of tactical nuclear weapons and its stringent refusal to negotiate and sign a multi-lateral Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and continued Chinese help to Pakistan in and outside the NSG. While Pakistan has never subscribed to an NFU commitment and its nuclear arsenal is specifically India-centric; the recent change in China’s nuclear posture is definitely of concern to India. The writing is on the wall as China does not have good track record of strategic comfort and reliability vis-a-vis India. The current incidence of Chinese incursion into Indian territory in Daulat Beg Oldie region in the Ladakh sector should be an eye-opener. While India must focus on its economic, infrastructure and social development and must not waste her meager fiscal resources in a costly nuclear race, she needs to be prepared for all strategic options. Given the aggressive behavior of China in recent years appropriate and credible policies need to be adopted including having a re-look at evolving nuclear posture of China.

The (Pak) Military Identifies Militants as the New Enemy Anwar Iqbal |    Illustration by Abro Martyrs’ monument, GHQ, Rawalpindi: Bearded men in turbans are the new enemy. And the message came loud and clear from the country’s military high command. The enemy’s bearded face dominated two large screens, placed on both sides of the parade ground at GHQ. It was April 30, the day when the nation remembers those killed in the fight against terror. The guests were escorted to the ground by smartly dressed military officers, both men and women. The guests could see that the military had changed. As the guests were seated, the two screens lit up, showing men in uniform, including policemen, fighting bearded militants. The militants were shown ambushing military convoys and killing innocent civilians. There’s no room for ambiguity. The military had made up its mind: the Taliban was the new enemy. The military high command wanted the whole nation to learn this and to notice its commitment to fighting the militants. So the country’s civilian leaders, both in and out of the government, were also invited to join the army in pledging to fight the new enemy. The media and diplomats from friendly nations were also there to watch this and share it with the rest of the world. Some watched silently, some with tears rolling down their cheeks as the stories of terrorism’s victims were reenacted for the screen. A child was shown playing with his father, hugging his mother, preparing for his examination, training at the military academy and then taking up his duties as a soldier. The story then moved to his marriage, his children and finally to the ambush as tall bearded men, their faces hidden behind turbans, attacked a military convoy. The soldier died fighting the enemy in a barren valley. Then the parents, children and siblings of slain soldiers were brought on the stage. They completed the story, telling the audience who killed those soldiers and why. A Baloch woman, whose son died while fighting militants in Balochistan, broke down on the stage. Her wailing wet most eyes. Even foreign military attaches could be seen wiping their tears. Every body joined her when she chanted, “Pakistan Zindabad.” The martyrs whose stories were reenacted on the Martyrs’ Day included a police officer, a politician and a journalist. Police superintendent Syed Kalam was tasked with “uniting the people” against the Taliban and was killed when he refused to give up his campaign. Journalist Nasrullah Khan Afridi was silenced because he refused to stop criticizing the Taliban. Politician Bashir Ahmad Bilour was killed because he was trying to unite the country’s political forces against the Taliban. Their stories were also reenacted and their children too were brought on the stage to tell the audience how they sacrificed their lives in the fight against the terrorists. The wife of a Western military attaché sobbed as Afridi’s daughter, who cannot speak, used the sign language to share her grief. The message was loud and clear, the Taliban were the enemy. And the army chief, Gen. Ashraf Pervez Kayani, warned those who still say this is not Pakistan’s war, not to do so. “If a small faction wants to enforce its distorted ideology over the entire nation by taking up arms … and considers all forms of bloodshed justified, then does the fight against this enemy of state constitute someone else’s war?” he asked. Urging people to stop questioning the need to fight the militants, he said: “We cannot afford to confuse our soldiers and weaken their resolve with such misgivings.” But his deeds were stronger than his words. The Pakistani governments, both civilian and military, have often been hostile to Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his family. Those of us, who have witnessed this hostility, could never imagine that an ANP leader (Bilour) will one day be eulogised at the GHQ. Similarly, including a journalist and a police officer on the military’s list of fallen heroes also reflected a major change in the country’s military culture. It seems that the army has not only recognised the Taliban as its enemy but also realizes that it needs the support of the entire nation to win this war. The author is a correspondent for Dawn, based in Washington, DC.

Why do U.S. senior officials visit China in succession?  13:32, April 27, 2013   http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8225699.html Edited and translated by Liang Jun, People's Daily Online On April 24, U.S. deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns began his two-day visit to China. Burns is the fourth U.S. senior official Chinese top leaders met in recent one month. Analyst said a series of visits by U.S. senior officials to China aim to find out the direction for the future development of Sino-U.S. relationships after the leadership transitions in the world's two largest economies amid heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Former U.S. senior officials also visit Beijing one after another After the conclusion of China's "two sessions", the country's most important annual political convention, U.S. senior officials paid a series of visits to Beijing, during which, high-level officials of both sides held talks on important issues including economy, foreign diplomacy and military. On March 19, the new U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew, also U.S. president special representative, visited China. Between April 13 and 14, John Kerry paid his first visit to Beijing as the new U.S. Secretary of State. During his visit, the two countries singed and issued the joint statement on climate change. On April 21, Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff embarked on his first visit to China after taking office. It is learned that U.S. National Security Advisor to the President Tom Donilon will visit China in May. China and the U.S. will hold the fifth round of strategic and economic dialogue in Washington D.C. in July. Besides the incumbent U.S. officials, former U.S. senior officials including former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former Financial Minister Henry Paulson, also paid visit to China recently. They both met with Chinese leaders. China, U.S. "test the waters" On April 24, several experts interpreted U.S .officials' visits to China at the symposium on Asia-Pacific strategic change and a new type of Sino-U.S. ties. When interviewed by reporters of Beijing News, former deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said during visits, China and the United States not only talked about Korean Peninsula, but also currency devaluation and H7N9 bird flu. Wan Fan, professor with the Institute of International Relations Studies under China Foreign Affairs University, thinks the primary task of the U.S. officials' visits is "pathfinding". With new leaderships at the helm in both countries, they need to better understand the policy of each other so that they can set the directions for the future. In addition, the two sides have common concerns about regional hot issues and global issues including the DPRK nuclear issue, the Diaoyu Islands related issue, the financial reform, the energy issue and the Mideast issue.

India, Sri Lanka: So near, yet far

Updated:May 2, 2013    

http://southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?type=sl&nid=5028   

 

By Sugeeswara Senadhira

New Delhi’s decision to keep away from Canada’s call for shifting the venue of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) scheduled later this year in Sri Lanka has been strongly welcomed in the power corridors in Colombo, and the step is considered soothing balm over the “hurt feeling” that existed in the Sri Lankan capital over India’s decision to vote for the US sponsored resolution at the UNHRC in Geneva two months ago.

Colombo felt that if India, which represents 60 percent of the Commonwealth citizens, had succumbed to Tamil Nadu pressures and supported Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s call for a boycott of the Colombo CHOGM, Sri Lanka would have been in a diplomatic tight corner. Officials heaved a collective sigh of relief when UK, Australia and India distanced themselves from the Canadian call at the Commonwealth Ministerial Meeting earlier this week.

After the passing of the UNHRC resolution calling on Sri Lanka for credible investigations into alleged human rights violations and early implementation of the recommendations made by the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), Sri Lanka swung into hyper action to ensure confirmation of Colombo as the venue for CHOGM, believing that if the venue is shifted out it would be a major setback for Sri Lankan diplomacy.

New Delhi too played with caution despite vehement demands from two major Tamil Nadu political parties for a CHOGM boycott call. It was obvious that the Tamil Nadu opposition was more a ‘one-upmanship’ between the two Tamil parties than a show of solidarity with the Sri Lankan Tamils. Furthermore, the Tamil Nadu campaign against travellers from the country affected Sri Lankan Tamil traders and Tamil and Christian pilgrims visiting holy shrines in Tamil Nadu, than Sinhala Buddhist pilgrims as the latter could bypass south India and travel direct to Bodh Gaya or Varanasi for their pilgrimage.

Although India is not too happy over the slow progress in promised devolution to Tamil majority areas, New Delhi is keen to ensure that the age old Indo-Lanka bilateral ties remained strong. New Delhi has taken steps to expedite the construction of houses in the North and much awaited Sampur coal power plant in the East.

Both countries utilized the eighth Indo-Lanka Joint Commission meeting in New Delhi to give a positive spin to bilateral ties, with both parties expressing satisfaction that "the discussions had helped to further deepen understanding and friendship between the two countries to work together, to reap full advantage of opportunities that are beneficial to the people of both countries”.

Though India played a significant role in helping to end three decades of conflict in Sri Lanka, its decision to support the US backed resolution, which Sri Lanka deemed as an insult to its sovereignty and ‘great war victory’, was considered an unforgivable infringement of regional trust. This to a large extent helped tilt Sri Lanka's balance of friendship scale more in favour of China, much to the consternation of India.

In hindsight, Colombo understood the dilemma of New Delhi. The Indian government has been in what's called ‘between the devil and the deep blue sea' situation over its diplomatic relations with Sri Lanka, while trying to quell Tamil Nadu's anti-Sri Lankan sentiments without alienating the state.

Other Indian states did not see eye to eye with Tamil Nadu on its anti-Sri Lankan visitors’ campaign. While Sri Lankan players were not allowed to play in IPL matches in Chennai, the same players played in all other states including Tamil Nadu’s Dravidian neighbours Andhra, Kerala and Karnataka. Tamil players in IPL teams did not have any objections about playing with Sri Lankan players.

Tamil Nadu’s anti-Sri Lanka tirade is considered a temporary aberration and interaction between Tamil Nadu and Sri Lankan small time traders is continuing unabated.

Not only people-to-people contacts, India’s military cooperation with Sri Lanka too is expanding, which includes joint military exercises, sharing intelligence and training, although China provides military hardware to Sri Lanka.

China is the biggest lender to Sri Lanka, and big ticket projects like the Hambantota port have highlighted it. However, Sri Lanka had offered two major projects – Hambantota Port and Mattala Airport – to India first. As there was no positive response, Colombo asked for Chinese assistance. However, Chinese loans come with higher interest rates and premiums. Yet, the US remains the single largest source of portfolio investments in stocks and shares of private companies and government securities in Sri Lanka.

In spite of halving the number of flights from Chennai to Colombo and back due to Tamil Nadu protests, Indians still are the number one travellers to Sri Lanka. Of Sri Lanka’s annual tourist arrival of one million, nearly 400,000 are Indians. More than 300,000 Sri Lankan travellers also visit India annually.

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Illiteracy of War Drums: Lt Gen Prakash Katoch

In a recent TV debate on the Chinese intrusion in Ladakh, to a suggestion by a veteran Army General that India should be resolute in response, a Member Parliament from the ruling party said, “Yeh badi badi moochon wale general larai karwa kar chodenge (these big mustachioed Generals will plunge us into war).

Lack of governance and defence preparedness, plus incoherent strategy has undoubtedly created asymmetries vis-a-vis China.

The irony is that we are chock-a-block full with politicians of this breed who were best described as “Post Tortoise” by a wise farmer, which he amplified by saying, “When you’re driving down a country road and you come across a fence post with a tortoise balanced on top, that’s a Post Tortoise. You know he didn’t get up there by himself, he doesn’t belong up there, he doesn’t know what to do while he’s up there, he’s elevated beyond his ability to function, and you just wonder what kind of dumb jackass put him up there to begin with.” This specific Post Tortoise should have been asked, has one single military veteran ever recommended in the first place that this bunch of banner totting Chinese picnicking at Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) be attacked and wiped out or bombed?

The problem is that these Post Tortoises cannot visualize anything between war and groveling diplomacy – read inaction. Hence, disdain and arrogant retorts to sane advice of the ‘mustachioed General’. For them, any physical action whatsoever signifies direct beating of war drums. These are the fellows who perched atop the fence post are responsible for the nation’s security but do not see the a requirement of any national security strategy or even a standard operating procedure despite numerous intrusions and offensive actions by the Chinese who capitalize on fear psychosis of the Indian hierarchy.

Ask the government and take a bet they cannot reply why the ITBP guarding the LAC in DBO Sector is not under the Army and why is the Indian Army not responsible for complete land borders. Therefore, the gumption of the Chinaman in merrily intruding 30 kilometres inside your territory, with Xi Jinping  surveying the scurrying chicken with some running to nanny for advice and the Prime Minister with the Foreign Minister in tow still insisting this is “localized action”.

One wonders how many read the article by Manas Chakravarty titled “Lost but not found” in Hindustan Times dated 26 June 2011, saying that the real Manmohan Singh is gallivanting in Pattaya Beach and that his replacement back home is a robotic marvel made to order by the Japanese and wondered how much of it is fiction. As for the Post Tortoise, any mention of physical action gives him hallucinations of massive cyber and nuclear strikes by China. Mercifully, most of them, if not all, would be unaware of the Chinese term ‘Shaoshou Jian’ or Assassin’s Mace least much more panic would generate.  But then how can you expect the Port Tortoise to imagine that physical actions can also be other than direct attack, which can nonplus the attacker and make him recoil.

If only Nehru had followed just the first part, then we would have not halted operations in 1948 when Pakistanis were on the run. There would have been no POK and we would be linked with Afghanistan through the Wakhan Corridor with China treating us differently.

Writings in India, are full of quotes by Sun Tzu like, “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”. Very appropriate and we get awed by the Chinese following it religiously, for are aren’t these numerous intrusions and changing claim lines part of the same philosophy? But then Chanakya too had said that if the end could be achieved by non-military method, even by methods of intrigue, duplicity and fraud, he would not advocate an armed conflict.
Many of our Post Tortoises would perhaps not be aware who Chanakya was, what he wrote in 6th Century BC and if you tell them he said, “As soon as fear approaches near, attack and destroy it”, their immediate response will be to equate Chanakya with the ‘mustachioed Generals’ who can only think of ‘attack’; signifying beating of war drums. These fellows are the Ahmad Shah Abdalis of today; without a clue to attack fear and indulge in foolish action like Abdali leading a war on the sun. Those of us who have read Chanakya’s (also known as Kautilya or Vishnu Gupt) ‘Arthashastra’ would agree that Chanakya was at par, if not greater than Sun Tzu. Chankya wrote of “Silent War” including use secret agents, sowing discord amongst the enemy, use of ‘disinformation’ and the like. To the ignorant polity of ours, Arthashastra will perhaps be thought of as “Earthshastra” with visions of it being a treatise to optimize illegal mining for making billions. But the fact is that Arthshastra should be compulsory education for the ruling hierarchy with periodic quizzing to ensure it actually sinks in.  For that matter, the teachings of Gita too are excellent exposition for developing conflict strategy but that would be taboo on grounds of vote bank secularism practiced by our Post Tortoises.

Chanakya’s pearls include, “Your neighbor is your natural enemy state. The neighbor of your neighbor is your friend”. He did not by any logic preach that one must go for war against the neighbor but advocated an entire spectrum of statecraft to handle neighbours on the premise that the neighbor could be an enemy or potential enemy. Therefore, his teachings contained a five-fold approach; conciliation, gift and bribery, dissention, deceit and pretence, open attack or war. He also advocated that the ruler should not hesitate to break any friendship or alliances that are later found to be disadvantageous.

If only Nehru had followed just the first part, then we would have not halted operations in 1948 when Pakistanis were on the run. There would have been no POK and we would be linked with Afghanistan through the Wakhan Corridor with China treating us differently. Similarly, he would have not had the blind faith in the Chinese with Chou-en-Lai befooling him completely in 1962. But why talk of 1948 and 1962? In hindsight, Nehru’s successors should have at least taken in the second part of this advice by Chanakya – “The neighbor of your neighbor is your friend”. Had we followed this, we would have had our own string of pearls surrounding China and not the other way round. But nothing is lost even now.

Ironically, over this entire span of decades since 1948 to-date, of shall we say dismal statecraft, the present ruling party has the predominant lion’s share of causing national loss, both in terms of territory and prestige.

Through the follies of our Post Tortoises, we lost control of practically one third of Jammu and Kashmir in 1948; 13,297 square kilometers to be precise. Then was the usurping of 38,000 square kilometers of Aksai Chin by China followed by the illegal ceding of the 5,860 square kilometers of Shaksgam Valley by Pakistan to China. But it did not stop at this. Then has been the periodic swallowing (not nibbling) of Indian Territory by China, mostly kept under wraps by our petrified Post Tortoises, as is being attempted presently in relation to the Chinese intrusion in DBO.

Yet our Post Tortoises want to cover up portraying the 30 kilometres deep intrusion as 19 kilometres – as if the latter is of no consequence. It was depressing to listen to former Ambassador Stobdan (who hails from Ladakh) on national TV (29 April 203) telling us that since 1980, in Ladakh itself over 400 square kilometers of Indian Territory have been lost to China over and above the 38,000 square kilometers in Aksai Chin.  Ironically, over this entire span of decades since 1948 to-date, of shall we say dismal statecraft, the present ruling party has the predominant lion’s share of causing national loss, both in terms of territory and prestige.

Lack of governance and defence preparedness, plus incoherent strategy has undoubtedly created asymmetries vis-a-vis China. Our border communications and infrastructure are pathetic despite the hollow declarations of improvement. Given the current dispensation, these asymmetries are not going to go away in a hurry and may even increase. Those who talk of ‘first’ get over the asymmetry are living in a fool’s paradise. What we need to do is to target the mind of the enemy. “The arrow shot by an archer may or may not kill a single person; but skilful intrigue, devised by wise men, may kill even those who are in the womb“, said Kautilya. China has numerous vulnerabilities that are targetable and she knows them. That is where we need to apply pressure, however, this should not be misconstrued that we should not resort to acupressure in Ladakh also.

Thinking about China’s nuclear weapons

30Apr 2013;Benjamin Schreer 

http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/thinking-about-chinas-nuclear-weapons/ 

At a recent ‘track 2’ meeting between Americans and Australians, China’s nuclear arsenal was the subject of considerable debate. In the view of one participant, Beijing’s actual number of strategic nuclear weapons is much higher than the official US intelligence estimate of 300 and could be as much as 1,300. He based his claim on the much-reported 2011 Georgetown University project led by Professor Philipp Karber which concluded that China could have as many 3,000 nuclear weapons hidden in its vast ‘underground great wall’.

When Beijing recently released a new Defence White Paper (DWP), the New York Times ran an op-ed which argued that China had abandoned its long-standing nuclear ‘no first-use’ (NFU) policy because it didn’t get a mentioning in the document. If correct, such assessments would signal a major shift in China’s nuclear strategy.

A Chinese arsenal of over 1,000 strategic warheads would basically lead to a Cold War-type situation of mutual assured destruction (MAD) in China’s nuclear relationship with the US and also in its dealings with Russia. A change in its nuclear doctrine would signal to the US and the rest of the region that Beijing now assigns nuclear weapons a major priority in its foreign, security and defence policy.

It would also display Chinese anxieties about the heightened possibility of a preemptive strike by the US, with either conventional or nuclear weapons, against its nuclear forces.

To be sure, China has worked to improve the survivability of its nuclear strike capability, including the development of a new generation of nuclear-capable submarines.

It’s also entirely possible that the number of its nuclear warheads is higher than official estimates. And Chinese strategists have repeatedly argued that there might contingencies when a strict adherence to ‘no first use’ would have to be reconsidered.

Nevertheless, just as we should analyse the PLA’s conventional modernisation in a cool-headed fashion, we should avoid alarmism about China’s nuclear capabilities. Speculation about the true numbers of Chinese strategic warheads is just that: speculation. In other words, Western analyses should avoid turning ‘could’ into ‘is’, as if we learned nothing from the Iraq WMD assessments. Otherwise we run the risk of replaying Cold War threat assessments in which the Soviets were said to be developing all sorts of magic weaponry which never saw the light of day.

While it makes perfect sense from a Chinese perspective to improve its nuclear forces, particularly in the face of overwhelming US conventional strike capability, the survivability of its nuclear deterrent will probably depend much more on investments in infrastructure such as secure command and control systems than achieving ‘strategic parity’ with US and Russian nuclear forces in terms of warhead numbers.

Moreover, as analysts have convincingly argued, the omission of the ‘no first-use’ policy in China’s latest DWP doesn’t prove that Beijing’s nuclear doctrine has changed. On 8 April, the Chinese delegation to the UN Conference on Disarmament reiterated Beijing’s NFU pledge.

 Indeed, it’s hard to see why it would be in Beijing’s interest to unsettle the international community at a time when every PLA development is analysed through the lens of a changing strategic balance in Asia. In fact, the more confident China becomes in its second strike capability, the less the need for a change in its nuclear doctrine.

All good then? Not necessarily. China modernising its nuclear forces could seriously complicate relations with the United States and Asian neighbours. That’s because nuclear weapons rarely exist in a vacuum but are tied to power balances.

Recent scholarship points out that Beijing appears increasingly assured about its nuclear second-strike capability at a time when it has made considerable progress in projecting conventional military power in its ‘Near Seas’. In combination with a lack of comprehensive Sino-US dialogue on the nuclear balance, the emergence of a so-called ‘stability-instability paradox’ in East Asia looms large.

That is, (over-) confidence in its ability to deter US military engagement through the threat of nuclear escalation to encourage the Chinese leadership to conduct conventional campaigns to change the status quo.

Unaddressed, there’s a growing danger of US-Sino crisis instability. From a US perspective, China’s nuclear weapons will become more critical in the emerging strategic competition for leadership in Asia.

 Note that in January this year, President Obama signed a new National Defense Authorization Act (NDDA) which orders the Commander of the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) to submit a report by mid-August on the ‘underground tunnel network used by the People’s Republic of China with respect to the capability of the United States to use conventional and nuclear forces to neutralise such tunnels and what is stored within such tunnels’.

Further, allies in East Asia will look to their American ally to provide more visible nuclear extended deterrence commitments. While they’ll point to North Korea’s nuclear program, China’s new mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities will increasingly concern them. This suggests that nuclear weapons in Asia will be of growing not decreasing importance.

Moreover, China, the US and its allies need to engage in serious dialogue at the political, military and academic level about what ‘strategic stability’ means in 21st century. Like it or not, some Cold War concepts and debate related to nuclear strategy, such as the question of whether and how nuclear war can be controlled, will make a surprising comeback.