Esteemed Friends,
One has read quite a few news items mentioning Gen Jacob's claims to masterminding and then conducting the Bangladesh Campaign, almost single handed. All the right decisions seemed to have been made by him and him alone!!!
I discussed the matter with a dear friend of mine who was posted in HQ E Command in 1971 and attended Ops room briefings and discussions dealing with the War in the East. He was also sent to area close to Dacca when the Indian troops were approaching the City and then entered the city as well. I have double checked information and views given by him with his boss, head of a branch at HQ E Command at that time, who was also very intimately involved with the planning and conduct of the Bangladesh War.
What I gather from them is as under:
1. Lt Gen Jacob was a good Chief of Staff and did what a good Chief of Staff is supposed to do. He has to oversee making of detailed operational plans as per the decisions given by the Army Commander, ensure their implementation and give his advice. He is to ensure that the logistics, the infrastructure, the coordination between various Arms and Services and the other two Services is carried out to ensure success of the operational plan. He has also to think and plan ahead. Also knowing the mind of the Army Commander and over all aim of the operations, give some decisions.
2. Late Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Arora, the Army Commander was in full command. He was polite but and was the one who gave major decisions on operational and policy matters. He stood up to Sam Manekshaw a few times, it is reliably learnt. Good commanders especially when they have efficient staff, do not get involved in nitty gritty and that is what Gen Arora did.
3. Sam Manekshaw, the Chief had an informal way of working with subordinates and also higher ups, including the Prime Minister!! This is borne out not only by the forceful views expressed by Sam in the famous Cabinet meeting when the PM wanted him to attack E Pakistan post haste but in some other meetings of Mrs. Indira Gandhi held with the Army Brass at Delhi and Calcutta. Also, he would at times even ring up some heads of Branches at the Command HQ to emphasise some critical aspects. Of course he spoke to the Army Commander Gen Arora and also to Gen Jacob the Chief of Staff quite often and on occasions with some Corps Commanders as well.
4. Therefore it would be incorrect to say that Gen Jacob conducted the planning and operations and Gen Arora or Sam Manekshaw were mere spectators!!! It is rather sad that a distinguished general like Gen Jacob has decided to belittle the role and leadership of other personalities, senior to him and take all credit, when they are no more.
Dacca the Objective
Dacca was not the ultimate objective. The over all Policy was not to get involved in street fighting in cities. Taking in to account the terrain in East Pakistan, it was difficult to imagine that the Pak Forces would capitulate in such a short time. As things happened, Dacca did not have to be attacked and mere approach to the City did the trick. It is no big deal if Dacca was not made the ultimate objective initially. The higher commanders were flexible and made full use of the crumbling of Pak Forces in such short time and got them to surrender. No doubt Gen Jacob, prodded by Sam Manekshaw and Gen Arora played a key role in the surrender.
In fact if the Indian troops had got involved in capturing Dacca, this would have delayed the surrender.
Harbhajan Singh
Lt Gen (Retd)
Friday, June 10, 2011
Wednesday, June 8, 2011
India can’t do a ‘Geronimo’
The Tribune Wednesday, June 8, 2011, Chandigarh, India
There are major fault-lines by Lieut-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)
Consequent to American operation ‘Geronimo,’ at Abbottabad in Pakistan to eliminate Osama bin Laden, many in civil society have been asking whether India can go ahead with a similar operation. ‘Geronimo’ involved painstaking intelligence work spread over many years, though the final ‘fine- tuning’ took seven months or so. Detailed intelligence work and application of cutting edge technology apart, it required an enormous amount of co-ordination among those in the higher echelons of the civil administration and military high command as well as with the one who was to control the mission. The entire planning was closely monitored by the Chiefs of Defence Staff, the CIA chief and the President himself, who is also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.
For months they worked on the plan, disseminating information strictly following the principle, ‘need to know’. A mock-up of the ‘Osama house’ would have been erected and an operation rehearsed a number of times by the designated team of helicopter crews and Seals, and the latter had otherwise been undergoing one of the most vigorous training schedules. Only then was it possible to complete the mission with clock-work precision. It was the President who had to take the final call and gave written orders.
Since intelligence is the most essential input for such an operation, can Indian intelligence agencies measure up to this basic requirement? Weaknesses of Indian intelligence have repeatedly surprised the nation, be it the Chinese road across Ladakh, the scale of aggression in 1962, and mass infiltration in 1965 in J and K followed by the attack in Chamb-Jorian. Kargil was a major intelligence failure and so was the attack on Parliament where there were security lapses too. It was repeated at Mumbai, in spite of some early leads. More recent are the cases of lists of terrorists in Pakistan and the CBI team arriving in Copenhangen with an out-dated warrant of arrest. The list is endless.
Accurate and actionable intelligence is fundamental to the success of covert operations, whereas it remains our weakest point. In fact, in the case of Indian intelligence agencies, it is not the case of the left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing but the little finger not knowing whom the index finger, of the same hand, is fingering?
At the national level we have the NSG, especially trained and equipped for such operations. At Mumbai these commandos first took too long to arrive and later too long to complete the operation. Equally, are the NSG commandos equal to the job? Just recall the visuals of a commando holding his weapon well above his head and firing at supposedly some terrorists! This visual was repeatedly shown on the American TV, where we saw the drama unfold. The NSG was commanded by an army officer, invariably an ex-commando, but now it is a police officer with no ground-level experience of commando operations. Grabbing jobs, irrespective of the suitability of the appointee, is another feature of Indian setting.
There was no centralised control over the operation and the entire scene around Taj Hotel appeared one of a ‘circus,’ with apparently no one knowing what to do. The details of ammunition and grenades expended by the commandos in this action would give an idea of the operation and our suspicion of possible collateral damage.
Both the Indian Navy and the Indian Army have special forces which can carry out missions of the type conducted by the US naval Seals at Abbottabad. They are organised and trained for such missions and have the best of leadership. Quality of intelligence inputs apart, it is the joint operations where more than one service is to take part and then problems arise. There are major fault-lines in the field of coordination and meshing together of various aspects of such an operation between the two Services taking part in the operation. This lack of ‘joint-ship’ has been the bane of Indian defence forces, which essentially is the handiwork of the politic-bureaucratic combine. The policy of ‘divide and rule’, and ‘turf-tending’ over national interest has been the dominant feature of the Indian defence apparatus.
In the case of the Abbattobad raid, in spite of the complete integration of the defence forces in the United States, the Naval Seals had their own helicopters to ensure total involvement and commitment of those taking part in the operation. In the case of India, helicopters meant for carrying such troops are with the Indian Air Force rather than the Army! So, the total commitment required on the part of all those taking part in the operation will not measure up to the level required in an operation of the type conducted at Abbottabad. In fact, discord has often appeared when two Services had to operate together. It surfaced in rather an ugly form during the Kargil operations.
In the Indian political setting, a clear direction and the will to go for the kill will continue to be lacking. At Kargil, troops were told to carry out a ‘hot pursuit,’ but were forbidden to cross the Line of Control. This is when Pakistan had violated, on a very wide front and to great depth, India’s territorial integrity and the situation called for and justified a befitting response. However, India’s timid and inappropriate reaction resulted in frontal attacks up those impossible slopes, with avoidable casualties. Pakistan suffered no punishment for its blatant act of aggression. Consequent to attack on Indian Parliament, ‘Operation Parakaram’ kept the troops in their battle locations for months and ended in a fiasco. Indian reaction to these two incidents conveyed to Pakistan that it can take liberties with India and the latter carries no deterrence for the former. At the same time, it demonstrated that Indian political leadership will never have the stomach to order an operation of the ‘Geronimo’ type, no matter how provocative the action of the other country may be.
Civil society has suddenly woken up and is now seeking answers to searching questions on these issues, having closed its eyes and switched off its mind to national security issues all these decades. The inescapable fact is that the full potential of various components of the defence forces just cannot be realised without adopting the concepts of Chiefs of Defence Staff and “Theater Commands” along with the integration of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Services headquarters on the lines of the Pentagon. What has currently been carried out by way of amalgamation of Defence Headquarters with the MoD is a joke and a fraud on the nation. Yet civil society has remained a silent spectator. The Arun Singh Committee Report continues to gather dust, as it stands consigned to the archives of the Indian government.
Besides the above fault-lines in the Indian security establishment, it is the watertight compartments in which various organs of the state work. Foreign policy is evolved and practised in isolation of national security considerations and consultations. Intelligence agencies are never made accountable and have inadequate interaction with the defence Services.
The writer is a retired Deputy Chief of the Army Staff.
India can’t do a ‘Geronimo’
There are major fault-lines by Lieut-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)
Consequent to American operation ‘Geronimo,’ at Abbottabad in Pakistan to eliminate Osama bin Laden, many in civil society have been asking whether India can go ahead with a similar operation. ‘Geronimo’ involved painstaking intelligence work spread over many years, though the final ‘fine- tuning’ took seven months or so. Detailed intelligence work and application of cutting edge technology apart, it required an enormous amount of co-ordination among those in the higher echelons of the civil administration and military high command as well as with the one who was to control the mission. The entire planning was closely monitored by the Chiefs of Defence Staff, the CIA chief and the President himself, who is also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.
For months they worked on the plan, disseminating information strictly following the principle, ‘need to know’. A mock-up of the ‘Osama house’ would have been erected and an operation rehearsed a number of times by the designated team of helicopter crews and Seals, and the latter had otherwise been undergoing one of the most vigorous training schedules. Only then was it possible to complete the mission with clock-work precision. It was the President who had to take the final call and gave written orders.
Since intelligence is the most essential input for such an operation, can Indian intelligence agencies measure up to this basic requirement? Weaknesses of Indian intelligence have repeatedly surprised the nation, be it the Chinese road across Ladakh, the scale of aggression in 1962, and mass infiltration in 1965 in J and K followed by the attack in Chamb-Jorian. Kargil was a major intelligence failure and so was the attack on Parliament where there were security lapses too. It was repeated at Mumbai, in spite of some early leads. More recent are the cases of lists of terrorists in Pakistan and the CBI team arriving in Copenhangen with an out-dated warrant of arrest. The list is endless.
Accurate and actionable intelligence is fundamental to the success of covert operations, whereas it remains our weakest point. In fact, in the case of Indian intelligence agencies, it is not the case of the left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing but the little finger not knowing whom the index finger, of the same hand, is fingering?
At the national level we have the NSG, especially trained and equipped for such operations. At Mumbai these commandos first took too long to arrive and later too long to complete the operation. Equally, are the NSG commandos equal to the job? Just recall the visuals of a commando holding his weapon well above his head and firing at supposedly some terrorists! This visual was repeatedly shown on the American TV, where we saw the drama unfold. The NSG was commanded by an army officer, invariably an ex-commando, but now it is a police officer with no ground-level experience of commando operations. Grabbing jobs, irrespective of the suitability of the appointee, is another feature of Indian setting.
There was no centralised control over the operation and the entire scene around Taj Hotel appeared one of a ‘circus,’ with apparently no one knowing what to do. The details of ammunition and grenades expended by the commandos in this action would give an idea of the operation and our suspicion of possible collateral damage.
Both the Indian Navy and the Indian Army have special forces which can carry out missions of the type conducted by the US naval Seals at Abbottabad. They are organised and trained for such missions and have the best of leadership. Quality of intelligence inputs apart, it is the joint operations where more than one service is to take part and then problems arise. There are major fault-lines in the field of coordination and meshing together of various aspects of such an operation between the two Services taking part in the operation. This lack of ‘joint-ship’ has been the bane of Indian defence forces, which essentially is the handiwork of the politic-bureaucratic combine. The policy of ‘divide and rule’, and ‘turf-tending’ over national interest has been the dominant feature of the Indian defence apparatus.
In the case of the Abbattobad raid, in spite of the complete integration of the defence forces in the United States, the Naval Seals had their own helicopters to ensure total involvement and commitment of those taking part in the operation. In the case of India, helicopters meant for carrying such troops are with the Indian Air Force rather than the Army! So, the total commitment required on the part of all those taking part in the operation will not measure up to the level required in an operation of the type conducted at Abbottabad. In fact, discord has often appeared when two Services had to operate together. It surfaced in rather an ugly form during the Kargil operations.
In the Indian political setting, a clear direction and the will to go for the kill will continue to be lacking. At Kargil, troops were told to carry out a ‘hot pursuit,’ but were forbidden to cross the Line of Control. This is when Pakistan had violated, on a very wide front and to great depth, India’s territorial integrity and the situation called for and justified a befitting response. However, India’s timid and inappropriate reaction resulted in frontal attacks up those impossible slopes, with avoidable casualties. Pakistan suffered no punishment for its blatant act of aggression. Consequent to attack on Indian Parliament, ‘Operation Parakaram’ kept the troops in their battle locations for months and ended in a fiasco. Indian reaction to these two incidents conveyed to Pakistan that it can take liberties with India and the latter carries no deterrence for the former. At the same time, it demonstrated that Indian political leadership will never have the stomach to order an operation of the ‘Geronimo’ type, no matter how provocative the action of the other country may be.
Civil society has suddenly woken up and is now seeking answers to searching questions on these issues, having closed its eyes and switched off its mind to national security issues all these decades. The inescapable fact is that the full potential of various components of the defence forces just cannot be realised without adopting the concepts of Chiefs of Defence Staff and “Theater Commands” along with the integration of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Services headquarters on the lines of the Pentagon. What has currently been carried out by way of amalgamation of Defence Headquarters with the MoD is a joke and a fraud on the nation. Yet civil society has remained a silent spectator. The Arun Singh Committee Report continues to gather dust, as it stands consigned to the archives of the Indian government.
Besides the above fault-lines in the Indian security establishment, it is the watertight compartments in which various organs of the state work. Foreign policy is evolved and practised in isolation of national security considerations and consultations. Intelligence agencies are never made accountable and have inadequate interaction with the defence Services.
The writer is a retired Deputy Chief of the Army Staff.
India can’t do a ‘Geronimo’
Monday, June 6, 2011
India Treats Terrorists with Reverence- Dawood keen to Surrender?
A fictional account but fairly an accurate assessment
"osamaji- you did a cardinal mistake in seeking asylum in Pakistan, which is the most unsafe place in the world. Had you stayed in India you would have lived for another 30 years, thanks to the great Indian judicial system with multiple options. On top of it there is Presidential clemency and you could be sure no decision will be taken till the next millennia.
Take my own case, i am cooling my heels in Indian jail. I abuse the press, police, politicians and the judiciary. Nothing has happened.
Even an average Indian is an extremely nice guy. If you slap him he won't slap back. He'll find a pen and paper and file a complaint before Police who will not act on it as they have to determine whether the particular police station has jurisdiction or not. That is india. But it is a haven for terrorists, drug peddlers, rapists, black marketeers and money launderers.
The indian bureaucracy, politicians, police, press and good number of citizens are available for sale. Only you must know the price tag.
Fairly accurate assessment of the state of our Nation
Unsafe in Pakistan, Dawood plans to shift base
Mid-Day.com, Updated: June 06, 2011 16:25 IST
Mumbai: The ongoing US offensive against terrorists in Pakistan that saw bigwigs like Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden and HuJI head Ilyas Kashmiri falling, has left India's most wanted criminal Dawood Ibrahim jittery, prompting the elusive don to contemplate shifting his base to a safer place.
According to underworld sources, this is the first time in the past 15 years that Dawood is feeling threatened in Pakistan.
He feels no longer safe in the hands of his patron the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), which has been shielding him for decades.
Joint Commissioner of Police (crime) Himanshu Roy said, "After Osama bin Laden and 26/11 Mumbai attack suspect Ilyas Kashmiri being hunted down in Pakistani hideouts, the ISI does not want to be caught on the wrong foot once again by providing shelter to yet another most wanted suspect like Dawood. This will make their position very embarrassing."
Now, the don is apprehensive of the security of his family and himself despite having some close friends and relatives in the Pakistani army and ISI.
According to sources, Dawood is planning to shift his base from Pakistan to another country having strong mafia presence. He also plans to tag along his key associates such as Chhota Shakeel and Aftab Bhatki.
Apparently, there is some sort of trust deficit between Dawood and his Pakistani patrons, particularly the ISI. The notorious intelligence agency used Dawood and his network for carrying out the 1993 serial blasts.
A former Intelligence Bureau (IB) director told MiD DAY that it was foolish for Dawood to trust the ISI, a foreign agency known for sacrificing its own men for saving its skin.
If the sources are to be believed, the don recently sent feelers to the Indian Intelligence agencies asking if they could protect him if he is ready to face the rule of law in India.
Pakistani government is complicit in sheltering anti-nationals for its own advantage. These include gangsters and terrorists wanted in bomb blasts and killings in India. A survey indicates that the ISI needs Indian criminals as much as they need safe sanctuary to operate.
According to police sources, Dawood is respected in ISI circles because of his grip on Mumbai. Destabilising the country's economy under the Karachi Project tops the list of the ISI.
Dawood has the capability to arrange manpower in Mumbai, Bangalore, Mangalore, Nepal or Bangladesh, which could be a relatively difficult task for the ISI.
Besides, the don's men have access to police stations in the city and the corridor of power at Mantralaya. The ISI officials pay Dawood for getting their work done through him.
Mumbai police investigations have indicated Dawood is the main agent for subversive activities in India.
His clandestine operations include smuggling of counterfeit notes, arming loyal groups, harbouring gangsters and acting as a conduit for funds intended for the terror groups.
Read more at: Click here
Pak TV Program CROSSFIRE is very bold and critical of its Military and the Government
Here's what Asma Jahangir, a Pakistani lawyer and human right activist thinks about the Pak Army Generals! Check it out in the video links below:
Video 1
Video 2
Please note that there hardly any intervention by the anchor. Compare this with Goswamy on Times TV, Barkha Dutt and others on Indian TV Channels! They hardly let anyone have their say ...
Comment
Every Police Station in India collects Mamool from goondas,encroachers and law breakers. Is the MHA aware of this malaise which terrorists exploit to keep the Police Stations ineffective?
"osamaji- you did a cardinal mistake in seeking asylum in Pakistan, which is the most unsafe place in the world. Had you stayed in India you would have lived for another 30 years, thanks to the great Indian judicial system with multiple options. On top of it there is Presidential clemency and you could be sure no decision will be taken till the next millennia.
Take my own case, i am cooling my heels in Indian jail. I abuse the press, police, politicians and the judiciary. Nothing has happened.
Even an average Indian is an extremely nice guy. If you slap him he won't slap back. He'll find a pen and paper and file a complaint before Police who will not act on it as they have to determine whether the particular police station has jurisdiction or not. That is india. But it is a haven for terrorists, drug peddlers, rapists, black marketeers and money launderers.
The indian bureaucracy, politicians, police, press and good number of citizens are available for sale. Only you must know the price tag.
Fairly accurate assessment of the state of our Nation
Unsafe in Pakistan, Dawood plans to shift base
Mid-Day.com, Updated: June 06, 2011 16:25 IST
Mumbai: The ongoing US offensive against terrorists in Pakistan that saw bigwigs like Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden and HuJI head Ilyas Kashmiri falling, has left India's most wanted criminal Dawood Ibrahim jittery, prompting the elusive don to contemplate shifting his base to a safer place.
According to underworld sources, this is the first time in the past 15 years that Dawood is feeling threatened in Pakistan.
He feels no longer safe in the hands of his patron the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), which has been shielding him for decades.
Joint Commissioner of Police (crime) Himanshu Roy said, "After Osama bin Laden and 26/11 Mumbai attack suspect Ilyas Kashmiri being hunted down in Pakistani hideouts, the ISI does not want to be caught on the wrong foot once again by providing shelter to yet another most wanted suspect like Dawood. This will make their position very embarrassing."
Now, the don is apprehensive of the security of his family and himself despite having some close friends and relatives in the Pakistani army and ISI.
According to sources, Dawood is planning to shift his base from Pakistan to another country having strong mafia presence. He also plans to tag along his key associates such as Chhota Shakeel and Aftab Bhatki.
Apparently, there is some sort of trust deficit between Dawood and his Pakistani patrons, particularly the ISI. The notorious intelligence agency used Dawood and his network for carrying out the 1993 serial blasts.
A former Intelligence Bureau (IB) director told MiD DAY that it was foolish for Dawood to trust the ISI, a foreign agency known for sacrificing its own men for saving its skin.
If the sources are to be believed, the don recently sent feelers to the Indian Intelligence agencies asking if they could protect him if he is ready to face the rule of law in India.
Pakistani government is complicit in sheltering anti-nationals for its own advantage. These include gangsters and terrorists wanted in bomb blasts and killings in India. A survey indicates that the ISI needs Indian criminals as much as they need safe sanctuary to operate.
According to police sources, Dawood is respected in ISI circles because of his grip on Mumbai. Destabilising the country's economy under the Karachi Project tops the list of the ISI.
Dawood has the capability to arrange manpower in Mumbai, Bangalore, Mangalore, Nepal or Bangladesh, which could be a relatively difficult task for the ISI.
Besides, the don's men have access to police stations in the city and the corridor of power at Mantralaya. The ISI officials pay Dawood for getting their work done through him.
Mumbai police investigations have indicated Dawood is the main agent for subversive activities in India.
His clandestine operations include smuggling of counterfeit notes, arming loyal groups, harbouring gangsters and acting as a conduit for funds intended for the terror groups.
Read more at: Click here
Pak TV Program CROSSFIRE is very bold and critical of its Military and the Government
Here's what Asma Jahangir, a Pakistani lawyer and human right activist thinks about the Pak Army Generals! Check it out in the video links below:
Please note that there hardly any intervention by the anchor. Compare this with Goswamy on Times TV, Barkha Dutt and others on Indian TV Channels! They hardly let anyone have their say ...
Comment
Every Police Station in India collects Mamool from goondas,encroachers and law breakers. Is the MHA aware of this malaise which terrorists exploit to keep the Police Stations ineffective?
Friday, June 3, 2011
Consequences of Funding Pakistan Army- Enhancing World Terrorism?
Annals of Diplomacy- The Double Game
The unintended consequences of American funding in Pakistan.by Lawrence Wright May 16, 2011 The New Yorker
Ask the Authors: Join a live chat with Steve Coll and Lawrence Wright about Osama bin Laden on Tuesday, May 10, at 4:30 P.M. E.T.Keywords
Pakistan;Diplomacy;Foreign Policy;Foreign Aid;Inter-Services Intelligence (I.S.I.);Osama bin Laden;Terrorism, TerroristsIt’s the end of the Second World War, and the United States is deciding what to do about two immense, poor, densely populated countries in Asia. America chooses one of the countries, becoming its benefactor. Over the decades, it pours billions of dollars into that country’s economy, training and equipping its military and its intelligence services. The stated goal is to create a reliable ally with strong institutions and a modern, vigorous democracy. The other country, meanwhile, is spurned because it forges alliances with America’s enemies.
The country not chosen was India, which “tilted” toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Pakistan became America’s protégé, firmly supporting its fight to contain Communism. The benefits that Pakistan accrued from this relationship were quickly apparent: in the nineteen-sixties, its economy was an exemplar. India, by contrast, was a byword for basket case. Fifty years then went by. What was the result of this social experiment?
India has become the state that we tried to create in Pakistan. It is a rising economic star, militarily powerful and democratic, and it shares American interests. Pakistan, however, is one of the most anti-American countries in the world, and a covert sponsor of terrorism. Politically and economically, it verges on being a failed state. And, despite Pakistani avowals to the contrary, America’s worst enemy, Osama bin Laden, had been hiding there for years—in strikingly comfortable circumstances—before U.S. commandos finally tracked him down and killed him, on May 2nd.
American aid is hardly the only factor that led these two countries to such disparate outcomes. But, at this pivotal moment, it would be a mistake not to examine the degree to which U.S. dollars have undermined our strategic relationship with Pakistan—and created monstrous contradictions within Pakistan itself.
American money began flowing into Pakistan in 1954, when a mutual defense agreement was signed. During the next decade, nearly two and a half billion dollars in economic assistance, and seven hundred million in military aid, went to Pakistan. After the 1965 Pakistan-India war began, the U.S. essentially withdrew aid to both countries. Gradually, U.S. economic aid was restored, but the Pakistani military was kept on probation.
Those civilian-aid programs were largely successful. Christine Fair, a specialist on South Asia at the Center for Peace and Security Studies, at Georgetown University, notes that the original model for economic assistance was “demand driven”—local groups or governments proposed projects and applied for grants. Aid usually came in the form of matching funds, so that grantees had a stake in the projects. Moreover, American specialists presided over the disbursement of these funds and served as managers. “That was effective,” Fair says. “But we haven’t done it for decades.”
Then, in 1979, U.S. intelligence discovered that Pakistan was secretly building a uranium-enrichment facility in response to India’s nuclear-weapons program. That April, the military dictator of Pakistan, General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, hanged the civilian President he had expelled from office, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto; he then cancelled elections. U.S. aid came to a halt. At the same time, Zia began giving support to an Islamist organization, Jamaat-e-Islami, the forerunner of many more radical groups to come. In November, a mob of Jamaat followers, inflamed by a rumor that the U.S. and Israel were behind an attack on the Grand Mosque, in Mecca, burned the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad to the ground, killing two Americans and two Pakistani employees. The American romance with Pakistan was over, but the marriage was just about to begin.
The very next month, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. President Jimmy Carter, in a panic, offered Zia four hundred million dollars in economic and military aid. Zia rejected the offer, calling it “peanuts”—the term often arises in Pakistani critiques of American aid, but it must have rankled the peanut farmer in the White House. Zia was smart to hold out. Under Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan, U.S. aid nearly quintupled: about three billion dollars in economic assistance and two billion in military aid. The Reagan Administration also provided three billion dollars to Afghan jihadis. These funds went through the sticky hands of the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, the spy branch of the Pakistani Army. Starting in 1987, the I.S.I. was headed by General Hamid Gul, a cunning and bitterly anti-American figure. The I.S.I. became so glutted with power and money that it formed a “state within a state,” in the words of Benazir Bhutto, who became Pakistan’s Prime Minister in 1988. She eventually fired Gul, fearing that he was engineering a coup.
Milton Bearden, a former C.I.A. station chief in Pakistan, once described Gul to me as having a “rococo” personality. In 2004, I visited Gul—a short man with a rigid, military posture and raptor-like features—at his villa in Rawalpindi. He proudly asked his servant to bring me an orange from his private grove. I asked Gul why, during the Afghan jihad, he had favored Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, one of the seven warlords who had been designated to receive American assistance in the fight against the Soviets. Hekmatyar was the most brutal member of the group, but, crucially, he was a Pashtun, like Gul. As I ate the orange, Gul offered a more principled rationale for his choice: “I went to each of the seven, you see, and I asked them, ‘I know you are the strongest, but who is No. 2?’ ” He formed a tight, smug smile. “They all said Hekmatyar.”
Later, Gul helped oversee the creation of the Taliban, reportedly using mainly Saudi money. The I.S.I. openly supported the Taliban until September 11, 2001. Since then, the Pakistani government has disavowed the group, but it is widely believed that it still provides Taliban leaders with safe harbor in Quetta, where they stage jihad against Western forces in Afghanistan.
In 1990, President George H. W. Bush cut off military aid to Pakistan. Ostensibly, this was in response to Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, but it’s also true that, after the Soviets were pushed out of Afghanistan, in the late eighties, the U.S. lost interest in Pakistan. U.S. assistance, directed almost entirely toward food and counter-narcotics efforts, fell to forty-five million dollars a year, and declined further after 1998, when Pakistan began testing nuclear weapons.
After the September 11th attacks, Pakistan abruptly became America’s key ally in the “war on terror.” Under President George W. Bush, the U.S. gave billions of dollars to Pakistan, most of it in unrestricted funds, to combat terrorism. Pervez Musharraf, who served as President between 1999 and 2008, now admits that during his tenure he diverted many of those billions to arm Pakistan against its hobgoblin enemy, India. “Whoever wishes to be angry, let them be angry—why should we bother?” Musharraf said in an interview on the Pakistani television channel Express News. “We have to maintain our security.” Since Musharraf left office, there has been little indication that U.S. aid—$4.5 billion in 2010, one of the largest amounts ever given to a foreign country—is being more properly spent.
The main beneficiary of U.S. money, the Pakistani military, has never won a war, but, according to “Military Inc.,” by Ayesha Siddiqa, it has done very well in its investments: hotels, real estate, shopping malls. Such entrepreneurship, however corrupt, fills a gap, as Pakistan’s economy is now almost entirely dependent on American taxpayers. In a country of a hundred and eighty million people, fewer than two million citizens pay taxes, and Pakistan’s leaders are doing little to change the situation. In Karachi, the financial capital, the government recently inaugurated a program to appoint eunuchs as tax collectors. Eunuchs are considered relentless scolds in South Asia, and the threat of being hounded by one is somehow supposed to take the place of audits.
Eliminating, or sharply reducing, military aid to Pakistan would have consequences, but they may not be the ones we fear. Diminishing the power of the military class would open up more room for civilian rule. Many Pakistanis are in favor of less U.S. aid; their slogan is “trade not aid.” In particular, Pakistani businessmen have long sought U.S. tax breaks for their textiles, which American manufacturers have resisted. Such a move would empower the civilian middle class. India would no doubt welcome a reduction in military aid to Pakistan, and the U.S. could use this as leverage to pressure India to allow the Kashmiris to vote on their future, which would very likely be a vote for independence. These two actions might do far more to enhance Pakistan’s stability, and to insure its friendship, than the billions of dollars that America now pays like a ransom.
Within the I.S.I., there is a secret organization known as the S Wing, which is largely composed of supposedly retired military and I.S.I. officers. “It doesn’t exist on paper,” a source close to the I.S.I. told me. The S Wing handles relations with radical elements. “If something happens, then they have deniability,” the source explained. If any group within the Pakistani military helped hide bin Laden, it was likely S Wing.
Eight days before Osama bin Laden was killed, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the head of the Pakistani Army, went to the Kakul military academy in Abbottabad, less than a mile from the villa where bin Laden was living. “General Kayani told the cadets, ‘We have broken the backbone of the militants,’ ” Pir Zubair Shah, the reporter, told me. “But the backbone was right there.” Perhaps with a touch of theatre, Hamid Gul, the former I.S.I. chief, publicly expressed wonder that bin Laden was living in a city with three army regiments, less than a mile from an élite military academy, in a house that appeared to have been built expressly to protect him. Aside from the military, Gul told the Associated Press, “there is the local police, the Intelligence Bureau, Military Intelligence, the I.S.I. They all had a presence there.” ♦
Extracted
Click here to Read the four paged- The New Yorker article
The unintended consequences of American funding in Pakistan.by Lawrence Wright May 16, 2011 The New Yorker
Ask the Authors: Join a live chat with Steve Coll and Lawrence Wright about Osama bin Laden on Tuesday, May 10, at 4:30 P.M. E.T.Keywords
Pakistan;Diplomacy;Foreign Policy;Foreign Aid;Inter-Services Intelligence (I.S.I.);Osama bin Laden;Terrorism, TerroristsIt’s the end of the Second World War, and the United States is deciding what to do about two immense, poor, densely populated countries in Asia. America chooses one of the countries, becoming its benefactor. Over the decades, it pours billions of dollars into that country’s economy, training and equipping its military and its intelligence services. The stated goal is to create a reliable ally with strong institutions and a modern, vigorous democracy. The other country, meanwhile, is spurned because it forges alliances with America’s enemies.
The country not chosen was India, which “tilted” toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Pakistan became America’s protégé, firmly supporting its fight to contain Communism. The benefits that Pakistan accrued from this relationship were quickly apparent: in the nineteen-sixties, its economy was an exemplar. India, by contrast, was a byword for basket case. Fifty years then went by. What was the result of this social experiment?
India has become the state that we tried to create in Pakistan. It is a rising economic star, militarily powerful and democratic, and it shares American interests. Pakistan, however, is one of the most anti-American countries in the world, and a covert sponsor of terrorism. Politically and economically, it verges on being a failed state. And, despite Pakistani avowals to the contrary, America’s worst enemy, Osama bin Laden, had been hiding there for years—in strikingly comfortable circumstances—before U.S. commandos finally tracked him down and killed him, on May 2nd.
American aid is hardly the only factor that led these two countries to such disparate outcomes. But, at this pivotal moment, it would be a mistake not to examine the degree to which U.S. dollars have undermined our strategic relationship with Pakistan—and created monstrous contradictions within Pakistan itself.
American money began flowing into Pakistan in 1954, when a mutual defense agreement was signed. During the next decade, nearly two and a half billion dollars in economic assistance, and seven hundred million in military aid, went to Pakistan. After the 1965 Pakistan-India war began, the U.S. essentially withdrew aid to both countries. Gradually, U.S. economic aid was restored, but the Pakistani military was kept on probation.
Those civilian-aid programs were largely successful. Christine Fair, a specialist on South Asia at the Center for Peace and Security Studies, at Georgetown University, notes that the original model for economic assistance was “demand driven”—local groups or governments proposed projects and applied for grants. Aid usually came in the form of matching funds, so that grantees had a stake in the projects. Moreover, American specialists presided over the disbursement of these funds and served as managers. “That was effective,” Fair says. “But we haven’t done it for decades.”
Then, in 1979, U.S. intelligence discovered that Pakistan was secretly building a uranium-enrichment facility in response to India’s nuclear-weapons program. That April, the military dictator of Pakistan, General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, hanged the civilian President he had expelled from office, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto; he then cancelled elections. U.S. aid came to a halt. At the same time, Zia began giving support to an Islamist organization, Jamaat-e-Islami, the forerunner of many more radical groups to come. In November, a mob of Jamaat followers, inflamed by a rumor that the U.S. and Israel were behind an attack on the Grand Mosque, in Mecca, burned the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad to the ground, killing two Americans and two Pakistani employees. The American romance with Pakistan was over, but the marriage was just about to begin.
The very next month, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. President Jimmy Carter, in a panic, offered Zia four hundred million dollars in economic and military aid. Zia rejected the offer, calling it “peanuts”—the term often arises in Pakistani critiques of American aid, but it must have rankled the peanut farmer in the White House. Zia was smart to hold out. Under Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan, U.S. aid nearly quintupled: about three billion dollars in economic assistance and two billion in military aid. The Reagan Administration also provided three billion dollars to Afghan jihadis. These funds went through the sticky hands of the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, the spy branch of the Pakistani Army. Starting in 1987, the I.S.I. was headed by General Hamid Gul, a cunning and bitterly anti-American figure. The I.S.I. became so glutted with power and money that it formed a “state within a state,” in the words of Benazir Bhutto, who became Pakistan’s Prime Minister in 1988. She eventually fired Gul, fearing that he was engineering a coup.
Milton Bearden, a former C.I.A. station chief in Pakistan, once described Gul to me as having a “rococo” personality. In 2004, I visited Gul—a short man with a rigid, military posture and raptor-like features—at his villa in Rawalpindi. He proudly asked his servant to bring me an orange from his private grove. I asked Gul why, during the Afghan jihad, he had favored Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, one of the seven warlords who had been designated to receive American assistance in the fight against the Soviets. Hekmatyar was the most brutal member of the group, but, crucially, he was a Pashtun, like Gul. As I ate the orange, Gul offered a more principled rationale for his choice: “I went to each of the seven, you see, and I asked them, ‘I know you are the strongest, but who is No. 2?’ ” He formed a tight, smug smile. “They all said Hekmatyar.”
Later, Gul helped oversee the creation of the Taliban, reportedly using mainly Saudi money. The I.S.I. openly supported the Taliban until September 11, 2001. Since then, the Pakistani government has disavowed the group, but it is widely believed that it still provides Taliban leaders with safe harbor in Quetta, where they stage jihad against Western forces in Afghanistan.
In 1990, President George H. W. Bush cut off military aid to Pakistan. Ostensibly, this was in response to Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, but it’s also true that, after the Soviets were pushed out of Afghanistan, in the late eighties, the U.S. lost interest in Pakistan. U.S. assistance, directed almost entirely toward food and counter-narcotics efforts, fell to forty-five million dollars a year, and declined further after 1998, when Pakistan began testing nuclear weapons.
After the September 11th attacks, Pakistan abruptly became America’s key ally in the “war on terror.” Under President George W. Bush, the U.S. gave billions of dollars to Pakistan, most of it in unrestricted funds, to combat terrorism. Pervez Musharraf, who served as President between 1999 and 2008, now admits that during his tenure he diverted many of those billions to arm Pakistan against its hobgoblin enemy, India. “Whoever wishes to be angry, let them be angry—why should we bother?” Musharraf said in an interview on the Pakistani television channel Express News. “We have to maintain our security.” Since Musharraf left office, there has been little indication that U.S. aid—$4.5 billion in 2010, one of the largest amounts ever given to a foreign country—is being more properly spent.
The main beneficiary of U.S. money, the Pakistani military, has never won a war, but, according to “Military Inc.,” by Ayesha Siddiqa, it has done very well in its investments: hotels, real estate, shopping malls. Such entrepreneurship, however corrupt, fills a gap, as Pakistan’s economy is now almost entirely dependent on American taxpayers. In a country of a hundred and eighty million people, fewer than two million citizens pay taxes, and Pakistan’s leaders are doing little to change the situation. In Karachi, the financial capital, the government recently inaugurated a program to appoint eunuchs as tax collectors. Eunuchs are considered relentless scolds in South Asia, and the threat of being hounded by one is somehow supposed to take the place of audits.
Eliminating, or sharply reducing, military aid to Pakistan would have consequences, but they may not be the ones we fear. Diminishing the power of the military class would open up more room for civilian rule. Many Pakistanis are in favor of less U.S. aid; their slogan is “trade not aid.” In particular, Pakistani businessmen have long sought U.S. tax breaks for their textiles, which American manufacturers have resisted. Such a move would empower the civilian middle class. India would no doubt welcome a reduction in military aid to Pakistan, and the U.S. could use this as leverage to pressure India to allow the Kashmiris to vote on their future, which would very likely be a vote for independence. These two actions might do far more to enhance Pakistan’s stability, and to insure its friendship, than the billions of dollars that America now pays like a ransom.
Within the I.S.I., there is a secret organization known as the S Wing, which is largely composed of supposedly retired military and I.S.I. officers. “It doesn’t exist on paper,” a source close to the I.S.I. told me. The S Wing handles relations with radical elements. “If something happens, then they have deniability,” the source explained. If any group within the Pakistani military helped hide bin Laden, it was likely S Wing.
Eight days before Osama bin Laden was killed, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the head of the Pakistani Army, went to the Kakul military academy in Abbottabad, less than a mile from the villa where bin Laden was living. “General Kayani told the cadets, ‘We have broken the backbone of the militants,’ ” Pir Zubair Shah, the reporter, told me. “But the backbone was right there.” Perhaps with a touch of theatre, Hamid Gul, the former I.S.I. chief, publicly expressed wonder that bin Laden was living in a city with three army regiments, less than a mile from an élite military academy, in a house that appeared to have been built expressly to protect him. Aside from the military, Gul told the Associated Press, “there is the local police, the Intelligence Bureau, Military Intelligence, the I.S.I. They all had a presence there.” ♦
Extracted
Click here to Read the four paged- The New Yorker article
Thursday, June 2, 2011
Washington moves to classify cyber-attacks as acts of war
Washington moves to classify cyber-attacks as acts of war. Pentagon has concluded that the laws of armed conflict can be widened to embrace cyberwarfare Ed Pilkington in New York guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 31 May 2011 23.27 BST
The new strategy would adapt the existing right of self-defence contained in the UN charter by bringing cyberweapons under the definition of armed attacks. Photograph: Jim Young/Reuters
The US government is rewriting its military rule book to make cyber-attacks a possible act of war, giving commanders the option of launching retaliatory military strikes against hackers backed by hostile foreign powers.
The Pentagon has concluded that the laws of armed conflict can be widened to embrace cyberwarfare in order to allow the US to respond with the use of force against aggressive assaults on its computer and IT infrastructure.
The move, to be unveiled in a US department of defence strategy document next month, is a significant step towards the militarisation of cyberspace, with huge implications for international law.
Pentagon officials disclosed the decision to the Wall Street Journal, saying it was designed to send a warning to any hacker threatening US security by attacking its nuclear reactors, pipelines or public networks such as mass transport systems. "If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks," an official said.
The new strategy would adapt the existing right of self-defence contained in the UN charter by bringing cyberweapons under the definition of armed attacks.
Joel Reidenberg, a professor at Fordham University in New York who teaches IT law, said the policy was an important recognition that new forms of warfare could harm Americans, "and that the US will protect its citizens in their 21st-century activities."
Sami Saydjari, a former Pentagon cyber expert who now runs a consultancy called Cyber Defense Agency, said the rule change was a logical and reasonable next step. "The US is vulnerable to sabotage in defence, power, telecommunications, banking. An attack on any one of those essential infrastructures could be as damaging as any kinetic attack on US soil."But other cyber specialists warned the new provision would be extremely hard to implement and could escalate the militarisation of the internet.
Jody Westby, co-author of the UN publication The Quest for Cyber Peace, said attacks were difficult to track and trace back to their origins, often making it impossible to determine who is behind them.
She called for more diplomatic efforts to increase co-operation between governments rather than widening military options. "Sabre-rattling like this in the cyber age could backfire on the US, as it could spark further cyber-attacks on US infrastructure that could be massively destructive for American civilians."
The Obama administration signalled its intentions two weeks ago when the White House released its vision for the future of cyberspace. "When warranted, the US will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country," it said, adding that such responses included "all necessary means" including military ones.
The US is considered especially prone to cyber-attacks because millions of computers in America have been infected and because its military networks are so highly computerised.
Alan Paller, research director at the Sans Institute, which trains computer security professionals, said military and defence computers in the US had come under attack from foreign states at least since 2003, with losses including key technical data for the $300bn F35 fighter.
"The military knows its systems are under constant and increasingly sophisticated attacks," he said.
US analysts have their sights particularly on China and Russia as potential sources of state-sponsored cyberwarfare. A congressional panel has warned that China had the capability of hitting federal networks connected via the internet, such as the national electricity grid, in a way that "could paralyse the US".But tRussia was blamed in 2008 for a computer attack on the US Central Command which oversees the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Russia was also implicated in more localised cyber attacks on Georgia and Estonia.
The US has also been implicated in cyber sabotage. It has been suggested that Stuxnet, the computer worm unleashed last year against Iran, was the work of the Israeli government, backed by Washington. Westby pointed out that the US has not denied the claim. "It seems we're happy to launch our own cyber-attacks when it suits us. That's hardly good diplomacy."
Washington moves to classify cyber-attacks as acts of war
Related Reading
Cyber threat: Google hacked company blames China
Keep Information Safe Online
Ensuring your information is safe online
Massive Gmail phishing attack hits top U.S. officials
Targeted attacks against personal accounts of military, government employees and associates
The new strategy would adapt the existing right of self-defence contained in the UN charter by bringing cyberweapons under the definition of armed attacks. Photograph: Jim Young/Reuters
The US government is rewriting its military rule book to make cyber-attacks a possible act of war, giving commanders the option of launching retaliatory military strikes against hackers backed by hostile foreign powers.
The Pentagon has concluded that the laws of armed conflict can be widened to embrace cyberwarfare in order to allow the US to respond with the use of force against aggressive assaults on its computer and IT infrastructure.
The move, to be unveiled in a US department of defence strategy document next month, is a significant step towards the militarisation of cyberspace, with huge implications for international law.
Pentagon officials disclosed the decision to the Wall Street Journal, saying it was designed to send a warning to any hacker threatening US security by attacking its nuclear reactors, pipelines or public networks such as mass transport systems. "If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks," an official said.
The new strategy would adapt the existing right of self-defence contained in the UN charter by bringing cyberweapons under the definition of armed attacks.
Joel Reidenberg, a professor at Fordham University in New York who teaches IT law, said the policy was an important recognition that new forms of warfare could harm Americans, "and that the US will protect its citizens in their 21st-century activities."
Sami Saydjari, a former Pentagon cyber expert who now runs a consultancy called Cyber Defense Agency, said the rule change was a logical and reasonable next step. "The US is vulnerable to sabotage in defence, power, telecommunications, banking. An attack on any one of those essential infrastructures could be as damaging as any kinetic attack on US soil."But other cyber specialists warned the new provision would be extremely hard to implement and could escalate the militarisation of the internet.
Jody Westby, co-author of the UN publication The Quest for Cyber Peace, said attacks were difficult to track and trace back to their origins, often making it impossible to determine who is behind them.
She called for more diplomatic efforts to increase co-operation between governments rather than widening military options. "Sabre-rattling like this in the cyber age could backfire on the US, as it could spark further cyber-attacks on US infrastructure that could be massively destructive for American civilians."
The Obama administration signalled its intentions two weeks ago when the White House released its vision for the future of cyberspace. "When warranted, the US will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country," it said, adding that such responses included "all necessary means" including military ones.
The US is considered especially prone to cyber-attacks because millions of computers in America have been infected and because its military networks are so highly computerised.
Alan Paller, research director at the Sans Institute, which trains computer security professionals, said military and defence computers in the US had come under attack from foreign states at least since 2003, with losses including key technical data for the $300bn F35 fighter.
"The military knows its systems are under constant and increasingly sophisticated attacks," he said.
US analysts have their sights particularly on China and Russia as potential sources of state-sponsored cyberwarfare. A congressional panel has warned that China had the capability of hitting federal networks connected via the internet, such as the national electricity grid, in a way that "could paralyse the US".But tRussia was blamed in 2008 for a computer attack on the US Central Command which oversees the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Russia was also implicated in more localised cyber attacks on Georgia and Estonia.
The US has also been implicated in cyber sabotage. It has been suggested that Stuxnet, the computer worm unleashed last year against Iran, was the work of the Israeli government, backed by Washington. Westby pointed out that the US has not denied the claim. "It seems we're happy to launch our own cyber-attacks when it suits us. That's hardly good diplomacy."
Washington moves to classify cyber-attacks as acts of war
Related Reading
Cyber threat: Google hacked company blames China
Keep Information Safe Online
Ensuring your information is safe online
Massive Gmail phishing attack hits top U.S. officials
Targeted attacks against personal accounts of military, government employees and associates
Hundred years of Signalling
100 YEARS OF SIGNALLING (1911-2011)-SEMAPHORE TO SATELLITE(Lt Gen Harbhajan Singh, PVSM)
The journey of Corps of Signals through 100 years of its existence has been aSaga of rich heritage, providing communications often under fire, in hostile climatic and terrainconditions, in undivided India, after independence and in many corners of the world. The Corpshas excelled in fulfilling its role during war, in insurgency milieu, peace, in aid to civil authorityduring man made or natural disasters and for peace keeping under the United Nations in a number of countries. Its performance has stood up to its motto of Certa Cito,Tez-o-Sahi(after Independence) and afterwards Teevra Chaukas. Many brave Signallers paid the supreme sacrifice but kept the communications THROUGH, in the best traditions of the Corps of Signals and theIndian Army. We pay homage to them.The means of signal communications available at various times through these 100 yearsdepended on the technology in vogue, to fulfill the war and peace time requirements of the IndianArmy at different times. Before Independence, the British brought in the technology, ideas andmeans of communications from England, for both military and civil communications in India.After Independence on 15 Aug 1947, the sources of technology and equipment were diversified.While, the Soviet Union became major supplier for lethal weapons and platforms like aircraft, shipsand tanks, the communication equipment bore the stamp of Western countries. Gradually, localassembly and manufacturing capacity was set up in India, mostly in the Public Sector. After theeconomic and industrial liberalization in 1991, the electronics scene in India changed and it became possible for the civil sector to start supplying equipment, at times with foreign collaboration. Thecontributions of our Defence Scientists and the public and private sector companies has been of very high standards.
The Corps has excelled in adapting available technology and modernization/updating of means of communications to meet the changing operational scenarios. Those at the helm in SignalsDirectorate showed great vision and organizational skills to keep the Corps contemporary in itsthinking, communication systems, equipment, training and organizations.The Corps of Signals has also been responsible for introducing new systems likeComputers electronic warfare, signal intelligence in the Army and training personnel of all armsand services as also the Navy and the Air Force.
Click link to read more ...100 YEARS OF SIGNALLING (1911-2011)-SEMAPHORE TO SATELLITE (Lt Gen Harbhajan Singh, PVSM)
The journey of Corps of Signals through 100 years of its existence has been aSaga of rich heritage, providing communications often under fire, in hostile climatic and terrainconditions, in undivided India, after independence and in many corners of the world. The Corpshas excelled in fulfilling its role during war, in insurgency milieu, peace, in aid to civil authorityduring man made or natural disasters and for peace keeping under the United Nations in a number of countries. Its performance has stood up to its motto of Certa Cito,Tez-o-Sahi(after Independence) and afterwards Teevra Chaukas. Many brave Signallers paid the supreme sacrifice but kept the communications THROUGH, in the best traditions of the Corps of Signals and theIndian Army. We pay homage to them.The means of signal communications available at various times through these 100 yearsdepended on the technology in vogue, to fulfill the war and peace time requirements of the IndianArmy at different times. Before Independence, the British brought in the technology, ideas andmeans of communications from England, for both military and civil communications in India.After Independence on 15 Aug 1947, the sources of technology and equipment were diversified.While, the Soviet Union became major supplier for lethal weapons and platforms like aircraft, shipsand tanks, the communication equipment bore the stamp of Western countries. Gradually, localassembly and manufacturing capacity was set up in India, mostly in the Public Sector. After theeconomic and industrial liberalization in 1991, the electronics scene in India changed and it became possible for the civil sector to start supplying equipment, at times with foreign collaboration. Thecontributions of our Defence Scientists and the public and private sector companies has been of very high standards.
The Corps has excelled in adapting available technology and modernization/updating of means of communications to meet the changing operational scenarios. Those at the helm in SignalsDirectorate showed great vision and organizational skills to keep the Corps contemporary in itsthinking, communication systems, equipment, training and organizations.The Corps of Signals has also been responsible for introducing new systems likeComputers electronic warfare, signal intelligence in the Army and training personnel of all armsand services as also the Navy and the Air Force.
Click link to read more ...100 YEARS OF SIGNALLING (1911-2011)-SEMAPHORE TO SATELLITE (Lt Gen Harbhajan Singh, PVSM)
Wednesday, June 1, 2011
Pak Army's double Game: Taliban Terror and Hostility to Democracy
‘Pak army more anti-American than radical’ By Malik Siraj Akbar, DAWN.COM
Pakistani protesters hold up a burning US flag during a demonstration against the visit of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Lahore on May 27, 2011. Clinton said on May 27 that the United States was more committed to Pakistan after the Osama bin Laden crisis, but urged the country to take decisive steps to defeat al Qaeda. – AFP Photo
Dr. Stephen Philip Cohen, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, Washington DC, is a respected authority on the Pakistani army and the country’s politics. His book The Pakistan Army was published in 1998 and was translated into Urdu and Chinese. In 2004, he published another book The Idea of Pakistan. In an exclusive interview with Dawn.com, Dr. Cohen speaks about the Pakistan-US relationship and the future of South Asia after the Osama bin Laden crisis.
Q: Who do the Americans hold responsible for harbouring Osama bin Laden: The Pakistani civilian government or the army?
A: The US military respects the Pakistan army for its professionalism but they are angry with the Pakistani military for playing both sides against the middle. They are aware that if you’re an American soldier and the Afghan Taliban who are shooting at you are actually the ones being supported and trained in Pakistan. So, there is real anger with the Pakistan army over this double game. I can understand why they are playing this double game as the Taliban are an asset for Pakistan but the Americans do not like this. There is also deep resentment over some of the policies the army has imposed on the civilian government.
Q: How old is the history of collaboration in the Pakistan army with the Islamic radicals?
A: It dates back to the Bangladesh separatist movement when the army recruited people for al Badar and its death squads. It became more systematic during Zia’s government both in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Now, it is a full-fledged strategic alliance for the Pakistan military.
Q: The Pakistanis complain that dictatorship and Islamic radicalisation were actually gifted to them by the United States. What has compelled the US to support military rulers in Pakistan?
A: The US has needed Pakistan for strategic purposes. Our policies have done as much harm to Pakistan as they have helped the country. We could have supported them but put more pressure to liberalise and democratise the society. The Bush administration made a strategic mistake by supporting Pervez Musharraf and excluding the other politicians. We should have supported Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif. The US did support a deal between Musharraf and Bhutto but excluded Sharif. We should have come out and said publicly that we support all the legitimate politicians in Pakistan.
Q: Do you think the Pakistan army can ever overcome its obsession with India? How can the US help both the countries resolve this conflict?
A: I am writing a book about the India-Pakistan rivalry and calling it the “hundred-year old war”. My prediction is that the India-Pakistan conflict, which includes Kashmir besides many other problems, will last for one hundred years or even more.
I am very pessimistic about a solution between the two countries. They should cooperate over trade, for instance. Kashmir will eventually find its way. The United States should have only a silent role which should be limited to providing ideas and suggestions as we often do in the Middle East peace process.
Q: Does Osama bin Laden’s killing formally end the war on terror?
A: I don’t know if it was a murder or not but maybe it was an extrajudicial killing. Yet, it does not bring the war on terror to an end. Al Qaeda is a large global movement and it will continue to operate. It has diminished not only in terms of its organisational capability but also in terms of its symbolism. There will be major terrorist attacks on Pakistan, United States, India and other countries.
The notion of having a global Khalifat, where the whole world is united under one Khalifa is fanciful. That was not popular in Pakistan some years back. The anti-Americanism popular in Pakistan is based on the misunderstanding of American policies and some of the things that we have done in the past.
Q: Is it anti-Americanism or anti-Indianism that motivates radical elements in the Pakistan army?
A: I don’t have evidence of Pakistan army as radical in the extreme sense. However, it has become more anti-American. Some sections of the army are more anti-American than they are anti-India. The obsession with India, on the other hand, is weakening Pakistan rather than strengthening it. Pakistan has a huge list of reforms that it should have made.
In a talk at Quetta’s Staff College, I said Pakistan should take a lesson from South Korea and Japan which had their own way of taking revenge through economic productivity. Pakistan should struggle to beat India in the software industry, modern agriculture and exports.
Pakistan has had natural advantages over India in many areas but it has failed to capitalise on those advantages. I do not know if it is too late to reverse that process but if Pakistan continues to make India the center of its foreign policy, the country will go nowhere.
Q: There is a lot of resentment inside Pakistan over the drone strikes which many view as a violation of the country’s sovereignty. Can anti-Americanism subside if these attacks stop?
A: We know from the WikiLeaks that the Pakistanis themselves are helping us with the targets. It’s astonishing that the Pakistan government has not said this publicly. The government is too much of a coward to openly admit that some of the drone strikes have killed the enemies of Pakistan. If the Pakistani army and police had taken action against the terrorists, the drone strikes would probably not take place. Every state in the world has an obligation not to allow its territory to be used for terrorist attacks on other states. Pakistan has allowed groups to operate from its territory to launch attacks against the US, Afghanistan and of course India.
Q: How serious is the crisis in Pakistan and how can the world help Pakistan overcome this?
A: There are two things requiring attention: The State of Pakistan, which is mostly bureaucratic, and the idea of Pakistan. The United States can help the State of Pakistan in many ways by developing its organisational and budgetary procedures but we can’t do much about the idea of Pakistan. Pakistanis themselves have to discuss and debate what it means to be a Pakistani. If being anti-India is being a Pakistani then you are taking the crisis deeper but if you are looking for a modern Islamic state that rest of the world should look upon then that is a different definition of Pakistan.
Q: Do you think the Pakistan army will eventually move with another coup?
A: I don’t see a coup coming in Pakistan. There is this joke in America that when Obama got elected, some newspapers wrote: “Black man gets worst job in the US”. Who wants to be the president of Pakistan? Zardari is doing a mediocre job. I doubt if General Kayani can do a better job as the president. Pakistan is currently pressed and embarrassed with many issues. Another military coup will simply make things worse for that country.
Q: How do you predict the scenario once the US withdraws from Afghanistan?
A: The US will stay in Afghanistan to a limited degree to make sure that al Qaeda does not show up again. A significant development program is going on in Afghanistan which is more effective than our development work in Pakistan. There is no economic and strategic interest for the US in Afghanistan. It is important because it is having a contaminating effect on Pakistan.
Q: How serious is the tug of war between Pakistan and India to gain political and economic influence in Afghanistan?
A: The good news I have heard is that both the countries are going to talk about Afghanistan. If both the countries can work on an agreement as to what role they should play in Afghanistan to help the Afghan people then that will be a role model for the United States and Iran. The four countries — United States, Pakistan, Iran and India — are critical for the future of Afghanistan. They should agree to have a non-aligned democratic, but certainly not a radicalised, Afghanistan. I am optimistic that the Indians and Pakistanis will work together in Afghanistan.
Q: The right-wing opposition leaders are suggesting that Pakistan should stop getting aid from the United States. Is that going to help Pakistan attain more prosperity and self-reliance?
A: Pakistan should develop its own strategy to develop its industry and agriculture. It has to work out with India on the agreements over Indus waters and also work among its provinces. I want to see a business-like transactional relationship between the United States and Pakistan. The Pakistanis should tell the US what and why they need assistance in certain areas. Once we commit our aid, the US should work as if we are under a contract and if the Pakistanis perform effectively, we should provide them further aid on time.
Malik Siraj Akbar, a Hubert H. Humphrey Fellow based in Washington DC, is a visiting journalist at the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) of the Center for Public Integrity (CPI).
‘Pak army more anti-American than radical’ By Malik Siraj Akbar
Pakistanis react with revulsion and anger over journo's death
Dr. Stephen Philip Cohen, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, Washington DC, is a respected authority on the Pakistani army and the country’s politics. His book The Pakistan Army was published in 1998 and was translated into Urdu and Chinese. In 2004, he published another book The Idea of Pakistan. In an exclusive interview with Dawn.com, Dr. Cohen speaks about the Pakistan-US relationship and the future of South Asia after the Osama bin Laden crisis.
Q: Who do the Americans hold responsible for harbouring Osama bin Laden: The Pakistani civilian government or the army?
A: The US military respects the Pakistan army for its professionalism but they are angry with the Pakistani military for playing both sides against the middle. They are aware that if you’re an American soldier and the Afghan Taliban who are shooting at you are actually the ones being supported and trained in Pakistan. So, there is real anger with the Pakistan army over this double game. I can understand why they are playing this double game as the Taliban are an asset for Pakistan but the Americans do not like this. There is also deep resentment over some of the policies the army has imposed on the civilian government.
Q: How old is the history of collaboration in the Pakistan army with the Islamic radicals?
A: It dates back to the Bangladesh separatist movement when the army recruited people for al Badar and its death squads. It became more systematic during Zia’s government both in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Now, it is a full-fledged strategic alliance for the Pakistan military.
Q: The Pakistanis complain that dictatorship and Islamic radicalisation were actually gifted to them by the United States. What has compelled the US to support military rulers in Pakistan?
A: The US has needed Pakistan for strategic purposes. Our policies have done as much harm to Pakistan as they have helped the country. We could have supported them but put more pressure to liberalise and democratise the society. The Bush administration made a strategic mistake by supporting Pervez Musharraf and excluding the other politicians. We should have supported Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif. The US did support a deal between Musharraf and Bhutto but excluded Sharif. We should have come out and said publicly that we support all the legitimate politicians in Pakistan.
Q: Do you think the Pakistan army can ever overcome its obsession with India? How can the US help both the countries resolve this conflict?
A: I am writing a book about the India-Pakistan rivalry and calling it the “hundred-year old war”. My prediction is that the India-Pakistan conflict, which includes Kashmir besides many other problems, will last for one hundred years or even more.
I am very pessimistic about a solution between the two countries. They should cooperate over trade, for instance. Kashmir will eventually find its way. The United States should have only a silent role which should be limited to providing ideas and suggestions as we often do in the Middle East peace process.
Q: Does Osama bin Laden’s killing formally end the war on terror?
A: I don’t know if it was a murder or not but maybe it was an extrajudicial killing. Yet, it does not bring the war on terror to an end. Al Qaeda is a large global movement and it will continue to operate. It has diminished not only in terms of its organisational capability but also in terms of its symbolism. There will be major terrorist attacks on Pakistan, United States, India and other countries.
The notion of having a global Khalifat, where the whole world is united under one Khalifa is fanciful. That was not popular in Pakistan some years back. The anti-Americanism popular in Pakistan is based on the misunderstanding of American policies and some of the things that we have done in the past.
Q: Is it anti-Americanism or anti-Indianism that motivates radical elements in the Pakistan army?
A: I don’t have evidence of Pakistan army as radical in the extreme sense. However, it has become more anti-American. Some sections of the army are more anti-American than they are anti-India. The obsession with India, on the other hand, is weakening Pakistan rather than strengthening it. Pakistan has a huge list of reforms that it should have made.
In a talk at Quetta’s Staff College, I said Pakistan should take a lesson from South Korea and Japan which had their own way of taking revenge through economic productivity. Pakistan should struggle to beat India in the software industry, modern agriculture and exports.
Pakistan has had natural advantages over India in many areas but it has failed to capitalise on those advantages. I do not know if it is too late to reverse that process but if Pakistan continues to make India the center of its foreign policy, the country will go nowhere.
Q: There is a lot of resentment inside Pakistan over the drone strikes which many view as a violation of the country’s sovereignty. Can anti-Americanism subside if these attacks stop?
A: We know from the WikiLeaks that the Pakistanis themselves are helping us with the targets. It’s astonishing that the Pakistan government has not said this publicly. The government is too much of a coward to openly admit that some of the drone strikes have killed the enemies of Pakistan. If the Pakistani army and police had taken action against the terrorists, the drone strikes would probably not take place. Every state in the world has an obligation not to allow its territory to be used for terrorist attacks on other states. Pakistan has allowed groups to operate from its territory to launch attacks against the US, Afghanistan and of course India.
Q: How serious is the crisis in Pakistan and how can the world help Pakistan overcome this?
A: There are two things requiring attention: The State of Pakistan, which is mostly bureaucratic, and the idea of Pakistan. The United States can help the State of Pakistan in many ways by developing its organisational and budgetary procedures but we can’t do much about the idea of Pakistan. Pakistanis themselves have to discuss and debate what it means to be a Pakistani. If being anti-India is being a Pakistani then you are taking the crisis deeper but if you are looking for a modern Islamic state that rest of the world should look upon then that is a different definition of Pakistan.
Q: Do you think the Pakistan army will eventually move with another coup?
A: I don’t see a coup coming in Pakistan. There is this joke in America that when Obama got elected, some newspapers wrote: “Black man gets worst job in the US”. Who wants to be the president of Pakistan? Zardari is doing a mediocre job. I doubt if General Kayani can do a better job as the president. Pakistan is currently pressed and embarrassed with many issues. Another military coup will simply make things worse for that country.
Q: How do you predict the scenario once the US withdraws from Afghanistan?
A: The US will stay in Afghanistan to a limited degree to make sure that al Qaeda does not show up again. A significant development program is going on in Afghanistan which is more effective than our development work in Pakistan. There is no economic and strategic interest for the US in Afghanistan. It is important because it is having a contaminating effect on Pakistan.
Q: How serious is the tug of war between Pakistan and India to gain political and economic influence in Afghanistan?
A: The good news I have heard is that both the countries are going to talk about Afghanistan. If both the countries can work on an agreement as to what role they should play in Afghanistan to help the Afghan people then that will be a role model for the United States and Iran. The four countries — United States, Pakistan, Iran and India — are critical for the future of Afghanistan. They should agree to have a non-aligned democratic, but certainly not a radicalised, Afghanistan. I am optimistic that the Indians and Pakistanis will work together in Afghanistan.
Q: The right-wing opposition leaders are suggesting that Pakistan should stop getting aid from the United States. Is that going to help Pakistan attain more prosperity and self-reliance?
A: Pakistan should develop its own strategy to develop its industry and agriculture. It has to work out with India on the agreements over Indus waters and also work among its provinces. I want to see a business-like transactional relationship between the United States and Pakistan. The Pakistanis should tell the US what and why they need assistance in certain areas. Once we commit our aid, the US should work as if we are under a contract and if the Pakistanis perform effectively, we should provide them further aid on time.
Malik Siraj Akbar, a Hubert H. Humphrey Fellow based in Washington DC, is a visiting journalist at the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) of the Center for Public Integrity (CPI).
‘Pak army more anti-American than radical’ By Malik Siraj Akbar
Pakistanis react with revulsion and anger over journo's death
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)